

PRINCELY VIRTUES
IN THE MIDDLE AGES

DISPUTATIO

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PRINCELY VIRTUES
IN THE MIDDLE AGES
1200–1500

Edited by

István P. Bejczy and Cary J. Nederman



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Uxoribus emeritis nostris carissimis, pro otio et libertate.

—Cary & István

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	ix
List of Abbreviations	xi
Introduction	1
CARY J. NEDERMAN AND ISTVÁN P. BEJCZY	
The Concept of Political Virtue in the Thirteenth Century	9
ISTVÁN P. BEJCZY	
<i>Rex strenuus valde litteratus</i> : Strength and Wisdom as Royal Virtues in Medieval Spain (1085–1284)	33
MANUEL ALEJANDRO RODRÍGUEZ DE LA PEÑA	
Princely Virtues or Virtues for Princes?	51
William Peraldus and his <i>De eruditione principum</i>	
MICHIEL VERWEIJ	
Virtue and the City: The Virtues of the Ruler and the Citizen in the Medieval Reception of Aristotle's <i>Politics</i>	73
MARCO TOSTE	
Royal Misdemeanour: Princely Virtues and Criticism of the Ruler in Medieval Castile (Juan Gil de Zamora and Álvaro Pelayo)	99
FRANK TANG	
Justice, Temptation, and the Limits of Princely Virtue in Dante's Conception of the Monarch	123
MARY ELIZABETH SULLIVAN	

Virtues and Exempla in John of Wales and Jacobus de Cessolis PAMELA KALNING (translated by ERIC KUCHLE)	139
The Opposite of Love: Royal Virtue, Economic Prosperity, and Popular Discontent in Fourteenth-Century Political Thought CARY J. NEDERMAN	177
<i>Clemens princeps: Clementia</i> as a Princely Virtue in Michael of Prague's <i>De regimine principum</i> MICHAEL HOHLSTEIN	201
Jean Gerson on Virtues and Princely Education YELENA MAZOUR-MATUSEVICH AND ISTVÁN P. BEJCZY	219
Princely Virtues in <i>De felici progressu</i> of Michele Savonarola, Court Physician of the House of Este GABRIELLA ZUCCOLIN	237
Piety, Wisdom, and Temperance in Fifteenth-Century Germany: A Comparison of Vernacular and Latin Mirrors for Princes GEORG A. STRACK	259
Bibliography	281
Index of Manuscripts	307
Index of Names and Anonymous Works	309
List of Contributors	315

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The idea that the goodness of political rule depends on the personal goodness of the ruler was commonplace in medieval political thought. As personal goodness was usually conceived in terms of virtue, the virtues became instruments in the Middle Ages of morally defining political power. In order to study this phenomenon, a conference on Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200–1500 was convened at Nijmegen, The Netherlands, on 8 and 9 October 2004. The conference was organized by István Bejczy, director of the research programme ‘A Genealogy of Morals: The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages’, with generous subventions from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW).

The present volume extends the original vision of the conference, incorporating a number of essays that were not presented there. The editors wish to thank other participants in the conference whose papers are not, however, included here: Janet Coleman, Dirk-Jan Dekker, Bettina Koch, Oliver Plessow, Thomas Renna, and Vasileios Syros. In addition, Cary Nederman wishes to thank Mary Elizabeth Sullivan of Texas A&M University for her editorial assistance in formatting and proofreading the chapters and Karen L. Bollermann of Arizona State University for her comments and useful suggestions concerning the introduction.

ABBREVIATIONS

CCSL	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954–)
CCCM	Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis (Turnhout: Brepols, 1983–)
CSEL	Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum (Vienna: Tempsky, 1866–)
PL	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus [...]</i> <i>Series Latina</i> , ed. by Jacques-Paul Migne, 221 vols (Paris: Migne, 1844–64)

INTRODUCTION

Cary J. Nederman and István P. Bejczy

Much like democracy in the contemporary occidental world, the intrinsic superiority of government by princes went nearly unrivalled during the Latin Middle Ages. Of course, principality was never the only form of political regime, in either practice or theory, known and available to medieval people—urban communal self-government and representative assemblies were part and parcel of European political experience from the early Middle Ages onward. Moreover, considerable dispute occurred about the extent and limits of princely power, as well as the mechanisms by which monarchic office ought to be conferred (for instance, heredity versus election). Yet across medieval Europe — north to south, west to east — the rule of princes was usually conceded to be both a naturally ordained and a divinely authorized system of government.

The meaning and application of the very term *prince* perhaps require comment. *Princeps* was probably the most generic word in general usage in Latin during the Middle Ages to describe the rule of a single person (usually a man, although it could be extended even to queens and other female rulers). It could apply to an array of lords, stretching from local seigneurs all the way to the ‘universal’ Holy Roman Emperor. In contrast to terms such as *rex* (king), *monarchus* (monarch), and *imperator* (emperor), all of which conveyed more specific types of one-person rule, *princeps* was usually deployed in order to capture the common elements shared by all such regimes. Furthermore, the word *prince* could be employed to denote a pope or other high ecclesiastical official as well as purely secular rulers. In sum, *princeps* had a highly elastic connotation.

In turn, the authority of princes of all sorts rested for medieval people largely upon the personal qualities that they manifested in the conduct of their government as well as in their private behaviour. That is, princes enjoyed a claim on the obedience, respect, and love of their subjects only to the extent that they

demonstrated spiritual and moral goodness and hence exercised forms of virtue. But to assert that virtue was necessary for legitimate rule only begged a deeper and more complex set of questions concerning the standards to be employed in defining the specific moral qualities necessary for a prince. Did the prince need to possess all of the cardinal virtues (temperance, courage, justice, wisdom) as well as key Christian virtues (faith, hope, charity, humility)? Or were some of these more necessary for the prince to possess than others? Should the prince employ the virtues in the same way as his subjects or in some particular, 'princely' manner? Were there other virtues or qualities (for example, clemency or peacefulness) specifically required for princely rule, and were others less relevant, such as the 'monastic' virtues of obedience, chastity, and poverty? It is too often forgotten that medieval life was beset by multiple, diverse, and sometimes conflicting visions of the good life and thus of the nature and ordering of the virtues, as Alasdair MacIntyre and others have pointed out.¹ To say that the prince must be virtuous only opened the door to a wide-ranging debate about the nature and practice of the virtues appropriate to the ruler.

Part of the problem stems from the vast diversity of sources available to medieval political authors. The virtues ascribed to the prince might originate from various ancient philosophical writings (for instance, Stoic, Platonic, and Aristotelian) that circulated during the Middle Ages. Moreover, Christian moral theology espoused by patristic, monastic, and scholastic writers articulated alternative systems of moral and spiritual virtue. The tension between 'secular' or 'philosophical' perspectives on virtue and Christian moral thought suffused many of the medieval texts that addressed the virtues of the prince. Another issue open to dispute was the relationship between the practicalities of everyday governance and the higher-order demands of ethical and religious goodness. Machiavelli's *Principe* was not the first tract to reflect upon the sometimes cross-cutting requirements of effective rule and moral rectitude.² In addition, contextual factors influenced directly the diversity of perspectives on princely virtue. A large number of writings on the topic were couched in the genre of the *speculum principum*

¹ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1981), p. 165. See also Constantin Fasolt, *Council and Hierarchy: The Political Thought of William Durant the Younger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 103, and Cary J. Nederman, *Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of Religious Toleration, c.1100–c.1550* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2000), pp. 3–4.

² A useful survey is provided by Frank Tang, 'Machiavelli's Image of the Ruler: *Il Principe* and the Tradition of the Mirror for Princes', *Yearbook of European Studies*, 8 (1995), 187–200.

(mirror of princes). These were often composed within the circumstances of a particular court and dedicated to a single historical king or prince. As a consequence, the courtly mirrors commonly analyzed and evaluated the virtues in direct relation to the perceived strengths and weaknesses of specific rulers. Other authors conceived of monarchical rule in more abstract terms, drawing overtly on sources that were mainly studied in the university setting, such as Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. Even before the recovery of the Aristotelian corpus in the middle of the thirteenth century, there was considerable academic debate about the so-called 'political' virtues. One should not assume, however, that such scholastic discussion lacked a practical dimension or influence among rulers and their counselors. As Steven Williams has documented, the *De regimine principum* by Giles of Rome, a Paris-educated academic, was 'the most popular' of the medieval writings of instruction and advice to princes about how to be virtuous and govern well, and indeed seems to have been read (either in Latin or in vernacular translation) by a number of eminent rulers throughout Europe.³ The fact that the principal source for Giles's tract was the moral and political teaching of Aristotle as transmitted by the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas does not seem to have diminished the perception of its utility or practicality.

Although there exists a large body of scholarly literature on medieval political thought, the meaning and function of the virtues in a political context is a theme which has thus far suffered from scholarly neglect. The main reason seems to be a widespread perception that the works of princely education and advice produced during the Middle Ages were highly standardized and mundane exercises in political moralizing — rigidly conventional at best and simply bombastic at worst. As Bernard Guenée complained a generation ago, scholars 'have been discouraged from the outset by works thought to be stereotyped and conventional, with no visible relation to concrete political life'.⁴ Despite the efforts of Guenée and a few others to dispel this image, a cursory survey of the

³ Steven J. Williams, 'Giving Advice and Taking It: The Reception by Rulers of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Secretum Secretorum* as a *Speculum Principis*', in *Consilium: Teorie e pratiche del consigliare nella cultura medievale*, ed. by Carla Casagrande, Chiara Crisciana, and Silvana Vecchio (Florence: Sismel, 2004), pp. 139–80 (pp. 154–55).

⁴ Bernard Guenée, *States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe*, trans. by Juliet Vale (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p. 71 (first publ. as *L'Occident aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles: Les États* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1971)).

main historical and philosophical scholarship on medieval political thought, even when concerned with its ethical dimension, suggests that little has changed.⁵

The present volume concentrates on the virtues as instruments in the moral definition of political power in the later Middle Ages, both in academic writing and in literature of instruction to princes about the acquisition and application of virtue. Our focus is on the rule and behaviour of those in secular regimes governed by a single person. The chapters consider many relatively unknown and even unedited medieval texts in order to illustrate the range and diversity of views about the personal qualities that princes require in order to govern well. The contributors' concentration on late-medieval Latin (occasionally in conjunction with vernacular) writings that discuss the virtues from a political angle guarantees a unity of purpose throughout the volume. The writings under discussion are not bound to national or linguistic areas and often influenced one another. Yet the coverage of the theme of princely virtue is pan-European in scope. The contributions are spread geographically, including appraisal of texts of French, German, English, Italian, and Spanish origin. Moreover, the volume has a broad chronological sweep, devoting equal and balanced attention to the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries.

István P. Bejczy opens the volume with a survey of the transformation of the idea of 'political virtue' in academic discourse before and after the reception of Aristotle's major moral and political works into Latin Europe. In brief compass, he demonstrates that the concept of 'political virtue' enjoyed a considerable history before the translation of Aristotle, and he demonstrates how the pre-existing discussion of the topic both shaped later scholastic teachings and was also profoundly altered by the rediscovery of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

The impression of the complexity of the role played by Aristotle's thought in delineating princely virtue is supported by the contributions of Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña, Michiel Verweij, and Frank Tang. Rodríguez de la Peña considers the reflections on the virtues found in a number of royal chronicles primarily from Castile and León dated between the late eleventh and the late thirteenth centuries. He documents how the personal merit of strength was consistently foregrounded throughout the period to suit the purposes of both propaganda and princely instruction. By contrast, the more 'intellectual' virtue of

⁵ For example, see the almost total disregard of the mirror of princes literature in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c.350–c.1450*, ed. by James H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

wisdom emerged as a quality worthy of emulation and practice only later on, perhaps as a function of the growing influence of scholastic erudition.

Verweij draws our attention to a tract on the education of the prince composed by the Dominican William Peraldus, a rough contemporary of Thomas Aquinas. Probably written just as the Latin translation of Aristotle's *Politics* by William of Moerbeke began to circulate, it shows no apparent debt to Aristotelian categories. Rather, Peraldus draws upon a customary classification of the virtues drawn from theological debate in order to analyze the office of the prince. This stems from the centrality for Peraldus of the welfare of the Christian community as the key issue in the analysis of secular government.

Tang returns us to the Castilian kingdom and directs our focus to the mirror of princes treatises composed by Juan Gil de Zamora in the late thirteenth century and Álvaro Pelayo in the mid-fourteenth century. While these authors apparently evince some familiarity with the classical conception of the virtues and the new Aristotelian learning, Tang demonstrates that their purposes in writing were of an immediate and critical nature. He argues, indeed, that the genre of princely mirrors, even when it seems to remain within fairly conventional boundaries, can be approached as political commentary on contemporary personages and events.

Even when the effects of Aristotelian erudition are more clearly on display, their application led not to conformity of thought about princely virtues but to deep dispute, as the chapters by Marco Toste and Mary Elizabeth Sullivan reveal. Toste considers the earliest commentary literature on the *Politics* dating to the late thirteenth century, especially works by Albert the Great, Peter of Auvergne, and the Anonymous of Milan. Focusing on the reception of the Aristotelian theory of the political virtues proper to the citizen and to the ruler, Toste finds a political theory in which prudence can have a certain autonomy with regard to the moral virtues, which leads to an autonomy of politics with regard to ethics. In the case of the princely virtues, this means that the king is not by definition and necessarily a virtuous man.

Sullivan addresses the political thought of Dante Alighieri, who has been widely upheld as a virtuoso of medieval political Aristotelianism. She discovers, however, that Dante's famous ideal of the monarch — in effect, the universal world emperor — bears little mark of Aristotle's influence, especially in connection with the virtue of justice. Dante seems sufficiently distrustful of the capacity of rulers to act virtuously that he replaces a moral conception of just rule with structural mechanisms that eliminate any temptation a prince might have to indulge in tyrannical conduct.

Disagreements about princely virtue do not become any more settled once Aristotelian philosophy has become an accepted and uncontroversial feature of the medieval intellectual landscape. On the one hand, Aristotle's insights sometimes are entirely overlooked by authors discussing the qualities of the prince, a point illustrated by Pamela Kalning and Cary Nederman. Kalning examines the systematization of the princely virtues contained in Jacobus de Cessolis's *Liber de ludo scaccorum*, an analysis of the characteristics of different social orders organized around the principles of the game of chess. Her essay traces an important source for the virtues of the ruler in this fourteenth-century treatise to a thirteenth-century work on the virtues of ancient princes and philosophers compiled by John of Wales. Jacobus thus relies on an essentially non-Aristotelian conception of the princely virtues even though, one may assume, Aristotle's texts would have been accessible to him.

Nederman looks at two mid-fourteenth-century mirrors, one written in Latin, the other in French, that adopt a decidedly worldly perspective on the virtues, especially the reciprocal bond of *caritas* that should exist between a king and his subjects. The first of these tracts, an advice book in two recensions addressed to King Edward III composed by William of Pagula, emphasizes the consequences of royal misrule for the economic condition of the English peasantry and threatens the prince with the withdrawal of popular 'love'. The second treatise, an anonymous vernacular work, borrows nominally upon the tripartite structure of Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum* but concentrates on economic themes similar to the concerns evinced by William of Pagula. Both authors assimilate royal virtue quite directly to the function of economic stewardship and the promotion of material well-being of subjects.

On the other hand, the final four chapters in this volume address the perpetuation of advice literature into the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as a synthesis of Aristotelian doctrines (often filtered through Giles of Rome) and alternative sources that nevertheless teaches innovative lessons. Michael Hohlstein introduces us to Michael of Prague's little-known yet unique synthesis of classical and medieval sources for the virtues, stated in a treatise *De regimine principum* that contains an original treatment of 'clemency' as a necessary quality for the prince to possess. Explicitly admitting the novelty of his own classification of the virtues, Michael of Prague made a conscious decision to dispense with the position of Aristotle and his medieval adherents. Certainly, such a tactic suggests an independence of mind and a confidence in his own judgement that many medieval political authors were disinclined to express overtly.

Jean Gerson is one of the most important theologians and philosophers of the late Middle Ages, but his remarks about the education of rulers have been almost entirely overlooked. István P. Bejczy and Yelena Mazour-Matusevich rectify this lacuna in their chapter focusing on Gerson's two letters of instruction addressed to teachers within the French royal house. While Gerson employed some of his favorite political themes of an Aristotelian provenance, he mixed into his advice an eclectic array of sources that demonstrated his own wide learning. He emphasized, in particular, elements of Christian morality that may not have sat easily with classical conceptions of the virtues.

Gabriella Zuccolin appraises the partially unedited and unknown political writings of Michele Savonarola, a physician whose main claim to fame (other than as grandfather of the Florentine reformer Girolamo Savonarola) was his medical writings. While borrowing heavily upon the scheme of the virtues employed by Giles of Rome, Michele Savonarola produced an original synthesis directed to the specific circumstances confronted by the House of Este in the fifteenth century. Zuccolin charts how the classification of the virtues adopted by Savonarola reflects the personalities of the aspiring dynasts of the leading family while also integrating elements of early Italian humanism.

Finally, Georg Strack surveys the state of princely advice literature written in fifteenth-century Germany, devoting special attention to the relationship between Latin and vernacular texts. Strack highlights how the agenda of religious reform shaped and inspired many of the mirrors produced during this time. Yet he also reveals how princely virtues such as wisdom differed subtly depending upon whether they were articulated by Latin authors (for example, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, the future Pope Pius II) or by writers working in the German language. The latter tended to place special emphasis on piety and matters of confession, an intriguing emphasis on the verge of the Protestant Reformation. The former, by contrast, were influenced by humanistic education and were inclined to look to classical antiquity, and especially to the Romans, for an appropriate standard of princely conduct.

Taken as a whole, the chapters in this volume confirm the thesis that medieval views about princely virtue, and thus the advice and instruction given to rulers, were anything but standardized, stereotyped, and rigidly monolithic. On the contrary, the rich array of classical and Christian sources about the nature of virtue available to medieval thinkers presaged the expression of a wide range of positions about how the good ruler ought to conduct himself in his office. While some sources (such as Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum*) enjoyed a vast and appreciative readership, seldom do they seem to have been parroted slavishly.

Rather, even the best-known and most influential conceptions of princely virtue were adapted to current circumstances, modified, and even explicitly criticized when they did not suit the needs of their audience. This realization of the diversity of approaches to the princely virtues during the late Middle Ages ought to provide sufficient evidence of the need for much more careful and detailed research into the large body of writings, many of them languishing in archives, that have been overlooked and dismissed by past generations of scholars.

THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL VIRTUE IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

István P. Bejczy

The connection of virtues with politics is a common phenomenon in late-medieval moral thought, but perhaps even more so in classical Greek and Roman philosophy. The cardinal virtues take their origin in ancient political thought — they first occur in Plato's *Republic* — and retain a political connotation, notably in Roman Stoicism. Moreover, Aristotle's theory of the virtues in the *Nicomachean Ethics* centres around attitudes to be taken in civil and political life, as medieval readers realized.¹ Actually, the medieval history of the virtues partly consists in their depoliticization: next to, or even instead of, civil attitudes, the virtues became instruments of salvation. However, it is in the later Middle Ages that a concept of *virtus politica* came into development. It is my aim to analyse and document this development with particular concentration on the thirteenth century. As the concept of *virtus politica* was chiefly employed in academic theology, most of my examples come from theological sources; whenever possible, I will refer to other genres as well.

It is important to note that the term *virtus politica* is absent from Latin classical and patristic sources except for Macrobius's commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*, which contains a summary of Plotinus's doctrine of the virtues. Plotinus identified political virtue as a first, propaedeutic stage of moral

¹ See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.161.1 ad 5, in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882–), x, 293: Aristotle discussed the virtues 'secundum quod ordinantur ad vitam civilem'; Roger Bacon, *Moralis philosophia* (= *Opus maius*, VII) 1 Proem., ed. by Ferdinand Delorme and Eugenio Massa (Zürich: Thesaurus mundi, 1953), pp. 5–6: 'Hec vero scientia moralis vocatur ab Aristotele et aliis civilis scientia, quia iura civium et civitatum demonstrat.'

development, to be followed by higher stages of contemplating the truth.² Apart from Macrobius, Roman authors never adopted the term *virtus politica*; only the term *virtus civilis* occurs in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* (as a specific Platonic concept),³ in the late-ancient *Historia augusta*, and in the writings of Augustine.⁴ Neither do the terms *virtus politica* and *virtus civilis* appear in the *Aristoteles Latinus*, although *prudencia politica* is discussed in the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The medieval conceptualization of *virtus politica*, then, rests on the reception of Macrobius's *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*. Many authors expressly acknowledged their dependence on Macrobius or quoted him so extensively — with his typical fourfold division of the cardinal virtues into *virtutes politicae*, *virtutes purgatoriae*, *virtutes purgati animi*, and *virtutes exemplares* — that their use of Macrobius becomes evident for the reader.

Although the reception of Macrobius's work was fairly extensive from an early date,⁵ references to his conception of political virtues are rare before the twelfth century. I have found such references only in the work of Sedulius Scottus in the

² See Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, I.viii.5–11, ed. by Jacobus Willis, 2nd edn (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970), pp. 37–39. According to Giovanni Catapano, 'Alle origini della dottrina dei gradi di virtù: Il trattato 19 di Plotino (enn. I 2)', *Medioevo*, 31 (2006), 9–28, Macrobius followed in fact Porphyry's adaptation of Plotinus's doctrine. Plotinus recognized only two sorts of virtues, political and contemplative; the distinction between *virtutes purgatoriae* and *virtutes purgati animi* is not his, while he denied, moreover, that the models of virtue in the divine mind (*virtutes exemplares* according to Macrobius) were themselves virtues.

³ See Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, I.xi.17, ed. by Ludwig Radermacher, 2 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907–35), I, 67.

⁴ See Trebellius Pollo (?), *Historia Augusta*, 24: *Triginta tyranni*, xix.1 (fifth century?), ed. by Ernestus Hohl, in *Scriptores historiae augustae*, 2 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1927), II, 119; Augustine, *Contra academicos*, III.xvii.37, ed. by William M. Green (CCSL, 29, p. 57, with a reference to Plato). Augustine's appreciation of 'civil virtues' wavered; in *Ep.* 138.3, ed. by Alois Goldbacher (CSEL, 44, p. 144), he valued them as a step toward real virtue; in *Contra Iulianum*, 4 (PL, XLIV, col. 751), he dismissed them as evil. The only other mention of *virtus civilis* in patristic literature I have been able to find is Pseudo-Augustine, *Liber sententiarum XXI* (PL, XL, col. 732; fifth century?).

⁵ For a survey up to 1200, see Irene Caiazzo, *Lectures médiévales de Macrobie: Les Glosae Colonienses super Macrobius* (Paris: Vrin, 2002), pp. 27–85; for additional sources, see below. For the influence of Macrobius's theory of the virtues in the thirteenth century, see also Huub van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne de la vertu: Essai sur la genèse d'un article de la Somme théologique de Saint Thomas* (Fribourg: Studia friburgensis, 1926), especially pp. 123–98. Rather disappointing is Albrecht Hütig, *Macrobius im Mittelalter: Ein Beitrag zur Rezeptionsgeschichte der 'Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis'* (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 1990).

ninth century and Manegold of Lautenbach in the eleventh.⁶ Even an anonymous paraphrase of Macrobius's exposition on the virtues composed around 1000 A.D. omits the term *virtus politica*.⁷ In early-medieval texts, the factual connection of virtues with politics was obviously far from negligible,⁸ but the concept of political virtue did not play any accompanying role.

In the twelfth century, however, Macrobius's work was commented upon by a number of scholars, of whom William of Conches (c. 1090–c. 1155) was the most important. His still unedited glosses contain a number of remarkable statements on the subject of political virtues in particular.⁹ Moreover, Macrobius's definitions of the virtues were quoted in an even wider range of sources than medievalists have thus far acknowledged. Apart from theology and philosophy, we can point to hagiography. Several twelfth-century hagiographers included the political virtues as defined by Macrobius among the qualities of their saints, sometimes proposing a spiritualized interpretation of these virtues and presenting them as divine gifts.¹⁰

Thanks to the lively reception of Macrobius's commentary, his fourfold division of the virtues became common knowledge in the course of the century.

⁶ Sedulius Scottus, *Collectaneum miscellaneum*, 46, ed. by Dean Simpson (CCCM, 67, pp. 220–26); Manegold of Lautenbach, *Contra Wolfelmum*, 22, ed. by Wilfried Hartmann (Weimar: Böhlau, 1972), pp. 93–94. Rufinus, bishop of an unknown see in the late eleventh century, briefly referred to *iustitia politica* in *De bono pacis*, ii.8 (PL, CL, col. 1615A), without explaining the term.

⁷ See Hubert Silvestre, 'Une adaptation du commentaire de Macrobe sur le Songe de Scipion dans un manuscrit de Bruxelles', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 29 (1962), 93–101.

⁸ See Sibylle Mähl, *Quadruga virtutum: Die Kardinaltugenden in der Geistesgeschichte der Karolingerzeit* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1969); István P. Bejczy, 'Kings, Bishops and Political Ethics: Bruno of Segni on the Cardinal Virtues', *Mediaeval Studies*, 64 (2002), 267–84.

⁹ Whereas Macrobius connected the *virtutes politicae*, *purgatoriae*, and *purgati animi* to the first, second, and third ages of man, respectively, William, *Glosae super Macrobius*, on I.viii.8, ed. by Helen Rodnite Lemay (forthcoming; read by her kind permission), states that man in his first age does not possess virtues or vices; in his second age, man becomes a *homo politicus*, while the third age is devoted to the contemplative life. He thus implicitly merged *virtutes purgatoriae* and *virtutes purgati animi* into one category of 'philosophical' virtues standing over against the *virtutes politicae*. See also Caiazzo, *Lectures*, pp. 57–72.

¹⁰ See István P. Bejczy, 'Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie latine du moyen âge', *Analecta Bollandiana*, 122 (2004), 313–60 (Iotsaldus of Cluny, *Vita Odilonis*; Gaufridus Grossus, *Vita Bernardi de Tironio*). See also Thiofrid of Echternach, *Flores epytaphii sanctorum*, ii.6, ed. by Michele C. Ferrari (CCCM, 133, p. 49).

Several edited and unedited texts refer to it in passing,¹¹ while Peter Abelard in his *Theologia christiana* insisted at length on the similarity of Macrobius's definitions to Christ's precepts.¹² Peter the Chanter and Pope Innocent III employed the expression *virtutes politicae* out of its Macrobian context, as a designation of the cardinal virtues,¹³ actually upsetting Macrobius's system according to which the cardinal virtues appear not only as political but also as contemplative virtues.

In two fields in particular, *virtus politica* became an operational concept. The first is civil law. The Bolognese glossator Martin Gosia (d. 1158/66) inserted Macrobius's exposition on the fourfold division of the virtues in his *Exordium* on Justinian's *Institutiones*, explaining thereafter that justice as a legal concept should be understood as a merely political virtue.¹⁴ I have argued elsewhere that Martin thus vindicated the superiority of divinely inspired virtues over human law, leaving room for the possibility of disregarding the law on moral grounds.¹⁵ The other field is moral theology. Some early Porretan writings summarize Macrobius's division of the virtues without building an ethical system on it.¹⁶

¹¹ See Peter Abelard, *Collationes*, ed. by John Marenbon and Giovanni Orlandi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 122; Zacharias of Besançon, *In unum ex quatuor*, Praef. (PL, CLXXXVI, col. 24); *Florilegium morale Oxoniense*, ed. by Philippe Delhaye and Charles H. Talbot (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955), pt 1, pp. 87–89; anonymous text on the virtues, MS Vendôme, Bibliothèque municipale 148, fol. 75^v: 'Item aliam de uirtutibus idem philosophi faciunt diuisionem. Aiunt enim virtutes alie economice, alie politice, alie purgatorie, alie purgati animi.' The last text also appears in MS Bruges, Grootseminarie 406, fols. 128^r–29^v; see A. Partin, 'Un manuscrit du XII^e siècle de l'ancienne abbaye bénédictine d'Eename retrouvé (Bruges, Grand Séminaire, MS 406)', *Scriptorium*, 44 (1990), 79–91 (p. 87).

¹² Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana*, ii.64ff., ed. by Eloysius M. Buytaert (CCCM, 12, pp. 157ff.).

¹³ See Peter the Chanter, *Summa Abel*, MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 10633, fol. 133^v: 'Virtutes alie cardinales sive politice vel philosophice scilicet hee quatuor: prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia'; Lotharius of Segni (Pope Innocent III), *Sermones communes*, 1 and 5 (PL, CCXVII, cols 600A and 615B–C); Lotharius of Segni, *De missarum mysteriis*, i.63 (PL, CCXVII, col. 797D).

¹⁴ Martin Gosia, *Exordium Institutionum*, ed. by G. B. Palmieri, *Scripta anecdota glossatorum*, Bibliotheca iuridica medii aevi 1: Additiones, 2nd edn (Bologna: Gandolphi, 1914), pp. 4–5 (= 272–73 in another printing).

¹⁵ See István P. Bejczy, 'Law and Ethics: Twelfth-Century Jurists on the Virtue of Justice', *Viator*, 36 (2005), 197–216.

¹⁶ See William of Lucca (d. 1178), *Comentum in Tertiam ierarchiam Dionisii que est de diuinis nominibus*, i.6, ed. by Ferruccio Gastaldelli (Florence: Olschki, 1983), pp. 47–49; *Compendium logicae porretanum ex codice Oxoniensi collegii Corporis Christi 250: A Manual of Porretan Doctrine*

Around 1170, however, Alan of Lille changed medieval moral thought for good by recognizing two sorts of virtues: Catholic virtues, given by God to Christians alone, and political virtues, which non-Christians could acquire by natural means. Catholic virtues were directed to God in accordance with the teachings of the Church; political virtues either aimed at secular ends (in case of the gentiles) or ran counter to the teachings of the Church (in case of the Jews). However, grace could transform the political into Catholic virtues whenever honourable unbelievers converted to Christianity.¹⁷ Thus Alan devised a scheme which incorporated several characteristics of Macrobius's model: a distinction between basic, political virtues and superior, contemplative virtues; the idea of political virtue as a first step toward contemplative virtue; and the appearance of the same virtues on both, political and contemplative, levels. A major difference from Macrobius's model (apart from Alan's Christian conceptions) is that only the Catholic virtues resulted into salvation, whereas according to Macrobius the political virtues had a beatific effect, too.¹⁸

It is obvious that Alan's *virtutes politicae* do not bear a purely political character. All good habits of non-Christians are political virtues in his system, while Christians only dispose of Catholic virtues, even in political life. Still, Alan explained the name *virtutes politicae* by deriving it from the Greek *polis*, meaning *civitas* in Latin, as these virtues took their name *secundum usum ciuitatum*; he also took its origin from *polis* in the sense of 'multitude' (a corruption of the Greek *polus* = many) because many people appreciated such virtues.¹⁹ Alan's twelfth-century followers more explicitly linked the political virtues to public life. Some of them stated that the political virtues consisted in a permanent resolution to act in the interests of the state.²⁰ Accordingly, they introduced the

by a Pupil of Gilbert's, ed. by Sten Ebbesen, Karin M. Fredborg and Laure O. Nielsen, Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen âge grec et latin, 46 (Copenhagen: Jensen, 1983), p. 74.

¹⁷ Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis et de donis Spiritus sancti*, i.1 and 3, ed. by Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, 6 vols (Gembloux: Duculot; Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1942–60), VI, 45–92 (pp. 50 and 58); see also István P. Bejczy, 'The Problem of Natural Virtue', in *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, ed. by István P. Bejczy and Richard G. Newhauser (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 133–54. Ironically, Alan's system came closer to Plotinus's original twofold division of the virtues (see n. 2, above) than to Macrobius's fourfold distinction.

¹⁸ See Macrobius, *Commentarii*, I.viii.12, p. 39.

¹⁹ Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus*, I.1, p. 50.

²⁰ See especially Simon of Tournai, *Summa theologiae*, cited by Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 107; likewise Martinus, *Summa theologiae*, MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de

term *civil* to describe the range of action of the political virtues;²¹ one master Hubertus (c. 1194/1200) proposed the term *virtus civilis* as a synonym for *virtus politica*, as did some antedating, non-theological authors as well.²² Moreover, Simon of Tournai specified four ‘temporal’ ends for the political virtues: glory, dignity, power or majesty, and friendship, whereas the Catholic virtues had God as their only goal.²³ Finally, some theologians active around 1200 reinforced the propaedeutic character of the political virtues by stating, or suggesting, that the Catholic virtues developed from them even among Christians.²⁴ But all adhered

France, lat. 14556, II, fol. 325^{va}. Simon’s definition of the *officium* of political virtue as ‘congruus actus [...] secundum (mores et) instituta patrie’ was often repeated; see Martinus, *ibid.*; Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 114, n. 5 (Praepositinus of Cremona); Artur M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, 4 in 8 vols (Regensburg: Pustet, 1952–56), I.1, 172, n. 55; Richard Heinzmann, *Die Summe ‘Colligite Fragmenta’ des Magister Hubertus (Cln 28 799): Ein Beitrag zur theologischen Systembildung in der Scholastik* (Munich: Schöningh, 1974), p. 202, n. 123.

²¹ See Simon of Tournai, *Summa*, cited by Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 107: ‘officium est ciuile siue politicum a ciuili iure uel a ciuitate approbatum’; Martinus, *Summa*, fol. 325^{va}: ‘hoc officium est ciuile siue publicum a ciuili uel ciuitate appellatum’, while also their *finis* is ‘ciuilis, scilicet conseruatio uel confederatio rei publice’; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, I.1, 173, n. 55.

²² See Heinzmann, *Die Summe*, p. 202, n. 123. Antedating texts: Martin Gosia, *Exordium*, p. 4/272: ‘Prime [virtutes], id est civiles, politice vocantur’; anonymous glosses on Macrobius’s *Commentarii* (see Caiazzo, *Lectures*, pp. 77–82), MS Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale 226, fol. 73^v: ‘polis dicitur ciuitas inde politice id est ciuiles uocantur ille uirtutes quibus ciuitates reguntur’; anonymous text on the virtues, MS Vendôme, Bibliothèque municipale 148, fol. 75^v: ‘Politice quoque sunt iijor que politice, id est ciuiles dicuntur, quia per eas ciuium mores ciuiler disponuntur, ciuilia negocia iuste tractantur, ciuibus et hostibus competenter prouidentur.’

²³ Simon of Tournai, *Summa*, cited by Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 118, n. 1: ‘Sunt autem fines quatuor: gloria, dignitas, amplitudo, amicitia’; MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14886, fols. 34^{vb}–35^{va} continues: ‘Est autem gloria frequens de aliquo fama cum laude; ad hoc autem frequenter tendunt qui pollicitis uirtutibus uirtutibus [*lege* utuntur, IB] ut sibi conquirant frequenter famam cum laude. Dignitas alicuius alicuius honesta et cultu et honore et uerecundia digna auctoritas; qui et utuntur pollicitis uirtutibus, ad hoc quandoque finaliter reddunt ut conquirant sibi honestam auctoritatem cultu et honore et uerecundia dignam. Amplitudo est potencie aut maiestatis aut aliquarum copiarum magna habundancia; vsus quoque politicarum uirtutum utentibus confert magnam copiam potencie aut maiestatis aut aliquarum copiarum, igitur ad id finaliter quandoque tendunt. Amicitia est uoluntas erga aliquem bonarum rerum illius causa quam diligit cum eius pari uoluntate. Ad hanc amicitiam tendatur usu politicarum uirtutum tamquam ad finem. Eo [?] enim sepe amicitia conquirit’; *ibid.*, fol. 39^{ra}: ‘Cum politicarum uirtutum, ut dictum est, multiplex sit finis, catholice uirtutes ad unum tantum tendunt qui deus est.’

²⁴ See Bejczy, ‘The Problem’.

to Alan of Lille's distinction between political and Catholic virtues, which exercised a lasting influence on moral thought until the end of the Middle Ages.

By the thirteenth century, then, the term *virtutes politicae* carried three different meanings. First, the phrase could be used as an alternative name for the cardinal virtues. Second, it could stand for all virtues, whether political in character or not, which humans could acquire by natural means. Third, *virtutes politicae* could refer to the virtues of political life. As the virtues of political life were generally thought acquirable by natural means and exemplified by the cardinal virtues, confusion was bound to arise. Some thirteenth-century moral writings appear to equate the cardinal with the political and the acquired virtues,²⁵ but theologians generally refrained from doing so, as Peter Lombard had canonized Augustine's doctrine that the cardinal virtues survived in heaven as modes of loving God.²⁶ In their celestial existence, the cardinal virtues were obviously divine gifts, unrelated to politics. In order not to subvert this teaching, thirteenth-century authors generally held, quite in conformity with Alan of Lille's teaching, that the cardinal virtues were *politicae* only if uninformed by grace — an opinion voiced not only in theology but also in pastoral literature.²⁷

Still, the identification of the political with the cardinal virtues is manifest in the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre (c. 1220), a work which deeply influenced moral theology around the middle of the century. In a section titled 'De virtutibus politicis', William identified the *virtutes politicae* with the cardinal

²⁵ See, e.g., John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, III.ii.7, ed. by Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964), p. 157: 'Virtutes autem consuetudinales, politice, actiue, cardinales secundum rem idem sunt, que diuiduntur secundum diuisionem operationum regentium vitam actiuam, quarum sunt medietates'; Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium theologiae veritatis*, v.33, in Albert the Great, *Opera omnia*, ed. by Stephanus C. A. Borgnet, 38 vols (Paris: Vivès, 1890–99), XXXIV, 179: 'Istae quatuor virtutes appellantur cardinales [...] Vocantur etiam politicae [...]. Appellantur etiam consuetudinales [...].'

²⁶ See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, III.xxxiii.3, ed. by Ignatius C. Brady, 2 vols, 3rd edn (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1971–81), II, 188–89; Augustine, *De trinitate*, xiv.9, ed. by W. J. Mountain and F. Glorie (CCCM, 50A, pp. 438–39).

²⁷ See, e.g., Roland of Cremona, *Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis liber tercius*, 208, ed. by Aloysius Cortesi (Bergamo: Monumenta Bergomensia, 1962), p. 619: 'Iste quattuor virtutes, secundum quod sunt politice, idest informes'; *Summa virtutum de remediis animae*, 1, ed. by Siegfried Wenzel (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984), pp. 53–55: 'Virtus autem politica comprehendit etiam uirtutes cardinales dum sunt informes, quia cum gracia informantur, sub uirtute gratuita continentur.'

virtues as mentioned in Sap. 8. 7. Although the political virtues took their origin in natural law, William maintained that if charity informed them, they earned merit in the same way as the virtues infused by grace.²⁸ From the perspective of Alan of Lille and his followers, William's statement amounts to a *contradictio in terminis*: in their view, political virtues could be transformed by grace but stopped being political in such a case. The same point was made in the late thirteenth century by Henry of Ghent (d. 1293).²⁹ According to William, however, Augustine and the ancient philosophers agreed that beatitude constituted the only goal of virtue, so that even the political virtues led to a heavenly reward.³⁰ If one substitutes 'political' with 'cardinal', William's statement is perfectly orthodox; it is merely his ambiguous use of the term *political* that makes his words sound like a shocking novelty. In accordance with William's vocabulary, some scholastics (Hugh of Saint-Cher, Albert the Great)³¹ and other religious authors (an unknown abbreviator of William Peraldus, Stephen of Bourbon, Servas Sanctus of Faenza, William Durand, Raimund Lull)³² casually used the expressions 'political virtues' and 'cardinal virtues'

²⁸ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, III.xix, ed. by Jean Ribailier, 5 vols (Paris: CNRS; Rome: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1980–87), III, 385–86.

²⁹ See Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariam*, xlv.2, 2 vols (Paris: Bade, 1520; repr. Saint Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1953), II, fols 20^v–21^r: 'morales virtutes non dirigunt hominem nisi secundum vitam politicam. Vnde subtractus a vita politica ad contemplativam, morales sive politicas virtutes habere non dicitur.'

³⁰ See *Summa aurea*, III.xix.1 and xx.3, pp. 386 and 395. See also *ibid.*, III.xl.2, p. 769, where William attributes the statement 'virtus facit dignum beatitudine' to Aristotle; cf. Aristotle, *Ethica nova*, i.10, trans. by Burgundio of Pisa, ed. by René-Antoine Gauthier, *Aristoteles Latinus*, XXVI.i.3.2 (Leiden: Brill; Brussels: de Brouwer, 1972), p. 83: 'virtutis enim bravium et finis, optimum videtur quid et beatum.'

³¹ Hugh of Saint-Cher, commentary on *Sententiae*, III.xxxiii, MS Padua, Biblioteca universitaria 853, fol. 105^{va}: 'Post uirtutes theologicas agit magister breuiter de politicis secundum quod ad speculationem theologi pertinet, distinguens usus earum in presenti et in futuro' (*usus in futuro* refers to the celestial existence of the virtues); Albert the Great, *Ethica*, I.ix.1, in *Opera*, ed. by Borgnet, VII, 140; Albert the Great, *Commentarii in Sententias*, III.xxxiv.1, in *ibid.*, XXVIII, 619.

³² *De uirtutibus cardinalibus et moralibus*, MS Trier, Stadtbibliothek 535, fol. 4^r: 'theologie precedunt politicas quia ordinant nos ad supremum finem'; Stephen of Bourbon, *De diversis materiis praedicabilibus*, v.7, MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15970, fol. 546^{va}: 'dicendum quomodo per donum consilii multiplex beneficium gratie ipsis uirtutibus prebeatur politicis siue cardinalibus' (the cardinal virtues are *politicae* and *consuetudinales*, but the gift of counsel gives them a salvific function); Servas Sanctus of Faenza, *De exemplis naturalibus*, iii.18, MS Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 1589, fol. 48^{va}: 'Sunt autem uirtutes magis famose ad quas sunt alie numero reducende vii, tres theologie [...] et iiii politice [...]. Politice dicuntur

as synonyms; the lexicographer Giovanni Balbi did likewise in his influential *Catholicon* (1286).³³ Yet the majority of these authors evoked the religious connotations of the virtues or referred to their survival in heaven. Calling the cardinal virtues 'political' does not therefore necessarily imply a restriction of the cardinal virtues to the political atmosphere.

Such a restriction is nevertheless suggested by the current thirteenth-century notion that the cardinal virtues determined the active life and man's relations with his neighbours or the outer world, whereas the theological virtues regulated the contemplative life and man's relation with God.³⁴ Accordingly, numerous

et cardinales'; Servas Sanctus of Faenza, *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis*, 5.1, MS Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi soppressi E.VI.1046, fol. 54^{rb}: 'restat ut uideamus de parte ultima siue quarta que erit de cardinalibus uirtutibus siue politicis et peccatis eis oppositis'; William Durand the Elder, *Rationale divinorum officiorum*, III.xvii.8, ed. by Anselme Davril and Timothy M. Thibodeau (CCCM, 140, p. 221): 'Quatuor cruce purpuree sunt quatuor uirtutes politice, scilicet iustitia, fortitudo, prudentia et temperantia, que, nisi cruce Christi sanguine purpurentur, falsum sibi uirtutis nomen usurpant, et ad ueram beatitudinis gloriam non perducunt'; Raimund Lull, *Investigatio mixtionum*, 5, ed. by Michela Pereira and Theodor Pindl-Bücher (CCCM, 79, p. 442): 'si homo habens temperantiam uel aliam uirtutem politicam propter istam uitam solummodo et non propter fidem, spem uel caritatem, quam habet ad Deum et futuram uitam, est sua temperantia etc. informis, quia non habet finem ultimum.' See also Odo Rigaldi, cited by Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 183, and Lottin, *Etudes de morale: Histoire et doctrine* (Gembloux: Duculot, 1961), pp. 88–89: the 'philosophers' called the cardinal virtues *politice*, but theologians consider them divine gifts.

³³ Giovanni Balbi, *Catholicon* (Venice: Locatelli, 1495), lemma 'Virtus', fol. 305^{rb}: 'Uirtutes autem cardinales siue politice sunt quattuor, scilicet prudentia, fortitudo, iustitia, temperantia.'

³⁴ Neighbour/God: see Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, ed. by Nikolaus Wicki (Bern: Francke, 1985), p. 701; Richard Fishacre, *In tertium librum Sententiarum*, II: *Dist. 23–40*, 23, ed. by Klaus Rodler (Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2003), p. 6; Servas Sanctus of Faenza, *De exemplis naturalibus*, iii.18, fol. 48^{ra}; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, III.xxxiii.1.1 and 4, in *Opera omnia*, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), III, 712 and 720. Active/contemplative: see John of La Rochelle, see n. 25, above; Guido Faba, *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus*, II.1, ed. by Virgilio Pini, 'La Summa de Vitiis et Virtutibus di Guido Faba', *Quadrivium*, 1 (1956), 41–152 (p. 128). Outer world: see Philip the Chancellor, *Summa*, p. 746 (repeated by John of La Rochelle, *De divisione*, III.ii.9, p. 161); Hugh Ripelin, see next note; Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, II.xl.1.5, ed. by Pierre F. Mandonnet and M. Ferdinand Moos, 4 vols (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929–47), II, 1024; Servas Sanctus of Faenza, *De exemplis naturalibus*, iii.18, fol. 48^{ra}. See also Henry of Rimini, *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus* Prol. (Speyer: [n. pub.], 1472/73), fol. 11^v: 'Patet ergo quod ad hominis perfectionem vii virtutes in vniuerso requiruntur iiii respectu vite ciuilis & iii respectu vite beate [...] iiii virtutes anime perficiunt solum in vita ciuili vnde ad constructuram vite spiritualis non sufficientur.'

theologians and other authors explained that the term *virtutes politicae* counted among the designations of the cardinal virtues, as one function of these four virtues — their main function according to some — was to create good relations in social, civil, or political life.³⁵ As Godfrey of Fontaines (died c. 1306) observed, the political virtues, which regulated the relations of humans to others and to themselves, made man into the *civile animal* of which Aristotle had spoken.³⁶

³⁵ See, e.g., Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de arte predicandi*, vi.4, ed. by Franco Morenzoni (CCCM, 82, p. 200): 'Iste autem uirtutes politice dicuntur quia inter politicos, id est inter ciues et simul commorantes, necessarie sunt'; Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius*, 208, p. 620: 'iste quattuor virtutes dicuntur politice [...] quoniam maxime sunt utiles in regimine civitatum, sive in regimine pluralitatis [...]. Et iterum [...] quia in pluribus sunt quam theologice, quoniam quicumque habent theologicas habent illas, sed non convertitur'; Robert Kilwardby, *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum* (Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1982–85), II: *Tugendlehre*, 25, ed. by Gerhard Leibold (1985), p. 87: 'ideo dicuntur politicae, quia sunt ad regimen hominum civiliter cohabitantium'; Albert the Great, *In libros Sententiarum*, III.xxxiii.2, in *Opera*, ed. by Borgnet, XXVIII, 610: 'Civiles autem dicuntur, secundum quod constituunt bonum statum unius cum alio in ordine civium: et haec eadem ratio est, quare dicuntur politicae, nisi quod unum est Graecum, et alterum Latinum' (repeated by Simon Hinton, *Summa iuniorum* = *Compendium theologiae* in Jean Gerson, *Opera omnia*, I, ed. by Louis Ellies du Pin (Antwerp: Societas, 1706), p. 301, with an added reference to Macrobius); Albert the Great, *De bono*, I.vi.2, ed. by Heinrich Kühle and others, in *Opera omnia* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1951–), XXVII, 80: 'Politicae vero, idest civiles, dicuntur, eo quod in ipsis et in operibus earum perfectionem habet res publica secundum optimum statum civium. Cuius signum est, quod omnis legislatio construit aliquam harum virtutum'; Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium theologiae veritatis*, v.16, p. 165: 'Politicae namque dicuntur secundum quod regunt vitam humanam, quoad opera exteriora, et secundum quod pugnant contra vitia' (likewise v.33, p. 180); *ibid.*, v.33, p. 179: 'Vocantur etiam politicae, quia ordinatur in his vita civilis, et hominem poliunt et ornant' (both sentences repeated by John Rigaldi, *Compendium pauperis*, v.35 (written 1311/17), MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3150, fol. 67^{va}); Bonaventure, *In libros Sententiarum*, III.xxxiii dub. 5, in *Opera*, III, 730: 'Politicae vero dicuntur [...] quia reddunt hominem bene ordinatum ad vivendum inter homines; unde politica virtus dicitur a polis, quod est pluralitas.' See also Guido Faba, *Summa*, II.1, p. 128: 'Pollice uirtutes dicuntur ciuiles que conueniunt illis qui rem publicam cum ratione gubernant'; Pseudo-Bonaventure, *Opusculum de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus* (fourteenth or fifteenth century), in Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, ed. by Adolphe C. Peltier, 15 vols (Paris: Vivès, 1864–71), VII, 506–09 (pp. 506–07): 'virtutes politicae, id est, scientiae de gubernatione civitatum [...]. Politicae dicuntur, prout sunt in recto regimine rationis.'

³⁶ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet*, 14.1.1–2, ed. by J. Hoffmans, *Les quodlibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines* (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1932), pp. 303–05; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I.ii.61.5, in *Opera*, VI, 398: 'quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi [...] politicae vocantur'; see also Irene Zavattero, 'Moral and Intellectual Virtues in the Earliest Latin Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*',

Since social and political life belonged to the transient world, most theologians held that *qua* political virtues, the cardinal virtues could be acquired by natural means (as Alan of Lille had been the first to contend), through constant application (as Aristotle had taught), or, in the typical scholastic formula of the thirteenth century, *ex frequenter bene agere*. In this context, an interesting shift took place in the theologians' etymological interpretation of the word *political*. Like Alan of Lille, they often averred that the term *political* derived from the Greek *polis* in the sense of *civitas* or community, as well as from its (alleged) homonym *polis*, meaning 'multitude'. In contrast to Alan, however, some authors related this 'multitude' not to the large numbers of people who applauded the virtues, but to the many acts from which the virtues arose as habits — in other words: to the *frequenter bene agere* which in the Aristotelian conception laid the basis of virtue.³⁷ Thus understood, the term *political* covered both the natural and the sociopolitical character of the cardinal virtues.

Albert the Great is probably the scholastic theologian who most consistently interpreted the cardinal virtues as political concepts. Not only when expounding Aristotle's *Ethics* did Albert affirm that the moral (notably the cardinal) virtues regulated the relations of citizens among one another,³⁸ but also in his commentary on the *Sententiae*. Explaining why the cardinal virtues were four in number, Albert argued that the *bonum statum civitatis* required four habits on the part of the citizens: one which determined the rightness of their deeds, one which made them act well toward others, one which checked the pleasures of the present life (notably the sense of touch), and one which governed the dangers impressed by others (notably during war). These habits are prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude; the last two are especially described in such a way as to fit Aristotle's

in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200–1500*, ed. by István P. Bejczy (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming), citing the commentary preserved in MS Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale 232, fol. 90^r: 'uirtus consuetudinalis [...] alio nomine dicitur politica [...] quia per eam conveniens est hominem conversari cum hominibus.'

³⁷ See *Summa virtutum de remediis animae*, 1, p. 53; Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 178, n. 2 (Odo Rigaldi).

³⁸ See Albert the Great, *Super Ethica*, x.2 (902), ed. by Wilhelm Kübel, in *Opera omnia* (see n. 35, above), XIV.ii, p. 756: 'secundum enim quod disponuntur cives ipsi per ipsas vel in passionibus innatis vel illatis vel operationibus communicationum vel electionibus, sic dicuntur politicae.' The moral virtues are political either in a strict sense (regulating the relations of citizens within the political community) or in a broader sense (regulating their relations in wartime, opposing one political community to another).

definitions.³⁹ The remarkable thing about Albert's argument is that it self-evidently takes its point of departure in political life, even though as a theologian Albert could not but confirm the survival of the virtues in heaven.⁴⁰ Yet Albert did not take many pains to relate the political virtues to the celestial destination of man. Only once in his commentary on the *Sententiae* did he observe in passing that the cardinal virtues had God as their end, without making clear whether he was thinking of the virtues as being informed by grace.⁴¹ Other passages in the same work suggest that the political virtues aim just at the well-being of civil society⁴² and that acts motivated by them are morally good, but irrelevant to salvation.⁴³

De regimine principum (c. 1290), a treatise on the cardinal virtues written by the Austrian abbot Engelbert of Admont, displays an ever stronger disconnection of the virtues' political and religious significance. The work is an original attempt to subsume the entire range of government and civic behaviour under the four cardinal virtues. In Engelbert's view, politics aims at four different ends which are each served by one of the four virtues. Prudence, which provides the material

³⁹ See Albert the Great, *In libros Sententiarum*, III.xxxiii.1, in *Opera*, ed. by Borgnet, XXVIII, 606–07.

⁴⁰ Helmut Kohlenberger, 'Virtus politica: Einige terminologische Hinweise zum Verhältnis von Ethik und Politik bei Albertus Magnus', in *Virtus politica: Festgabe zum 75. Geburtstag von Alfons Hufnagel*, ed. by Joseph Möller (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann, 1974), 95–106 (p. 95), is therefore not entirely right to consider *virtus politica* and *virtus cardinalis* as 'austauschbare Begriffe'.

⁴¹ See Albert the Great, *In libros Sententiarum*, III.xxvi.1, in *Opera*, ed. by Borgnet, XXVIII, 491: the theological virtues order our acts directly to God, the cardinal virtues 'actus terminant in medio, et finem ponunt in Deo'. At *In libros Sententiarum*, xxxiii.4 and xxxiv.1, pp. 612 and 619, he alludes to the distinction in *finem/ad finem* (see below); see also *In libros Sententiarum*, xxiii.2, p. 407, II.xxvii, in *ibid.*, XXVII, p. 478, and *Summa theologiae*, II.xvi.103.2, in *ibid.*, XXXIII, p. 263: the theological virtues lead directly in *finem*, the political/cardinal virtues (acquired according to the *Summa*) regard the *medium*. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 183, notes that *medium* may stand for 'les moyens pour y atteindre' as well as for the middle ground between two vices.

⁴² See Albert the Great, *In libros Sententiarum*, III.xxxiii.2, p. 609: 'Alii autem, ut Philosophi, vocant eas cardinales, ideo quia sunt cardo revolutionis humanae vitae secundum statum civilem et honesti'; *In libros Sententiarum*, p. 610 (quoted above, n. 35). See also *De bono*, vi.2, p. 301: 'differunt virtutes politicae a gratuitis [...] secundum intentionem agentis, quia operatio virtutis politicae est propter bonum civile, operatio gratuitarum propter deum.'

⁴³ See Albert the Great, *In libros Sententiarum*, II.xli.5, p. 645.

needs of human life, makes the subjects live *commode*; fortitude, which combats their dangers and enemies, makes them live *secure*; justice, which gives everyone his due, makes them live *juste*; finally, thanks to temperance the subjects may live *honeste*.⁴⁴ Every possible responsibility on the part of rulers and their subjects is covered by one of the four virtues and their species, which together constitute the field of political morality. In kings, the cardinal virtues must become royal virtues of grand and noble stature which confer *serenitas*, a special form of majestic honour.⁴⁵ Nowhere does Engelbert transcend the context of politics; thus, he interprets justice as attributing to everyone his due share in the material goods of the community (arguing that common property would involve constant strife and anarchy — a remarkable view for a Benedictine abbot); moreover, as the highest instance of fortitude he does not adduce martyrdom, as medieval authors usually did, but death as a warrior on behalf of one's terrestrial fatherland.⁴⁶

Engelbert's strictly secular approach is exceptional among thirteenth-century political writers who generally considered virtuous life, including its supernatural aspects, as the goal of the political community (even though tales about virtuous rulers of antiquity were widely diffused, thanks for instance to the *Breviloquium de virtutibus* of John of Wales). Thus Giles of Rome explained at the beginning of his *De regimine principum* that the prince must seek his happiness in the love of God and use his power to imply the divine will. What God wants princes above all to do is to wield a just and holy government based on prudence and law. Princes must therefore exercise their power in accordance with prudence directed by charity.⁴⁷ These opening remarks give a theological perspective to all following chapters. Moreover, in a section concerning Macrobius's fourfold division of the virtues Giles insisted that princes must observe the cardinal virtues not only as *virtutes politicae* but on all four levels, including even the *virtutes exemplares* located in the divine mind, as princes should set virtuous examples of almost superhuman stature to their subjects. For this latter task, they needed the aid of

⁴⁴ Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum*, ii.6, ed. by Johann G. T. Hufnagel (Regensburg: Pez, 1725), pp. 48–49.

⁴⁵ Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum*, vii, pp. 190–248.

⁴⁶ Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum*, iv.2 and vi.4, pp. 128 and 201.

⁴⁷ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, i.i.2 (Rome: Zanetti, 1607; repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1967), p. 39; see also Matthew S. Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 151–52 and 156.

grace.⁴⁸ In Giles's conception, the virtues of government thus exceeded the limits of Aristotelian philosophy and required charity and grace to be perfectly fulfilled. Some thirteenth-century theologians and philosophers accordingly suggested that only true Christians could properly observe the political virtues. Thus, Roland of Cremona, the first Dominican to compose a theological summa (1229/30), subscribed to the idea that the cardinal virtues in their political dimension were uninformed by grace, but nevertheless repelled the notion of simple-minded people that politicians who never listened to sermons and were unconcerned with divine matters could be capable and virtuous rulers. In reality, such rulers were harmful according to Roland; indeed, all evil in society was caused by them.⁴⁹ Other authors accentuated the political significance of charity. In his *Moralis philosophia* Roger Bacon presented charity as the main virtue related to the common good; it is accompanied by *concordia*, *pax*, and *iustitia*, which transcend individual life, for 'man is a social being'.⁵⁰ Robert Kilwardby argued in his commentary on the *Sententiae* (c. 1245) that charity comprised the entire *ars recte vivendi* and therefore included the political virtues,

for whoever has charity, loves God before all and obeys him before all. But obeying him means orderly behaving oneself in relation to oneself and to others. So, whoever has charity does this. But the political virtues do nothing else than ordering man in relation to himself and to others, especially in the present life. So, whoever has charity, lives also in accordance with the political virtues, as he usually possesses these as well.⁵¹

Kilwardby's statement issues from the Augustinian idea, universally accepted in thirteenth-century theology, that charity covers the entire range of virtue. However, many twelfth- and thirteenth-century theologians argued that political virtues lost their political character once being informed by charity, whereas according to Kilwardby charity actually guaranteed the sociopolitical effect of the

⁴⁸ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.33, p. 150.

⁴⁹ Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius*, 237, pp. 678–79.

⁵⁰ Bacon, *Moralis philosophia*, 3 Proem., p. 45.

⁵¹ Kilwardby, *In tertium Sententiarum*, 27, p. 104: 'Secundo ostenditur quod habens caritatem, habet habitualiter politicas virtutes. Quia qui habet caritatem, Deum prae omnibus amat et ei prae omnibus oboedit. Sed oboedientia eius est ordinate se habere hominem erga se et proximum. Ergo qui habet caritatem, hoc facit. Sed nihil aliud faciunt virtutes politicae quam ordinare hominem erga se et proximum praecipue in via. Ergo qui habet caritatem, vivit etiam secundum politicas virtutes, quare et illas habitualiter habet.' See also n. 35, above, for Roland of Cremona's view that whoever has the theological virtues, has the political virtues as well.

virtues (the idea was not without precedent: John of Salisbury emphasized in his *Policraticus* that biblical virtues had a marked effect in civic life).⁵² Naturally, Kilwardby did not make the political virtues dependent upon charity, accepting instead that they were products of human effort uninformed by grace,⁵³ but one can easily infer from his statement that the best and most reliable administrators are those who act from infused charity rather than acquired habits.

While Giles of Rome and others spoke about religion and grace leading to political virtue, some thirteenth-century authors argued that observing the political virtues would lead to embracing religion and grace. The conception of nongratuitous virtue as a step toward true, Christian virtue had been present in theology from the late twelfth century, but some thirteenth-century authors asserted in particular that the sociopolitical aspects of nongratuitous virtues made humans apt for salvation. William of Auxerre may have inaugurated this tradition with his observation that the political (uninformed) virtues made human beings similar to God from the exterior and thus prepared them for having the theological virtues.⁵⁴ According to Giovanni Balbi, the political virtues elevated the human being to contemplation by regulating the affairs of civil life,⁵⁵ while Thomas Aquinas maintained in his *Summa theologiae* that nongratuitous virtues, procuring such finite goods as the *conservatio communitatis*, could lead to the supernatural good.⁵⁶ In his *Quaestiones disputatae*, however, Aquinas took an opposite view;⁵⁷ likewise, Philip the Chancellor, Roland of Cremona, and Henry

⁵² See John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, viii.9, ed. by Clement C. J. Webb, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), II, 279–80.

⁵³ See Kilwardby, *In tertium Sententiarum*, 2, 26, and 27, pp. 11, 89–91, 98–99; but cf. below, n. 80.

⁵⁴ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, III.xix, p. 385; cf. III.xviii.3, p. 377: ‘per virtutes politicas veniamus ad theologicas per quas meremur.’

⁵⁵ Giovanni Balbi, *Catholicon*, lemma ‘Virtus’, fol. 305^{va}: ‘Sunt enim politice secundum quod homo per eas in ciuilibus operibus vtens ad quietes contemplationis aliquis [*lege aliquas*, IB] anhelat.’

⁵⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.23.7, in *Opera*, VIII, 171. See also Lottin, *Etudes*, p. 99.

⁵⁷ See Thomas Aquinas, *De virtutibus cardinalibus*, 4, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. by P. Bazzi and others, 2 vols, 8th edn (Turin: Marietti, 1949), II, 827: ‘Manifestum est autem quod virtutes acquisitae, de quibus locuti sunt philosophi, ordinantur tantum ad perficiendum homines in vita civili, non secundum quod ordinantur ad caelestem gloriam consequendam [...]. Sed virtutes cardinales, secundum quod sunt gratuita et infusae [...] perficiunt hominem in vita praesenti in ordine ad caelestem gloriam [...] perficiunt hominem in vita activa, sicut in quadam via qua

of Ghent denied the relevance of the political (uninformed) virtues to man's final destination.⁵⁸ In his *Summa de bono* (1236), Philip argued that only the infused cardinal virtues ordered humans *ad finem* through their upright behaviour in the world, whereas the theological virtues conducted humans directly *in finem*. By contrast, the political virtues (including the cardinal virtues if they were naturally acquired) were unable to guide the soul to God in any way.⁵⁹

What we have seen thus far is that the different meanings which the expression *virtutes politicae* accumulated in the late twelfth century not only coexisted in thirteenth-century theology but continually interfered with each other. Sometimes the *virtutes politicae* were synonymous with *virtutes cardinales*, sometimes rather with *virtutes informes*, *virtutes acquisitae*, or *virtutes consuetudinales* — three current names for naturally acquired virtues uninformed by grace. Sometimes the *virtutes politicae* had a sociopolitical connotation, sometimes not; this connotation was sometimes considered relevant to religion, sometimes not. William of Auxerre, who called the cardinal virtues 'political' even if infused by grace, knew very well that in theology the phrase *virtutes politicae* specifically referred to naturally acquired virtues. Not only did he use the phrase in that sense, but he explained in so many words that it conveyed a double meaning:

Political virtues are taken twofold, for sometimes they are considered to be the consuetudinal virtues which Aristotle discusses in his *Ethics* and which humans may possess even in mortal sin; sometimes the political virtues are considered to be prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, for these regulate human life concerning its outer aspects, are referred to in Wisdom 8, and have faith, hope, and charity as their intrinsic principle.⁶⁰

pervenitur ad terminum contemplationis patriae [...] [virtutes politicae] ordinantur tantum ad bonum civile praesentis vitae.'

⁵⁸ See Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius*, 208, pp. 619–20; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XIII*, 10, ed. by Jos Decorte, *Opera omnia*, XVIII (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1985), pp. 73–75 (adducing quotations from Augustine to counter the view that political virtues ordering civil life have a supernatural effect). For Philip, see n. 59, below.

⁵⁹ See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 756.

⁶⁰ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, III.xl.2, p. 770: 'Virtutes politice duplice sumuntur: quandoque enim dicuntur virtutes politice virtutes consuetudinales, de quibus agit Aristoteles, in *Ethicis*, quae et in peccato mortali possunt haberi; quandoque dicuntur virtutes politice prudentia, iustitia, temperantia, fortitudo, eo quo [*lege quod, IB*] regant vitam humanam quantum ad opera exteriora, de quibus in libro Sapientie, viii, ille habent principium intrinsecum: fidem, spem et caritatem.'

In their first meaning, *virtutes politicae* resulted from *frequenter bene agere*, explained William, whereas the theological virtues were divine gifts.⁶¹ Similar statements occur in the writings of other thirteenth-century theologians.⁶²

The use of the expression *virtutes politicae* in their second sense, as synonymous with the cardinal virtues even if informed by grace, received vehement criticism in the work of William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris from 1228 to 1249. Irritated by those who called the cardinal virtues 'merely political, being mistaken about them in contents as well as in vocabulary, not knowing what they say nor what they are talking about',⁶³ William explained that virtues existed either as attitudes of specific social groups, in which case they should be called 'monastic', or as qualities in dealing with society at large. The latter sort of qualities were either 'economic' if concerned with serving other human beings or 'political, royal, or civil' if concerned with commanding them. In William's view, calling the cardinal virtues 'political' unduly suggested that their meaning related to politics and government only, whereas they had a manifest theological function, too.

William's division of the virtues had its roots in the threefold division of ethics into *ethica monastica*, *economica*, and *politica* which became current in the thirteenth century⁶⁴ and derived in turn from the ancient division of practical science into *ethica*, *economica*, and *politica*.⁶⁵ In accordance with the threefold division of ethics, Pseudo-Alexander of Hales and Thomas Aquinas distinguished 'monastic', 'economic', and 'political' virtues as pertaining to individuals, to households, and to the state community, respectively, with Pseudo-Alexander noting that these three classes of virtues could be subsumed under the 'political

⁶¹ See *Summa aurea*, xi.1, p. 172; cf. xl.2, pp. 769–70.

⁶² See e.g. Godfrey of Poitiers, *Summa*, cited by Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 125, n. 1; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*, I.1, 182, n. 87; John of La Rochelle, *De divisione*, III.ii.4, p. 149; Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius*, 299, p. 842; Simon of Hinton, *Summa iuniorum*, p. 294.

⁶³ William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus*, 12, in *Opera omnia*, 2 vols (Paris: Pralard, 1674; repr. Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1963), I, 162a: 'Sunt et alij tam re, quam nomine circa eas errantes, qui politicas eas solummodo nominant, nescientes quae loquuntur, neque de quibus affirmant.'

⁶⁴ William of Auvergne mentioned Macrobius as his source; the same thing happens in Pseudo-Alexander of Hales, *Summa de virtutibus*, cited in Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne*, pp. 129–30.

⁶⁵ See Georg Wieland, *Ethica — scientia practica: Die Anfänge der philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981), pp. 94–95; for twelfth-century antecedents see Cary J. Nederman, 'Aristotelianism and the Origins of Political Science in the Twelfth Century', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 52 (1991), 179–94.

virtues' of which Macrobius had spoken.⁶⁶ This threefold distinction, which gained acceptance outside academic theology as well, finally provides us with *virtutes politicae* of an unequivocally political character, even though Aquinas attached the term *political* more often to individual cardinal virtues than to the notion of virtue in general.⁶⁷ Thus, Aquinas made a distinction between monastic, economic, and political prudence, observing that *prudentia politica* (a concept which also appears in the *Nicomachean Ethics*) belonged to princes and kings rather than to their subjects, as it guided the princely exercise of justice and the other moral virtues.⁶⁸ In commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics* written around 1300 as well as in moral theology, Aquinas's threefold division of prudence became a common feature.⁶⁹ Yet Aquinas pointed out that the expression *prudentia politica* in fact rather applied to the attitude of subjects who wisely obeyed their rulers (in accordance with Aristotle's apparent use of the term), whereas the prudence of the rulers themselves, connected with the exercise of government, should rather be

⁶⁶ See Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne*, p. 148.

⁶⁷ Discussing the cardinal virtues in *Super libros Sententiarum*, Aquinas introduced their 'political' variant. See III.xxxiii.3.3.3 ad 1, III.ii, p. 1090 (referring to *fortitudo politica* and to *politicae virtutes cardinales* which 'in vita civili perficiunt'; 3.1.4, p. 1078 (*prudentia politica*); 3.4.5 ad 3, pp. 1101–02 (*iustitia politica*). Aquinas mentioned *iustitia politica* also in *Sententiae libri Ethicorum*, ix.1, in *Opera*, XLVII, 501 as a synonym of *iustum politicum*, a term occurring in Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, v.10, trans. by Robert Grosseteste (recensio pura), ed. by René-Antoine Gauthier, *Aristoteles Latinus*, XXVI.i.3.3 (Leiden: Brill; Brussels: de Brouwer, 1972), p. 241.

⁶⁸ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.47.11–12 and 50.1 with ad 1, in *Opera*, VIII, 359–60 and 374 = Pseudo-Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum morale*, I.iii.35 and 43 (Douai: Beller, 1624; repr. Graz: AVEDA, 1964), pp. 287 and 309–10; see also 35, pp. 284–85: 'Politica [prudentia] docet regere regna, vnde haec praecipue necessaria est regibus, & principibus.'

⁶⁹ See Roberto Lambertini, 'Individuelle und politische Klugheit in den mittelalterlichen Ethikkomentaren (von Albert bis Buridan)', in *Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter*, ed. by Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), pp. 464–78 (pp. 471–73 and 477); for theology, see, e.g., Francis of Meyronnes (c. 1288–1327/28), in *quatuor libros Sententiarum*, III.xxxiii–xxxvii.1.13 (Venice: Scoto, 1520; repr. Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1966), fol. 173^{rb}; John Baconthorpe (c. 1290–1348), *Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum* III.xxxvi.3, 2 vols (Cremona: Belpiero, 1618; repr. Farnborough: Gregg, 1969), II, 213–16; cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quaestiones ordinariae*, 3.5, ed. by Odon Lottin, in *Le quodlibet 15 et trois questions ordinaires de Godefroid de Fontaines* (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1937), p. 137: 'prudentia perfecti viri dicatur simpliciter prudentia in quantum est sui regitiva, dicatur autem politica in quantum est ita perfecta quod sufficit ad regendos alios.' See also Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum*, xii.3–4, ed. by Karl Ubl (Hannover: Hahn, 2004), pp. 421 and 423.

called *prudentia regnativa* (a term adopted from Robert Grosseteste's translation of Pseudo-Andronicus of Rhodes, *De passionibus*; in Grosseteste's translation of the *Ethics*, the prudence specific to rulers is called *prudentia architectonica*).⁷⁰ Similar distinctions between the administrative prudence of rulers and the political prudence of subjects appear in theological works and moral treatises which depend on Aquinas, such as *De regimine principum* of Giles of Rome,⁷¹ Richard of Mediavilla's commentary on the *Sententiae* (c. 1285–95),⁷² Henry of Rimini's treatise on the cardinal virtues written for the citizens of Venice (c. 1295),⁷³ and the *Speculum morale* of Pseudo-Vincent of Beauvais.⁷⁴ Giles, moreover, proposed the term *prudentia civilis* as an alternative for *prudentia politica* in its reduced sense of civic morality. In one of the many treatises influenced by Giles's work, Engelbert of Admont's *De regimine principum*, all other Aristotelian virtues are valued as political qualities as well. Although Engelbert was not entirely consistent in his terminology, he preferred to call the princely virtues of good government *virtutes administratoriae* or *virtutes regales*, while he called the virtues enabling their subjects to live in peaceful harmony *virtutes politicae* or *virtutes civiles*.⁷⁵ It is obvious from this evidence that as

⁷⁰ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super libros Sententiarum*, III.xxxiii.3.1.4, III.ii, p. 1078; *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.48.1 and 50.1–2, in *Opera*, VIII, 365–66, 374–75; Pseudo-Andronicus of Rhodes, *De passionibus*, trans. by Robert Grosseteste, in *Peri pathon*, ed. by A. Glibert-Thirry (Leiden: Brill, 1977), p. 240 (distinguishes ten *comita* of prudence, among which *regnativa*, *politica* and *oiconomica*); Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachaea*, vi.8, trans. by Robert Grosseteste (recensio pura), p. 261: 'Eius autem que circa civitatem, hec quidem ut architectonica prudentia, legis positiva; hec autem ut singularia, commune habet nomen politica.'

⁷¹ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, III.iii.1, pp. 555–59; see also Roberto Lambertini, 'Tra etica e politica: la *prudentia* del principe nel *De regimine* di Egidio Romano', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 3 (1992), 77–144 (pp. 118–25).

⁷² Richard of Mediavilla, *Super quatuor libros Sententiarum*, III.xxxiii.2.3, 4 vols (Brescia: Di Sabbio, 1591; repr. Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1963), III, 381, distinguishing *prudentia monastica, economica* and *politica*; *prudentia politica* is divided into *politica architectonica* 'quae est directiua principis in regimine ciuitatis' and *politica simpliciter dicta* '[quae] est directiua ciuis in regimine sui ipsius in comparatione ad conuersationem politiae bene ordinatae'. *Fortitudo politica* (military courage related to the *civitas inferior* rather than the celestial city) is discussed at 4.6, p. 399.

⁷³ Henry of Rimini, *Tractatus*, I.v.28, fol. 32^r: Aristotle's *prudentia architectonica* is called 'prudentia regnatiua siue legis positiua' (cf. I.v.23, fol. 30^r); political prudence 'in subditis [...] communi nomine retento dicitur pollitica.'

⁷⁴ Pseudo-Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum morale*, I.iii.36, pp. 289 and 309–10.

⁷⁵ Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum*, II.8–III.1, pp. 52–53 (*virtutes administratoriae, regales*); III.17 and IV.2, pp. 68–69, 128 (*virtutes politicae, civiles*). At *Speculum virtutum*, IV.13,

political instruments the virtues controlled the princely efforts to establish a civil order in society on the one hand and the efforts of the subjects to respect and maintain that order on the other. This observation is not without significance. In a frequently quoted passage from the *Politics*, Aristotle had declared that virtue was first of all needed by rulers, while the virtues of subjects (and even more so of slaves) depended on the virtues of the ruler and were therefore imperfect.⁷⁶ Thirteenth-century political thinkers appear to have recognized civic virtues as on a par with princely virtues rather than as derivatives of the latter, thus establishing a political morality of a more egalitarian character than Aristotle's.

If there is one word to characterize the history of political virtue in thirteenth-century moral thought, it is ambiguity. The phrase *virtus politica* was confusing even from a thirteenth-century perspective, as it comprised several related, yet not interchangeable, meanings; William of Auvergne's irritation at the careless use of the phrase is actually quite understandable. What is more, the phrase was in fact superfluous. Thirteenth-century authors did not need an alternative name for the cardinal virtues, as they could simply call these *virtutes cardinales*. Nor did they need the phrase *virtutes politicae* to refer to the virtues uninformed by grace, for which several appropriate and much clearer designations existed: *virtutes informes*, *virtutes acquisitae*, *virtutes consuetudinales*. The phrase was not even necessary for labelling the virtues related to politics. William of Auvergne and Thomas Aquinas proposed alternative names for these virtues in moral theology, while Giles of Rome, Engelbert of Admont, and Henry of Rimini did likewise in political thought; even the virtues of citizenship, for which Aquinas and his followers reserved the name 'political' in apparent agreement with Aristotle, might as well be called *civiles*, following Giles's and Engelbert's vocabulary.

There is one field, however, in which the term *virtus politica* was really indispensable. In dealing with Macrobius's fourfold division of the virtues, thirteenth-century authors were bound to enter Macrobius's conceptual framework. While some authors, like William Peraldus, just included a paraphrase

p. 204, Engelbert refers back to *De regimine principum* for a discussion of the political dimension of the virtues.

⁷⁶ See Aristotle, *Politica*, 1.13, trans. by William of Moerbeke, ed. by Pierre Michaud-Quantin, in *Aristoteles Latinus*, XXIX.i (Bruges: de Brouwer, 1961), pp. 3–56 (pp. 21–22); see also Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), pp. 227–29.

of the relevant parts of Macrobius's commentary in their works,⁷⁷ others tried to connect Macrobius's Neoplatonic classification with Christian concepts. A number of theologians stated on Origen's supposed authority that Salomon taught the *virtutes politicae* in the Book of Proverbs, the *virtutes purgatoriae* in Ecclesiast, and the *virtutes purgati animi* in the Canticle.⁷⁸ This idea appears to have been introduced by Roland of Cremona, who may also have been the first to associate Macrobius's *virtutes politicae* with the virtues originating *ex frequenter bene agere*; the *virtutes purgatoriae* with the salvific virtues infused by grace; and the *virtutes purgati animi* with the celestial virtues of the blessed.⁷⁹ Bonaventure introduced a variant of this idea, relating Macrobius's first three classes of virtue to the active life, the contemplative life, and the vision of light (similar views occur in the work of some contemporary theologians);⁸⁰ to dealing with others, dealing with oneself, and conforming to God; and to the modification, the purgation, and the reformation of the self.⁸¹ Accordingly, Bonaventure repeatedly presented the

⁷⁷ See William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus*, iii.6, in *Summae virtutum ac vitiorum* (Lyon: Beringer, 1554), pp. 573–74; Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum doctrinale*, iv.9 (Douai: Beller, 1624; repr. Graz: AVEDA, 1965), p. 306; Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum historiale*, iv.9 (Douai: Beller, 1624; repr. Graz: AVEDA, 1965), p. 119; István P. Bejczy, 'De origine virtutum et vitiorum: An Anonymous Treatise of Moral Psychology (c. 1200/1230)', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 72 (2005), 105–45 (pp. 130–31).

⁷⁸ See Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius*, 299, pp. 841–43; John of La Rochelle, *De divisione*, III.ii.5, p. 154; Bonaventure, *Hexaëmeron*, vi.25, in *Opera* v, 363; Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium*, v.16, p. 165.

⁷⁹ See Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius*, 242, pp. 687–88.

⁸⁰ See Kilwardby, *In tertium Sententiarum*, 31, pp. 122–24: *in statu proeliantis*, man fights *contra peccata vitae communis* with the political, and *contra peccata vitae solitariae* with the purgatorial virtues; *in statu triumphantis*, he enjoys the virtues of the purged mind. Otherwise said: *in patria* man enjoys the virtues of the purged mind; *in via*, the contemplative life is dominated by the purgatorial virtues, while in the active life the virtues are 'aut imperfectae et informis [*lege informes*], aut perfectae et formatae, et utroque modo sunt politicae' (p. 124). Kilwardby's recognition of infused political virtues upsets the distinction between political and gratuitous virtues to which he normally adheres. See also Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne*, pp. 145–46: the *Summa de virtutibus* of Pseudo-Alexander of Hales connects the political virtues with the active life, the purgatorial virtues with the contemplative life *in fieri*, the virtues of the purged mind with the contemplative life *in facto*; this threefold division applies to the cardinal as well as the theological virtues.

⁸¹ Bonaventure, *Hexaëmeron*, vi.24 and vii.4, in *Opera* v, 363 and 366; cf. *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, I.iv.4, ed. by Ferdinand M. Delorme (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1934), pp. 99–100. See also Pseudo-Bonaventure, *Opusculum de quatuor virtutibus*, p. 509: 'per virtutes

three classes of virtue as progressive degrees of ascending to God, an idea expressed by Thomas Aquinas as well.⁸² Especially outside academic theology the idea circulated that sin was softened by the political and removed by the purgatorial virtues, while the virtues of the purged mind annihilated even the recollection of sin (a modification of Macrobius's own statement bearing on the passions rather than sin);⁸³ accordingly, the three sorts of virtues belonged to the *incipientes*, the *proficientes*, and the *perfecti*, respectively.⁸⁴

Typically, all thirteenth-century interpretations of the fourfold division of the virtues respect the Macrobian conception of the political virtues as an initial stage of morality leading to the contemplative life. This is all the more striking as from an Aristotelian perspective, political virtues did not represent a lower stage of morality, but occupied the first place, in accordance with the idea that the more a virtue secured the common good, the better it was — an idea with which many scholastics were familiar.⁸⁵ Yet Kilwardby, Bonaventure, and Giles of Rome agreed that the political virtues pertained to moral goodness in its lowest degree.⁸⁶ Some authors even went so far as to impose the classification of Macrobius on Aristotle's

cardinales, ut sunt politicae, homo ordinatur in operationibus suis quoad proximum suum; per virtutes, quae sunt purgatoriae, ordinatur ad seipsum: per virtutes purgati animi, ad Deum.'

⁸² Bonaventure, *Hexaameron*, Principium i.33, ed. by Delorme, p. 16; Bonaventure, *Sermo in festo omnium sanctorum*, 2, in *Opera*, IX, 604; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I.ii.61.5, in *Opera*, VI, 398.

⁸³ See Bartholomew of Recanato's glosses in *Das Moralium dogma philosophorum des Guillaume de Conches*, ed. by John Holmberg (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1929), p. 79; Guido Faba, *Summa*, ii.1, p. 129; Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium*, v.16, p. 165; Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.33, pp. 148–49; cf. Macrobius, *Commentarii*, I.viii.11, p. 39.

⁸⁴ Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium*, v.33, p. 180 (repeated in John Rigaldi, *Compendium*, v.35, fol. 67^{va}); Giovanni Balbi, *Catholicon*, lemma 'Virtus', fol. 305^{va}. For a twelfth-century precedent, see *Florilegium morale Oxoniense*, p. 89 (*boni, meliores, optimi/perfecti*); for fourteenth-century resonances, see Robert Holcot, *Super librum Sapientie* (Basel: Amerbach, 1489), lectio 108 (on Sap. 8. 7), fol. r1^{rb} (*boni, meliores, optimi*); René-Antoine Gauthier, 'Un prologue inédit au *Moralium dogma philosophorum*', *Revue du moyen âge latin*, 11 (1955), 51–58 (p. 55).

⁸⁵ See Kempshall, *Common Good*, pp. 46 (Albert the Great), 116 (Thomas Aquinas), and 233–34 (Godfrey of Fontaines).

⁸⁶ See Kilwardby, *In tertium Sententiarum*, 31, p. 122: 'status infimus est politicus qui consistit in usu virtuosos vitae communis sive civilis'; Bonaventure, *Hexaameron*, I.iii.24–25, ed. by Delorme, p. 97: 'politicae proficiunt in purgatorias, purgatoriae proficiunt in eas quae sunt animae purgatae et hae ultimae solae faciunt beatos' (contradicting Macrobius's view that the political virtues have a beatific effect, too; see n. 18, above); Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.32, pp. 148–49: 'Sunt autem huiusmodi [sc. politicae] virtutes minime inter virtutes alias.'

Ethics. A number of early commentators identified Aristotle's consuetudinal and intellectual virtues with the political and purgatorial virtues, respectively.⁸⁷ Albert the Great derived climbing degrees of virtue from Book VII of Aristotle's *Ethics* as well as from Plato's *Timaeus* and related these to Macrobius's *virtutes purgantes*, *purgatoriae*, and *purgati animi* (perhaps avoiding the term *virtutes politicae* on purpose).⁸⁸ Giles of Rome connected Macrobius's system with four classes of good people inferred from Aristotle's Book VII (*perseverantes*, *continentes*, *temperati*, and *homines divini*), even presenting the *homines divini* as possessing the *virtutes exemplares* which Macrobius, as well as most thirteenth-century authors, located in God's mind only.⁸⁹

Medievalists and others must be careful when using the term 'political virtues' and make explicit what exactly they refer to. The obvious pitfall to avoid is equating the political with the cardinal virtues. To be sure, late-medieval theologians and moral writers assigned a special function to the cardinal virtues in regulating the exercise and acceptance of temporal power (they figured as princely and civic virtues at the same time) and frequently depicted them as the main instruments of political morality. For some of these authors political morality stood to some extent apart from religion, so that in the domain of politics the cardinal virtues enjoyed a relative independence from theology.⁹⁰ But other authors suggested that even in political life true virtue was impossible without charity and the Christian faith. Moreover, for many authors the political virtues corresponded with a mere first degree of morality on the road to beatitude. The cardinal virtues thus figured in moral thought as naturally acquired habits with a primarily political significance on the one hand, as gratuitous instruments

⁸⁷ See Valeria A. Buffon, 'Philosophers and Theologians on Happiness: An Analysis of the Early Latin Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics', *Laval théologique et philosophique*, 60 (2004), 449–76 (pp. 468–69).

⁸⁸ Albert the Great, *Ethica*, VII.i.1, in *Opera*, ed. by Borgnet, VII, 463–64; see also Jörn Müller, *Natürliche Moral und philosophische Ethik bei Albertus Magnus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2001), pp. 192–97.

⁸⁹ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.32, p. 146.

⁹⁰ Kempshall, *Common Good*, pp. 347–60, observes a tendency among scholastic authors to associate the moral and the theological virtues with temporal and spiritual power, respectively. Some authors (Remigio dei Girolami, Marsilius of Padua, William of Ockham) limited the role of temporal power to providing the *utile* (material security) rather than the *bonum*, thereby nearly excluding politics from the realm of ethics.

of salvation on the other.⁹¹ Covering both the natural and the supernatural destination of man, they enabled thirteenth-century authors to establish a connection between political and religious morality and thus to take a step beyond Aristotelian political ethic — especially by following the Neoplatonic model of Macrobius, to whom the Middle Ages owed the concept of political virtue in the first place.

⁹¹ See Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne de la vertu*, pp. 176–78, on Aquinas's argument that the political virtues in the transient world and the celestial virtues of the blessed are of the same nature.

REX STRENUUS VALDE LITTERATUS:
STRENGTH AND WISDOM AS ROYAL
VIRTUES IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN (1085–1284)

Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña

I. León and Castile: Theory and Practice of Frontier Kingship

The middle of the eleventh century saw the emergence in Christian Spain of a new ‘society organized for war’¹ that, after centuries of struggle for survival against the Islamic civilization occupying half of the Iberian Peninsula, was now restlessly advancing its frontier south. That was indeed a sudden change. At the beginning of the eleventh century, León and Castile were still an upland frontier, far from the maritime lanes of the urbanized Mediterranean. By the time of the incorporation of the ancient Visigothic *civitas regia* of Toledo in 1085, Alfonso VI (r. 1065–1109) was collecting tribute from Muslim frontier districts as well as from the *taifas* of Seville, Granada, and other important southern regions. In his Arabic letters, Alfonso VI even used the impressive title of ‘emperor of the two religions’ (*al-Imbratur dhū-l-Millatayn*).² At his death in 1109, he left a kingdom enlarged to almost twice its original size, which matched the surface of England.

It is possible to argue that the quick growth of the land under control of the Spanish Christian kingdoms from 1085 onward was the greatest challenge offered to Hispanic kingship since the beginning of the Reconquista (Reconquest). This

¹ See Elena Lourie, ‘A Society Organized for War: Medieval Spain’, *Past and Present*, 35 (1966), 54–76. All translations are mine unless noted otherwise.

² Angus Mackay and Muhammad Benaboud, ‘Alfonso VI of León and Castile, *al-Imbratur dhū-l-Millatayn*’, *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*, 56 (1979), 95–101 (p. 95).

expansion demanded not only the unfolding of political ideas and practices rooted in the Visigothic tradition, but also — a point not so frequently noticed — a departure from it. The belief is still found today that ever since King Recaredo's conversion to Catholicism in 587, Spain had been a 'clericocracy' with its secular rulers governing only in name, as puppets manipulated by the bishops. But the truth is that the Islamic conquest (711) ended this Visigothic hierocracy. Most historians of the Reconquest period now sustain the view that in early-medieval Spain from 711 onward, the papacy and the church enjoyed far less political power than in France, England, or Italy. In fact, between 900 and 1200 the king's authority was stronger in León and Castile than in any other European country. The Visigothic law, the *Fuero juzgo*, emphasized the overriding legal authority of the king, and the Romano-Visigothic principle that newly conquered land which was unoccupied belonged to the king was still enforced.³ Accordingly, the Leonese and Castilian kingdoms developed a strong concept of royal sovereignty in which inaugural sacral ceremonies such as royal anointing were not thought necessary until 1284. Alfonso VII simply crowned himself at León in 1135, Alfonso X did likewise at Seville in 1252, while Alfonso VIII (r. 1158–1214) was neither anointed nor crowned throughout his reign of fifty-six years.⁴ It is actually ironic that royal anointing first fell into disuse in post-Visigothic Spain, as Leonese-Castilian kingship claimed direct descent from the Visigothic kingdom which produced the first documented account of royal anointing in the West (that of King Wamba at Toledo in 672). As Peter Linehan has argued, this peculiar Spanish trend can be explained by the fact that Leonese and Castilian bishops were very much the king's creatures, being a kind of intelligentsia of courtly clerics (*clericos aulicos*) in the Ottonian way.⁵ Spanish bishops identified themselves with their king, the more so as many of them served the Crown in some capacity, often in the royal chancery, before their elevation to the episcopate.⁶

³ See Bernard F. Reilly, *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain (1031–1157)* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

⁴ Peter Linehan, 'Frontier Kingship: Castile, 1250–1350', in *La royauté sacrée dans le monde chrétien*, ed. by Alain Boureau and Claudio S. Ingerflom (Paris: EHESS, 1992), pp. 71–79 (pp. 72–73).

⁵ See Peter Linehan, *The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); cf. C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Origins of Courtliness: Civilizing Trends and the Formation of Courtly Ideals (939–1210)* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985).

⁶ See Richard A. Fletcher, *The Episcopate in the Kingdom of León in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

II. Kingship and the Production of Chronicles in León and Castile

Some of these courtier bishops wrote Latin chronicles that were masterpieces of royal propaganda. Indeed, the study of political thought in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Christian Spain is almost synonymous with the study of Latin historiography, a field which until recently received only moderate scholarly interest, like most of the Latin literature of high medieval Spain. The general framework for the study of the Latin historiography of León of Castile has now been laid, with basic problems pertaining to authorship and the dating of political events having been solved.⁷ However, the topic of the chronicles' discourse on kingship has suffered from scholarly neglect.

The chronicles were primarily conceived as celebratory works, intended to exalt the military and pious deeds of the Spanish kings.⁸ *Fortitudo* and *sapientia*, strength and wisdom, appear in many instances as the leading royal virtues. The celebration of military strength in the hard times of the Christian reconquest of Muslim Spain is hardly surprising, especially in view of the role of the Church in focusing the public mind of victory over Islam and preparing the armies for combat. Although some historians are sceptical about the existence of any *reconquista* idea prior to the thirteenth century,⁹ it is easy to establish that from the time of Alfonso II the Chaste of Asturias (r. 791–842) the Spanish chronicles favoured the theme of *pugna pro patria* over the idea of *pro fidei mori*, even after the proclamation of the papal bull *Quantum praedecessores* (1147) when the royal chancery accepted the supranational idea of the crusade.¹⁰

⁷ See Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) and Georges Martin, *Les juges de Castile: Mentalités et discours historique dans l'Espagne médiévale* (Paris: ENS-LSH, 1992).

⁸ Geoffrey West, 'The Destiny of Nations: Treatment of Legendary Material in Rodrigo of Toledo's *De Rebus Hispaniae*', in *The Medieval Mind: Hispanic Studies in Honour of Alan Deyermond*, ed. by Ian MacPherson and Ralph J. Penny (Woodbridge: Tamesis, 1997), pp. 517–33 (p. 521).

⁹ Raymond McCluskey, 'Malleable Accounts: Views of the Past in Twelfth-Century Iberia', in *The Perception of the Past in Twelfth-Century Europe*, ed. by Paul Magdalino (London: Hambledon, 1992), pp. 211–25 (p. 223).

¹⁰ Richard A. Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade in Spain, 1050–1150', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 37 (1987), 31–47 (p. 43); Reilly, *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain*, p. 211; Ariel Guance, 'Morir por la patria, morir por la fe: La ideología de la muerte en la *Historia de rebus Hispaniae*', *Cuadernos de Historia de España*, 73 (1991), 75–106.

III. The Cluniac Chronicles (1085–1214): Strength

Beginning with Ferdinand I (r. 1035–65), the kings of León and Castile became personal associates (*socii, familiares*) of Cluny. The Cluniacs were experts in prayer for the souls of sin-laden kings, a service which Ferdinand is known to have rewarded with an annual census of one thousand gold pieces. His successor Alfonso VI gave the see of Toledo to a French Cluniac monk, Bernard of Sédirac, who thus became primate of Spain; moreover, between 1073 and 1077, he granted four Spanish monastic houses to the monks of Cluny and in 1077 not only re-established the Fernandine census but doubled its rate. In acknowledgment, Cluny's liturgical commemoration of the Leonese royal family would match that accorded to the Holy Roman Emperors.¹¹ Moreover, 'Burgundian' monks and Cluniac-minded clerks entered Leonese royal service and gradually came to dominate the chancery.¹²

In speaking of princely virtues, it is important to note that Alfonso VI not only turned to Cluny for guidance in spiritual matters and in hiring ecclesiastical and royal personnel, but also for ideas about the duties of Christian kingship. In fact, historiography in Spain, and thus the conception of kingship, changed its character under Cluniac influence. Chroniclers such as Sampiro of Astorga (c. 1100),¹³ Pelayo of Oviedo (active 1101–30 and labelled 'the prince of falsifiers' by Linehan), and the anonymous author of the *Historia silense* (c. 1115) heavily concentrated on the deeds of the Christian kings, in particular on the royal efforts to rebuild the lost Visigothic monarchy in a never-ending fight against Islam.¹⁴ It can be forcefully argued that especially the *Historia silense* — probably composed at the Leonese monastery of Sahagún by a monk well educated in the Visigothic

¹¹ See Charles J. Bishko, 'Fernando I y los orígenes de la alianza castellano-leonesa con Cluny', *Cuadernos de historia de España*, 47–48 (1968), 31–135, 50–116 (pp. 31–35); Peter Segl, *Königtum und Klosterreform in Spanien: Untersuchungen über die Cluniacenklöster in Kastilien-León von Beginn des 11. bis zur Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts* (Kallmünz: Laßleben-Michael, 1974).

¹² See Bernard F. Reilly, 'Alfonso VI: Conqueror, politician, europeanizer', in *Estudios sobre Alfonso VI y la reconquista de Toledo* (Toledo: Instituto de estudios Visigótico-Mozárabes, 1987), pp. 20–35 (p. 28); Bernard F. Reilly, 'The Chancery of Alfonso VI of León-Castile (1065–1109)', in *Santiago, Saint Denis and Saint Peter: The Reception of the Roman Liturgy in León-Castile in 1080*, ed. by Bernard F. Reilly (New York: Fordham University Press, 1985), pp. 1–22.

¹³ For the text see Sampiro of Astorga, *Su crónica y la monarquía leonesa en el siglo X*, ed. by Justo Pérez de Urbel (Madrid: CSIC, 1952).

¹⁴ See Derek W. Lomax, *The Reconquest of Spain* (London: Longman, 1978), pp. 101–02.

cultural tradition and jealous of its preservation¹⁵ — centres around the reaffirmation of the Visigothic roots of kingship against ‘Burgundian’ influence.¹⁶ Yet in the following decades, not only chancery documents but also historical narrative became progressively more ‘Burgundian’ and less ‘Visigothic’. A series of Cluniac chronicles appeared which present the history of León and Castile in a way unknown until then in Spain. The chroniclers judged the kings by taking into account their attitude toward the Church and to the order of Cluny in particular. New themes like royal tyranny, crusading warfare, and the topos of the hero entered the historical discourse. While the concept of a tyrant as wicked and unjust ruler already formed part of the Hispanic political language, the association of tyranny with the usurpation of rights belonging to the Church or to the nobility could have originated only in a monastic environment permeated with the ideals of the Gregorian Reform.¹⁷

Good examples of historical episodes involving the theme of tyranny from a Cluniac perspective can be found in the *Historia Roderici* (c. 1110) and the *Historia compostellana* (c. 1140). The *Historia Roderici* offers an account of the relation between Alfonso VI and his faithful vassal, the Cid (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar). The composition of a historical work about a hero who equals kings but is no king himself already represented a break with the tradition of Hispanic historiography.¹⁸ Moreover, the chronicle portrays Alfonso as a tyrant and the Cid as a blameless hero, twice exiled by his unjust lord.¹⁹ The image of Alfonso as a *rex iniustus* was by all means revolutionary; until then, Alfonso counted as *optimus rex*. Only the authorship of a French Cluniac monk such as Jerome of Périgord,

¹⁵ See José M. Canal Sánchez-Pagín, ‘¿Crónica Silense or Crónica Domnis Santis?’, *Cuadernos de historia de España*, 63–64 (1980), 94–103.

¹⁶ McCluskey, ‘Malleable Accounts’, pp. 214–15. The narrative of the *Historia* as it has come down to us runs from King Vitiza (698–710) until the death of Fernando I in 1065. For the text see *Historia silense*, ed. by Justo Pérez de Urbel (Madrid: CSIC, 1959).

¹⁷ See Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña, ‘Ideología política y crónicas monásticas: La concepción cluniacense de la Realeza en la España del siglo XII’, *Anuario de estudios medievales*, 30–32 (2000), 681–734.

¹⁸ See Geoffrey West, ‘King and Vassal in History and Poetry: A Contrast between the *Historia Roderici* and the *Poema de Mio Cid*’, in *Mio Cid Studies*, ed. by Alan D. Deyermond (London: Tamesis, 1977), pp. 177–91 (p. 179).

¹⁹ See West, ‘King and Vassal’; Edmund De Chasca, ‘The King-Vassal Relationship in the *Poema de Mio Cid*’, *Hispanic Review*, 21 (1953), 183–92; Roger Walker, ‘The Role of the King and the Poet’s Intentions in the *Poema de Mio Cid*’, in *Medieval Hispanic Studies Presented to Rita Hamilton*, ed. by Alan D. Deyermond (London: Tamesis, 1976), pp. 257–66.

Bishop of Valencia during the Cid's brief tenure of this Muslim city, can explain these novelties.

The *Historia compostellana* is the first example of a Cluniac chronicle that creates images of good and bad rulers in accordance with their behaviour in ecclesiastical matters. The *Historia*, which counts almost six hundred pages in print, relates the *gesta* of Diego Gelmírez, Archbishop of Compostela (1100–40). It was written by four of his canons led by Munio Alfonso, later to be consecrated as Bishop of Mondoñedo.²⁰ It betrays a strong Cluniac mentality and promotes the fortune of Compostela as the see of the apostle James.²¹ The authors praise Alfonso VI as an *optimus rex* full of good judgement, wisdom, and humility (*discretio, sapientia, humilitas*)²² and express a strong dislike of his daughter and successor Urraca (the main enemy of Diego Gelmírez).²³ The *Historia* describes her as a tyrannical and incestuous queen, a 'second Jezebel', who as a woman should not have exercised political power in the first place.²⁴ Like many of her predecessors, Queen Urraca tried to obtain additional resources by sacking the churches of her kingdom. This was something Cluniac chroniclers were not ready to forgive. In the words of the *Historia*, she 'stripped the churches throughout her kingdom of their gold and silver and their treasures'.²⁵ Urraca's husband, Alfonso I, 'el Batallador' (the Battler), King of Aragón, is cast in an equally infamous role as an antagonist of the Church, as sacrilegious, illiterate, superstitious, who brutally abused his wife.²⁶ By contrast, there is a remarkable stress on the political virtues of Alfonso VI. The *Historia* hails the mighty conqueror of Toledo by reiterating his many virtues as a 'Catholic king of good memory': wisdom,

²⁰ See Bernard F. Reilly, 'The *Historia compostellana*: The Genesis and Composition of a Twelfth-Century Spanish *Gesta*', *Speculum*, 44 (1969), 78–85 (p. 79). The other authors were Pedro Gundesíndez (chaplain), Hugh (later Bishop of Porto), and Girardus of Beauvais (magister).

²¹ See McCluskey, 'Malleable Accounts', p. 218; Bernard F. Reilly, 'Santiago and Saint-Denis: The French Presence in Eleventh-Century Spain', *Catholic Historical Review*, 54 (1968), 467–83; Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, 'Ante la *Historia Compostelana*', *Logos*, 7 (1954), 67–95.

²² See Reilly, 'Alfonso VI: Conqueror', p. 14.

²³ See Reilly, 'The *Historia compostellana*'.

²⁴ Richard A. Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult: The Life and Times of Diego Gelmírez of Santiago de Compostela* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 129.

²⁵ *Historia compostellana*, ii.53.7, ed. by Emma Falque Rey (CCCM, 70, p. 322): 'Ipsa nimirum ecclesias ubique per regnum suum auro, argento et quibusque pretiosis spoliauerat.'

²⁶ *Historia compostellana*, i.64.2 (p. 102–03).

humility, cleverness, and temperance.²⁷ Moreover, Alfonso is depicted as a *rex pacificus*. His 'invincible sword freed many places from the yoke of the Ismaelites' and provided an age of peace for his people.²⁸ He possessed the *strenuitas* desperately needed in the hard times of the Reconquest, a quality which Queen Urraca obviously lacked.²⁹

Another major specimen of Cluniac historiography is the *Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris*, devoted to the reign of the so-called Emperor of Spain, Alfonso VII of León and Castile (1126–57). The *Chronica* was written around 1149 in the kingdom of León by a cleric well versed in classical literature.³⁰ Scholars have proposed Arnaldo, Bishop of Astorga from 1144 to 1152, as its author. Arnaldo's name is more Gallic than Spanish, and possibly he was one of the many French Cluniac monks who migrated to Spain.³¹ Be it as it may, the chronicle is remarkable for the author's restraint against exaggerating the achievements of the Emperor, while the nobility of León and Castile often come to the foreground. Especially in the final part of the chronicle, the probably unfinished *Prefatio de Almaria*, Alfonso is overshadowed by his brave vassals. The poem offers a synopsis of Alfonso's deeds along with a presentation of the barons accompanying the Emperor on his campaign against the Muslim kingdom of Almería. At the beginning, the chronicler introduces a eulogy of Alfonso focusing on his *strenuitas* and *imperialis dignitas*, which even make him Charlemagne's equal: 'emulating

²⁷ *Historia compostellana*, i.46 (p. 84): 'In regendis autem subditis, licet prepotentissimus esset, tante discretionis et tante sapientie et humilitatis extitit, quantam si describere uellet humanum ingenium, nequaquam posset[...]. Vnde a subditis quam iusto et temperato moderamine debita potestatis exegerit seu quam pacificus circa eos extiterit, post eius obitum nobilium uirorum perniciēs et subsequētia bella crebrius exorta aperte monstraerunt.'

²⁸ *Historia compostellana*, i.46 (p. 84): 'ea loca, que a potestate Ismahelitarum gladio suo inuicto liberauit, corporali intuitu perspeximus'; see also Bernard F. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI (1065–1109)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 405.

²⁹ See also Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult*, p. 151: Pope Calixtus II addressed Urraca in a letter as 'illustris regina', but her son Alfonso VII (his own nephew) as 'strenuus et gloriosus Hispaniarum rex'.

³⁰ See Maurilio Pérez González, 'Influencias clásicas y bíblicas en la *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris*', in *Actas del I Congreso de Latin Medieval*, ed. Maurilio Pérez González (León: Universidad de León, 1995), pp. 349–55.

³¹ See the introduction to *Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris*, ed. by Luis Sánchez Belda (Madrid: CSIC, 1950), p. xix. Other scholars claim that the author may have been Peter of Poitiers, secretary of Peter the Venerable; see Ángel Ferrari, 'El cluniacense Pedro de Poitiers y la *Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris*', *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, 153 (1963), 153–204.

the deeds of Charles the Great, with whom it is right to compare him, Alfonso was equal in rank and like him in military valour. Similar also was the glory of the wars they had waged. The evil pestilence of the Moors gave witness to this.³² In the remainder of the poem, however, members of the aristocracy are often given a more significant role than the King. For example, the central character of Book II (Chapters 67–77) is Alfonso's great captain, Munio Alfonso, who is praised for his victory in the Battle of Montiel and for other military deeds. With reference to Álvaro Fáñez, one of Alfonso's lieutenants, the author says: 'I assure you that if, in the time of Roland, Alvaro had been the third man after Oliver, the race of Saracens would have been brought to heel by the Franks.'³³

The *Chronica* implies a clear break with the Visigothic and Leonese historiographic tradition centred in kingship. However, the words 'si complacet imperatoris' from verse 8 of the poem suggest that the work was written at Alfonso's own request. Alfonso surely would have appreciated the *Chronica*'s emphasis on *strenuitas* as a main political virtue. It is not by chance that at the very beginning of the *Prefatio* we find an invocation to God as *rex fortis*.³⁴ Indeed, the *Chronica* contains a pervasive message: strength is a virtue given by God to those who pray for it. For a direct, unambiguous articulation of this notion, we can adduce the passage in which the chronicler blames the defeat of the Salamanca officers in their fight against the Almoravids to the fact 'that they trusted too much in their own strength and not enough in the Lord's power'. The remedy was no new military strategy but prayer and penance:

After this they did penance for their sins and prayed a great deal. They offered tithes and their first fruits to God, and he favoured them. They were given the gift of valour and prudence while waging war. For that reason, subsequent to their prayers, they were a constant threat to the Moors in their own land under the leadership of Count Poncio.³⁵

The same idea, this time connected with the *rex pacificus* theme, was reinforced by the chronicler when citing the speech that the Bishop of Pamplona delivered to the King of Aragón: 'That force is very small, but it is indeed great, for God is on its side, and God will defend it.[...] It loves peace and it seeks peace. Indeed everyone who loves peace loves the Lord. It is not difficult for God to surround

³² *Prefatio de Almaria*, 15–21, ed. by Juan Gil (CCCM, 71, p. 255). I quote the English version of Glenn Edward Lipskey (McCluskey, 'Malleable Accounts', p. 218).

³³ *Prefatio de Almaria*, 228–30, p. 262; McCluskey, 'Malleable Accounts', pp. 218–19.

³⁴ *Prefatio de Almaria*, 255: 'Rex pie, Rex fortis, cui sors manet ultima mortis.'

³⁵ *Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris*, ii.29, ed. by Antonio Maya Sánchez (CCCM, 71, p. 209).

many with a few. The victory in battle does not depend on the size of the army. No, the strength comes from heaven.³⁶

IV. The Three Episcopal Chroniclers of the Thirteenth Century: Strength and Wisdom

Whereas monastic scriptoria in France and England hummed with activity, Spanish historiography and political literature languished in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. After the *Chronica Naierensis* (c. 1160), no Latin chronicle was produced in León-Castile for two generations. Then, in the course of a single decade, three chronicles appeared in rapid succession: Lucas of Tuy's *Chronicon mundi*, Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada's *De rebus Hispaniae*, and the anonymous *Chronica latina regum Castellae* (attributed reliably to Juan of Soria).³⁷ The composition of these works coincided with the acceleration of the military reconquest of Islamic Andalusia and with cultural stirrings evidenced by the development of the *mester de clerecía* (clerical vernacular literature) and the foundation of the universities of Palencia and Salamanca. National pride rose to new heights in these days. In his gloss to the decree *Venerabilem* (*Decretales* I.vi.34) of Pope Gregory IX, the canonist Vincentius Hispanus contrasted the admirable Spaniards, who had forged themselves an empire by their strength (*virtute sua*), valour, and probity (*dominantes audacie et probitatis virtutibus*), with the Germans who had lost theirs as a result of their stupidity (*per busnardiā*).³⁸ Indeed, while the Holy German Empire was quickly disintegrating under the reign of Frederic II, the kingdoms of Castile and León, reunited by Ferdinand III el Santo (1217–52) in 1230, were recovering territory from the Muslims at a breathless pace.

The contemporary chronicles occasionally echo the chauvinism of Vincentius. 'Oh, what blessed times are these', intoned Bishop Lucas of Tuy (d. 1249), praising his 'holy fatherland' (*sanctissima patria*) for being distinguished by the

³⁶ *Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris*, i.15, p. 157: 'Victoria belli non est in multitudine exercitus, sed de celo fortitudo est.'

³⁷ Peter Linehan, 'On Further Thought: Lucas of Tuy, Rodrigo of Toledo and the Alfonsine Histories', *Anuario de estudios medievales*, 27 (1997), 415–36 (p. 415).

³⁸ See Gaines Post, 'Blessed Lady Spain — Vincentius Hispanus and Spanish National Imperialism in the Thirteenth Century', *Speculum*, 29 (1954), 198–209 (p. 206). I have chosen to translate *virtus* as 'strength' instead of 'valour' (Gaines Post's choice).

purity of its Catholic faith, its martyrs, saints, philosophers, the many virtues of its kings, and the achievements of its mighty armies.³⁹ More important, the chronicles betray a shift in the Spanish perception of the past. The three works are universal histories which start with the creation of the world and proceed in a grand sweep to the present, in stark contrast with the dry, annalistic treatment of earlier Spanish experiments in the genre.

The *Chronicon mundi* of Lucas of Tuy was the first of the three chronicles to be written. Some time after 1230, Queen Berenguela, widow of Alfonso IX of León, commissioned Don Lucas to write his work, a task which he completed in or after 1236, when Berenguela's son Ferdinand III conquered Córdoba. Although the re-evaluation of his work is still in progress (much aided by the recent publication of Emma Falque's edition), there is already a general appreciation of his skill in falsifying the historical record, his almost Machiavellian capacity for manipulating existing sources and inventing new ones in order to serve the interests of the kingdom of León in the aftermath of its reunification with Castile.⁴⁰

For Don Lucas, the conquest of Córdoba signalled the defeat of Spanish Islam and the expunging of the shame of Spain. He therefore called Ferdinand III a 'pious, prudent, humble, benign and catholic king', whose main virtue was *humilitas* because his kingship was based on obedience to the Church and his mother's advice, 'as if he were a very humble child under tuition'.⁴¹ Even when severely punishing heretics or being merciful with criminals, King Ferdinand displayed the Christian virtue of humility.⁴²

As Peter Linehan has observed, the Isidorian etymology *rex a recte agendo* pervades the entire *Chronicon*.⁴³ In fact, the chronicle's prologue quotes Isidore's famous saying in order to introduce the five qualities which a king should necessarily possess: faith in the Holy Trinity, righteous moral behaviour, peaceful

³⁹ Lucas of Tuy, *Chronicon mundi*, Praef. 2, ed. by Emma Falque (CCCM, 74, p. 7).

⁴⁰ See Peter Linehan, 'Dates and Doubts about Don Lucas', *Cahiers de linguistique et de civilisation hispaniques médiévales*, 24 (2001), 249–78.

⁴¹ See Lucas of Tuy, *Chronicon mundi*, iv.93, p. 332: 'Hic autem rex Fernandus grauissima adolescencia uenustatus, non, ut illa etas assolet, lasciuam amplexatus est mundi, sed pius, prudens, humilis, catholicus et benignus senilibus se moribus decorauit. Etenim ita obediebat prudentissime Berengarie regine matri sue, quamuis esset regni culmine sublimatus, ac si esset puer humillimus sub ferula magistrali.'

⁴² *Chronicon mundi*, iv.93, p. 332: 'Aderat illi in humilitate iusta seueritas, qua reprobos puniebat, et in seueritate iusta misericors et clemens humilitas, qua prostratis inimicis parcebat.'

⁴³ Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 316.

rulership, justice, and virile strength.⁴⁴ To this enumeration of virtues, Don Lucas added this laconic sentence linking fortitude and learning: 'a prince who excels in wisdom is reinforced by strength and sustained by counsel.'⁴⁵

Don Lucas transformed the traditional royal virtue of strength into a national quality. He reinforced the neo-Gothic interpretation of history (which takes its point of reference in the Visigothic kingdom) by referring to the rulers of the Reconquest as Goths, explaining in accordance with Isidore's *Etymologiae* that the name of the Goths, *gens fortissima*, derived from the very word *strength*.⁴⁶ Accordingly, as Kenneth Baxter has pointed out, the Bishop of Tuy transformed the barbaric ferocity of the Goths in the praiseworthy military courage of a nation that conquered the mighty Rome.⁴⁷ Through this, Spanish national identity became linked to military strength.

Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, known as 'el Toledano', has long been regarded as the most important and influential Latin chronicler of medieval Spain as well as the 'chief ideologist of the Castilian court'. Although of Navarrese origin, and an alumnus of both Paris and Bologna, it was in Castile where he made his mark, both as royal prelate in the service of Alfonso VIII and Ferdinand III, and as Archbishop of Toledo from 1208 until his death in 1247. Recent studies by Peter Linehan and Georges Martin describe Rodrigo's historiographic activity as inspired by 'Castilian aristocratic predilections' and directed against the Leonese propaganda of Lucas of Tuy.⁴⁸

Written around 1243, *De rebus Hispaniae* is perhaps the most successful attempt to systematize a new Castilian approach to Spanish history before the *estorias* from the time of King Alfonso the Wise. The objective of Don Rodrigo was to harmonize the neo-Gothic ideal of *praeclara Gothorum posteritas* with the ambitions of Castile as well as the claims of Toledo to be *caput regni* and the see

⁴⁴ Lucas of Tuy, *Chronicon mundi*, Praef. 1, p. 3.

⁴⁵ *Chronicon mundi*, Praef. 1, p. 3: 'De principe autem quem precedit sapiencia, roborat fortitudo, consilium firmat.'

⁴⁶ *Chronicon mundi*, ii.21, p. 135: 'Interpretatio namque nominis eius in linguam nostram recte quoque significatur fortitudo, quia reuera nulla gens in orbe fuit que Romanum Imperium adeo fatigauerit ut hii.'

⁴⁷ Kenneth Baxter, *Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1990), p. 17.

⁴⁸ Linehan, *History and the Historians*, pp. 313–419; Martin, *Les juges de Castille*, pp. 205–06. See also Ana Rodríguez, 'History and Topography for the Legitimation of Royalty in Three Castilian Chronicles', *Maiestas*, 12 (2004), 61–82.

of Spain's primate.⁴⁹ Composed in response to Ferdinand III's request for an account of Spanish *antiquitas*, *De rebus Hispaniae* takes on the character of a story of the decline and subsequent revival of the Spanish *patria* thanks to the recovery of the *strenuitas regia*.⁵⁰ Rodrigo's attempts to make Castile rather than León appear as the heir of ancient Visigothic strength marks a notable difference from the approach of Lucas of Tuy.

Castile's rulers assume the role of Don Rodrigo's ideal monarchs. In a sycophantic chapter he presents Alfonso VIII as a true model king by underlining the monarch's nobility of heart. Alfonso's patience, justice, tranquillity, and moderation transformed the charlatanry and ambition of his vassals into cheerfulness and virtue. But, above all, Rodrigo praises the Castilian king's 'solemn wisdom' and 'exemplary bravery'.⁵¹ Whereas Lucas of Tuy valued *humilitas* above all other royal virtues, Rodrigo's *optimus rex* is characterized above all by *sapientia* in combination with *strenuitas*. In fact, Rodrigo presents wisdom and learning as perennial characteristics of the Spanish nation and its Gothic predecessors. The Goths, whose reputation as barbaric invaders of the Roman Empire was far from untarnished, appear in Rodrigo's account as the most cultivated of the Germanic tribes.⁵² Their second settlement was in Dacia, where they had many kings well versed in admirable learning: Zeutas, Dicineus, Zalmoxis, and many others. Thanks to their wise kings (who are absent from Isidore of Seville's *De origine Gothorum*, the main source for Spanish chroniclers writing on ancient Gothic history),⁵³ the Goths virtually equalled the Greeks.⁵⁴ Naturally, the attribution of long and distinguished ancestry was a frequent preoccupation of national historians in the Middle Ages, but what is noteworthy about Don Rodrigo is that he tried to enhance the status of the Goths culturally. For all his usual common sense, he accepted the legendary tale⁵⁵ of the wise Visigothic kings which moreover accorded with his own view of kingship, in which the wisdom of the ruler was a

⁴⁹ Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 316.

⁵⁰ Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 353.

⁵¹ Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, *Historia de rebus Hispanie sive historia gothica* viii.4, ed. by Juan Fernández Valverde (CCCM, 72, p. 262); see also Linehan, 'On Further Thought', p. 427.

⁵² Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, *De rebus Hispaniae*, i.10, p. 25: 'Gothi sapientiores pene omnibus barbaris extiterunt Grecis pene consimiles.'

⁵³ Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 354.

⁵⁴ Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, *De rebus Hispaniae*, i.10, p. 25.

⁵⁵ His source was Jordanes, *Getica*, v.39–40. Probably Jordanes found this tale in the lost *Historia getica* of Dio Chrysostom (d. 120).

decisive political virtue. He describes Alfonso VIII not only as a warrior-king who bravely defeated the mighty armies of Islam in the Battle of Las Navas, but also as a seeker of wisdom who founded the first Spanish university at Palencia: 'Lest the burden of the charismata that had flowed onto him by the Holy Spirit be removed', explains Rodrigo, 'the King summoned wise people from the Gauls and Italy so that the discipline of wisdom would never be missing in his kingdom. In Palencia they gathered masters from all faculties to whom the King granted large stipends, so that, because of the desire of each of them for learning, wisdom flowed like manna in the mouth of every member of the faculty.'⁵⁶ We find here the topos of the king as *institutor scholarum*. The implausibility of the topos is patent, however, from the poor intellectual profile of the King of Castile and the fact that the University of Palencia was probably founded by the bishop of the city, Tello Téllez. The royal contribution to the development of the university seems to have been rather circumstantial.⁵⁷ In comparison to Rodrigo's extensive praise, the passage in Don Lucas's *Chronicon* concerning the foundation of the university strikes by its soberness:

At that time King Alfonso summoned the masters of theology and of the other liberal arts, and established schools in Palencia under the administration of the most reverend Tello, bishop of this city. For, as antiquity recalls, scholastic wisdom has always been strong there, as well as chivalry.⁵⁸

Don Lucas's attitude toward the foundation of the University of Salamanca in 1218 by Alfonso IX of León (his favourite king) is quite similar. The Bishop of

⁵⁶ Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, *De rebus Hispaniae*, vii.34, p. 256; see also Adeline Rucquoi, 'El Rey sabio: Cultura y poder en la monarquía medieval castellana', *Repoblación y Reconquista: Actas del III Congreso de Cultura Medieval* (Aguilar de Campoo: Codex Aquilarensis, 1991), 77–87 (p. 80); Adeline Rucquoi, 'La royauté sous Alphonse VIII de Castille', *Cahiers de linguistique et de civilisation hispaniques médiévales*, 23 (2000), 215–41 (pp. 215–16); Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña, 'El paradigma de los reyes sabios en el *De Rebus Hispaniae* de Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada', in *Sevilla, 1248*, ed. by Manuel González (Madrid: Fundación Ramón Areces, 2000), pp. 757–65; Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña, 'Rex scholaribus impendebant: The King's Image as Patron of Learning in Thirteenth Century French and Spanish Chronicles: A Comparative Approach', *Medieval History Journal*, 5 (2002), 21–36 (pp. 28–33).

⁵⁷ See Adeline Rucquoi, 'La double vie de l'Université de Palencia (circa 1180–1250)', *Studia gratiana*, 29 (1998), 723–48 (pp. 723–29).

⁵⁸ Lucas of Tuy, *Chronicon mundi*, iv.84, p. 324: 'Eo tempore rex Adefonsus euocauit magistros teologichos et aliarum arcium liberalium et Palencie scholas constituit procurante reuerentissimo et nobilissimo uiro Tellione eiusdem ciuitatis episcopo. Quia ut antiquitas refert, semper ubi uiguit scolastica sapiencia, uiguit et milicia.'

Tuy again stressed the episcopal advice received by the King.⁵⁹ Yet Lucas praised Alfonso VIII as embodying strength and wisdom⁶⁰ and quoted the Platonic proverb regarding the happiness of a land ruled by a wise king (*beata terra cuius rex sapiens est*, a variant of Eccl. 10. 17).⁶¹ He even praised the Castilian king as a Salomon of our times (*alter nostris temporibus Salomon*), albeit merely in relation to Alfonso VIII's foundation of the royal nunnery of Las Huelgas in Burgos.⁶²

The third Latin history under consideration here, the so-called *Chronica latina regum Castellae*, stands apart from the other two. Its unique manuscript lacks both a prologue and an indication of its author, but the text is now attributed to Juan of Soria (d. 1246), chancellor of Ferdinand III and successively Abbot of Santander and Bishop of Osma and Burgos.⁶³ After a rapid review of the first two centuries of Castilian history, the *Chronica* dedicates sixty-seven of its seventy-five chapters to the eighty years between the accession of Alfonso VIII and the conquest of Córdoba. The narrative concludes in 1236, which is also the last year covered by the *Chronicon* of Lucas of Tuy.

Introducing the crusading theme in Spanish historiography, Juan presented the victories of Ferdinand III, *miles Christi fortissimus*, as blows struck for the exaltation of the name of Christ rather than for the aggrandizement of the kingdom of Castile.⁶⁴ Yet he praised God for having awarded 'the glory of the famous victory at Las Navas to Spain, and particularly to the kingdom of Castile, and not to the crusaders from the rest of Europe'.⁶⁵ From this passage one may infer that Juan regarded strength as a religious virtue in the fight against Islam. Strength also appears in the *Chronica* as a personal virtue of Alfonso VIII combined with wisdom and other virtues like justice, generosity, integrity, and

⁵⁹ *Chronicon mundi*, iv.96, p. 335: 'Hic, salutari consilio evocavit magistros peritissimos in Sacris Scripturis et constituit scholas fieri Salamantice.'

⁶⁰ *Chronicon mundi*, iv.83, p. 321: 'Fuit namque sapiencia magnus, consilio prouidus, armis strenuus, largitate precipuus et fide catholica roboratus.'

⁶¹ *Chronicon mundi*, Praef. 1, p. 4.

⁶² *Chronicon mundi*, iv.84, p. 324; see also Rodríguez de la Peña, 'El paradigma', p. 759.

⁶³ Derek W. Lomax, 'The Authorship of the *Chronique Latine des Rois des Castille*', *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*, 40 (1963), 205–11.

⁶⁴ See Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña, 'La Cruzada como discurso político en la cronística alfonsi', *Alcanate*, 2 (2000–01), 23–42.

⁶⁵ Juan of Soria, *Chronica latina regum Castellae*, 22, ed. by Luis Charlo Brea (CCCM, 73, p. 58).

prudence.⁶⁶ However, all evidence leads to conclude that Juan of Soria, unlike Don Rodrigo, did not consider intellectual qualities as important for a Christian king as military courage. Crusading warfare was to be his main duty for centuries, and wisdom could be dispensed with.⁶⁷

V. Alfonso X: *Wisdom*

Alfonso X of Castile (r. 1252–84), named ‘el Sabio’ (the Wise, or the Learned), saw himself as king or even emperor of all Spain and struggled during most of his reign to validate his claims as Holy Roman Emperor. Throughout a life of war and tension, Alfonso promoted and closely directed at his court an outpouring of creative works, including major translations, in law, literary fiction, music, astronomy, education, history, games, and Islamic and Jewish erudition.⁶⁸ Scholarship has disclosed much evidence of Alfonso’s personal intervention in the work of his translators and scientists.⁶⁹

The Castilian royal *scriptorium* attempted to present Alfonso X as a wise king across a wide variety of vernacular texts, ranging from prologues to astronomical treatises and board games to poems in praise of the Holy Virgin. The praise of Alfonso as a learned ruler was not unique in the Middle Ages, since notably Emperor Frederic II (Alfonso’s uncle) was eulogized in similar terms.⁷⁰ According

⁶⁶ *Chronica latina*, 28, p. 68: ‘Flos regni fuit, decus mundi, omni morum probitate conspicuus, iustus, prudens, strenuus, largus, ex nulla parte maculam in gloria sua posuit’; cf. 17, p. 52: ‘Nobilis igitur rex Castelle licet, tanquam uir sapiens et discretus, intelligeret.’

⁶⁷ See Ana Rodríguez, ‘De rebus Hispaniae frente a la *Crónica latina de los reyes de Castilla*: Virtudes regias y reciprocidad política en Castilla y León en la primera mitad del siglo XIII’, *Cahiers de linguistique et de civilisation hispaniques médiévales*, 26 (2003), 133–49.

⁶⁸ See Joseph F. O’Callaghan, *The Learned King: The Reign of Alfonso X of Castile* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); Evelyn S. Procter, *Alfonso X of Castile: Patron of Literature and Learning* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951); Robert I. Burns, ‘Castle of Intellect, Castle of Force: The Worlds of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror’, in *The Worlds of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror: Intellect and Force in the Middle Ages*, ed. by Robert I. Burns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 3–22 (p. 13).

⁶⁹ See Evelyn S. Procter, ‘The Scientific Works of the Court of Alfonso X of Castile: The King and His Collaborators’, *Modern Language Review*, 40 (1945), 12–29.

⁷⁰ Kirstin Kennedy, ‘The *Sabio*-Topos: Prologues of Alfonso X in the Context of his Thirteenth-Century Royal Contemporaries’, *Proceedings of the Ninth Colloquium (Medieval Hispanic Research Seminar)*, ed. by Andrew Beresford and Alan Deyermond (London: Queen Mary and Westfield College, 2000), pp. 175–90 (p. 176).

to the Alfonsine prologues, the King restored learning to Spain and acted as a teacher of his people who possessed a deeper knowledge of science than the scholars he hired.⁷¹ We find here the *rex institutor scholarum* topos employed earlier by Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, but now applied unanimously and with greater plausibility. Moreover, the prologues explicitly compare Alfonso to Salomon, concentrating on the wisdom of the latter rather than on his qualities as a legislator (III Reg. 3. 28) or his medieval reputation as a magician.⁷² For example, the *Libro de las cruces* states that the King, to whom God had given greater knowledge than to any other ruler of his time, resembled Salomon in his quest for wisdom ('el Rey semaja a Salamon en buscar et espaladinar los saberes').⁷³

As for historiography, a staff working under Alfonso's direction produced two seminal works with confusingly similar titles: the *Crónica general de España*, or *Estoria de Espanna*, a history of Spain up to the reign of Alfonso's father Ferdinand III, and the *General estoria*, a history of the world running from antiquity almost to the time of Christ.⁷⁴ Alfonso stated in the prologue of the *General estoria* that the true purpose of history was moral education, 'so that men would take example to do good from the deeds of the good, and receive a lesson in what to avoid from the deeds of the wicked'.⁷⁵ Likewise, the prologue of the *Estoria de Espanna* is preceded by a Latin poem in which Alfonso is presented as a teacher of his subjects.⁷⁶ Finally, the famous work of royal legislation known as the *Siete partidas* (Seven divisions [of law], c. 1265) introduces the theme of Salomonic wisdom as well. According to the second *partida*, future kings should learn, among other things,

⁷¹ Kennedy, 'The *Sabio*-Topos', p. 181.

⁷² Kennedy, 'The *Sabio*-Topos', p. 177.

⁷³ Kennedy, 'The *Sabio*-Topos', p. 178.

⁷⁴ See Georges Martin, 'El modelo historiográfico alfonsí y sus antecedentes', *La historia alfonsí: El modelo y sus destinos (siglos XIII–XV)*, ed. by Georges Martin (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2000), pp. 9–40.

⁷⁵ *General estoria*, 1 Praef., ed. by Antonio G. Solalinde (Madrid: CSIC, 1930), p. 1b: 'delos fechos de los buenos tomassen los omnes exemplo pora fazer bien, et de los fechos de los malos que reçibiessen castigo por se saber guardar delo non fazer.'

⁷⁶ See *Primera crónica general: Estoria de España que mandó componer Alfonso el Sabio y se continuaba bajo Sancho IV en 1289*, ed. by Ramón Menéndez Pidal (Madrid: Bailly-Baillière, 1906); Diego Catalán Menéndez Pidal, *La Estoria de España de Alfonso X: Creación y evolución* (Madrid: Fundación Ramón Menéndez Pidal, 1992).

reading and writing, which is very advantageous to the one who knows[...]. The king should be eager to learn the liberal arts, because by them he will understand the essence of things and will better know how to work with them, and also by knowing how to read he will better know how to guard his secrets and be lord of them, which in any other manner he would not be able to do well, because his ignorance in these matters would force him to involve another person who has such knowledge. And it could come to pass to him what King Salomon said, that he who places his secret in another's power makes himself that person's slave; and he who knows how to keep it to himself is lord of his heart, which is very appropriate for a king.⁷⁷

It is significant that strength, suddenly forgotten by the Castilian ideologists, was now replaced as a main royal virtue with wisdom. The substitution is not surprising in view of Alfonso's intellectual profile and the end of the Islamic menace in the south. Indeed, the downgrading of *strenuitas* as a royal virtue in his sponsored works had probably much to do with his own lack of interest for warfare and his love for books and Roman Law. Moreover, the development of the Alfonsine treatment of the king's spiritual function is reminiscent of the Aristotelian discourse of Frederic II's *Constitutions of Melfi* (1231), where justice was proclaimed the main political virtue.⁷⁸ As Roberto González-Casanovas has pointed out, the Alfonsine legal codes (*Espéculo*, *Fuero real*, and *Siete partidas*) 'projected an image of the king as wise lawgiver; for Alfonso, the king's authority, as writer, interpreter, and enacter of the laws, had to make manifest God's grace.'⁷⁹ In the third prologue of the *Siete partidas*, for instance, Alfonso X poses as a Salomon whose justice matched his wisdom:

Kings, knowing the things which are true and right, do the things which they have to and will not consent to others which pass against them. As was said of King Salomon, who was very wise and administered justice very fairly, when the king rules in his seat of justice

⁷⁷ *Siete partidas*, ii.16, ed. by Emiliano González (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1985): 'acucioso deve el rey ser en aprender los saberes: ca por ellos entendera las cosas de reyes e sabra mejor obrar en ellas. E otrosi, por saber leer sabra mejor guardar sus poridades et ser señor dellas, lo que de otra guisa non podria bien fazer. Ca por la mengua de non saber estas cosas, avria por fuerça a meter otro consigo que lo sopiesse. E poderle ya avenir, lo que dixo el rey Salomon, que el que mete su poridad en poder de otro faze se su siervo, e quien la sabe guardar es señor de su coraçon, lo que conviene mucho al rey.'

⁷⁸ Linehan, *History and the Historians*, p. 431; David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 206–07.

⁷⁹ Roberto J. González-Casanovas, 'Courtly Rhetoric as a Political and Social Code in Alfonso X: The Prologues to the *Espéculo* and the *Siete Partidas*', in *Medieval Iberia: Essays on the History and Literature of Medieval Spain*, ed. by Donald J. Kagay and Joseph T. Snow (New York: Lang, 1997), pp. 129–41 (p. 129).

(*cátedra de justicia*), under his gaze all evils will be resolved[...]. For this reason, we have made illustriously this our book of laws so the kings of our dominion may look in it as in a mirror.⁸⁰

As a result of Alfonsine ideological influence, only justice could equal wisdom in Castilian political thought in the next one hundred years.

It is evident from our survey that the theme of Salomonic kingship (in its two biblical dimensions: wisdom and justice) entered Spanish literature only during the second half of the thirteenth century in connection with a king whose personal wisdom was undisputed and even legendary. Whereas in twelfth-century Europe the Platonic ideal of a 'philosopher-king' (known from *De consolacione philosophiae* of Boethius) merged with the biblical image of Salomon into the courtly theme of learned Christian rulers,⁸¹ particularly in the *Policraticus* of John of Salisbury, Spanish authors writing on kingship in the twelfth and early thirteenth century remained preoccupied with the virtue of strength, which they first of all understood as military valour conferred by God in order to wage war against Islam. Only in some Cluniac chronicles do we find cursory references to such 'intellectual' virtues as prudence and wisdom. In the 1230s, Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada and Lucas of Tuy were the first to emphasize wisdom as a central royal virtue and to compare the king to Salomon, respectively, but their observations remained rather superficial and they always gave priority to other virtues as strength, humility, or nobility. The consistent interpretation of Hispanic kingship in terms of Salomonic wisdom was to some degree a fruit of the reign of Alfonso the Wise in a time in which kingship was again the central subject of any discourse in Christian Spain,⁸² and the hero topos languished as a result of the near end of the centuries-old Reconquest.

⁸⁰ *Siete partidas*, Prol. 3, 217–18: 'Ca los reyes, sabiendo las cosas que son verdaderas et derechas, fazer las an ellos et non consintirán a los otros que pasen contra ellas, segunt dixo el Rey Salamón. Que fue muy sabio et muy justiciero, que quando el Rey sobiera en su cátedra de justicia, que ante el su acatamiento serán desatados todos los males [...] por esta razón fezimos señalada ment este nuestro libro porque sienpre los reyes de nuestro señorío caten en él así commo en el espejo.'

⁸¹ See Wilhem Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters* (Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1938), p. 66; see also Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña, 'Imago sapientiae: Los orígenes del ideal sapiencial medieval', *Medievalismo*, 7 (1997), 11–39.

⁸² See Francesco C. Cesáreo, 'The Centrality of the King in the Thought of Alfonso of León-Castile', in *Kings and Kingship*, ed. by Joel T. Rosenthal (Binghamton: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 121–31.

PRINCELY VIRTUES OR VIRTUES FOR PRINCES? WILLIAM PERALDUS AND HIS *DE ERUDITIONE PRINCIPUM*

Michiel Verweij

I. Introduction

The French Dominican William Peraldus (fl. c. 1250) is mainly known for his two vast summae of the virtues and vices, which together constitute the most widely transmitted medieval encyclopedia of moral concepts.¹ However, he left some other works as well, among which circulate a series of sermons and a treatise on the education of princes, *De eruditione principum*.² In

I would like to thank István Bejczy for his most valuable advice in improving this article.

¹ For a survey of the life and works of Peraldus, see Antoine Dondaine, 'Guillaume Peyraut: Vie et oeuvres', *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum*, 18 (1948), 162–236; Thomas Kaeppli, *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum medii aevi*, 4 vols (Rome: Ad S. Sabinae and Istituto storico domenicano, 1970–93), II (1973), 133–42, and IV, completed by Emilio Panella (1993), 106. For the transmission of the summae in particular, see Michiel Verweij, 'The Manuscript Transmission of the *Summa de virtutibus* by Guilielmus Peraldus: A Preliminary Survey of the Manuscripts', *Medioevo*, 31 (2006), 103–297.

² See Dondaine, 'Guillaume Peyraut', pp. 220–32; Kaeppli, *Scriptores*, II, 150–52. The work has been edited in the *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici ordinis praedicatorum opera omnia*, 25 vols (Parma: Fiacadori, 1852–73), XVI (1864), 390–476, an edition which is also accessible on the Internet: www.corpusthomisticum.org/xre0.html. All quotations from *De eruditione principum* are taken from this edition; I have respected the classicized orthography (with some peculiarities of the nineteenth century). A more recent edition is included in *S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia*, ed. by Robertus Busa, 7 vols (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), VII, 89–121.

the past, this last work has sometimes been attributed to Thomas Aquinas on the basis of an attribution found in the oldest manuscript, dated 1303 (MS Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 811),³ but in 1948 Antoine Dondaine offered some decisive arguments in favour of Peraldus's authorship.⁴ The way the author refers to himself in the prologue, *in ordine fratrum praedicatorum minimus*, repeats almost literally the self-designation of Peraldus in the prologue of the *Summa de virtutibus*.⁵ Peraldus wrote his work at the request of 'some prince' (*a quodam principe rogatus*),⁶ perhaps the King of Navarre.⁷

Of all known works by Peraldus, *De eruditione principum* appears to have been completed last: it is generally dated about 1265. The treatise met with quite a bit of success in medieval and early-modern times. Dondaine lists thirty-one manuscripts plus three manuscripts of a French translation; Thomas Kaeppli adds twenty Latin manuscripts to Dondaine's list as well as an Italian version

³ See Augustus Pelzer, *Codices Vaticani Latini*, II, 1: *Codices 679–1134*, Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae codices manu scripti recensiti (Vatican City: Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, 1931), pp. 151–52. In this catalogue no connection with Peraldus is made or suggested.

⁴ See Dondaine, 'Guillaume Peyraut', pp. 221–25.

⁵ William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus*, Prol.: 'ego minimus de ordine fratrum predicatorum desideravi colligere aliqua que difficile in scriptis de virtutibus inveniuntur' (quotation after MS Brussels, Koninklijke Bibliotheek / Bibliothèque royale 5614–16, fol. 209^{va}). In view of the absence of a modern critical edition of both Peraldian summae, I will quote the text and refer to it as found in one of the manuscripts. There are at least thirty-eight editions of the summae, which means that all references are necessarily arbitrary. MS 5614–16 from the Royal Library in Brussels dates from the (early) fourteenth century and probably belongs to the important (and generally good) Parisian branch of the text transmission; see Verweij, 'The Manuscript Transmission', p. 122, no. II, 26.

⁶ See William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, Prooem., p. 390: 'Propterea ego in ordine fratrum praedicatorum minimus a quodam principe rogatus et ad acquiescendum ejus precibus a majoribus meis, quibus obedire debebam, inductus, ad gloriam beatissimae Trinitatis colligere volui aliqua ad instructionem et ad exhortationem principum utilia.'

⁷ See Dondaine, 'Guillaume Peyraut', pp. 222 and 230–31. This attribution is suggested by the colophon in MS Valencia, Biblioteca universitaria, 1764: 'precibus regis tunch nauarre'; cf. Marcelino Gutiérrez del Caño, *Catálogo de los manuscritos existentes en la Biblioteca Universitaria de Valencia*, 3 vols (Valencia: Librería Maragat, 1913), III, 22. This manuscript is dated 1476. If this attribution is correct, the most likely candidate would be Thibaud II, Count of Champagne and King of Navarre (1253–70). It should, however, be stressed that this attribution is found only in this Valencia manuscript and that Peraldus does not refer to a specific prince in the *Prologus* himself.

surviving in a single manuscript.⁸ The text seems to have been edited for the first time in the Roman edition of the works of Thomas Aquinas published in 1570,⁹ an edition based on the Vatican manuscript mentioned above. Despite this success, the treatise has largely been neglected in modern scholarship.¹⁰ Studies exclusively devoted to it simply do not exist, with the exception of one recent article concerned with the miniatures in one of the manuscripts containing the French translation.¹¹ It is the aim of this article to present an analysis of the treatise, with special attention for the schemes of virtues used (or neglected) by Peraldus in order to structure his treatise and uphold moral lessons to his

⁸ See n. 1, above, for the references. Whereas the Royal Library in Brussels has manuscripts of all other works by Peraldus, it has none containing *De eruditione principum*.

⁹ *Opera omnia S. Thomae*, XVII (Rome: Accoltus, 1570), fols 226^v–67^v.

¹⁰ In the note on *De eruditione principum* in Hans Hubert Anton and others, 'Fürstenspiegel', in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, 10 vols (Zürich: Artemis; Munich: LexMA, 1980–99), IV (1987), 1040–58 (p. 1045), Peraldus's treatise is still mentioned as by 'Ps.-Thomas'. It is discussed in Wilhelm Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters* (Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1938), pp. 185–95 and 308–13. However, most of the discussion revolves around the authorship; rather unexpectedly, Berges makes Peraldus turn up as a member of the Dominican circles in Paris. As Berges considers our treatise as a (rather disappointing) final stage of the works and efforts of Vincent of Beauvais, his judgement on the text is rather negative. Following Berges's suggestion, Jacques Krynen, *L'empire du roi: Idées et croyances politiques en France, XIII^e–XV^e siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), pp. 173–79, briefly discusses Peraldus's treatise and the *De morali principis institutione*, ascribed to Vincent of Beauvais, together. He abandons Berges's theory of a close relationship between these works and stresses the differences between both almost contemporary works from a Dominican environment. According to Krynen, *De morali principis institutione* departs from the 'réalité monarchique et administrative de l'époque' and 'oeuvre consciemment au renforcement de la figure du roi', whereas Peraldus 's'adresse [...] à la société féodale' and 'l'ignore [*viz. the person of the king*], comme si la société devait continuer à vivre sous l'égide immuable des barons'. However, like many French historians who use the borders of present-day France for the distant past, Krynen forgets that Peraldus worked in Lyon, which at the time was not a French city, but belonged to the kingdom of Burgundy, part of the Holy Roman Empire. Lyon was annexed to France only by Philippe le Bel in 1307. Peraldus had no reason whatsoever to think of the King of France in particular: the reality in which he lived was that of feudalism and feudalism alone.

¹¹ See Christiane Raynaud, 'Images d'une éducation choisie: L'Enseignement des princes de Guillaume Peyraut et le *Livre du gouvernement des princes* de Gilles de Rome dans le ms. 434 de la bibliothèque municipale de Besançon', in *Education, apprentissages, initiation au moyen âge*, 2 vols (Montpellier: Centre de recherche interdisciplinaire sur la société et l'imaginaire au moyen âge, 1993), II, 429–47. MS Besançon, Bibliothèque municipale, 434, appears to have belonged to the French king Charles V.

audience. After a discussion of the work's general outline and a survey of its sources in the following section, I will analyze its contents and attempt to seize Peraldus's understanding of virtuous princely government (section 3).

II. *De eruditione principum*: Structure and Sources

De eruditione principum consists of a prologue and seven books which each develop a specific topic. While the first book examines princely rule in general, the second to seventh books explore the different kinds of relations which the prince entertains with himself and with others. The second book sets rules for the behaviour of the prince toward God and the Church; the third book discusses his attitude toward himself. The remaining books deal with those who are dependent on the prince: his court (Book IV), his offspring (Book V), his subjects (Book VI), and his enemies (Book VII).¹² The order of the books evolves from a clear hierarchy. The dealings of the prince with God and the Church come first, since these are the two instances which occupy a position superior to princely government.¹³ Next comes the attitude of the prince toward himself, while his attitude toward others comes last. The hierarchy corresponds to the traditional medieval notion that human beings should love God first, then themselves, then others. What is particular to Peraldus is that he gives the Church a position equal to God: the first duties of the prince pertain to 'God and his Church'.¹⁴ In fact, the starting point of his work is the Church, as Peraldus makes clear in the *Prooemium* to his treatise. Peraldus states in his opening sentence that the princes form part of the Church and that the *minores* depend on them, so that it is fitting

¹² William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, Prol., p. 390: 'Opus vero istud decrevi in septem libros distinguere, ut ea quae in ipso continentur et facilius inveniantur et melius in memoria teneantur. In primo libro agitur in communi de quibusdam quae ad principes pertinent; in secundo ostenditur quomodo ad Deum et Ecclesiam eius habere se debeant; in tertio quomodo ad seipsos; in quarto quomodo ad eos qui sunt circa ipsos; in quinto quomodo ad eos qui sunt ex ipsis, scilicet ad filios; in sexto quomodo ad populum sibi subditum; in septimo quomodo ad eos qui sunt contra ipsos, scilicet ad hostes.'

¹³ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, iii Prooem., p. 414: 'Ostensum est in praecedenti libro, quomodo princeps habere se debeat ad eum qui est super eum, scilicet ad Deum, vel ejus Ecclesiam.'

¹⁴ See the two previous notes and William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii Prooem., p. 405: 'ostendetur in hoc secundo libro, quomodo princeps habere se debeat ad Deum, et ejus Ecclesiam.'

that clerics should take care of princes.¹⁵ In doing so, clerics follow the example of Paul, who already knew that the goodness of the princes is of great use to the Church, and that ecclesiastical leaders should regret seeing deterioration among the higher orders of society, degeneration among the generous, and deformity in those who should be elevated above all others.¹⁶ In this way, Peraldus defends the fact that clerics (including himself!) occupy themselves with the princes, basing his position on the universality of the Church and its concern for all members of society, meanwhile clearly putting forth the supremacy of the Church. A similar 'reduction of politics to religion' can be found, for instance, in the *Eruditio regum et principum*, written by the Franciscan friar Gilbert of Tournai (d. 1284) for King Louis IX of France.¹⁷

Peraldus's predominantly religious perspective is also apparent from his use of sources. The writings of Peraldus often give the impression of consisting of, in large part, a patchwork of quotations. Insight into Peraldus's knowledge of sources and his way of handling and interpreting them is therefore essential for an assessment of his method and personal views. Like many contemporary pastoral authors, Peraldus tended not to acknowledge sources written after the middle of the twelfth century. In his *Summa de virtutibus*, for instance, he conceals his frequent use of the *Moralium dogma philosophorum* as well as his occasional borrowings from theological authorities such as Peter Lombard, William of Auxerre, and Peter the Chancellor. He does, however, explicitly mention the authors quoted in these texts, often rearranging these quotations or replacing some of them with others. As a result, many of the explicit references in this work concern his indirect sources, while some of his direct sources remain hidden. Yet it is by aid of his explicit references that Peraldus lends authority to his text. A

¹⁵ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, Prol., p. 390: 'Cum pars illustris Ecclesiae sit coetus principum et initium ab eis dependeat vitae minorum, non est negligenda cura eorum ab his qui Ecclesiae habent zelum.'

¹⁶ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, Prol., p. 390: 'Nec mirum quod haec faciebat Paulus: sciebat enim bonitatem eorum valde utilem esse Ecclesiae Dei multumque dolendum esse his qui Ecclesiam regunt cum conspiciunt in optimatibus deteriorationem, in generosis degenerationem et deformitatem in illis qui debuerunt esse prae ceteris speciosi.'

¹⁷ See Carla Casagrande, 'Le roi, les anges et la paix chez le franciscain Guibert de Tournai', in *Prêcher la paix et discipliner la société: Italie, France, Angleterre (XIII^e-XV^e siècles)*, ed. by Rosa Maria Dessi, Collection d'études médiévales de Nice, 5 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 141-53 (especially p. 153: 'Il s'agit d'une sorte de *reductio* du "politique" au "religieux", et donc d'une opposition implicite mais ferme aux théories politiques des aristotéliens').

study of his acknowledged sources in *De eruditione principum* can thus reveal what sort of impression Peraldus wants to make on his audience.

With regard to explicit quotations, the results point in a specific direction. If one counts all explicitly marked quotations from the seventh book, dealing with the prince's attitude toward his enemies, one finds a total of 118. Of these, 88 (i.e., 74.6 per cent) stem from the Bible, the remaining quarter being divided among 'Seneca' (9 = 7.6 per cent), Augustine (8 = 6.7 per cent), Bernard of Clairvaux (5), Gregory the Great (2), and Cicero, Horace, Jerome, Origen, and Aristotle (1 each); finally, an unidentified source about Diogenes is quoted. This division gives us a clear insight into Peraldus's cultural spectre. Peraldus mainly argues using passages from the Bible and patristic authorities up to Bernard of Clairvaux, even in the field of political morality. He certainly did not want to pose as an academic. Even if he had some knowledge of Aristotle, the Philosopher plays a very moderate role in his treatise (as in the *Summa de virtutibus*). Neither did Peraldus mainly assemble classical authorities, as his contemporary John of Wales did when discussing secular rule in his *Breviloquium de virtutibus*. Classical antiquity is mainly represented by Seneca (or what was considered to be Seneca; some of the passages attributed to him derive in reality from Martin of Braga's *Formula vitae honestae*).¹⁸ The same situation exists in the other books, as can easily be inferred from the quotations below.

As to Peraldus's recent and unacknowledged sources, one should note first of all the parallels between many longer passages from *De eruditione principum* and Peraldus's own *Summa de virtutibus* and *Summa de vitiis*. Antoine Dondaine has listed the most extensive parallels:¹⁹

De eruditione principum, i.4–5 = *Summa de vitiis*, *Superbia*, pars iii, caput 28–29²⁰

De eruditione principum, i.12 = *Summa de virtutibus*, *Iustitia*, pars xiv

De eruditione principum, i.14 = *Summa de virtutibus*, *Temperantia*, caput 6

De eruditione principum, ii.2² = *Summa de virtutibus*, *Fides*, caput 4 (end)

De eruditione principum, ii.7 = *Summa de virtutibus*, *Spes*, caput 4

¹⁸ From the nine quotations said to be from Seneca, seven are really Senecan (*Ep. Luc.* and *Clem.*), one is from the *Formula vitae honestae* by Martin of Braga which often was attributed to Seneca as well, and one is as yet unidentified.

¹⁹ See Dondaine, 'Guillaume Peyraut', p. 226. The same procedure is seen also in Peraldus's *De eruditione religiosorum*.

²⁰ Dondaine overlooked this parallel.

De eruditione principum, ii.8 = *Summa de virtutibus*, *De dono timoris*, caput 2

De eruditione principum, ii.11–12 = *Summa de virtutibus*, *Caritas*, caput 7–8

De eruditione principum, iii.7–9 = *Summa de virtutibus*, *Beatitudines*, pars iv, caput 2–3

De eruditione principum, iv.3–8 = *Summa de vitiis*, *Avaritia*, pars ii, caput 5

De eruditione principum, vi.2–3, 5–6 = *Summa de vitiis*, *Avaritia*, pars ii, caput 2–3

De eruditione principum, vii.8–12 = *Summa de vitiis*, *Ira*, pars iii, caput 1–3.

It is evident that in the early books of *De eruditione principum* Peraldus uses the *Summa de virtutibus*, whereas the later books contain sections from the *Summa de vitiis*. It is important to note that the borrowings do not appear in the order in which Peraldus discusses the virtues and vices in his summae. Hence, his treatise on the education of princes does not follow the pattern of his two larger moral encyclopedias; there seems not even to be a clearly defined pattern at all, except in the second book, in which the discussion on the theological virtues in the *Summa de virtutibus* seems to have formed the framework. Moreover, the absence of borrowings from the *Summa*'s discussion on the cardinal virtues (except for one section from *Iustitia*) is quite astonishing. Peraldus's contemporary Giles of Rome devoted a large section of *De regimine principum* to the cardinal virtues and their subspecies (the remaining virtues listed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*); some other thirteenth-century authors even employed the cardinal virtues as the main scheme of their tracts on political morality (Giles of Paris, *Karolinus*; John of Wales, *Breviloquium de virtutibus*; Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum*; Henry of Rimini, *Liber de quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus*). In *De eruditione principum*, however, the cardinal quartet only occurs in a single passage which, moreover, is borrowed from Bernard of Clairvaux's *De consideratione*.²¹ Considering secular government in the light of the theological virtues, as Peraldus does in his second book, is a much less current phenomenon, which is a reason for considering it in some detail in the next section.

III. *Virtuous Government*

If Peraldus has any sort of a theory on politics (which is something different from a political theory!), it has secure theological roots. The *Prooemium* sets forth a rather negative view on political power, inferred for the most part from patristic authorities. All men are equal by nature, argues Peraldus; the domination of one

²¹ See William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, iii.4, pp. 416–17.

man over others is not natural — man was created to govern the irrational creatures, not his fellow men — but a consequence of the Fall. God's command or popular usefulness may justify the assumption of political power which, however, remains to be feared and distrusted rather than desired for its own sake.²² The love of power is a danger for those who wield it. Princes should avoid the seeming honour of lordship, just like Emperor Augustus, who forbade that anyone should call him 'lord'; they should realize that there is only one Lord and that their rule amounts to *ministerium* rather than *dominium*.²³ It is not to be wondered at that the first thing to come to the aid of the ruler is wisdom (Book I, Chapter 2), but in its own turn this wisdom has need for goodness (Chapter 3). In the beginning of the chapter on goodness, the close relationship with the position of the Church becomes clear once again: the combination of goodness, power, and wisdom is useful for God's Church, which suffers, by contrast, from the diabolical combination of power, shrewdness, and evil.²⁴ The prime virtues of

²² William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, i.1, pp. 390–91: 'Cum inordinatus amor potestatis terrenaе multum, noceat, juxta illud Bernardi in Lib. de Consid. *nullum tibi venenum, nullum gladium plus formido quam libidinem dominandi*; diligenter attendendae sunt conditiones hujus potestatis, ex quibus manifestum erit, quod ipsa est timenda, et non propter se appetenda, licet aliquando suscipienda sit propter Dei ordinationem, et populi utilitatem. Sciendum ergo, quod potestas terrena, qua homo super alios homines est, non est res naturae, sed sequela culpae [...] non enim datum est homini ab initio, ut praeesset hominibus, sed ut praeesset creaturis irrationabilibus. Gen. 1: *faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit piscibus maris, et volucris caeli, et bestiis terrae*. Naturaliter aequitas est inter homines, non praelatio. Gregorius: *omnes homines naturaliter sunt pares*. Item ibid.: *non est data homini praelatio ut dominetur hominibus, sed bestiis terrae et volucris et piscibus, idest hominibus in eo quod induunt faciem horum*.' For the connection between the Fall and political power in medieval thought, see Wolfgang Stürner, *Peccatum und Potestas: Der Sündenfall und die Entstehung der herrscherlichen Gewalt im mittelalterlichen Staatsdenken* (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1987); Bernhard Töpfer, *Urzustand und Sündenfall in der mittelalterlichen Gesellschafts- und Staatstheorie* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1999). Neither study mentions Peraldus.

²³ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, i.1, p. 391: 'Sublimitas honorum magnitudo scelerum est: dominium esse videtur, cum potius sit subjectio: ministerium potest homo habere in talibus; sed verum dominium illius est, qui ait: *ego dominus, ego dominus* Lev. 19, et cui Ecclesia dicit: *tu solus dominus*. Augustus Caesar cum toti mundo praeesset, prohibuit ne aliquis eum dominum vocaret.' The reference to Augustus bears on the legend of the *Ara coeli* and the Church of Santa Maria in Aracoeli in Rome.

²⁴ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, i.3, p. 394: 'Notandum ergo quod si bonitas potestatem et sapientiam concomitetur, eis bene utitur, et est hoc multum utile Ecclesiae Dei; si vero bonitas desit, et malitia adsit, male utentur eis, et est Ecclesiae valde noxium, ut patet in Diabolo habente magnam potestatem et astutiam sine bonitate.'

a prince seem to be wisdom and goodness; if in a number of medieval moral and political tracts justice takes the place of an overarching principle, this is not the case in Peraldus, who hardly mentions this virtue in the first book. Generally, the tone of *De eruditione principum* is more pastoral than scholarly or philosophic, as is notably apparent from the discussion of goodness. The rest of the chapter is mainly taken up with an enumeration of seven factors stimulating moral goodness, but actually none of these is specific for a prince: the goodness of the heavenly Father, the fact that we have a good Lord who hates wickedness, the corruption involved in loving goodness in outer things but not in ourselves, and so on. This is typical of the way Peraldus proceeds. He starts with a general statement, often illustrated with a quotation from the Bible, the general tenure of which is that a certain virtue is important. Then he expands on that virtue, lavishly illustrating it with (mostly biblical) quotations which underline its general utility rather than its specific relevance to princely rule.

From the discussion of nobility (Chapters 4–5) one may actually infer that the prince, for Peraldus, is no more than a common human being invested with special responsibilities. From the early Middle Ages, moral authors distinguished the nobility of the soul from the nobility of the body or the blood. Twelfth- and thirteenth-century authors of moral-political tracts tended to understand nobility primarily as a mental quality, claiming, however, that noble descent predisposed princes to acquire a noble character.²⁵ Peraldus takes a radical stand in this discussion. He takes a whole chapter to reject, and even to ridicule, the opinions of those who believe that nobility has anything to do with bodily qualities or pedigree. In his view, noble lineage is not an encouragement for true nobility, but rather a false conception in the first place. We are all God's children, argues Peraldus; in this respect, all human beings have equally noble origins. Moreover,

²⁵ Walter Map suggested in *De nugis curialium* (c. 1183–91) that people of low birth were unable to acquire virtues, while Giles of Paris, author of the *Karolinus* (1200), connected virtuous government with Carolingian blood; see Björn Weiler, 'Royal Justice in English Historical Writing', in *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, ed. by István P. Bejczy and Richard G. Newhauser (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 317–39 (pp. 334–36); Céline Billot-Vilandrau, 'Charlemagne and the Young Prince: A Didactic Poem on the Cardinal Virtues by Giles of Paris (c. 1200)', in *ibid.*, pp. 341–54 (pp. 351–54). Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum*, Praef. and ii.14, in *Bibliotheca ascetica antiquo-nova*, ed. by Bernard Pez, 3 vols (Regensburg: Peezcius, 1724; repr. Farnborough: Gregg, 1967), III, 4–5 and 71 (fully quoted in Billot-Vilandrau, 'Charlemagne and the Young Prince', p. 353) considered moral virtues as innate qualities of princes; however, nobles who neglect the virtues will degenerate, while men of lower rank can ennoble themselves through virtue, since it is virtue that confers nobility.

we all descend from Adam and Eve; as far as ancestry is concerned, all human beings are therefore equal, too. We do not read that God created some men from silver so that they could boast of their nobility; in fact, God created all men from mud.²⁶ Nobility, for Peraldus, is purely to be conceived as a mental quality resulting from virtue.²⁷ True nobility of princes shows itself in freedom from sin and servitude (to the devil and the vices, that is), abhorrence of shameful acts, generosity, clemency, piety, humility, and a dedication to goodness.²⁸ Significantly, Peraldus claims that generosity and liberality have their opposite in rapacity, by which he understand spoliating the poor;²⁹ his concern for the welfare of common people, in particular of the poor, is a recurrent theme in his treatise from the very beginning of the general *Prooemium*. The observations of Peraldus on nobility have a close parallel in his *Summa de vitiis*;³⁰ the chapters in question exercised a considerable influence on late-medieval vernacular literature.³¹

²⁶ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, i.4, p. 395: 'Tertius error est, quod credunt aliquos esse nobiles, quia a nobilioribus originem habuerunt, qui error multipliciter potest manifestari. Primo quia si habeatur respectus ad primam causam, scilicet hominum, ab uno omnes originem habemus; unde quantum ad hoc omnes homines sunt aequae nobiles [...]. Si respectus habeatur ad causam creatam, omnes habemus primum patrem et primam matrem, Adam scilicet et Evam. Omnes ergo vel sumus nobiles vel sumus ignobiles. Non legitur Deus fecisse unum hominem argenteum, unde essent nobiles, et unum luteum unde essent ignobiles; sed unumquemque de limo terrae plasmavit.'

²⁷ See William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, i.4, p. 395: 'Sextus error est, quod nobilem reputant eum qui per ignaviam nobilitatem amisit, et non illum qui virtute eam acquisivit'; i.5, p. 395: 'nobilitas sola est animum quae moribus ornat.'

²⁸ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, i.5, p. 396: 'Ad veram principis nobilitatem pertinet ut ipse sit sine ignobilitate, sine erubescibili servitute, a nulla rusticitate superari se permittat, turpitudinem omnem abhorreat, ad largitatem bonorum bene se habeat, bona sua libenter et liberaliter tribuat, subjectis sit clemens et pius, in rebelles severus, parva despiciat, magna appetat, aggrediatur ardua, non vano timore ab eo quod aggressus est citra consummationem desistat.'

²⁹ See William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, i.5, p. 396: 'Et sicut liberalitas signum est nobilitatis, sic rapacitas signum est rusticitatis: unde aliqui qui reputantur nobiles, rusticissimi sunt, eo quod bonis suis spolient pauperes.'

³⁰ See William Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, v.iii.28–29 (from the section on *superbia*; MS. Brussels, Koninklijke Bibliotheek / Bibliothèque royale, 5614–16, fols 145^v–47^v).

³¹ See William C. McDonald, 'The Nobility of Soul: Uncharted Echoes of the Peraldean Tradition in Late Medieval German Literature', *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 60 (1986), 543–71.

The remaining part of the first book is taken up by discussions of four virtues: humility (Chapters 6–12), truthfulness (Chapter 13), clemency (Chapter 14), and piety (Chapter 15).³² The long section on humility consists of seven chapters devoted to various forms of vanity, which are notably reprobable in princes: pride (Chapter 6), the vanity opposed to truth (Chapter 7), vanity in general (Chapter 8), vanity of riches (Chapter 9), of carnal desires (Chapter 10), of earthly glory (Chapter 11), and of the search for glory and praise (Chapter 12). In this final part of Book I, Peraldus is not so much concerned with princely rule as with the prince's spiritual well-being.

The second book focuses on the relationship of the prince with God and the Church. It is the only systematically organized part of the work: the traditional scheme of the theological virtues serves as a structuring device in what otherwise seems to be a rather loose presentation of virtues which a prince should acquire. Peraldus begins his second book in his typical way, with a short preface presenting his general outline. The second book subsequently discusses *fides* (Chapters 1–3), *spes* (Chapters 4–7), *timor* (Chapters 8–9), and *amor* (Chapters 10–12).³³ Peraldus does not either justify his choice or explain why he adds the fear of the Lord to the theological virtues; actually, he does not even evoke the concept of *virtutes theologicae* itself.

Having argued in Chapter 1 of Book II that *fides* is essential for all human beings, Peraldus explains in the next chapter why it is *specialiter necessaria* for the prince: 'because he knows who is above himself, whom he should serve, whom he serves well with much profit, but with much danger if he serves Him badly'.³⁴ One can only serve 'him' (Peraldus does not explicitly name God in this section, probably because God is already implied in the notion of *fides*), if one serves him according to his will, and therefore it is necessary that the prince should know this will. By *fides* the prince comes to know that in what we deem ours (Peraldus

³² Cf. William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, Prol., p. 390: 'Primus liber continet octo partes: in prima agitur de potestate terrena: in secunda, de sapientia habenti potestatem necessaria: in tertia, de bonitate, sine qua potestas et sapientia sunt nociva: in quarta, de nobilitate vera, quae principem multum decet: in quinta, de humilitate principum: in sexta, de veritate quam debent diligere: in septima, de eorum clementia: in octava, de pietate.'

³³ See William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii Prooem., p. 405: 'Declaratis quibusdam in praecedenti libro, quae communiter decent principem, ostendetur in hoc secundo libro, quomodo princeps habere se debeat ad Deum, et ejus Ecclesiam. Et primo tangetur de fide ipsius: secundo de spe: tertio de timore: quarto de amore.'

³⁴ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.2, p. 406: 'quia cognoscit eum sub quo est, cui serviturus est, cui fructuosissime bene servitur, periculosissime male.'

changes to the first-person plural, thus indicating that what he says is valid for all men), we only have the *ministerium*, not the *dominium*, because only God is Lord (see Book I, Chapter 1). The prince should therefore be careful not to pass from *ministerium* to *dominium* by seeking his own glory and following his own will when he should seek God's honour and follow the divine will. There are four characteristics of someone who considers himself only a *minister*: first, he takes care to fulfil his Lord's will; second, he acts in such a way as if he must give account of everything; third, if his Lord takes his *ministerium* from him, he should not object or become angry, but say with Job 'The Lord giveth, the Lord taketh away' (Job 1. 21); fourth, he generously gives to others (humility and generosity appear here as princely virtues ensuing from faith). Conversely, God dislikes *incredulitas* in a prince who holds his place. *Fides* makes men win in war, both physical and spiritual; it receives strength from God and frees one from danger. But lack of faith leads to defeat. In conclusion, faith shows God's mercy and justice toward his servants, both that which he has already bestowed and that which he will yet bestow on them, and the treasure in heaven.³⁵ Although it seems somewhat awkward, the general idea here seems to be like a contract: if one believes, God will take care of his followers. Interestingly, Peraldus extensively quotes two historical anecdotes about Alexander the Great in order to illustrate the advantage of faith for a prince, even though faith in this case is *informis*, as it lacks *caritas*. In the case of Alexander, whose appearance in this context may be somewhat bewildering, faith seems to be equal to acceptance or recognition of the true God, even if Alexander did not really 'believe' in the sense that he adhered to God's cult. In one of these examples, Alexander came across some apostate Jews in the Caspian region, who asked to be put at liberty, but the King, when informed about their veneration of golden calves instead of the one and true God, replied that they should be guarded even more closely.³⁶ The second example describes

³⁵ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.2, p. 407: 'Fides ostendit misericordiam, et iustitiam Dei in servos suos, et exhibitam et exhibendam, iustitiam in offendentes, misericordiam in debito modo servientes. Ostendit etiam thesaurum regni caelestis, quod Deus daturus est servantibus sibi debito modo.'

³⁶ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.2, p. 407: 'etiam fide informi, quae sine caritate est, miracula fiunt, ut patet in Alexandro, qui cum venisset ad montes Caspios, et petiissent filii captivitatis decem tribuum ab eo licentiam egrediendi, ipse, cognita causa inclusionis eorum, quod scilicet aperte recessissent a Deo Israel vitulis aureis immolando, et per prophetas Dei praedictum eis quod a captivitate non essent redituri, respondit quod arctius includeret eos: cumque angustas vias eorum obstruere vellet molibus bituminatis, videns laborem humanum non sufficere, oravit Deum Israel, ut opus illud compleret, et accesserunt ad se invicem praeupta

how God appeared to Alexander in a dream to prophesy his victory in Asia.³⁷ In both cases, Peraldus presents these stories as illustrations of the power of faith, even when it is *informis*. If, it has to be understood, faith has these positive results, even for a pagan, what must be the consequences for a truly believing Christian prince?³⁸ Peraldus seems to have chosen these examples in accordance with the theme of princely rule; while his argumentation is theological and biblical in the beginning of Chapter 2 of Book II, he passes to history near the end.

In the last chapter on *fides*, Peraldus states that the faith of princes should be *magnam, vivam et stabilem*. All of this is substantiated with passages from the Bible, as is Peraldus's wont. Again, his exhortations apply to all mortals alike, not only, or even specifically, to princes, but there is one exception. In the last lines, Peraldus speaks about heresies. Faith should be stable; therefore, those who abandon the faith in which they have been educated and embrace the doctrine of heretics are condemnable. Even if a prince should find heretics who display such qualities as abstinence or compassion, he should not have pity, nor should he allow himself to be misled by their capacity to hide their malice.³⁹ Peraldus, who worked and lived in Lyon, may well have been thinking of contemporary heterodox groups such as the Albigensians of southern France. But the most striking characteristic of the chapters on faith is the circumstance that little of it appears to be concerned with princely rule in particular, except for the insistence

montium, et factus est locus immeabilis, ut dicit Josephus.' Peraldus refers to Josephus = Flavius Josephus, but, in fact, he quoted this story from Petrus Comestor, *Historia scholastica*, Esther 5 (PL, CXCVIII, col. 1498A–C): 'De reclusionem decem tribuum, et morte Alexandri.' In this way, this is an interesting example of Peraldus's way of handling 'recent' sources. Interestingly, in Comestor, it is the moral conclusion which is borrowed from Josephus, not the story as he told it: 'Et, ut ait Josephus, Deus quid facturus est pro fidelibus suis, si tantum fecit pro infideli?'

³⁷ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.2, p. 407: 'Etiam fides informis facit triumphare, sicut accidit in Alexandro, cui per somnium Deus apparuit in habitu summi sacerdotis, dum adhuc ipse in litia civitate Macedoniae esset constitutus, dumque cogitaret utrum Asiam posset obtinere, iussit eum confidere: nam ipse exercitum ejus perduceret, et principatum Persarum ei traderet, qui promissioni ejus credidit, et secundum fidem suam factum est ei.'

³⁸ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.2, p. 407: 'Quid facturus est Deus pro fidelibus suis, si tantum fecit pro infideli?' See also n. 35, above.

³⁹ See William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.3, p. 408: 'Nec debet homo moveri, si aliquos haereticos videat vel abstinentes, vel misericordes, cum plures tales inveniantur qui sunt fidei Catholicae, vel si aliqui, qui sunt fidei Catholicae, inveniantur mali, multi enim magnae malitiae sunt inter haereticos, sed occultant eam quantum possunt, nec mirum cum et seipsos occultent.'

on *dominium* which is only in the hands of God, and *ministerium* which becomes earthly rulers.

The chapters on hope, introduced with the typically Peraldian formula *Dicto de fide principis, dicendum est de spe illius*, are structured in much the same way as the preceding section on faith. Chapter 4 of Book II defines hope in accordance with Peraldus's own *Summa de virtutibus*; Chapter 5 discusses the necessity of *spes* for every human being; Chapter 6 expounds its necessity for the prince in particular; and finally, Chapter 7 is devoted to the things opposed to hope (a similar chapter also forms part of the *Summa de virtutibus*).⁴⁰ According to Peraldus, *spes* is of particular importance to a prince because his responsibilities surpass human nature: he must not only rule himself, but others as well. The only way to compensate for his human insufficiency is to put his hope in God and associate divine omnipotence with human weakness.⁴¹ The rest of the chapter is mainly taken up by a discussion of human insufficiency in general. The prince suffers from insufficiency more than other human beings because of his exalted position (*excellens status*) and the burden of his task (*gravitas oneris*); his duties are godlike rather than human, so that he needs God's assistance even more than other mortals. In fact, Peraldus does not so much speak about specific virtues for princes as about the specific need for princes to be virtuous in view of the general insufficiencies of man.

Chapters 8–9 of Book II discuss *timor Dei*, which in the *Summa de virtutibus* is treated among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. As in the two previous sections, Peraldus first discusses the importance of *timor Dei* for human beings in general, then for the prince in particular. In general, *timor Dei* is important for humans, as it is the beginning and the root of all wisdom (Prov. 1. 7, 9. 10; Eccles. 1. 16). The prince, however, should fear the Lord all the more because the Final Judgement will be terrible for rulers and for subjects, but most of all for rulers. Peraldus gives five reasons for this: first, the prince sins by passing judgement; second, the passing of judgement is often accompanied by pride; third, those who are used to pass judgement will find it more difficult to be judged themselves;

⁴⁰ See William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus*, II.ii.4, fols 275^{rb}–76^{ra}.

⁴¹ See William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, II.6, pp. 408–09: 'Principi maxime necessaria est spes tamquam illi qui ea facturus est, ad quae omnino ex se insufficiens est: non solum habet regere se, sed etiam alios [...]. Negotium principis, qui locum Dei tenet, et voluntatem ejus facere intendit, et gloriam ipsius quaerit, supra vires hominis est: unde oportet infirmitati humanae Dei omnipotentiam associari, ut negotium valeat implere, spe firma innitendo Deo. In Psal. 25: *sperans in domino non infirmabor*.'

fourth, princes will not only be judged for their own acts, but also for those of their subjects, in the same way as a master can be called to answer for his servant; and fifth, because the Lord will find discontent if his steward does not act like God, but instead like the devil.⁴² The position of the prince makes him more apt to sin, more suitable to fall to the temptation of pride: in sum, it is especially dangerous. Peraldus repeats what he wrote in the beginning of his work: no one should rule on his own behalf.⁴³ He ends his chapter on the *timor Dei* with the parable from Judic. 9 on the trees that chose a king.

The last theological virtue, *caritas*, mostly called *amor* in this part, is the subject of Book II, Chapters 10–12. Chapter 10 enumerates a series of princely characteristics which testify to his being loved by God: *sapientia*, *munditia*, *mansuetudo*, *liberalitas*, *humilitas*, *dilectio*,⁴⁴ and *temporalium contemptus*. These could be considered virtues that the prince should strive for, but in this passage they actually serve as tokens or signs that God looks upon his steward with benevolence. In Chapter 10, Peraldus concentrates on princes, but in Chapter 11, he presents his material once again in a general way: *Novem sunt signa quibus perpenditur quod Deus ab aliquo ametur*. Most of his observations are valid for every human being, but he explicitly returns to the prince in the final part of the chapter: the prince should seek God's love for him by meditating on the love God shows us, just like a fire is not kindled better than by fire.⁴⁵ He should nourish God's love for him by the benefices received from God, so that a wealth of works

⁴² William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.9, p. 411: 'illis, qui praesunt, erit iudicium valde durum quinque de causis. Primo, quia iudicando peccaverunt, et *per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur*, Sap. 40. Secundo, propter adnexam superbiam, quam solet habere potestas judiciaria. In Psal. 30: *retribuet abundanter facientibus superbiam*; superbia in principio inhonoravit Deum, ideo Deus speciale odium habet ad eam. Tertio, quia gravius erit illis iudicari, qui iudicare consueverunt, sicut gravius est pauperem esse illi qui fuit dives. Quarto, quia iudicabuntur pro se, et pro aliis. Hebr. 14: *obedite praepositis vestris et subjacete eis: ipsi enim pervigilant quasi rationem reddituri pro animabus vestris*. Quinto, quia iudicium domini est; ideo multum displicet ei, quando scilicet ille qui locum Dei tenet, et qui operari debuit ut Deus, operatur ut Diabolus.'

⁴³ See William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.9, p. 411: 'Status principis periculosus est valde, nec est res propter se appetenda, sed magis timenda, licet aliquando propter Dei ordinationem, et populi utilitatem, sit sustinenda'; cf. above, n. 22.

⁴⁴ See William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.10, p. 412: 'Diligit enim dominus eos qui se diligunt, alioquin esset infidelis.'

⁴⁵ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.11, pp. 412–13: 'Attendere debet princeps in se dilectionem Dei, meditatione amoris, quam Deus nobis exhibuit: sicut enim ignis non melius quam igne accenditur, nec amor ita melius quam amore.'

of perfect goodness springs forth from this love of God which leaves no place to laziness, negligence, vainglory, or love of earthly things.⁴⁶ For the first time in this second book Peraldus then makes a reference to the Church, when he says that the prince should observe the immunity of holy places, as is demonstrated by the history of Eliodorus (II Mach. 3) and by another example, not identified in the text but actually taken from Peter Comestor's *Historia scholastica*: when Pompey conquered Jerusalem, his troops profanated the temple, and because of that, it is believed that Pompey never won a victory again, although he had been very fortunate before.⁴⁷

Although Chapter 12, devoted to the love of one's neighbour, starts with the statement 'Ad amorem proximi primo incitare debet principem', the main part of this chapter is taken up with generalities which apply to all human beings and do not have any particular bearing on princely rule and behaviour. Only near the end of the chapter does Peraldus discuss the love of the prince for the clergy (*amor cleri*). According to Peraldus, the prince should protect the clergy in the same way as the hand protects the eye in case of danger, the more so as God considers that anything done to his servants is done to Him. Furthermore, the clergy are the prince's spiritual parents to whom he owes honour and love; they wield the spiritual goods and are therefore entitled to receive temporal goods as well. In fact, the clergy have a right to be honoured in a double way, as they live well and as they rule well. They deserve heavenly praise in order to be obeyed, and earthly praise in order to be nourished.⁴⁸ Peraldus does not develop a theoretical framework for

⁴⁶ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.11, p. 413: 'Nutrire etiam debet in se Dei dilectionem, signis beneficiorum divinorum generalium et specialium quae a Deo recipimus, et continue recipimus, ut de ferventi Dei amore abundantia operum perfectae bonitatis procedat, ita ut in eo locum non habeat pigritia, vel negligentia, vel fastidium, nec amor vanae laudis, vel vanae gloriae, vel alicujus terreni emolumenti caritati opus praeripiat et sibi usurpet.'

⁴⁷ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.11, p. 413: 'Item cum Pompejus venisset Jerosolymam, irruentes Romani prophanaverunt templum, equos in porticibus stabulaverunt, ob quam rem Pompejus creditur de cetero nunquam pugnasse, quin vinceretur, qui hactenus fuerat fortunatissimus.' Cf. Peter Comestor, *Historia scholastica*, II Mach. 9 (PL, CXCVIII, col. 1529A–B): 'Faustus autem Cornelius, Syllae filius, primus ingredi ausus est, et irruentes Romani prophanaverunt templum, et, ut alibi legitur, equos in porticibus stabulaverunt. Ob quam rem traditur nunquam de caetero pugnasse Pompeium, quin vinceretur, qui hactenus fortunatissimus fuerat.' This is another instance of sources written after 1150 not being identified by Peraldus.

⁴⁸ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, ii.12, p. 414: 'Incitare debet principem ad amorem cleri, amor, quem in corpore humano videmus inter manum et oculum; si oculo immineat periculum, manus se opponit oculum protegens, et ictum suscipiens. Secundo hoc quod

the princely obligations to the clergy, while he remains altogether silent about the obligations of the clergy toward the prince. In a way, Peraldus takes the attitude of an admonishing parish priest or a schoolmaster rather than a theorist of political rule.

Finally, Peraldus presents a portrait of the good prince, the *bonus princeps*, in the very last chapter of the second book (Chapter 13). The chapter wholly consists of quotations attributed to Cyprian, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Bernard of Clairvaux. Peraldus's portrait of the good prince is not his own.

Peraldus does not use a structuring scheme of virtues in the other books of *De eruditione principum*. The central idea of the third book, which deals with the attitude of the prince toward himself, is that in his concern for others the prince should not forget to take care of himself. Self-reflection is the central theme of the book, and prudence its central virtue. The prince should frequently consider what he is, who, and how; also, he should consider whether his actions are permitted, profitable, and fitting.⁴⁹

The fourth book, on the prince's attitude toward his direct environment (that is, to his counsellors and administrators), seems at first sight to lack a central theme or virtue. However, most chapters are somehow concerned with covetousness, quite in conformity with his earlier remarks on true nobility. After warning

Deus reputat sibi fieri, quod ministris ejus exhibetur. Matth. 16: *qui vos audit, me audit; et qui vos spernit, me spernit*. Tertio hoc quod parentes sunt spirituales, quibus honor et amor debetur. Basilii: *parentes nostros ut propria viscera diligamus*. Quarto hoc quod ministrant spiritualia, ideo merito debentur eis temporalia. Matth. 10: *dignus est operarius cibo suo*. 2 Tim. 2: *laborantem agricolam oportet primum de fructibus percipere*, Gal. 6: *communicet is qui catechizatur verbo ei qui se catechizat in omnibus bonis*, 1 Timoth. 5, *qui bene praesunt presbyteri, duplici honore digni habeantur, maxime qui laborant in verbo et doctrina*. Duplici honore sunt digni, quia bene vivunt, et bene praesunt, secundum Ambrosium. Digni sunt honore sublimi, et terreno honore: sublimi ut eis obediatur, terreno ut eis necessaria ministrentur, 1 ad Thess. 5: *rogamus vos, fratres, ut noveritis eos qui laborant inter vos, et praesunt vobis in domino, et monent vos, ut habeatis eos abundantius in caritate*.

⁴⁹ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, iii Prooem., pp. 414–15: 'Ostensum est in praecedenti libro, quomodo princeps habere se debeat ad eum qui est super eum, scilicet ad Deum, vel ejus Ecclesiam; in hoc tertio libro ostendetur, quomodo princeps habere se debeat ad seipsum. Cavendum est principi primo ne circa alios occupatus seipsum negligat: secundo, ne relictis aliquibus vitiis, aliqua vitia retineat quibus pereat: tertio, ne subditis suis bona eorum auferat, propter quae ipsos subditos amittat. Principi etiam multum necessarium est ut actionem consideratione praeveniat, prudentia fortitudinem suam cohibeat. Trina consideratione quod facturum est, debet praevenire, scilicet an liceat, an expediat, an deceat. Frequenter etiam de se debet cogitare quid sit, quis, qualis.' The chapters of the book correspond to these themes.

against bad company in Chapter 1 and recommending the habit of taking advice from good people in Chapter 2, Peraldus devotes the next two chapters to the danger of corruption inherent in the acceptance of gifts and no less than four chapters to the greed (consistently designated as robbery, *rapina*) of the prince and his officers in dealing with the possessions of the subjects (Chapters 5–8); the section culminates in an emphatic plea to take measures against those who deprive the poor of their goods. The same concern for the property of the prince's subjects is apparent from the final chapter (Chapter 9), which lists a number of vices frequently occurring in the prince and his *ministri*: greed (*vulpina astitia ad rapiendum*) comes first, followed by curiosity, contempt, and suppression of the common people, cruelty, and the seizure of ecclesiastical possessions. Peraldus's concern was by no means uncommon in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as is apparent from the contribution of Cary Nederman to this volume, but it is clear from his grim language and lengthy digressions that he had a keen personal sense of what one nowadays would call social justice.⁵⁰

The fifth book is almost as long as all other books taken together. It concerns the upbringing of the sons (Chapters 1–48) and daughters (Chapters 49–67) of nobles and contains remarkable analogies with *De eruditione filiorum regalium* by Peraldus's confrere Vincent of Beauvais.⁵¹ The book is largely unspecific to princely rule and rather makes the impression of a general pedagogical tract. Only in the short third chapter does Peraldus point out that princes need to take even greater care of the education of their children than other parents, as young princes need wisdom on behalf of their future government.⁵²

The sixth book focuses on a number of virtues and vices relevant to the prince's relation with his subjects: meekness, truthfulness, and justice (Chapter 1), greed or robbery of the poor (Chapter 2), cruelty (Chapter 3), mutual fidelity (Chapters 4 and 6), ingratitude (Chapter 5), love (Chapter 7), and pride (Chapter 8). Most of these virtues and vices receive an interpretation as distinctly princely qualities, but they do not correspond to any known scheme. Although a central idea seems absent, Peraldus's frequent warnings against princely greed and the

⁵⁰ Krynen, *L'empire du roi*, p. 176, presents a short list of various lengthy excursions in *De eruditione principum* in the line of this sentiment of social justice.

⁵¹ See Dondaine, 'Guillaume Peyraut', pp. 226–31.

⁵² William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, v.3, p. 429: 'Debent principes magis esse solliciti de filiorum eruditione, quia sapientia eorum poterit pluribus utilis esse qui habebunt se et populum regere. Sapiens: *neminem magis decet quam principem meliora vel plura noscere, cujus doctrina poterit omnibus subjectis prodesse*. De hac materia require primo Lib. c. 2.'

oppression of the poor (not only in Chapter 2 but also in the other chapters) remind one of the preoccupations which dominate the fourth book. Thus, Peraldus explains truthfulness as respect of property rights, and justice as a factor curbing the princely greed for the possessions of his subjects,⁵³ while he mentions the levy of unjust taxes as a main instance of cruelty.⁵⁴ He even claims that God gives every poor man a guardian angel to protect him, notably by despising those from whom the poor man suffers.⁵⁵ If Peraldus's urge for social justice is not the overarching theme of *De eruditione principis*, it runs at least as a thread through many of his truly political chapters.⁵⁶

The seventh book discusses the prince's attitude toward his enemies and mainly concentrates on military aspects. Strikingly, Peraldus is more concerned with restricting war and its evil consequences than with actual warfare. He conceives of the military as soldiers of God (Prooem.) who need mental fortitude

⁵³ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, vi.1, p. 467: 'Veritas vim rationalem ejus dirigere debet, ne falsitatem circa subditos inveniatur, vel inventam ab aliis admittat, ut bona eorum valeat extorquere: rectitudo vero justitiae vim concupiscibilem debet fraenare, ut cum Deo voluntatem unam habeat, et bona subditorum inordinate non appetat.'

⁵⁴ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, vi.3, p. 467: 'Circa principes qui in subditos suos sunt crudeles, specialiter attendenda est impietas injustarum talliarum. Et primo ostendetur circa hoc magnitudo culpa. Secundo magnitudo poenae. Tertio quam miserabilis sit status aliquorum principum, qui dicunt se a talibus talliis non posse cessare, cum tamen sciant quod facere eas ipsis sit damnabile'; see also vi.6, pp. 468–69: 'Prima poena principum qui in subditos suos crudeles sunt, est paupertas. Dominus enim videns eos iniquos in paucis bonis temporalibus eis commissis, non vult eis amplius dare [...]. Dicunt se a talibus talliis non posse cessare, cum tamen eas facere sciant esse damnabile. Sicut lupus odio habetur ab hominibus et a ceteris animalibus, quia non vivit nisi ex eis quae rapit; sic tales odio habentur. In hoc tamen est differentia: quia lupi non exercent rapinam contra lupos, sed contra animalia alterius speciei; sed raptores homines exercent rapinam contra homines qui sunt ejusdem speciei cum eis.'

⁵⁵ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, vi.5, p. 468: 'Licet enim Deus tradiderit pauperes custodientes potentibus hujus saeculi, tamen ipse noluit eos esse absque custodibus caelestibus: immo unusquisque homo habet Angelum bonum sibi ad custodiam deputatum, quem ille contemnit qui pauperem hominem opprimit'; see also vi.7, p. 469: 'De labore quem [sc. principes] habet pro subditis pauperibus, et de beneficiis eis impensis debet retributionem a Deo, non ab homine, expectare. Debet eos a malis protegere, nec sustinere debet majores minores opprimere. Ministros pauperibus subditis misericordes debet habere. Princeps subditos suos majores opprimentes minores, fortiter debet reprimere.'

⁵⁶ Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, pp. 192–95, noted this already, but as he considers the treatise *De eruditione principum* as an element in the chain of political encyclopedical tracts by Vincent of Beauvais, he discusses the text in view of the ideas expressed in the various versions of the *Opus universale*.

and nobility (Chapter 1), must be prepared to die worthily for their only Lord (Chapter 3), and should, like the prince, avoid vainglory (Chapter 4). But the best thing for a prince to do is not to wage war at all. Peraldus urges the prince to have patience, reminding him of Christ who triumphed over his enemies by suffering rather than persecuting them (Chapter 2).⁵⁷ The prince must curb his anger (Chapter 5) and never rashly begin a war (Chapters 6–8); Peraldus even adds a whole chapter in praise of peace (Chapter 9). In the deplorable case of war, the prince must on any account avoid war crimes: he should neither burn towns, villages, homes, and fields (Chapter 10) nor indulge in massive slaughter (Chapters 11–12). Next to social justice, pacifism appears as an important point on Peraldus's political agenda.

IV. Conclusion

The above analysis has revealed three particular characteristics of *De eruditione principum*. First, it shows the absence of a clear conceptual framework. Despite the moral character of the treatise and Peraldus's frequent borrowings from his own summae on the virtues and the vices, the work is not structured according to any known scheme of moral concepts, except for the second book which follows the scheme of the three theological virtues plus the fear of the Lord. Many chapters from other books are devoted to particular virtues and vices, but these cannot be grouped together in a current arrangement. The cardinal virtues, which play a significant role in contemporary political literature, are all but absent; the same is true for Aristotelian ethics or political theory. What one can say is that a religious perspective dominates the work, which moreover claims a superior position for the Church and the clergy vis-à-vis secular politics.

Second, it reveals the general character of many of Peraldus's admonitions. Only in some books and chapters does Peraldus consider the function and behaviour specific to princes. His moral lessons mostly apply to a general audience of Christian believers. Many virtues are introduced with the remark that they are useful for every Christian, in particular for princes. When Peraldus does speak about virtues in relation to princes, he is often primarily concerned with their

⁵⁷ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, vii.2, p. 471: 'Princeps Ecclesiae Christus potius triumphavit de hoste, patiendo, quam percutiendo. Exemplo ergo ejus milites Christiani patientiam debent amplecti tamquam multum eis necessarium.'

spiritual welfare: his precepts should protect the prince against the dangers inherent to his unnaturally elevated position.

Third, it portrays Peraldus's political radicalism. His chapters on nobility strike one by their extreme egalitarianism, while Peraldus's cry for social justice dominates both books (the fourth and the sixth), which are devoted to princely rule in the proper sense, that is, the exercise of public authority. Moreover, in the seventh book Peraldus manifests himself as a pacifist who abhors the moral and social detriments of war. His sympathies are beyond any doubt with the common people over whom the princes wield their unnatural authority.

It would seem that these three features have a common source in the essentially pastoral character of Peraldus's political thought. Even when writing about secular government, the primary concern of Peraldus is with the spiritual welfare of the Christian community (including the prince himself) for which the clergy are responsible. Princely government is an unnatural phenomenon necessitated by original sin which, if used immorally, may lead to the destruction of the community which it is supposed to serve: hence the emphasis in *De eruditione principis* on religiously interpreted virtues and vices, in disregard of academic schemes and structures; hence the embedding of princely behaviour in a morality valid for all Christians; hence the well-being of common believers as the main criterion of just politics. In sum, Peraldus does not so much deal with princely virtues as with virtues for princes. Like his summae on the virtues and vices, his *De eruditione principis* is designed so as to serve the flock entrusted to his pastoral care.

VIRTUE AND THE CITY: THE VIRTUES OF THE RULER AND THE CITIZEN IN THE MEDIEVAL RECEPTION OF ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS*

Marco Toste

I. Introduction

Scholarship has paid considerable attention to the place of moral and civic virtues in the history of political thought, specifically in the works belonging to the literary genre of the *specula principum*.¹ In this genre reflection on the virtues assumes a fundamental role, since the *speculum* normatively describes the prince's conduct and his political office, in which private and public life are assimilated. The prince is conceived as an exemplary figure who must simultaneously reflect virtue and guide the deeds of his subjects.²

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¹ See notably Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), II: *Renaissance Virtues*; Maurizio Viroli, *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics, 1250–1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For criticism, see Alberto Andreatta, 'A proposito di ragion di Stato e di rivoluzione: Sulla relazione di Maurizio Viroli', in *Aristotelismo politico e ragion di stato*, ed. by Artemio E. Baldini (Florence: Olschki, 1995), pp. 325–34.

² On this genre see Wilhelm Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters* (Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1938); Diego Quaglioni, 'Il modello del principe cristiano: Gli specula principum fra Medio Evo e prima Età moderna', in *Modelli nella storia del pensiero politico*, ed. by Vittor Ivo Comparato (Florence: Olschki, 1987), pp. 103–22; Cary J. Nederman, 'The Mirror Crack'd: The *Speculum Principum* as Political and Social Criticism in the Late Middle Ages', *European Legacy*, 3.3 (1998), 18–38; *Specula principum*, ed. by Angela De Benedictis (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1999).

Another genre that treats princely virtues is the commentary tradition on the *Politics* of Aristotle, a text translated into Latin around 1265.³ On the one hand, Aristotle's work attributes a great significance to the ruler's role in the political community, having thus a common point with the *specula principum*; on the other hand, it deals with the problem of the origin and the exercise of (temporal) power, as in medieval writings belonging to the genre of the *De potestate papae*.⁴ But it would be inaccurate to think that the commentaries on the *Politics* provide a kind of synthesis of these genres. While *specula* are dedicated to given monarchs and *De potestate papae* are usually the result of political controversy, the commentaries on the *Politics* are often products of university teaching, intended by their authors as scientific inquiries. Moreover, the commentaries naturally follow the Aristotelian text and hence have a much broader focus than the other two genres. Specifically, in the *Politics* Aristotle examines not only the role of the leaders and their relationship with their subjects, but also the concept of citizenship and the different parts and offices of the political community. And contrary to the other two genres, in which authors often reduce the subject matter of their works to the consideration of monarchy and its deviation, tyranny, a significant part of the *Politics* is dedicated to the study of the diverse types of constitutions. Hence, in commentaries on the *Politics* the virtues have to be evaluated not only in relation to the different elements of the community, such as the rulers and the subjects, but also to different constitutional regimes.

Although Aristotle's *Politics* (along with the *Nicomachean Ethics*) provides significant raw materials for late medieval reflection on the virtues, not many studies have been devoted either to the consideration of the role of the moral virtues in politics or to the relationship between the moral and political virtues in the medieval reception of Aristotelian texts.⁵ The aim of this paper is therefore to

³ On the medieval reception of the *Politics* see Christoph Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter*, 2 vols (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1992). For additional bibliography see Flüeler, 'Politischer Aristotelismus im Mittelalter: Einleitung', *Vivarium*, 40 (2002), 1–13, especially 11–13.

⁴ See Jürgen Miethke, *De potestate papae: Die päpstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).

⁵ The main exception is Matthew S. Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). Nevertheless, Kempshall does not take into account the commentaries on the *Politics*.

study the relationship between the moral and political virtues in medieval commentaries on the *Politics*.

II. *The Virtues in Politics*

Even though a close analysis of virtue is largely absent in Aristotle's *Politics* — this rather belongs to the domain of ethics — virtue is a key concept in the work, since it yields the qualitative criterion to distinguish different regimes, along with the quantitative criterion of the number of persons who rule. The performance of virtuous acts enables one to reach the end of a rightful political constitution, that is, political happiness. Virtue is the criterion to ascertain the rightness of a constitution and its consequent legislation; in a rightful regime, virtue is the aim of law. Hence, while in the *Nicomachean Ethics* the analysis of the virtues is confined to the individual and his relation to the common good, in the ambit of the *Politics* the virtues relate to political constitutions; moreover, they form the basis of all the political distinctions inside the city, since in a right regime the criterion for the distribution of political offices and honours is the citizen's virtue. Yet Aristotle's political analysis is not reduced to the consideration of a virtuous society. The criterion for access to political offices changes according to the aim of each constitution, the possible criteria being thus not only virtue, but also freedom, wealth, and nobility.⁶ Even though from an ethical point of view virtue is the best standard according to which a society should live, it is only one among several possible criteria from a political perspective. This can be understood if we take into account the use Aristotle makes of his hylomorphistic theory in politics. According to Aristotle, it is the matter that individualizes the form. If the application of the form depends on the matter, this means that not every matter can receive any kind of form. In politics, as well, the form (i.e., the constitution) must be applied in accordance with the matter (i.e., the citizens). Hence, the establishment of a given constitution depends on the citizens — or more precisely on their degree of virtue — to which the constitution should be applied. In other words, since it is the degree of virtue that determines the applicability of a

⁶ Aristotle, *Politicon libri octo cum vetusta translatione Guilelmi de Moerbeka*, iv.8 (1294a9–25), ed. by Franz Susemihl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1872), pp. 408–10; iv.12 (1296b13–19), p. 425 (hereafter cited as *Politica*). I indicate the standardized order of the books of the *Politics* rather than the one followed by Susemihl.

constitutional regime, every kind of constitution has its own legitimacy, appropriate to a certain community.⁷

Nonetheless, political theory must not only deal with the virtues and their degrees. Aristotle points out that the virtues are connected with the passions, which means that they are liable to variability, law being for this reason preferred to virtue in governing the political community.⁸ Indeed, from a political point of view, the concept of virtue has to be correlated with that of law, given the Aristotelian assumption that not everyone is virtuous, so some may have to be compelled through the law. Moreover, law, which stimulates virtuous acts, can be an impetus to the acquisition of virtue in the political community, since a man becomes virtuous through the repetition of virtuous acts. Virtue is thus the aim of the law, but also one of the possible instruments to reach the end of a rightful regime.⁹ The significance of the law to the exercise of virtue can be demonstrated by the examples of liberality and temperance, the former being related to individual property, the latter to pleasures. The establishment of a constitution such as the one proposed by Plato, in which women are common and individual property is forbidden, would lead to the impossibility of the actualization of these two virtues and thus to the impossibility of achieving a good moral life.¹⁰ A good constitution is the one in which law is instituted according to virtue.

Medieval commentators of the *Politics* follow these arguments about virtue's significance and occasionally expound on some problematic issues left open by Aristotle. Although they pretend to adopt a scientific approach to political phenomena, they are nevertheless influenced by medieval social and political reality. Some questions concerning virtue formulated by Aristotle, such as whether the community should obey a virtuous man or to law, whether nobility should be a criterion for the distribution of political offices, whether slaves and artisans need moral virtues, or considerations on the virtue of the multitude, provide commentators with occasions to legitimize medieval social hierarchy and present monarchy as the best regime.¹¹ The influence of the contemporary

⁷ See *Politica*, iv.1, pp. 372–77.

⁸ *Politica*, iii.16 (1287a19–87b31), pp. 228–32.

⁹ *Politica*, iii.9 (1280b5–13), p. 186; iv.8 (1294a1–9), p. 408.

¹⁰ *Politica*, i.5 (1263b7–14), p. 76.

¹¹ See Gianfranco Fioravanti, 'Servi, rustici, barbari: Interpretazioni medievali della *Politica* aristotelica', *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Classe di Lettere e Filosofia*, 11 (1981), 399–429; Jean Dunbabin, 'The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle's *Politics*', in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the*

political context associates the commentaries with genres such as the *specula principum* and *De potestate papae*, but the approach to the virtues in the commentaries is different. The fact that commentaries on the *Politics* were often written by masters from the Arts Faculty, who did not apply to theological categories, or by theologians such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, who separated philosophy from theology, led to political theorization in which human ends are sufficient.¹² Since the end of political action is intrinsic rather than being conceived in regard to extrinsic or supernatural ends, the commentaries on the *Politics* deal only with the relationship between the moral and the political virtues and leave the theological virtues aside.

One of the reasons for the nontheological use of virtue can be traced to the tentative efforts made by the first commentators, specially Peter of Auvergne — the first author who commented on the *Politics* inside the university¹³ — to

Desintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600, ed. by Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 723–37; Lidia Lanza, 'I commenti medievali alla Politica e la riflessione sullo stato in Francia (secoli XIII–XIV)', in *Il commento filosofico nell'Occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV): The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West (13–15th Centuries)*, ed. by Gianfranco Fioravanti, Claudio Leonardi, and Stefano Perfetti (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), pp. 401–27; Marco Toste, 'Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi: The Role of the Philosopher in the Political Community at the Faculty of Arts in Paris in Late Thirteenth Century', in *Itinéraires de la raison: Études de philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Cândida Pacheco*, ed. by José Francisco Meirinhos (Louvain-la-Neuve: FIDEM, 2005), pp. 269–308.

¹² On the distinction between philosophical and theological levels in medieval philosophy see Luca Bianchi, 'Loquens ut naturalis', in Bianchi and Eugenio Randi, *Le verità dissonanti: Aristotele alla fine del Medioevo* (Rome: Laterza, 1990), pp. 33–56. For the same distinction in the commentaries on the *Politics* see Lidia Lanza, 'Il finis hominis nell'Etica e nella Politica di Aristotele: Note su alcuni commenti del secolo XIII', *Medioevo e Rinascimento*, 12 (1998), 143–81 (pp. 171–81).

¹³ Peter of Auvergne composed two commentaries between 1274 and 1296. One is a literal commentary that continues the commentary initiated by Thomas Aquinas, treating the beginning of Book III up to Book VIII. The first six lessons of Book III are edited in *The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle's 'Politics': The Inedited Part: Book III, less. I–VI*, ed. by Gundisalvus M. Grech (Rome: Desclée-Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas, 1967), pp. 73–129. The remaining part is edited in Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. by Raimondo Spiazzi, 2nd ed. (Turin: Marietti, 1966), pp. 141–438. Hereafter, both editions are cited as *Scriptum*. Lidia Lanza is preparing a critical edition of this commentary. Peter's other commentary is in the form of *quaestiones* and survives in MSS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16089, fols 274^{ra}–319^{ra} (hereafter cited as P; questions on the first seven books); Frankfurt am Main, Universitätsbibliothek, Praed. 51, fols 172^{ra}–79^{rb} (only some questions from the first book); Bologna, Biblioteca universitaria, 1625, fols 68^{rb}–79^{vb} (hereafter cited as B; on the

harmonize the ideas stated in the *Politics* with the whole *Corpus aristotelicum*. Since the *Politics* was translated without any Arabic or Byzantine commentaries which could help Latin medieval commentators in the comprehension of the text, the first commentators tend to interpret the *Politics* with arguments and categories taken from the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*.¹⁴ The term *virtue* is sometimes assimilated to the concept of 'strength' or 'potentiality', according to the acceptation given in the *Physics*, or even with the meaning of 'skill' or 'ability'. The meaning of virtue is therefore much more extensive in the *Politics* than in the *Ethics*, leading to a separation between a strict ethical meaning and another definition independent of an ethical point of view. Some examples, taken from Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones* on the *Politics*, are sufficient to confirm this view. Aristotle states that the slave is an instrument of his master, advancing the theory that the slave cannot provide for himself his own end by reason of his incapacity to use the virtue of prudence and therefore needs someone who can direct him to his end.¹⁵ Peter conceives the relationship between master and slave as a movement in which the former impresses his movement upon the latter, the slave having the capacity (*virtus*) to receive that impression.¹⁶ Second, in the passage in which Peter asserts that tyranny is the worst form of government, the tyrant's 'virtue' denotes force or power.¹⁷ Third, as we shall see later in this paper, in the

first seven books, but the first two books and a large part of the third contain a different text from P). I am preparing a critical edition of this second commentary. Hereafter, the second commentary is cited as *Quaestiones*; I will quote from P with significant variants from B. On the *Scriptum*, see Lidia Lanza, 'Aspetti della ricezione della Politica aristotelica nel XIII secolo: Pietro d'Alvernia', *Studi medievali*, 35 (1994), 643–94. On the *Quaestiones*, its authorship and its *Tabula*, see Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation*, I, 86–131; II, 101–12. Flüeler has also edited some questions.

¹⁴ See Christoph Flüeler, 'Ontologie und Politik: Quod ratio principantis sumitur ex ratione actus et potencie', *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 41 (1994), 445–62.

¹⁵ *Politica*, I.4, pp. 13–16.

¹⁶ Cf. Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation*, I, 180–84, especially pp. 181 and 183.

¹⁷ Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones*, IV q. 3, P, fol. 301^{ra-b}, B, fol. 70^{va}: 'Dicendum quod [tyrannis] est pessima. Cuius ratio est, quia omnis uirtus unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa, ut patet in calore incluso in nube. Et ratio huius propositionis est, sicut innuit Proclus, quia quanto aliquid propinquius primo in illo genere, tanto est magis rationem illius participans. In genere autem potentium primum potens est unum. Ergo omnis uirtus quam magis est una, tanto potentior est. Sed uirtus tyrannica est unita magis quam democratica. Ergo potentior est ad nocendum. In illis, scilicet democratia <et> oligarchia, uirtus principantium nociuorum consistit in pluribus. Hic autem consistit in uno tantum. Ergo efficacius potest nocere.'

question in which Peter deals with the definition of the virtue of the citizen, he states that an individual can possess this 'virtue' even without possessing the moral virtues.

The use of the term *virtue* with a nonethical meaning was common not only in philosophical works, such as the texts on the soul and on its parts, which were called *virtutes* with the meaning of faculties or potentialities, but even in political texts.¹⁸ In the case of the commentaries on the *Politics*, it is not so much the use of the term *virtue* in a nonethical sense that is noteworthy, but rather the fact that the virtues are seen within a political perspective which does not immediately involve moral goodness. Thus in the final chapter of the first book of the *Politics*, Aristotle raises the question of whether there are any virtues in the slave or in the artisan beyond those required to be a slave or an artisan, that is whether the slave and the artisan have a need for moral virtues.¹⁹ On the one hand, the artisan does not need the moral virtues for his proper activity as artisan, but only for the use he makes of his products, because this involves an operation of the will. Consequently, it is possible to assert that there are activities inside the political community that may be morally neutral and thus do not require moral goodness. On the other hand, concerning the slave, Aristotle's answer is affirmative. However, the virtues of the slave are only directed to the necessities of the master; the moral virtues are more required in the master, because an unjust master cannot rule properly. The difference between the master and the slave is not one of degree in virtue, but a difference between command and obedience, which means that the difference between them is not established on moral grounds. Hence, it is possible to assert a difference between the levels of ethics and politics, given the fact that this social and political distinction has no foundation in differing degrees of moral virtue. This can be further understood if we take briefly into consideration the definitions of slave and citizen in the *Politics*. The slave is mainly defined as the man who cannot reach his self-sufficiency due to his incapacity to actualize his virtue of prudence completely. Thus, the slave is differentiated due to his deficient use of an intellectual rather than a moral virtue.

¹⁸ In Giles of Rome's *De ecclesiastica potestate*, the term *virtue* is always used in a physical acceptance. See also Russell Price, 'The Senses of *virtù* in Machiavelli', *European Studies Review*, 3 (1973), 315–45, and the critique of Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, II, 210, n. 97. For a different analysis of the implications of the term *virtù* in Machiavelli see Cary J. Nederman, 'Machiavelli and Moral Character: Principality, Republic, and the Psychology of *Virtù*', *History of Political Thought*, 21 (2000), 349–64.

¹⁹ *Politica*, I.13, pp. 51–57.

Inequality among men in the political community has not a moral, but an intellectual, starting point. This inequality involves a teleological perspective of politics: men are differentiated through the capacity to achieve an end, for it is prudence which relates the means to the purpose. It is quite clear that if a man cannot reach his own end, he is also incapable of reaching the end of the community. For this reason, prudence and the capacity to become autonomous are the main attributes of the citizen.

Autonomy is not a moral concept, so that the main criterion for becoming a citizen seems to involve a separation between ethics and politics. According to the commentaries on the *Politics*, however, the autonomous men (*liberi*) are those whose minds can discover what must be done and who have a propensity for virtue.²⁰ Moreover, even though prudence is an intellectual virtue, it cannot exist apart from the moral virtues. To clarify this point, we must analyse how the relationship between prudence and the moral virtues is conceived in the commentaries on the *Politics*. Does the possible separation between prudence and the moral virtues imply the autonomy of politics in regard to ethics?

Since citizenship is defined on the basis of the capacity to reach the goal of the political community, it will help if we consider Book VII of Aristotle's *Politics*, which is devoted to the *optima politia* and to political and contemplative happiness. From the first two extant commentaries in question form (which usually develop a wider perspective than literal commentaries),²¹ those written by Peter of Auvergne and by the Anonymous of Milan, I examine Peter's commentary, on which the Anonymous depends.²² In Book VII, Peter raises three questions about the definition of political happiness. The titles of these questions suggest that the relationship between prudence and the moral virtues is Peter's main concern.²³ In the first two questions, whether happiness consists in an act

²⁰ Peter of Auvergne, *Scriptum*, iii.11, p. 160 (no. 452): 'liber autem dicitur qui mente potest praevidere quae agenda sunt et inclinatur ad virtutem.'

²¹ For the implications of the difference between these two forms of commenting on the *Politics* see Lanza, 'I commenti medievali', pp. 417–19.

²² The *Quaestiones* of the Anonymous are extant in MS Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., fols 1^{ra}–54^{vb}. On this commentary and its *tabula quaestionum* see Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation*, I, 229–55; II, 76 and 113–19. The prologue has been edited in Achille Zoerle, 'Il prologo di un commento anonimo alla Politica di Aristotele', *Rivista di storia della filosofia*, 3 (1987), 499–517.

²³ Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones*, vii, q. 3: 'utrum felicitas consistat in actu uirtutis per se' (P, fol. 315^{rb-vb}, B fol. 78^{ra-rb}); q. 5: 'utrum in actu uirtutis moralis consistat felicitas hominis, felicitas

of virtue in itself and whether man's political happiness resides in the acts of moral virtue, Peter establishes political prudence²⁴ as the virtue in which political happiness resides. In the third question, whether political happiness consists in the act of prudence, which is to lead, Peter, following Aquinas, distinguishes between three acts of prudence: advising, judging, and commanding (*consiliari, iudicare, praecipere*).²⁵ If we correlate the first two questions with the third, we may conclude that given the fact that political happiness can only be reached through the acts of prudence, only those who can perform one of these three acts within the political community can reach political happiness. At the same time, since leading (*principari*) is the main act of prudence, Peter concludes that political happiness is mainly reached by rulers. Even though he does not state so explicitly, we may infer that the other two acts of prudence (*consiliari* and *iudicare*) are attributes of the citizens.²⁶ The fact that this theory is presented in the book devoted to the *optima politia*, which is identified by medieval commentators with monarchy, allows for the conclusion that Peter, by attributing the foremost act of prudence to the ruler, legitimizes the supremacy of the monarch within the political community. Inside the *civitas* it is chiefly the ruler who performs the main acts dictated by prudence and therefore reaches political happiness; according to Peter, then, the prince appear to be by definition prudent

inquam politica' (P, fol. 316^{rb-vb}, B, fols 78^{va}–79^{ra}); q. 6: 'utrum felicitas consistat in actu prudence qui est principari' (P, fols 316^{vb}–17^{ra}, B fol. 79^{ra-rb}).

²⁴ In *Quaestiones*, ii, q. 4, P, fol. 284^{vb}, Peter distinguishes between *prudentia monastica*, related to the *finis unius hominis secundum se*, and *prudentia politica*, related to the *finis ciuitatis bene ordinate*. Cf. Roberto Lambertini, 'Individuelle und politische Klugheit in den mittelalterlichen Ethikkomentaren (von Albert bis Buridan)', in *Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter*, ed. by Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), pp. 464–78.

²⁵ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.47.8, in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882–), VIII, 356.

²⁶ In *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 3, P fol. 291^{rb}, B fol. 66^{ra}, Peter asserts that 'simpliciter erit ciuis qui potest participare principatu consiliatio uel iudicatio'. Unsurprisingly, since slaves and women cannot fully perform any of the acts of prudence, they will not be able to reach political happiness, which is thus reserved to male citizens and the prince. On the reception of the Aristotelian definition of citizenship in medieval commentaries on the *Politics* see Mario Grignaschi, 'La définition du civis dans la scholastique', *Ancien pays et assemblées d'états*, 36 (1966), 71–88; Ulrich Meier, *Mensch und Bürger: Die Stadt im Denken spätmittelalterlicher Theologen, Philosophen und Juristen* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994). Nevertheless, the Aristotelian idea of citizenship was not totally followed in medieval political texts. On this see Cary J. Nederman, 'Mechanics and Citizens: The Reception of the Aristotelian Idea of Citizenship in Late Medieval Europe', *Vivarium*, 40 (2002), 75–102.

and morally good. Consequently, politics and morality would necessarily coincide in the leadership of the political community.

The identification of monarchy with the *optima politia* in the first commentaries on Aristotle's works is well known.²⁷ Nevertheless, in the case of the commentaries on the *Politics*, this identification involves another perspective, given the recognition that there are regimes other than monarchy. The authors of the commentaries on the *Politics*, following Aristotle, accept the existence and the legitimacy of these regimes. But this broadens further the problem of the relationship between prudence and the moral virtues. To understand why, it is helpful to take again into consideration Peter's third question quoted above, whether political happiness consists in the act of prudence, which is to lead. In the argument *contra*, Peter states that the main act of prudence, which is to lead, cannot be easily performed without injustice. Instead of denying that the act of prudence may involve injustice, Peter accepts it by recognizing the existence of injustice in many governments (*principatus*).²⁸ If we connect this statement with the answer to the other question mentioned above, in which Peter assumes that political happiness resides in the act of prudence and not in the act of the moral virtues, we can deduce that for Peter the aim of a regime can be reached even without justice (understood as a virtue). In other words, it seems that in some governments the virtue of prudence can be separated from moral virtues such as justice, without undermining the legitimacy of those governments.

²⁷ Cf. Jean Dunbabin, 'Aristotle in the Schools', in *Medieval Political Thought*, ed. by Beryl Smalley (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), pp. 65–85; Roberto Lambertini, 'Governo ideale e riflessione politica dei frati mendicanti nella prima metà del Trecento', in *Etica e Politica: Le teorie dei frati mendicanti nel Due e Trecento* (Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull'alto Medioevo, 1999), pp. 233–77; Lambertini, 'La monarchia prima della Monarchia: Le ragioni del regnum nella ricezione medioevale di Aristotele', in *Pour Dante: Dante et l'Apocalypse: Lectures humanistes de Dante*, ed. by Bruno Pinchard and Christian Trottman (Paris: Champion, 2001), pp. 39–75.

²⁸ Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones*, vii, q. 6, P fols 316^{vb}–17^{ra}, B fol. 79^{ra}: 'utrum felicitas consistat in actu prudencie que [qui B] est principari. Arguitur quod non, quia felicitas non debet consistere in illo actu quem non contingit faciliter esse sine iniustitia. Sed talis est actus ille prudentie qui est principari. Ergo in eo non consistit felicitas [...]. Ad rationem dicendum quod actum principandi, absolute accipiendo, uniuersaliter non faciliter contingit esse sine iniustitia, quia multi sunt principatus inter quos difficile est tangere medium.' In this question, the third argument *contra* consists in the idea that the act of ruling involves *tristitia*, a statement that allows Peter to affirm the supremacy of the philosopher over the prince. On the supremacy of the philosopher over the prince in medieval commentaries on the *Politics* and on the *Ethics* see Toste, 'Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi', pp. 295–306.

The existence of prudence without justice is problematic, since the possession of the virtue of prudence implies the possession of the moral virtues. The admission of a detachment between prudence and the moral virtues would lead to a conception in which prudence is only accidentally connected with the moral virtues, or to an understanding of prudence as an instrumental virtue directed to good or bad ends and related to good or bad means. In both cases, the separation between morals and politics would be complete. The analysis of how the term *prudence* is used in the commentaries on the *Politics* can, however, help us to clarify the problem. Since the acts of prudence are assigned to the rulers and the citizens of the political community, I will concentrate in the next sections on the virtues of the citizen and the prince in the commentaries on the *Politics*.

III. The Virtue of the Citizen

The fourth chapter of Book III of the *Politics* is a nodal point in the argument of the entire work. There, Aristotle postulates the well-known difference between the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the good citizen. The difference between these two types of virtue implies that a man can possess one without possessing the other, that is to say, one can be a good citizen without being a good man. While the virtue of the good man is conceived as a virtue related to the individual, the virtue of the good citizen is defined as a virtue of the part toward the whole. Just as the different members of a ship's crew, even though distinguished according to their tasks, have a common name (they are sailors) and a common purpose (the ship's safety), so in the political community as well the citizens have diverse offices and still a common intent, the welfare (*salus*) of the community. Obviously, the welfare of the community does not involve a moral feature, since it is always the purpose of the citizens, whether in a rightful regime or in an unjust one. The virtue of the citizen is thus related to the constitution of which he is a member and not to a moral standard. Given the fact that there are many forms of constitutions, there are many types of good citizens, too. Hence, contrary to the moral virtues, the virtue of the citizen cannot be one and the same. Moreover, since it is impossible that every man has the same degree of virtue in the political community, even in the best regime the virtues of the good citizen and the good man are distinct.²⁹

²⁹ *Politica*, iii.4, pp. 161–69.

This theory is unreservedly accepted by the first commentators on the *Politics*,³⁰ the distinction being already known to medieval authors through Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.³¹ Nevertheless, in the *Ethics*, Aristotle merely states that it is not the same to be a good man and a good citizen, which means that, contrary to the *Politics*, the difference between a good man and a good citizen is not expressed as a distinction between two virtues. It is rather understood as a distinction within the virtue of justice, the theme of Book V. Given the fact that general justice is directed toward the common good while particular justice is directed toward another individual person, the commentators conceive the distinction between the good citizen and the good man as a distinction between public and private spheres.³²

³⁰ See Albert the Great, *Politica*, iii.2, *Opera omnia*, ed. by Stephanus C.A. Borgnet, 38 vols (Paris: Vivès, 1890–99), VIII, 218–19; Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Politicorum*, iii.3, *Opera omnia*, XIII, A193–94; Peter of Auvergne, *Scriptum*, iii.3, pp. 95–98; Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 6–8, P fols 292^{rb}–93^{ra}, B fol. 66^{rb-vb}; Anonymous of Milan, *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 6–7, fols 21^{ra}–22^{vb}; Raimundus Acgerii, *Sententia libri Politicorum Aristotelis*, MS Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, San Marco 452, fol. 55^{vb}; Guido Vernani, *Super Politicam*, MS Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat. VI.94 (2492), fols 85^{va}–86^{ra}; Walter Burley, *Expositio super librum Politicorum*, MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 1030, fols 40^v–41^r; Nicole Oresme, *Le livre de politiques d'Aristote*, iii.4, ed. by Albert D. Menut (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1970), pp. 120–21; Anonymous, *Commentum in octo libros Politicorum cum aliquibus dubiis*, MS Stuttgart, Württembergische Landesbibliothek, HB.X.28, fols 126^v–27^r; Johannes Versor, *Quaestiones super libros Politicorum*, iii, q. 3 (Cologne: Quentell, 1497), fols 36^{vb}–37^{rb}; Donato Acciaiuoli, *In Aristotelis libros octo Politicorum commentarii* (Venice: Valgriso, 1566), fols 83^v–84^v. The only studies devoted to this distinction are Lanza, 'Aspetti della ricezione della Politica', pp. 657–72; Lanza, 'Il finis hominis', pp. 171–81. Lanza concentrates on Peter of Auvergne's and Aquinas's literal commentaries, but her conclusions can be applied to the other commentaries. In the next pages I follow her positions.

³¹ See Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea*, v.5 (1130b26–29), trans. by Robert Grosseteste (recensio recognita), ed. by René-Antoine Gauthier, *Aristoteles Latinus* XXVI.i.3, fasc. 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1973), p. 457.

³² See Albert the Great, *Super Ethica*, v.4, ed. by Wilhelm Kübel, in *Opera omnia* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1951–), XIV, 326–27; Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, v.3, in *Opera omnia*, XLVII, 272–74; Anonymous (Radulphus Brito?), *Questiones in Ethicam*, MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 832, fol. 29^{ra-b}; Henry of Friemar, *Sententia totius libri Ethicorum*, MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.I.14, fol. 120^{rb}; Gerald of Odo, *Sententia et expositio cum questionibus [...] super libros Ethicorum*, v, lectio 3 (Venice: De Luere, 1500), fol. 97^{ra-rb}; Walter Burley, *Super decem libros Ethicorum expositiones*, v.2 (Venice: Scoto, 1481), fol. 112^{vb}. Other commentaries, such as those made at the Arts Faculty of Paris, do not make reference to the distinction between good man and good citizen. On the the twofold virtue of justice see

In the *Ethics*, the distinction thus still regards a moral virtue. By contrast, the statement in the *Politics* that the virtue of the good citizen is relative to the constitution of which he is a member implies that even in a *politia transgressa* this virtue is still a virtue and not a vice. This obviously contradicts the very concept of moral virtue, because an act can only be considered virtuous while related to a good end. Therefore, on one side, to preserve the unity of the moral virtues, it is necessary to establish that the virtue of the good citizen is not a moral virtue; on the other, this virtue cannot be utterly apart from the moral virtues because that would lead to a complete separation between the ends of politics and ethics. This dilemma is even weightier if we consider that not even in the *optima politia* is the virtue of the good man identical to the virtue of the good citizen, which implies that the latter is never reduced to the former. From the possible coincidence of these two virtues would follow the inclusion of politics within ethics and thus the total correspondence between politics and morality.

But this is not the view of the first commentators on the *Politics*. The distinction between individual and community is safeguarded in the theory of positive law as conceived by Thomas Aquinas. Since the purpose of the law is the common good, the ruler cannot pretend to legislate on all the virtues and vices of man, but only on those that are related to the common good and to the constitution. In other words, not only do positive and natural law belong to different spheres, but the role of the legislator is not to make men absolutely good (*boni simpliciter*); rather, they should become good citizens (*boni secundum quid*).³³ Politics and ethics have different aims, which do not always coincide.

The consequences of not recognizing the distinction between the virtues of the good man and the good citizen can be shown by two brief examples. First, while Giles of Rome follows Aquinas's theory of law in *De regimine principum*, he nevertheless considers that the aim of law is to make men absolutely good and not only good citizens. In so doing, he denies that politics can have an autonomous

Roberto Lambertini, 'Von der iustitia generalis zur iustitia legalis: Die Politisierung des Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes im 13. Jahrhundert am Beispiel des Aegidius Romanus', in *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), pp. 131–45.

³³ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I.ii.92.1, *Opera omnia*, VII, 159–60. Aquinas's theory on law, as presented in *Summa theologiae* I.ii.90–96, is the basis for the considerations on law in commentaries on the *Politics*, e.g., Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones*, II.8–9 ('utrum lex sit aliquid ad rationem pertinens, utrum lex ordinetur in fine communem'; cf. *Summa theologiae*, I.ii.90.1–2). The same influence is found in commentaries on the *Ethics*; see Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, 6 vols (Gembloux: Duculot; Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1942–60), II, 539–45.

sphere with regard to ethics. For this reason, he does not assert the distinction between the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man.³⁴ Second, while Aquinas quotes, in the *Summa theologiae*, the distinction as made in the *Politics*, late scholastic commentators from the sixteenth century comment on the same passage by quoting the distinction as made in the *Ethics*. This allows them to leave aside the question on the virtue of the good citizen and the fact that it is still a virtue even when related to an unjust regime. Therefore, even though they admit the distinction between good citizen and good man, they assert that, contrary to the Aristotelian theory, the former can be subsumed into the latter. At the same time, they state that the aim of positive law is to make citizens good, while the aim of ecclesiastical laws is to make men absolutely good. As a result, since the good citizen and the good man are respectively conceived as part and whole, they conclude that, given the fact that the aim of ecclesiastical laws has a broader range than the one of positive law, the temporal is subordinated to the spiritual power.³⁵

Since the virtue of the citizen is not a moral virtue, it is necessary to ask what kind of virtue it is, in order to understand the conception of the political virtues in the commentaries on the *Politics*. We can find divergent positions on this issue in the commentary literature.

The fact that the virtue of the citizen is defined on teleological grounds, since it depends on the purpose of the constitution of which the citizen is a member, implies that the acts of the citizen are also defined with regard to that end. As prudence is the virtue that relates the means to the ends of moral action, it seems quite logical to identify the virtue of the citizen with prudence. The only problem with this identification, as we have seen above, is that in the case of a *politia transgressa* prudence can exist without the virtue of justice. Albert the Great, who

³⁴ Cf. Lidia Lanza, 'La Politica di Aristotele e il De regimine principum di Egidio Romano', *Medioevo e Rinascimento*, 15 (2001), 19–75.

³⁵ See Domingo de Soto, *De legibus* (MS Ottob. lat. n.º 782), I: *Comentarios al tratado de la ley*, pt 1: *Tratado de la ley en general* (*Summa theologiae*, I–2, QQ. 90–97), ed. by Francisco Puy and Luis Núñez (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1965), pp. 49–57; Francisco de Vitoria, *Political Writings*, trans. by Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 164–67; Bartholomaeus de Medina, *Expositio in Primam Secundae angelici doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis* (Salamanca: Gastius, 1578), pp. 836b–39a. Other late scholastic authors accept the distinction between the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the good citizen. See Tommaso De Vio (Cajetan), in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I.ii.92.1, *Opera omnia*, VII, 160–61; Luis de León, *De legibus ó tratado de las leyes 1571*, ed. and trans. by Luciano Pereña (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1963), pp. 47–58.

likely wrote the earliest commentary on the *Politics*, seems to realize the problem, offering a solution later followed by some later commentators, albeit in modified form. In the first place, following the Aristotelian text, he assimilates the virtue of the good man to prudence, on the basis that no one can be a good man without having prudence. Then, to forestall the possibility that prudence can exist without the moral virtues, he states that the virtue of the good citizen has to be a sort of prudence (*prudentia sive disciplina quaedam*) related to an indistinct end (*ad quaedam*).³⁶ Naturally, this does not resolve the problem, since Albert does not clearly define what sort of prudence this is. Nevertheless, his answer provides a basis to identify the virtues of the good man and the good citizen and permits to the preservation of a kind of unity between politics and ethics.

If the identification of the virtue of the good man with prudence is followed by all commentators after Albert, the attribution of a *prudentia quaedam* to the virtue of the good citizen, instead, was either cautiously passed over or further refined. In literal commentaries, the authors speak of a *prudentia* or even of a *prudentia simpliciter* for the virtue of the good man, but prefer not to attribute to the virtue of the good citizen a sort of prudence. By contrast, we find an extension of Albert's argument in the commentaries in the form of questions written by Peter of Auvergne, the Anonymous of Milan, and Johannes Versor. In his *Quaestiones*, Peter deals with the conception of the citizen's virtue in three questions.³⁷ The question of whether to be a citizen is in itself a virtue leads Peter, on one hand, to conceive the action proper to the citizen as a virtue and, on the other, to define this virtue according to the definition of virtue given in the *Ethics*. The virtue of the citizen is thus assimilated to a *habitus*, which is acquired through the operations performed by man as citizen in regard to the common good. But this does not mean that it is enough for a man to relate his acts to the common good to acquire this *habitus*; its acquisition depends on the recognition by men of the main good of the constitution of which they are a member. Since this main good can be wealth, nobility, or virtue, depending on the goal of the constitution, the *habitus* and its consequent acts will reflect that main good of the constitution. But while Peter quotes the *Ethics* in order to establish the theoretical grounds for

³⁶ Albert the Great, *Politica*, iii.2, pp. 219–20.

³⁷ Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones*, iii, qq. 6–8, P, fols 292^{rb}–93^{ra}: 'utrum ciuis inquantum huiusmodi per se sit alica uirtus', 'utrum ciuis sit una uirtus secundum omnem politiam', 'utrum ciuis studiosi et uiri optimi sit eadem uirtus.' In B, fol. 66^{rb-vb}, these questions are titled 'utrum ciuis secundum quod ciuis sit aliqua uirtus', 'utrum ciuis secundum omnem politiam sit una uirtus', and 'utrum uiri optimi et ciuis studiosi sit una uirtus.'

the virtue of the citizen, at the same time he prevents any possibility that this virtue may have a moral implication. Indeed, he not only states that the moral virtue is not sufficient to define the virtue of the citizen, but also that this virtue is acquired not ‘ex consuetudine et operatione’, but ‘per inclinationem et appetitum quemdam proprium’. This means that the virtue of the citizen is neither acquired through the repetition of the acts proper to the citizen nor is conceived as something established in the manner of a moral virtue, but it is rather a propensity that can be actualized in the political community. Thus far, the definition Peter gives of the virtue of the citizen is not problematic. But when he identifies the proper operations of the citizen, no matter the goodness of the constitution of which he is a member, with judging (*iudicare*) and advising (*consiliari*), two acts of prudence, he is establishing the identification of the virtue of the citizen with prudence, resulting in a separation of prudence from the moral virtues. Peter seems to be aware of this implication. Even though he asserts that judging and advising can be performed without the moral virtues and that the moral virtues are not sufficient to define a citizen, he assigns prudence (*prudentia politica*) only to the virtue of the good man and never to the virtue of the citizen.³⁸

It seems that we can conclude that Peter understands the virtue of the good citizen as a sort of prudence, since the acts of the citizen are acts of prudence, but, contrary to Albert, he does not call it clearly prudence. Indeed, in the third

³⁸ *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 6, P, fol. 292^{va}: ‘cuius est alica operatio secundum quam contingit bene agere, eius oportet esse aliquem habitum per quem recte agat et bene. Cuius ratio est, quia bene agere non est nisi ab habitu, actus autem a potentia. Modo actus est ab habitu. Sed cuius est alica talis operatio, ut felicitas politi <c> a. Ergo eius erit aliquis habitus rectificans in bene agendo. Hic autem habitus est uirtus, quia uirtus est que habente <m> perficit et opus <eius> bonum reddit: secundo Ethicorum; septimo Phisicorum dicitur quod uirtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Dicendum quod cuius, cum sit pars ciuitatis, non determinatur ab alica forma aliter inquantum huiusmodi, sed determinatur per ordinem ad aliquid aliud secundum relationem fundatam super actionem uel passionem [...]. Hoc autem est principatus consiliatiuus et iudicatiuus. Hi enim sunt proprii actus partium ciuitatis. Et ideo cuius dicitur qui potest determinare istis principatibus. Modo uirtus moralis non facit eum ciuem simpliciter, ymo potest esse talis sine uirtute morali, saltim in politiis transgressis, ubi isti principatus sunt sine uirtute morali, et ideo etiam cuius ipsius. Tamen cuius secundum se est necessario alica uirtus propter rationem predictam. Cum enim sit ipsius alica operatio propria, ut iudicare, secundum diffinitionem eius necessario habebit habitum per quem bene iudicet et consilietur, quia hoc naturaliter appetit; et ille habitus existens, dispositio cuius ad suum optimum, inquantum est cuius, erit eius uirtus per se [...]. Et dico quod hec uirtus ei inest per naturam, non secundum actum perfectum, qui fit ex consuetudine et operatione, sed solum per inclinationem et appetitum quemdam proprium.’

question devoted to the virtue of the citizen, Peter does not name it prudence, reserving once again the expression ‘*prudentia politica simpliciter*’ to the virtue of the good man.³⁹ The problem seems to be that Peter is not able to find, in the philosophical terminology of his time, a term that can define better the virtue of the citizen — a term expressing that this virtue is not prudence but can still have a sort of prudence. In any case, in Peter’s commentary the question of the virtue of the citizen is broadened further than in Albert’s commentary and that virtue is clearly separated from a moral connotation.

The problem of the lack of a philosophical term to define the virtue of the citizen is dealt with in the commentary of the Anonymous of Milan. This author follows Peter’s line of reasoning, but he is much more concerned than Peter with the possibility that prudence can be separated from the moral virtues. In effect, while Peter takes the idea of *habitus* from the *Ethics*, the Anonymous precludes, from the beginning of his answer, any association between the *habitus* proper to the citizen and the moral virtues.⁴⁰ Even though he admits that the operations proper to citizens are acts of prudence, he carefully states that the virtue of the citizen can be named prudence only if we understand prudence in a broad sense (*accipiendo large prudentia*). He therefore limits the use of prudence to the citizen’s acts within a right constitution, while prudence in a broad sense is related to the *politiae transgressae*. This second kind of prudence is named *astutia*, ‘cunning’. On one hand, it has in common with prudence the cognition of the end

³⁹ *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 8, P, fol. 293^{ra}: ‘Dicendum quod cuius uirtus est per quam recte se habet in operatione in ordine ad bonum politie. Virtus autem uiri optimi uel uiri boni simpliciter est secundum quam dicitur bonus uel optimus, et ista est uirtus que est prudentia politica simpliciter. Dicendum ergo cuius studiosi secundum quamlibet politiam et uiri optimi non est una uirtus. Cuius ratio est, quia uirtus cuius studiosi est per quam dirigit operationes in salutem politie. Est autem alicuius politica mala. Ergo uirtus cuius illius est per quam saluat malam politiam. Hec autem non est prudentia politica simpliciter, que est uirtus boni uiri simpliciter.’

⁴⁰ Anonymus, *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 5, fol. 21^{ra-rb}: ‘Dicendum quod cuius, in eo quod cuius [*MS*: sciuus], est aliqua uirtus mobilis qua [*MS*: quam] exercet operationem propriam in habitudine ad bonum commune [...] nos uidemus quod sunt multi qui exercent operationes proprias per uirtutes proprias in habitudine [*MS*: cum *add.*] ad salutem nauis, sicut uirtus et operatio nauigatoris et etiam remigatoris et prorarii. Sic est de ciue, quod quantumcumque sint diuersi ciues et habeant diuersas operationes et etiam uirtutes, hoc tamen est in habitudine ad salutem ciuitatis, et omnes operationes suas per uirtutes suas exercent in habitudine ad salutem et conseruacionem ciuitatis [...] et sic cuius, in eo quod cuius, est aliqua uirtus mobilis.’ Once again, it is clear how the term *virtue* can be separated from any moral acceptance in the commentaries on the *Politics*.

of the political action; on the other, it is different from prudence, since it can use either evil means to reach a good end or good means to reach an evil end.⁴¹ As the Anonymous indicates, the source of the distinction between prudence and cunning can be found in Book VI of the *Ethics*. The distinction is further developed by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas;⁴² the originality of the Anonymous resides in the application of this distinction to a political text. Besides the fact that this distinction maintains the connection between prudence and the moral virtues, it also prevents the reduction of the virtue of the citizen to a moral virtue. The idea that the virtue of the citizen pertains both to good and bad purposes, and with good and bad means, does not involve illegitimacy from a political point of view, given the legitimacy of the *politiae transgressae*. The Anonymous clearly accepts this, since he states that in the case of obedience to an unjust regime, the fact that the virtue of the good man may be corrupted does not imply that the virtue of the good citizen will be corrupted, too.⁴³

⁴¹ Anonymus, *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 5, fol. 21^{ra}: ‘sed participare principatu et consilio et iudicio non potest per prudenciam, nisi in habitudine ad debitum finem. Ideo prudencia est uirtus ciuis, in eo quod ciuis, et hoc accipiendo large prudenciam’; fol. 21^{rb-v^a}: ‘in politiis bene rectis oportet principantem et subditos habere prudenciam politicam et ciuilem simpliciter dictam et absolute, sed in politiis [MS: potenciis] non bene rectis siue transgressis, ut dictum est, ciues non habent prudenciam simpliciter et absolute dictam, sed bene habent prudenciam, accipiendo prudenciam pro cognitione aliqua alicuius determinati finis politie talis et determinate politie. Et sic ciues in talibus policiis transgressis non sunt simpliciter sapientes, <sed> astuti, ut apparet sexto [MS: septimo] Ethicorum. Astuti autem uocantur qui per mala media attingunt [MS: attingit] bonum finem et qui per bona media attingunt malum finem [...] talis non diceretur prudens, sed astutus quantumcumque principaliter bene <se habet> secundum illum principatum. Eodem modo si aliquis per bonam uiam et operationes uirtuosas, propter sui mali appetitus inordinationem actingeret aliquem malum finem, sicut si de regno fecerit tyrannidem [MS: tyrannide] propter sui appetitus malitiam, talis non diceretur prudens simpliciter, sed [MS: si] astutus.’

⁴² See *Ethica nicomachea*, vi.13 (1144a22–29), p. 491; Albert the Great, *Super Ethica*, vi.16, p. 504; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.55.3, *Opera omnia*, VIII, 400 (establishing cunning as one of the vices opposed to prudence).

⁴³ Anonymus, *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 5, fol. 22^{va}: ‘licet bonus ciuis secundum se non diminuat de ratione boni uiui, tamen in habitudine ad aliquam politiam malam diminit de ratione boni uiui, quia talis politia simpliciter mala [MS: malam] est, et ideo ciuis in tali politia est [MS: esset] simpliciter malus. Et per consequens non est eadem uirtus talis ciuis et boni uiui. Verumtamen in tali politia transgressa et corrupta talis ciuis dicitur bonus ciuis, licet simpliciter sit malus. Eodem modo in aliis policiis transgressis [MS: transgressus]. Sicut nos dicimus de aliquo latrone quod est bonus latro, quia bene et fideliter diuidit spolia inter colatrones suos, et tamen simpliciter et absolute loquendo malus est. Sic etiam in talibus policiis corruptis dicitur bonus ciuis, quia bene ad finem talis policie se habet, licet talis simpliciter malus sit.’ For the idea of the good thief cf.

The identification of the virtue of the good citizen with cunning is also found, more than one century later, in the commentary of Johannes Versor, who calls it 'abilitas' or 'quedam mundana subtilitas sive astutia'.⁴⁴ It would thus seem that the entire theory of the virtue of the citizen is accepted in all the commentaries on the *Politics*. However, other authors seem to refute the distinction between the virtue of the good man and that of the citizen. This is the case with Nicholas of Waudemont (Pseudo-Buridan). Even though he does not raise any question about the virtue of the citizen, we may establish his position on the basis of other questions from his commentary. Concerning Book V, he raises the question of whether making men good is an effect of law, the question being completely identical to the one with the same title in the *Summa theologiae* of Aquinas. Although Nicholas reproduces the entire text of Aquinas, he omits the quotation from the *Politics* in which the virtue of the good citizen is distinguished from the virtue of the good man.⁴⁵ If we correlate this omission with his rejection of a distinction between a *bonum secundum quid* and a *bonum simpliciter*, precisely the distinction that legitimates the existence of unjust regimes, we may assume that Nicholas does not differentiate between the virtues of the good man and the good citizen. Obviously, in this case the problem of the identification of the virtue of the citizen disappears.

IV. The Virtue of the Ruler

In *Politics*, Book III, Chapter 4, Aristotle not only establishes the difference between the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man, but also distinguishes the virtue of the subjects from the virtue of the ruler. Since ruling is different from being ruled, the virtues have also to be of a different kind in the ruler and in the subjects. The moral virtues, such as justice or courage, are thus

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.47.13, *Opera omnia*, VIII, 361. This article of the *Summa* is also the basis for the distinction between two sorts of prudence, as will be shown below.

⁴⁴ Cf. Johannes Versor, *Quaestiones super libros Politicorum*, iii, q. 3, fol. 37^{rb}.

⁴⁵ See Nicholas of Waudemont [Pseudo-John Buridan], *Quaestiones super octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis*, v.11 (Paris: Petit, 1513; repr. Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1969), fols 73^{va}–74^{ra}. On the authorship of Nicholas see Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation*, I, 132–68. For a new attempt to date the commentary and for new elements on Waudemont's biography see William J. Courtenay, 'A Note on Nicolaus Girardi de Waudemont Pseudo-Johannes Buridanus', *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 46 (2004), 163–68.

considered differently whether we take into consideration the ruler or the subjects. And just as the moral virtues are more necessary in the master than in the slave, because there is a difference between command and obedience, in the ruler as well the virtues will be more necessary than in the subjects. This means that while in the case of the subjects, the virtue of the citizen and that of the good man are distinguished, in the case of the ruler of a rightful constitution there is a coincidence of the two virtues. This leads Aristotle to state that the virtue of prudence is properly attributed to the ruler, while the subjects have something like 'true opinion'.

Once again, this theory is accepted by medieval commentators.⁴⁶ The fact that the virtues of the good citizen and the good man coincide in the figure of the ruler in the rightful constitution, monarchy being the best constitution, permits anew the moral and political legitimation of the figure of the medieval monarch. Scholarship has already pointed out the identification of the prince with the figure of most virtuous man, of whom Aristotle speaks in Book III, and demonstrated how medieval commentators dealt with the problem of the relationship between this excellent man and law.⁴⁷ In this case, the commentaries on the *Politics* held similar positions to those found in the *specula principum*. Indeed, Aristotle's idea that the moral virtues are more required in the ruler than in the subjects, or his statement that prudence is mainly an attribute of the prince, accords well with the idea present in the *specula* literature that the prince must be an exemplary figure. Nevertheless, to grasp the peculiarity of these commentaries, it is necessary to analyse the grounds on which the ruler's virtue is conceived.

If the most fundamental attributes of the ruler are prudence and the unity of the virtues of the good citizen and the good man, it is not surprising that Albert the Great identifies the virtue of the good man with prudence and relates the virtue of the citizen with a sort of prudence (*prudencia quaedam*) that can be seen as the equivalent of the 'true opinion' of the subjects. This obviously does not

⁴⁶ See Albert the Great, *Politica*, iii.2, pp. 219–22; Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Politicorum*, iii.3, pp. A194–96; Peter of Auvergne, *Scriptum*, iii.3, pp. 99–107; Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 8, P, fols 292^{vb}–93^{ra}, B, fol. 66^{va}–vb; Anonymous of Milan, *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 7, fols 21^{vb}–22^{rb}; Raimundus Aegerii, *Sententia libri Politicorum*, fol. 55^{vb}; Guido Vernani, *Super Politicam*, fol. 86^{ra}–vb; Walter Burley, *Expositio super librum Politicorum*, fol. 41^r–v; Nicole Oresme, *Le livre de politiques*, pp. 121–24; Anonymous of Stuttgart, *Commentum in octo libros Politicorum*, fol. 127^r; Johannes Versor, *Quaestiones super libros Politicorum*, iii, q. 3, fols 37^{rb}–39^{ra}; Donato Acciaiuoli, *In libros Politicorum commentarii*, fols 84^v–86^v.

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Thomas J. Renna, 'Aristotle and the French Monarchy, 1260–1303', *Viator*, 9 (1978), 309–24.

mean that the citizens do not have prudence, since prudence is the criterion of citizenship, but rather that as citizens they perform two acts of prudence (advising and judging), while the ruler performs also the main act (leading). Thus, the virtue of the citizen resides not in commanding but rather in obeying the constitution.⁴⁸ On the contrary, the ruler needs prudence in order not to obey, but to lead, and for this reason the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the good citizen have to coincide in the ruler. At this point one might object that if the two virtues coincide in the ruler of a rightful constitution, then there is no separation between politics and morals, given the fact that it is the ruler who performs the main act of prudence and therefore determines the constitution. Then again, the heart of the matter is whether we can attribute prudence to the unjust ruler and whether the coincidence of the virtues in the ruler occurs in all constitutions.

It seems patent that Aristotle in his *Politics* deals with the coincidence of the virtues in the case of rightful constitutions. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas do not raise the problem of whether in the case of an unjust ruler there is a coincidence of the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man, but Peter of Auvergne gives the example of the tyrant as the case-limit in which a coincidence between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man is impossible.⁴⁹ It is quite clear that Peter is aware that if the coincidence of the virtues in the ruler were extended to the rulers of unjust constitutions, then even a tyrant would have prudence without the virtue of justice. In fact, in his *Quaestiones*, he naturally restricts the coincidence to the case of the ruler in the *optima politia*.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, Peter does not affirm that the ruler of an unjust constitution does not have virtues. In *Politics* (Book V, Chapter 9), Aristotle declares that the ruler, no matter the rightness of the constitution, needs to have three attributes, which in William of Moerbeke's Latin translation are rendered as 'amor ad consistentem politiam', 'potentia', and 'virtus et iustitia'.⁵¹ While Albert comments on this passage without developing it further, Peter tries to establish a philosophical justification for the three attributes. While he understands *potentia* as the indispensable coercive power to punish disobedience to the law, he substantiates

⁴⁸ This is, e.g., Aquinas's position on citizen's prudence, see *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.50.2, *Opera omnia*, VIII, 375. The clear identification of the 'true opinion' with the act of judging and advising is found in Nicole Oresme, *Le livre de politiques*, pp. 123–24.

⁴⁹ *Scriptum*, iii.3, p. 101.

⁵⁰ *Quaestiones*, iii, q. 8, P, fol. 293^{ra}.

⁵¹ *Politica*, v.9 (1309a33–39), p. 548.

care toward the constitution (*amor politiae*) as an act of prudence, on the grounds that (political) prudence is related with the end of the political community. Likewise, he interprets the necessity of virtue and justice as a necessity of prudence. Nevertheless, since Aristotle says that the justice required of the ruler depends on the justice of the constitution of which he is the ruler, Peter declares that justice is not always the same and that it depends on the form of the constitution. In other words, the justice required of the ruler can vary, which means that even an unjust ruler nonetheless possesses a sort of justice and therefore his own legitimacy.⁵²

In the same chapter Aristotle raises the question of who should hold public office: a military leader who does not care for the constitution or a just and loyal man. The answer he gives permits us to realize that the presence of the moral virtues in the political community is judged with a sense of proportion. According to Aristotle, we should choose the just man for a political office due to his virtue; instead, we should opt for the military leader for a military office, given his expertise.⁵³ In his *Quaestiones*, Peter deals not only with this question, following Aristotle's position, but also with the attributes required of the ruler. Here, his positions are more developed than in the *Scriptum*.⁵⁴ With regard to these attributes, Peter accepts their necessity in either rightful or unjust constitutions, but he clearly distinguishes between those attributes in a right and in an unjust ruler. Thus, while prudence is still the basis to justify the *amor politiae*, and this care toward the constitution is still necessary even in an unjust regime in order to preserve the welfare of the community, Peter nevertheless distinguishes between *prudencia simpliciter* and *prudencia secundum quid*, attributed respectively to the rightful and to the unjust ruler. Also, he distinguishes between *prudencia politica* and *prudencia imperfecta*, the first being proper to the virtuous man and the

⁵² *Scriptum*, v.7, pp. 278–79 (no. 829).

⁵³ *Politica*, v.9 (1309a34–09b9), pp. 548–49.

⁵⁴ *Quaestiones*, v, qq. 11–14, P, fols 309^{rb}–10^{vb}, B, fols 74^{vb}–75^{va}: 'utrum ad recte principandum exigatur scientia in principe'; 'utrum ad perfectionem principantis exigatur amor politie'; 'utrum potentia exigatur ad perfectionem principantis'; 'utrum posito quod sint duo, quorum unus sit potens et nequam, alius autem bonus et diligens politiam, quis horum magis eligendus est in principem.' Cf. Anonymous of Milan, *Quaestiones*, v, qq. 7–9, fols 44^{ra}–46^{va}: 'utrum debentem principari necesse sit habere amorem ad policiam'; 'utrum secundum maximos principatus debentem principari necessarium sit habere potenciam'; 'utrum sit magis eligendus in principem policie et civitatis ille, qui potens est et nequam, si sit aliquis talis, quam ille, qui uirtuosus est et non habens potenciam et econtrario.'

second to the military leader.⁵⁵ Even though Peter seems to be the first author to use these distinctions in a political text, his source is undoubtedly the *Summa theologiae* of Aquinas.⁵⁶ Yet the significant feature of the theory of two different sorts of prudence in a political text is, on one hand, to preserve the connection between prudence and moral virtues; in fact Peter states twice in three successive questions that prudence needs the moral virtues. On the other hand, he introduces a sort of instrumental prudence that helps to preserve unjust constitutions. This is what he unambiguously declares in the question on the *amor politiae*: the care for an unjust constitution is still good care with regard to the preservation of that constitution.⁵⁷ Given the impossibility of rejecting Aristotle's theory that all constitutions have their own legitimacy, Peter tries to find a basis that allows the autonomy of politics with regard to ethics and at the

⁵⁵ *Quaestiones*, v, q. 11, P, fol. 309^{va}, B, fol. 75^{ra}: 'sciendum quod non cuiuslibet principantis est quelibet prudentia, sed cum ratio principis sumatur ex operatione, ratio autem operationis ex fine, <prudentia diuersificatur secundum diuersitatem finis>. Ideo, cum prudentia sit ratio ordinandi et dirigendi in finem, necesse est ad diuersos fines dirigere per diuersas prudentias, ita quod secundum diuersitatem finis exigitur diuersa prudentia ad perfectionem principantis. Nam in recta politia, cum sit finis simpliciter bonus, exigitur perfectio prudenti simpliciter. In policiis autem transgressis prudentia secundum quid et ex suppositione tantum secundum diuersitatem et differentiam ipsius finis'; v, q. 14, P, fol. 310^{va}, B, fol. 75^{va}: 'Suppositum enim [est *add.* B] quod ille potens sit nequam, hoc autem non potest esse uerum de potente potentia rationali, que est prudentia. Hec enim nullum uicium secum [*om.* B] compatitur [patitur B], ut patet sexto Ethicorum. Et ideo uidetur quod intelligat [de potentia *add.* B] ciuili cum alica ratione prudentie imperfecta.'

⁵⁶ The statement that the prudence required for military action is not the *prudentia simpliciter* is found at *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.47.2, ad 1, *Opera omnia*, VIII, 349. The distinction between *prudentia perfecta*, *prudentia imperfecta*, and *prudentia falsa* is established in II.ii.47.13, p. 361. Neither Peter nor the Anonymous of Milan use the expression *prudentia falsa*, which may mean that they want to preserve a legitimacy of the unjust rulers from the point of view of the politics. The idea of a *prudentia secundum quid* can be already found in Albert the Great, *Super Ethica*, vi.10, pp. 462 and 469, but related either to animals or to the individual and without a clear definition.

⁵⁷ Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones*, v, q. 12, P, fols 309^{vb}–10^{ra}, B fol. 75^{vb}: '<C>onsequenter queritur utrum ad perfectionem principantis exigitur amor politie. Arguitur quod non, quia ad perfectionem principantis non exigitur aliquod malum. Sed amor politie est malus, quia quedam politia est mala [...]. Ad rationem dicendum quod consistentia male politie [prudentie B], licet sit mala simpliciter, est tamen bona ex suppositione, scilicet illis qui in ea conuersantur principibus. Et ideo amor illius exigitur ad perfectionem illorum principum in quantum huiusmodi. Licet enim sit amor malus simpliciter, est tamen bonus in illo genere principum, et ideo potest esse perfectio eorum.'

same time that prevents the complete separation between both. The split of the virtue of prudence becomes thus central in the *Quaestiones*. For this reason, the first question he raises in the chapter about the ruler's virtues is not about *amor politiae*, which would mean following the order of the Aristotelian text, but about the necessity of the prince's possession of prudence (or practical science), whether it is *prudentia simpliciter* or *secundum quid*. The impossibility of a complete absence of prudence in an unjust ruler is clearly stated by the Anonymous of Milan, because otherwise the unjust regime could not reach any purpose, not even the welfare of the community.⁵⁸

It is precisely the idea of a *prudentia secundum quid* that permits that even the worst constitution, tyranny, can be conceived as a constitution, and thus have its own legitimacy, albeit a legitimacy *secundum quid*.⁵⁹ This means that even the tyrant has a sort of prudence, since the constitution of which he is the ruler has a purpose. For this reason, in the passages of Book V dedicated to the *cautelae tyrannicae*, that is to say, the precautions the tyrant should have in order to endure his power, Peter can follow Aristotle in the statement that the tyrant should promote the political virtues and be virtuous, at least apparently. In this way, tyranny may seem similar to a monarchy.⁶⁰

In sum, the idea of a twofold prudence, whether in the ruler or in the citizen, forms the basis for the legitimacy of every kind of constitution. If we associate the fact that Peter follows Aquinas's conception of law as something rational, establishing prudence as the source of law, with his theory of two different kinds

⁵⁸ Anonymous, *Quaestiones*, v, q. 7, fol. 44^{rb}: 'Alia est prudentia qua aliquis scit et suos subditos et sibi [...] in finem apparentem bonum dirigere siue ad bonum finem, tamen per mala media et fraudulenter. Et talis prudentia dicitur astucia siue caliditas [...]. Modo debentem principari secundum principatus transgressos necesse est habere prudenciam. Cuius ratio est, quia media in omni actione oportet esse proportionata suo fini et quia prudentia principis est medium quoddam [MS: quoddem] ducens finaliter ad talem politiam.'

⁵⁹ In *Quaestiones*, v, q. 15 ('utrum tyrannis sit politia'), Peter asserts that tyranny is a constitution *secundum quid*. If we remember that the tyrant is portrayed by Aristotle as the ruler who searches his own good instead of the common good, and that for Albert the *prudentia secundum quid* is the prudence of the individual related to his own good, it would not be impossible that the idea of the *prudentia secundum quid* in the unjust ruler, and consequently in the tyrant, could be an influence of Albert on Peter.

⁶⁰ See *Scriptum*, v.12, pp. 301–03 (nos 911, 914, and 927). For a description of this topic in the commentaries on the *Politics* see Claudio Fiocchi, 'L'arte del tiranno: Letture delle cautelae tyrannicae tra Duecento e Trecento', in *Potere sovrano: Simboli, limiti, abus*, ed. by Stefano Simonetta (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), pp. 253–69.

of prudence, we can conclude that even the law set down by a ruler with *prudencia secundum quid* is legitimate law. As Peter says in the beginning of the fifth book, even the unjust constitutions can reach the end of the city, which is the *recte vivere*.⁶¹ The assumption of the legitimacy of different constitutions, whether just or unjust, with the consequent possible disconnection of prudence and the moral virtues, is one of the main features of medieval commentaries on the *Politics*.⁶² This also means that even though the commentators undertake to legitimate the figure of the medieval monarch as a virtuous man, they do not consider that moral goodness is a necessary predicative attribute of the definition of the monarch.⁶³

V. Conclusion

Michel Senellart has argued that the conception of prudence as formulated by Aquinas, with its emphasis on the means of the human action, opened the road to a 'rationalité de type instrumental' in medieval political thought and that is within this conception of prudence that Machiavelli emerged.⁶⁴ Indeed, it would not be impossible to draw Machiavelli nearer either to Aquinas or to medieval commentaries on the *Politics*. Recently, Carlo Ginzburg reopened the question of the supposed influence of Aquinas on Machiavelli or, to be more precise, of the possible influence of the literal commentary on the *Politics* written by Aquinas and continued by Peter of Auvergne.⁶⁵ Even if it seems difficult to prove that the

⁶¹ *Quaestiones*, v, q. 1, P, fol. 305^{va}, B, fol. 73^{ra}: 'finis ciuitatis est illud quod a ciuibus communiter queritur propter se et non propter aliud. Hoc autem, ut dictum est in tertio <Politicorum>, est recte uiuere, et hoc uel secundum ueritatem uel secundum apparentiam, non [ut B] in policiis transgressis.'

⁶² Nevertheless, the idea that politics and ethics belong to different levels of human action is already present in medieval commentaries on the *Ethics*, given the fact that the commentators associate the Aristotelian concept of political friendship with the *utile* and not with the *honestum*. On the distinction between *utile* and *honestum* in authors such as Albert and Aquinas see the index of Kempshall, *The Common Good*.

⁶³ See Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones*, v, q. 7, P, fol. 308^{rb}, B, fol. 74^{va}: 'bonus princeps inquantum bonus determinatur uirtute. Et ideo de ratione principis absolute non [om. B] est uirtus, licet sit de ratione principis boni.'

⁶⁴ Michel Senellart, *Les arts de gouverner: Du 'regimen' médiéval au concept de gouvernement* (Paris: Seuil, 1995), p. 178. Senellart's position is followed in Domenico Taranto, *Le virtù della politica: Civismo e prudenza tra Machiavelli e gli antichi* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2003).

⁶⁵ Carlo Ginzburg, 'Machiavelli, l'eccezione e la regola: Linee di una ricerca in corso', *Quaderni storici*, 38 (2003), 195–213.

Aquinas–Peter of Auvergne commentary is a source of *Il principe*,⁶⁶ what is significant in the tradition of commentaries on the *Politics* is the way in which the concepts of prudence and virtue are used, with different implications and not necessarily with a moral connotation. Even though the concept of prudence, as employed in these commentaries, has Aquinas as its source, the fact that it is used in political texts that admitted diverse means and ends within political action leads to a conception of politics as an autonomous sphere with regard to ethics and with its own methods and purposes. The theory of the virtue of the good citizen as separated from the virtue of the good man only confirms this. It is true that there is a normative conception of politics and that the aim of politics is rather happiness than security or the preservation of the community, but the theory that there is a *prudentia secundum quid*, which is not only a rational capacity⁶⁷ but also a legitimizing principle, permits a rational vision of political phenomena. This does not mean that the commentators are forerunners of the *reason of state* or that they are pre-Machiavellians. It means that instead of searching for either the hypothetical influence of these commentaries or for their originality within medieval political thought, it seems more profitable to see how some major political concepts, such as virtue or prudence, or even the different kinds of possible constitutions, may have been elaborated or transmitted by university teaching and then used in other contexts and by other authors with their own agendas.

⁶⁶ Given the fact that both Peter's commentaries had a wide influence and gave rise to a tradition of later commentaries on the *Politics*, in which originality was not the main attribute, it seems likely that if Machiavelli read the text of the *Politics* jointly with a commentary, as Ginzburg seems to suppose, he could have read a later commentary more accessible to him. It would be profitable to consider not only the Aquinas–Peter commentary, but also Italian commentaries from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, e.g., those by Donato Acciaiuoli, Guglielmo Becchi, Giovanni Ricci, and Ugolino Pisani. For the first two see Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation*, II, 9, n. 12, and 22–23, n. 23. For the third see David A. Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300–1650): The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 539. For the fourth see Marco Petoletti, 'Parlare con il testo nel XV secolo: L'umanista Ugolino Pisani e le sue passioni nelle note di lettura autografe di un codice ambrosiano', in *L'Europa del libro nell'età dell'umanesimo*, ed. by Luisa Secchi Tarugi (Florence: Cesati, 2004), pp. 113–26. The first three commentaries are extant in manuscripts conserved in Florentine libraries, which means that they could easily have been accessible to Machiavelli.

⁶⁷ The only medieval commentator I have found who attributes a character of irrationality to the virtue of the good citizen in an unjust constitution is Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum*, v, lectio 3, fol. 97^{rb}.

ROYAL MISDEMEANOUR: PRINCELY VIRTUES AND CRITICISM OF THE RULER IN MEDIEVAL CASTILE (JUAN GIL DE ZAMORA AND ÁLVARO PELAYO)

Frank Tang

In no medieval literary genre do princely virtues play a more prominent role than in the 'mirror of princes'. This term is often used rather arbitrarily and is applied to all sorts of texts, ranging from learned politico-philosophical tracts to popular collections of anecdotes and conventional wisdom; the genre is therefore difficult to circumscribe.¹ Still, I think it is sensible not to treat all political and moralistic works as belonging to a single category. When speaking of mirrors of princes, therefore, I refer exclusively to texts that were in the first place meant to prepare the ruler, or future ruler, for the performance of his duties by offering him a model of the ideal prince.² This definition does not resolve all

¹ For attempts to define the genre, see *Four English Political Tracts of the Later Middle Ages*, ed. by Jean-Philippe Genet (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, University College London, 1977), pp. xi–xiv; Einar M. Jónsson, 'La situation du *Speculum regale* dans la littérature occidentale', *Études germaniques*, 42 (1987), 391–408 (pp. 394–400).

² According to Jónsson, 'La situation du *Speculum*', pp. 405–06, it is an anachronism to speak of 'mirrors of princes' before the fourteenth century, because, apart from Geoffrey of Viterbo's untypical *Speculum regum*, there are no earlier extant works carrying that title that meet the criteria of her own definition. However, apart from the question whether this conclusion is not based on a confusion of *term* and *concept*, it is not correct that until the end of the thirteenth century 'aucun autre "Fürstenspiegel" n'est jamais comparé à un miroir.' Both the *Libro de los doze sabios* (written between c. 1230 and 1252) and the *Siete partidas* (1272–84), the second part of which definitely meets Jónsson's criteria, are compared to mirrors in their prologues: *El libro de los doze sabios o Tractado de la nobleza y lealtad* [ca. 1237], ed. by John K. Walsh (Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1975), p. 71; *Las siete partidas del rey don Alfonso el Sabio*, ed. by the Real Academia de la Historia, 3 vols (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1807), I, 4.

the ambiguities of classifying texts, but it definitely excludes works such as Marsilius of Padua's highly theoretical *Defensor pacis* or the Spanish collection of conventional wisdom called *Bocados de oro*. Characteristic of mirrors are the lists of virtues that every ruler should possess. They often also contain practical advice on administrative, judicial, and military questions, as well as statements, in separate chapters or made in passing, on the origins, the ends, the range, and the limits of princely rule. Finally, most authors illustrated their teachings with quotations and anecdotes from classical, biblical, patristic, and medieval sources.

Though the genre had its early students, of whom Wilhelm Berges is best known,³ it has generally been neglected. Leaving apart a few major works that attracted the attention of students of medieval political thought such as *De regno*, traditionally ascribed to Thomas Aquinas, or Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum*, mirrors were deemed not worth studying on account of their supposed stereotypical nature. The general opinion among scholars was that they had no or little relevance to everyday politics; they contained but the trivialities of dilettantes that avoided the critical questions of their own time.

In the past few years, however, interest in mirrors has renewed, a development that was initiated in the seventies by men like Bernard Guenée and Quentin Skinner, who did not fail to recognize the significance of the genre.⁴ By now scholars have learned to appreciate original elements in individual texts and have become interested in the role mirrors played in medieval society. One of the problems on which modern research of mirrors concentrates is the question of whether they were used to tackle contemporary social and political issues. Examples of this kind of research are Judith Ferster's *Fictions of Advice* and Cary Nederman's article "The Mirror Crack'd".⁵ Both came to the conclusion that the genre could be and was used as a tool to decry current abuses, criticize reigning monarchs, and give expression to calls for reform.

³ Wilhelm Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters* (Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1938).

⁴ Bernard Guenée, *L'Occident aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles: Les États* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1971), especially pp. 137–42; Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), I.

⁵ Judith Ferster, *Fictions of Advice: The Literature and Politics of Counsel in Late Medieval England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Cary J. Nederman, "The Mirror Crack'd: The *Speculum Principum* as Political and Social Criticism in the Late Middle Ages", *European Legacy*, 3.3 (1998), 18–38.

By studying their sources within their historical settings both authors have helped us to look at mirrors in a different way. However, in my opinion they also exaggerate the remarkableness of their conclusions by presenting these critical strands as exceptional or at least as contradictory to the conventions of the genre. According to Ferster and Nederman there exists a common opinion among scholars that the genre was traditionally favourable to the ruler. Ferster, who studied texts from fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England, thinks that mirrors only contain camouflaged criticism. Because it was too dangerous to write frankly about contemporary political issues, mirrors contain no overt criticism, but behind the cover of the 'comfortingly familiar stories and maxims of the advice tradition' they do contain a hidden message that needs to be unveiled.⁶ Nederman, by contrast, maintains that mirrors do leave room for overt criticism, but that it is to be found only in works that pertain to what he calls 'the border lands of the *speculum*'.⁷

I have some doubts concerning the correctness of certain other conclusions of Ferster, and of Nederman as well. However, this is not the time and place to delve deeper into these matters. I, therefore, shall restrict myself to broaching the question of to what degree it is true that criticism is contradictory to the conventions of the genre. I do not think that it is 'widely agreed', as Ferster claims, 'that mirrors for princes take the ruler's point of view', at least not in the sense that they should be favourable to him. This broad consensus, which is tacitly accepted by Nederman, has never existed and is based on a misreading of Skinner, who nowhere suggests such a thing.⁸

⁶ Ferster, *Fictions of Advice*, pp. 1–4.

⁷ Nederman, 'The Mirror Crack'd', pp. 19–20.

⁸ Ferster, *Fictions of Advice*, pp. 1–2 and 40, claims that it 'it is widely agreed that mirrors for princes take the ruler's point of view' and that they 'ought not to be provocative'. Her only reference is Skinner, *The Foundations*, I, 216, who does not suggest something like that at all: he explains that humanists that dedicated themselves to the education of the prince treated 'the problem of counsel' from the ruler's point of view, insisting on the need of choosing good councillors, whereas those who were more interested in a general reformation treated the problem from the perspective of men that might be asked to enter the royal service, i.e., in terms of the debate about the rival merits of *otium* and *negotium*. Nederman does not question Ferster's universal agreement, but seems to endorse it, which is confirmed by his interpretation of Berges's hesitation to classify the *Speculum regis Edwardi III* as a mirror of princes. According to him Berges placed that work outside the mirror tradition on account of its overt condemnation of royal conduct ('The Mirror Crack'd', p. 19). However, although Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, p. 343, took notice of the critical tone of the work, he placed it outside the mirror tradition on different

What in my opinion can be deduced from studies that base themselves entirely or partly on the mirror literature is that, surely, all authors implicitly or explicitly accepted kingship and that most of them even appreciated it as an institution ordained by God as well as suggested by nature. However, favourable to kingship does not necessarily mean favourable to the king; acceptance of the *institution* of kingship, does not always — and not even most times — imply satisfaction with the actions of the majority of the *incumbents*. On the contrary, given the unrealistic demands authors made on the behaviour of these incumbents, dissatisfaction with their actual behaviour was inevitable. Besides, some authors accepted kingship only reluctantly; in the tradition of Augustine of Hippo and Pope Gregory VII they saw it as a necessary evil. It constituted a means to dominate men's sinful inclinations since the Fall.⁹ A critical attitude toward rulers was especially to be expected from men such as these.

Apart from misreading Skinner's words, Ferster, and Nederman as well, neglect the findings of earlier students of the genre such as Berges and Krynen. One of the mirrors that Berges selected for individual analysis was Gilbert of Tournai's *Eruditio regum et principum*. In his analysis Berges pointed to Gilbert's criticism of the powerful and his demands for reform.¹⁰ Krynen has argued that from John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* onward most mirrors echoed the social and political preoccupations of their days.¹¹ In other words, it is no secret that in some 'mainstream' mirrors, that is, works that concentrate on princely virtues, reference is made to contemporary conflicts and problems. Their authors, who often belonged to the Franciscan order of which Gilbert of Tournai was also a member, while depicting their image of the ideal ruler, did not hesitate to denounce abuses and even criticize reigning monarchs. In fact, it sometimes even looks as if they wrote their mirrors with this as their primary intention; as if their expositions on virtues served above all as a framework for their criticism. To illustrate this we shall examine two mirrors from medieval Spain: Juan Gil de Zamora's *De preconiis*

grounds: the absence 'einer systematischen politischen Moral' (i.e. a catalogue of virtues) and the 'Predigtform'.

⁹ For the import of the idea of the Fall on medieval political thought, see Wolfgang Stürner, *Peccatum und Potestas: Der Sündenfall und die Entstehung der herrscherlichen Gewalt im mittelalterlichen Staatsdenken* (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1987); Bernhard Töpfer, *Urzustand und Sündenfall in der mittelalterlichen Gesellschafts- und Staatstheorie* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1999).

¹⁰ Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, pp. 150–59.

¹¹ Jacques Krynen, *L'Empire du roi: Idées et croyances politiques en France, XIII^e–XV^e siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), p. 169.

Hispanie and Álvaro Pelayo's *Speculum regum*. Both men were members of the Franciscan order. In addition, both were addressing themselves to members of the royal dynasty of Castile, the kingdom in which the genre, from the middle of the thirteenth century, reached a popularity at least comparable to that in France.¹² However, *mutatis mutandis*, the conclusions we shall arrive at also hold, as Berges and Krynen already have shown, for other regions.

We know very little about Juan Gil de Zamora, author of *De preconiis Hispanie* (The Eulogy of Spain).¹³ It seems he spent an important part of his life in the Franciscan convent of his native town, Zamora, which did not keep him from maintaining certain contacts with the court of Alfonso X, nicknamed 'the Learned' (1252–84). The frequency and exact nature of these contacts, however, remain unclear. It certainly goes too far to speak of 'an intimate friendship' between the King and the friar, as Manuel de Castro, who edited *De preconiis Hispanie*, does.¹⁴ Neither does the fact that Juan Gil dedicated his mirror to Alfonso's son Sancho (the future Sancho IV), who, after the death of his elder brother Fernando de la Cerda, had become heir to the throne, prove that the King had entrusted the education of the Prince to him;¹⁵ as we shall see, Juan Gil may have had quite different reasons.

In spite of its title, the work, written between 1278 and c.1282, belongs to the genre of the mirror of princes. In the prologue, the author warns Sancho he has written it not because of the *historiae* it contains, but because of the *mores*.

¹² Among hispanists the study of this literature has been dominated by philologists, who tend to regard mirrors as works of royal propaganda. See, e.g., Hugo O. Bizzarri, 'Las collecciones sapienciales castellanas en el proceso de reafirmación del poder monárquico (siglos XIII y XIV)', *Cahiers de linguistique médiévale*, 20 (1995), 35–73; Marta Haro Cortés, *La imagen del poder real a través de los compendios de castigos castellanos del siglo XIII* (London: Department of Hispanic Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College, 1996). The ideas expressed in Juan Gil de Zamora's *De preconiis Hispanie* were examined by Manuel de Castro, 'Las ideas políticas y la formación del príncipe en el "De preconiis Hispanie" de fr. Juan Gil de Zamora', *Hispania*, 12 (1962), 507–41, who dismissed the author's critical tone as 'boring' and 'pessimistic' (pp. 528–29). The critical elements in Álvaro Pelayo's *Speculum regum* were noticed before by Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 605–12.

¹³ Juan Gil de Zamora, *De preconiis Hispanie*, ed. by Manuel de Castro y Castro (Madrid: Universidad de Madrid, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1955).

¹⁴ *De preconiis Hispanie* (hereafter cited as *DpH*), pp. lxxxiii and xci. In his reconstruction of Juan Gil's life De Castro very frequently presents mere conjectures as facts.

¹⁵ Cf. *DpH*, pp. lxxxix–xc.

Departing from the thought that the deeds of noble lords are more motivating than the words of philosophers, he hopes to stimulate Sancho in the acquirement of virtues with the help of the examples of 'illustrious princes'.¹⁶ The virtues Sancho should acquire are discussed amply. These discussions are so extensive that one wonders whether the young prince, if he has taken the trouble to have a look at it at all, did not feel himself deceived as he advanced through the work.

Although Juan Gil cites a wide variety of authorities, biblical, classical, and medieval, the number of direct sources is limited. Apart from three chronicles (Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada's *De rebus Hispanie*, Lucas of Tuy's *Chronicon mundi*, and Martin of Troppau's *Chronicon summorum pontificum et imperatorum*), his main sources are the *Breviloquium de virtutibus antiquorum principum et philosophorum* by his fellow Minorite John of Wales, which, with the help of examples from ancient history, discusses the cardinal virtues, and a lost mirror of princes, the title of which, according to Blüher, must have been something like *De strenuitate regis*.¹⁷ In the last two books or, as the author calls them, tracts of *De preconiiis Hispanie*, which deal with military matters and therefore also fit well into the mirror of princes scheme, extracts from the *Epitoma de re militari* by Vegetius and the *Strategemata* by Frontinus, both very popular in the Middle Ages, are used.¹⁸

The virtues Sancho is instructed in are called *strenuitates* by Juan Gil. Though it is possible that he just follows a habit from one of his main sources — the already mentioned lost mirror — he may also be adopting an intentional strategy. Maybe he hoped that the chivalrous-sounding *strenuitas* would appeal more to his young addressee than the worn-out *virtus*. Whatever may have caused Juan Gil's preference for this term, his theory of the virtues is entirely conventional and

¹⁶ *DpH*, pp. 3–4.

¹⁷ Karl A. Blüher, *Seneca in Spanien: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Seneca-Rezeption in Spanien vom 13. bis 17. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Francke, 1969), p. 66, especially n. 4; Karl A. Blüher, 'Zur tradition der politischen Ethik im Libro del Caballero Zifar', *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, 87 (1971), 249–57.

¹⁸ In the last tract of *DpH* (Tract XII) Juan Gil constantly refers to Vegetius (used by him in Tract XI), though his real source is Frontinus, whose treatise in medieval manuscripts was often coupled to the one by Vegetius. Cf. Philippe Richardot, *Végèce et la culture militaire au moyen âge (I^{re}–XV^e siècles)* (Paris: Institut de stratégie comparée, 1998), p. 31. For more details on Juan Gil's sources, see Frank Tang, *King, Sword and Morals: Kingship in the Mirrors of Princes from Castile-León, c. 1230–1350* (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, forthcoming).

agrees with the tradition of the Christian mirror of princes.¹⁹ The excellent qualities of the different Spanish estates must inspire Sancho to the royal virtues, an idea the author has borrowed from Lucas of Tuy.²⁰ The liberality of the Spanish princes teaches him to be generous toward his men. The strength and bravery of the Spanish noblemen and knights should encourage his fortitude, both corporal and mental. The righteousness of the saints, martyrs, and prominent clergymen should inspire him to the *strenuitates* toward God, that is, fear of the divine might, knowledge of the divine truth, and love of the divine goodness. The 'very wise perspicacity' of philosophers and learned men should encourage the *strenuitates* toward himself and his people, which in the prologue are summarized as temperance and continence, justice and clemency, providence and cautiousness, but later on are developed as restriction of the heart, restriction of speech, perfection in deeds (the *strenuitates* toward himself), justice, pity, counsel, and prudence (the *strenuitates* toward his people). At the end of Tract X, Juan Gil summarizes his moral advice, insisting on the need of the four cardinal virtues. Moulded by these virtues, 'good' kings have acquired heavenly glory through grace.²¹

Taken all together, *De preconiis Hispanie* must be reckoned within the mainstream of the genre, but this does not mean that Juan Gil appreciates the powerful of his days positively or that he is blind to contemporary problems. Far from that, he shows himself very critical of *principes*, *potentes*, and *prelati*, both from the past and from his own time. He especially berates their greed, which causes destitution among the populace. As mentioned above, the first virtue, or *strenuitas*, Juan Gil discusses is the liberality of the Spanish princes, which is treated in the third tract. However, the way he describes it causes one to doubt whether in their case he considers it a virtue at all. Their liberality is so great that it does not allow them to stay rich for a long time, for it often takes on the shape of prodigality (*prodigalitatis speciem induit sive formam*). Precious and sumptuous garments are given away after only a few days of use; their retinues stand open to all knights. They give more than they are asked for, even to those who already have enough.²²

¹⁹ For a more detailed description of Juan Gil's catalogue of virtues, see Tang, *King, Sword and Morals*.

²⁰ Lucas of Tuy, *Chronicon mundi*, Praef., ed. by Emma Falque (CCCM, 74, p. 8).

²¹ *DpH*, p. 346.

²² *DpH*, p. 25.

Princes who behave this way cannot be expected to stay within the limits Juan Gil sets to the virtue of liberality a little bit later; in order to be able to show off their largesse, kings should not levy more taxes than is permitted by law and nature, neither should they invent laws that are meant to oppress their subjects and empty their purses.²³ As a matter of fact, about half of the tract 'De Hispanie liberalitate' consists of a denunciation of royal avarice, equated by the author with cupidity, the 'source of all evil'.²⁴ Moreover, Juan Gil does not limit himself to protesting against this vice. He also offers some practical advice: to avoid the ruin of paupers, widows, and orphans, it is necessary that a king knows all his revenues. If this is done, it will be impossible for his servants to embezzle any proceedings. He also will find out whenever his collectors tax somebody unjustly. Furthermore, he will not spend more than he receives.²⁵ Finally, Juan Gil reminds Sancho that greedy rulers inevitably call forth the hatred of their people, which will lead to their downfall. This he illustrates with the examples of rulers who, because of their avarice, met an unhappy end. A king, therefore, should be guided by temperance, mother of all regal *strenuitates*, both while giving and receiving.²⁶

It is possible to interpret Juan Gil's fulminations as a denunciation of princely behaviour in general. But anybody who is familiar with the history of the reign of Alfonso X will associate them with contemporary events and developments. The reign of Alfonso the Learned, who owes his modern reputation above all to his scientific and literary patronage, also witnessed a remarkable increase of royal activity in the political field. New codes of law were published, administrative and judicial institutions reformed, and new taxes introduced. The last measures served to meet the costs of the wars against Granada, the North-African Marinids, and neighbouring Christian states, as well as Alfonso's quest for the imperial crown. The King's subjects, who had to pay the bill, protested loudly against the new taxes, extraordinary levies, alterations of the coinage, and forced loans, which they viewed as infringements on their privileges and customs. Dissatisfaction was rife and Alfonso was confronted with a series of uprisings, some of them led by his own brothers. The resistance reached its climax when Prince Sancho, who was afraid that

²³ *DpH*, p. 29.

²⁴ *DpH*, pp. 35.

²⁵ *DpH*, pp. 39–40.

²⁶ *DpH*, pp. 40–41.

his father would bequeath parts of his heritage to the sons of Fernando de la Cerda, set himself up as the protector of the disgruntled and revolted in 1282.²⁷

There seems to be little doubt whether Juan Gil really has in mind Alfonso X while denouncing the avarice of princes. In his biography of the King, which forms part of the *Liber illustrium personarum*, he sighs that Alfonso, when still heir to the throne, was already so liberal that it took on the shape of prodigality (*prodigalitatis speciem induibat*).²⁸ He thus employs the same words he uses in *De preconiiis Hispanie* to describe the excessive largesse of the Spanish princes, which paradoxically leads to avarice.

If we assume that Juan Gil's complaint against royal avarice is made especially with Alfonso X in mind, it seems likely that the same applies to the tenth tract of *De preconiiis hispanie*, entitled 'De iuribus magnorum et obligationibus vassallorum'. In this tract, the author, referring to principles derived from civil, canonical and feudal law, maintains that *principes* and *domini* are not allowed to demand more from their subjects than is permitted by the laws of the kingdom, the statutes of the *fueros* (i.e., the law applied in local courts), and the approved customs of the people. Everything they violently take beyond this measure has to be considered robbery and extortion.²⁹ Subjects, therefore, do not have to comply with the demands of the present generation of *domini*, who exact much more than is customary and lawful.³⁰ This accusation is followed by a vehement attack on *principes* and *prelati*, who surround themselves with scoundrels and behave like the pharaoh of Egypt, who enriched himself at the cost of the suffering people of Israel.

Toward the end of this tract the author speaks directly to Sancho. Sancho's courtliness and benevolence have given Juan Gil the courage to write down these and similar things. He also has put aside his fear because of the frightened clamour

²⁷ Joseph F. O'Callaghan, 'Paths to Ruin: The Economic and Financial Policies of Alfonso the Learned and their Contribution to His Downfall', in *Emperor of Culture: Alfonso X the Learned of Castile and His Thirteenth-Century Renaissance*, ed. by Robert I. Burns (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. 41–67; Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *The Learned King: The Reign of Alfonso X of Castile* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); Manuel González Jiménez, *Alfonso X el Sabio, 1252–1284* (Palencia: Diputación Provincial/La Olmeda, 1993).

²⁸ Juan Gil de Zamora, 'Biografías de San Fernando y de Alfonso el Sabio', ed. by Fidel Fita, *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, 5 (1884), 308–28 (p. 319).

²⁹ *DpH*, p. 336.

³⁰ *DpH*, p. 339.

of the paupers, whom will be heard by nobody as long as pseudo-kings, -presidents, -bishops, -monks, and -judges are in charge at courts.³¹ Sancho is reminded that he is called by the Lord to his position in order to be a 'solicitous shepherd, an industrious leader and a perspicacious defender' of his people. He is there 'because of and for the sake of the people' (propter populum et per populum); they do not exist because of and for the sake of him. He therefore has to 'punish tyrants, console the oppressed, educate the people, frighten evil-doers, liberate clerics, humiliate the proud and protect the humble.'³² Tract X was written in or after 1282.³³ This means that Sancho's rebellion, which started in the spring of the same year, when the Prince convoked the *Cortes* to Valladolid without his father's consent, must have been at least in the air; for some time already Sancho had been promising noblemen, prelates, and townsmen to protect their rights, if necessary even against the King.³⁴ Against this background Juan Gil's appeal to Sancho sounds like a declaration of support.

The case, however, is more complicated, as there are several elements that suggest alternative readings. Tract X is connected with Tracts VIII and IX, as the author also presented them as a separate work entitled *De preconiis civitatis Numantine*.³⁵ Tract VIII, entitled 'De locorum Hispanie nominibus immutatis', sums up the changes that the names of the cities of the Iberian Peninsula underwent through history. Tract IX, which contains 'fables of princes and magnates, and their tyrannical obstinacy', is meant to demonstrate that 'those who had to rule the world in a salutary way have destroyed the whole world miserably'.³⁶ The long list of crimes committed by rulers and nobles from the creation of man until Juan Gil's own days, for which they, of course, were rightly punished, clearly expresses the view that the rule of man over other men originates in sinful lust for power.

It is Tract VIII that here calls for our attention most. Though Juan Gil briefly touches on the history of other places as well, the tract consists largely of a history

³¹ *DpH*, p. 342.

³² *DpH*, p. 343.

³³ *DpH*, p. 292.

³⁴ O'Callaghan, *Learned King*, pp. 258–62.

³⁵ Juan Gil de Zamora, *De preconiis civitatis Numantine*, ed. by Fidel Fita, *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, 5 (1884), 131–200.

³⁶ *DpH*, p. 297.

of his native town, Zamora, which, according to medieval tradition, he identifies with Numantia, the city that in antiquity had been destroyed by the Romans after a prolonged siege. Juan Gil's main line of argument is that throughout the ages, Zamora has always heroically resisted invaders and tyrants. He especially concentrates on the siege of Zamora (located in the once-independent kingdom of León) by Sancho II of Castile, who reigned from 1065 to 1072. He concludes his local history with a eulogy of the city, depicting its beauty, abundance, and stability, and ending with the statement that Zamora has always faithfully served its rulers but that it at the same time always has defended its rights and *fueros*, as a result of which it often met the hostility of 'princes that wanted to rule tyrannically and fatten themselves by burdening the people.'³⁷

Possibly Juan Gil simply wished to exculpate his hometown from the 'traitorous' murder of Sancho II, which had brought the siege to an end. In a passage of *De preconiis civitatis Numantine*, which does not appear in *De preconiis Hispanie*, he addresses the 'detractors' of the Zamora *concejo* (assembly of citizens), claiming that nobody has suffered so much for worldly loyalty as the inhabitants of Zamora.³⁸ Maybe the 'detractors' were those — among them the famous chronicler Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, Archbishop of Toledo — who accused Zamora of having treacherously killed Sancho.³⁹ In his account of the siege, Juan Gil had shown that the inhabitants had been within their rights while resisting the Castilian king, because they had been defending the cause of their legitimate ruler, Sancho's sister Urraca, to whom Zamora had been bequeathed by their father, Ferdinand I. Besides, he had proven that the *concejo* could not be held responsible for the murder anyway, as it had been perpetrated by one of Sancho's own knights (so by a real traitor) without the *concejo*'s knowledge.⁴⁰

But probably Juan Gil wanted more than just to clear his native town from the stain of treason. His statement concerning Zamora's readiness to defend its rights against tyrants is followed by a fragment from the prologue of Rodrigo de Rada's *Historia Romanorum*, in which Rodrigo bewails the disasters suffered by Spain caused by the sins and crimes of its *principes* and *potentes*. To *principes* and *potentes*

³⁷ *DpH*, pp. 275–76.

³⁸ *De preconiis civitatis Numantine*, p. 172.

³⁹ Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, *Historia de rebus Hispanie sive historia gothica*, vi.18, ed. by Juan Fernández Valverde (CCCM, 72, p. 199).

⁴⁰ *DpH*, pp. 258–67.

Juan Gil significantly has added *prelati*.⁴¹ In other words, he accuses the same categories of people whom he criticizes in the tenth tract. This addition can be explained as a result of the well-known rivalry between mendicants and seculars, but in view of the setting of Juan Gil's accusations — Zamora's staunch resistance against 'tyrannical' lords — it is possible that he had in mind one particular prelate: Suero, Bishop of Zamora.

Bishop Suero (1254–86) was a member of the class of clergymen Juan Gil despised: at home at court, owing his position to royal protection, dedicating himself above all to the enlargement of the patrimony of his church, as well as causing local mendicants many troubles.⁴² In the years Juan Gil was working on *De preconiis Hispanie*, Suero, together with the canons of his church, was also engaged in a prolonged and bitter conflict with the *concejo* of the city concerning their respective judicial and fiscal capacities.⁴³ Feelings had run high — people had been killed — and so Prince Sancho was called in as arbiter. One of the persons with whom Sancho consulted about the case was Juan Gil.⁴⁴ This took place during the summer of 1278, the year which marked the beginning of the composition of *De preconiis Hispanie*.⁴⁵ In May of the same year, the *Cortes* of Segovia had reaffirmed Sancho as heir to the throne.⁴⁶ The last event may have motivated Juan Gil to start writing his mirror of princes; it seemed urgent to prepare the young prince, who already had been given far-reaching administrative responsibilities by his father, for his future task. Still, one is tempted to establish

⁴¹ *DpH*, p. 276; cf. Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, *Historia Romanorum*, ed. by Juan Fernández Valverde and Juan Antonio Estévez Sola (CCCM, 72C, p. 37).

⁴² Peter Linehan, *The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 224–29; Peter Linehan, *The Ladies of Zamora* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Peter Linehan, 'The Economics of Episcopal Politics: The Cautionary Tale of Bishop Suero Pérez of Zamora', in Peter Linehan, *The Processes of Politics and the Rule of Law: Studies on the Iberian Kingdoms and Papal Rome in the Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), item V.

⁴³ José Luis Martín Rodríguez, *Campesinos vasallos del obispo Suero de Zamora (1254–1286)* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1981); Jesús I. Coria Colina, 'El pleito entre cabildo y concejo zamoranos de 1278: Análisis de la conflictividad jurisdiccional: Concejo, cabildo y rey', in *Primer Congreso de Historia de Zamora*, 4 vols (Zamora: IEZ, 1989–93), III (1991), 285–303.

⁴⁴ Coria Colina, 'El pleito', doc. no. 2, pp. 292–96.

⁴⁵ *DpH*, p. 18.

⁴⁶ O'Callaghan, *Learned King*, p. 246.

a connection with the conflict in which Juan Gil became involved. That is, his mirror of princes was perhaps, partly, conceived as a vehicle to defend the cause of his hometown, for which he shows so much sympathy in his writings. However, he did not succeed; Sancho sentenced in favour of the bishop and his chapter, imposing upon the *concejo* a heavy fine.

It seems unlikely that Sancho's verdict of 1278 would have been different if Juan Gil had finished *De preconiis Hispanie* in time, but it is remarkable that after years in which he apparently left the work untouched, he again took up writing on it in 1282,⁴⁷ the very same year in which the quarrel between bishop and *concejo* again became acute. On 2 July of that year, Sancho ordered that the sentence, which, in spite of several exhortations, had been ignored by the *concejo*, should finally be executed. If necessary, goods of the *concejo* should be confiscated. If Juan Gil indeed returned to writing with the intention of aiding the *concejo*, he again had little chance of success. Sancho had indicated that he was tired of the affair; he told the two knights, one from Salamanca and one from Benavente, who were to execute the sentence to do it in such way 'that the case will never again come before me.'⁴⁸ The last extant document relating to the dispute, issued 10 April 1283, contains the sentence of two knights from Toro, to whom the two aforementioned knights had delegated the case; the outcome is once more unfavourable to the *concejo*.⁴⁹

Thus, it is not unthinkable that Juan Gil's complaints in the tenth tract about 'tyrannical' lords are not primarily directed at Alfonso X, but rather at Bishop Suero. There remains, however, a third candidate: Prince Sancho himself. In Juan Gil's account of the siege of Zamora of 1072, the part of villain is played by Sancho II. The Castilian king is a tyrant, not only because he levies unlawful taxes and ignores the advice of his barons,⁵⁰ but also, and above all, because he has usurped the inheritance of his brothers and sisters against the will of their father, Ferdinand I.⁵¹ His behaviour therefore resembles that of his namesake Prince Sancho, who did not want to conform himself to the partition of the realm provided by his father. A contemporary must have noticed the parallelism. In other words, Tracts VIII, IX, and X, which, as said before, more or less constitute

⁴⁷ See n. 33, above.

⁴⁸ Coria Colina, 'El pleito', doc. no. 3 [bis], pp. 298–302.

⁴⁹ Coria Colina, 'El pleito', doc. no. 3, pp. 297–98.

⁵⁰ *DpH*, p. 258.

⁵¹ *DpH*, pp. 253–54.

a unity, may have been intended to keep Prince Sancho away from the path followed by his namesake.

In this respect, it is interesting that the second part of the ninth tract does not so much recount the evil deeds of kings as the rebellions of noblemen, that is, the group that caused Alfonso X so many troubles and formed Sancho's main ally. It is meaningful that the last story of the tract concerns an attempt to murder Alfonso X, committed, 'as people told', at the instigation of the nobles, who 'never are able to control their temperament'.⁵² Juan Gil's earlier mentioned appeal to Sancho's courtliness and benevolence indicates that — if the rising indeed already had taken place — he still recognized the Prince's authority, or at least accepted the status quo, but he does not seem to have favoured the rebellion. His warnings against 'tyrannical' lords may be meant for Sancho, too.

Juan Gil does not keep it a secret that he does not have a high opinion of the temporal and spiritual leaders of his time, and he leaves no doubt about what he thinks is wrong with them. This makes him quite overt in his criticism, though not entirely explicit, in the sense that he does not mention names. Furthermore, we can date certain parts of *De preconiiis Hispanie* only roughly and we lack detailed information about contemporary events. As a result, it is not possible to come to a definitive conclusion, though for contemporaries it must have been clear which specific persons and situations he was hinting at when denouncing the abuses of *principes*, *potentes*, and *prelati*. In each case, his criticism is much more overt than Ferster's 'camouflaged' messages. My second example, Álvaro Pelayo, goes even further. In his *Speculum regum*, he is very explicit in his criticism and there is no doubt as to the identity of the target of his accusations.

Álvaro wrote his *Speculum regum*,⁵³ which he dedicated to Alfonso XI, great grandson of Alfonso X, between 1340 and 1344. At that time he was Bishop of Silves in the Algarve, but, originating from Galicia and having been raised at the Castilian court, he still considered Alfonso his 'natural lord'.⁵⁴ As he did not feel safe in his own see, he spent much time in Seville, apparently under the protection of the Castilian king. He had obtained his bishopric as a reward for the services he had rendered to John XXII during the Pope's struggle with Emperor Louis of

⁵² *DpH*, pp. 331–32.

⁵³ Álvaro Pelayo, *Speculum regum*, ed. by Miguel Pinto de Meneses, 2 vols (Lisbon: Instituto de Alta Cultura, 1955–63). For Álvaro's biography, see José Antonio de C.R. de Souza, '¿Un fillo de Gómez Chariño? Álvaro Pais; traxectoria e promoción ao episcopado', *Revista galega do ensino*, 44 (2004), 177–98.

⁵⁴ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 4.

Bavaria. At the papal court in Avignon, he had written *De statu et planctu Ecclesiae*,⁵⁵ which was meant as a response to the attacks launched against the Pope by authors such as Marsilius of Padua and William Ockham, who supported the cause of John's opponent. Álvaro started writing his *Speculum* shortly after Alfonso, together with his father-in-law, Afonso IV of Portugal, had defeated the invading army of the Marinid sultan of Morocco, reinforced with troops from Granada, at the banks of the river Salado in the deep south of Spain. Álvaro congratulates the King on his victory, but at the same time he warns him that his task is not yet fulfilled; before he may lay down his weapons and disband his troops, he first has to recover Africa, which, according to Álvaro, had been a part of the old Visigothic kingdom of Toledo, for Christendom.⁵⁶

Though the accomplishment of this task is presented as a restoration of Alfonso's legitimate heritage, it is above all a service to Christendom, that is, an expression of *fides*, or faith. Álvaro amply treats the meaning of *fides*, a quality that naturally is indispensable to any Christian king.⁵⁷ He then gradually passes to other topics related to the royal office, copying parts of *De statu et planctu Ecclesiae*, which are in turn mainly based on three sources: Ptolemy of Lucca's *Determinatio compendiosa de iurisdictione imperii*, James of Viterbo's *De regimine christiano*, and *De regno*, attributed to Thomas Aquinas.⁵⁸ This part of the *Speculum* is followed by a list of seventy-one 'royal sins' (an adaptation of a comparable list from *De statu et planctu Ecclesiae*) and a chapter entitled 'De morte malorum regum', the main sources of which are Peter Comestor's *Historia scholastica* and Cassiodorus's *Historia tripartita*. To this Álvaro has added two treatises on the cardinal virtues: the first, John of Wales' *Breviloquium*,⁵⁹ already

⁵⁵ Álvaro Pelayo, *De statu et planctu Ecclesiae* (Venice: Tintus, 1560).

⁵⁶ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 6–12. Álvaro here alludes to the myth according to which the old Roman province Mauretania Tingitana had been a part of the Visigothic kingdom. This myth is to be found in Rodrigo de Rada's *De rebus Hispanie*, iii.16 (p. 97) and iii.21 (p. 105); and, based on Rodrigo, Juan Gil's *DpH*, pp. 23, 75, and 235.

⁵⁷ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 34.

⁵⁸ For Álvaro's use of the *De statu et planctu Ecclesiae* while writing this part of the *Speculum* and its ultimate sources, see Gerhard Schrick, *Der Königsspiegel des Álvaro Pelayo (Speculum regum)* (Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1953), pp. 41–46.

⁵⁹ Schrick, *Königsspiegel*, pp. 135–36, noticed that Álvaro had copied almost integrally a work that had been published in Cologne around 1472 by Arnold ter Hoernen under the title *De instructione principum*, but did not know this was John of Wales' *Breviloquium*.

used some generations before by Juan Gil de Zamora; the second, announced as a 'short epilogue'⁶⁰ but actually occupying more than half of the edition, an extensive excerpt of the third part of William Peraldus's *Summa virtutum*.⁶¹ According to Álvaro, it is necessary that a king possess the cardinal virtues in order to be able to rule himself and others. They are the four pillars that support his throne.⁶² Still, the most important virtue is, in Álvaro's view, faith; *fides* is the cornerstone of all other virtues, theological as well as cardinal.⁶³

It is therefore interesting to look more closely at what Álvaro exactly means by faith. At first sight, there is nothing remarkable about his idea of *fides*. First, King Alfonso has to believe firmly those things that are announced concerning matters invisible; second, he has to receive reverently those things that are celebrated in the visible sacraments; third, he has to avoid diligently and abhor vehemently all sacrilege.⁶⁴ He will be a good king if he is *fidelis* in his heart, his words, and his deeds.⁶⁵ He has to live well and abstain from all vice, so that one day he can exchange his transitory earthly kingdom for the eternal celestial kingdom.⁶⁶ He also has to obey the pope, *Dei vicarius principalis* in the Christian Commonwealth, as well as all other bishops, in their capacity as 'spiritual fathers'.⁶⁷ Further on it becomes clear that Álvaro wants secular rulers to submit himself to the pope not only in spiritual matters; the pope possesses an all-embracing power, *plenitudo potestatis*, both in the spiritual and temporal spheres. As a result, he can depose emperors and kings because of their crimes when they

⁶⁰ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 428.

⁶¹ William Peraldus, *Summae virtutum ac vitiorum* (Lyon: Beringer, 1554). Álvaro did not copy the last tract ('divisio virtutum cardinalium secundum Macrobius') of Part 3 of the *Summa virtutum*, probably because Macrobius's division also appears in the *Breviloquium*. On the other hand he added some fragments to the chapter 'De fide' (*Speculum*, II, 502–24). Interesting is his discussion of the — in an Iberian context surely not academic — question whether a Christian is allowed to swear fidelity to an infidel or ally himself with infidels against other Christians.

⁶² Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 322.

⁶³ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 34.

⁶⁴ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 18.

⁶⁵ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 20.

⁶⁶ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 26, 28.

⁶⁷ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 34, 36.

show themselves incorrigible.⁶⁸ In short, Álvaro's interpretation of *fides* betrays his hierocratic inclinations.⁶⁹

As has been said, faith also expresses itself in fighting the enemies of Christendom, both internal and external. The King should extirpate the former⁷⁰ and wage war upon the latter until he has restored *Africa* to Christianity. On account of his recent victory over the Muslims, Álvaro celebrates Alfonso as *rex fidelissimus* and 'victorious defender of the faith'.⁷¹ Yet his remark that 'what is the sense of conquering barbarian nations, if we are conquered by vices?' suggests that this *rex fidelissimus* in Álvaro's eyes is not exactly a paragon of royal virtue and is not free of sin.⁷² Previously, in *De statu et planctu Ecclesiae*, Álvaro had shown himself very critical toward the leaders of this world, both secular and spiritual, from both the past and the present. Michael Wilks has called that work 'a confused mass of contradictory opinions'.⁷³ The same can be said of the *Speculum regum*, in which much of the material from the first work is reused. We are confronted with all kinds of theories of kingship, which Álvaro has copied from his sources. This makes it difficult to establish Álvaro's own standpoint, though he certainly tends to see princely rule mainly as a consequence of sin. This opinion, which is expressed in many places in the *Speculum*, above all pervades the chapter 'De morte malorum regum', which gives a colourful description of the sacrileges and injustices committed by rulers throughout human history, as well as of the horrible punishments they subsequently received.

The chapter is meant to keep Alfonso from committing the seventy-one royal sins described in the preceding chapter. Alfonso is urged to confess his sins and correct himself in those things in which he offends God, if he wishes not to be

⁶⁸ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 104, 106.

⁶⁹ A more extensive discussion of Álvaro's ideas on the relationship between temporal and spiritual powers can be found in Tang, *King, Sword and Morals*.

⁷⁰ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 18, 20.

⁷¹ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 22–24. See also Frank Tang, 'El *rex fidelissimus*: Rivalidad hispano-francesa en la Castilla de Alfonso XI (1312–1350)', *Studia historica: Historia medieval*, 20–21 (2002–03), 189–206; and the English version of the same article, 'The "Rex Fidelissimus": Spanish-French Rivalry in the Reign of Alfonso XI of Castile (1312–1350)', in *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis/Legal History Review*, 73 (2005), 93–109.

⁷² Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 22.

⁷³ Michael J. Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 549.

counted among the rulers that sin against God, his law, and his faith by denying Christ, king of all kings, by their actions and habits, even though they profess their faith in him with words.⁷⁴ As mentioned above, this chapter is an adaptation of fragments from *De statu et planctu Ecclesiae*. To a large extent the royal sins, some of which are associated explicitly with the kings of Spain, or even the King of Castile, are connected with the king's relationship with the Church and matters of faith, but others are related to what we would call his private life and the governance of his kingdom. Many, if not all, apply to Alfonso XI; some even seem to have been noted especially with him in mind.⁷⁵

One of the sins the kings of Spain are explicitly accused of is making money by taxing the game of dice, even though gambling is forbidden by canon law. Possibly Álvaro is hinting at the regulations on gambling-houses issued by Alfonso the Learned. Another sin associated with Spanish kings is the eating of meat during Lent and other periods of fasting. Here they follow the advice of doctors who, in order to flatter them, promote the prescriptions of pagans like Galen and Hippocrates, and the devil.⁷⁶ A sin that does not occur in *De statu et planctu Ecclesiae*, and therefore may have been added to the list in the *Speculum* especially for Alfonso XI, is the royal love for hunting, a hobby the King, who ordered a book to be written on it (the *Libro de la montería*), seems to have been particularly keen on. This expensive and dangerous practice causes severe damage to the countryside and the fields of the peasants. Besides, kings neglect their duties in its pursuit. They therefore offer a pernicious example to their men; to occupy oneself with wild animals is, 'with due respect to the royal majesty', a 'beastly' habit.⁷⁷

With Álvaro's sensibility for the damage caused by the hunting parties to kingdom and people, we touch upon what we might call the social dimension of royal misdemeanour. To this dimension also belongs the crime of altering the coinage with the purpose of making a profit without the subjects' approval, but surely to their detriment; on account of such injury kings are obliged, both to God and to law, to give due compensation.⁷⁸ For Álvaro, it is an important principle

⁷⁴ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 236.

⁷⁵ A more detailed discussion of Álvaro's list than the one given here is to be found in Tang, *King, Sword and Morals*. Cf. Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain*, pp. 605–12.

⁷⁶ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 274.

⁷⁷ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 286.

⁷⁸ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 242.

that kings should try to gain the consent of their subjects whenever matters of general interest are involved. Sin number thirty-seven is that kings settle important state affairs (*maiora negotia regni*) according to their own discretion or together with only a few advisers, while they should convoke the *maior pars* of their subjects, because, 'what concerns all, must be approved by all' (*quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus debet approbari*).⁷⁹

In other items, too, Álvaro insists on the disastrous effects the royal misdeeds have on the kingdom and its inhabitants. Sin number sixty-two concerns the practice of purveyance: the confiscation of provisions while traveling the country without paying properly or, in this case, with *albarás* (charters). Álvaro speaks of the *reges Hispanie* and his reference to his native Galicia makes it clear that he is especially accusing the King of Castile:

The very kings, particularly the kings of Spain, who ought to cultivate justice, to live from their own and lawful revenues and protect their subjects against bandits, thieves and invaders, skin their subjects. Not only by means of extremely heavy taxes and levies, but also by robbing in boroughs, villages and in the country, and often also in cities, casks of wine, loads of grain, herds of sheep and cows, and other provisions, as well as wood, straw and textiles, from the owners, peasants and countrymen. And they only pay them with *pictatiolas*, i.e. letters, which they call *albara*. And all hand over their goods crying and wailing, and in Galicia shouting '*parcados*' [have mercy]. Against this the psalm says [Psalms 13. 4]: 'they are eating up my people, as if it were bread'; and also [Psalms 78. 7]: 'for they have devoured [Jacob] etcetera [...].' And therefore they can be called anthropophagi, which means man-eaters, who, driven by gluttony, excessiveness and lust, spend everything for which miserable peasants have been labouring a whole year; together with their many dogs, birds, vile scoundrels, common whores and other ones that in popular language are called *soldadeiras*, i.e. prostitutes, because they receive a stipend from the king and other magnates, whom they follow from place to place.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 260.

⁸⁰ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 264, 266: 'XLIIº, quia ipsi idem reges maxime Hispaniae qui deberent esse cultores iustitiae [...] et de propriis et de iustis redditibus vivere [...] et subditos suos a praedonibus et latronibus et invasoribus defensare [...] subditos suos exoriant, necdum per exactiones et collectas gravissimas, sed rapinas accipientes in castris et villis et ruribus et saepe in civitatibus, dolia vini, sarcinas grani, greges arietum et boum, et alia comestibilia, et ligna et paleas et panos a possessoribus et laboratoribus et rusticis, et nichil nisi pictolas, id est, cretulas [cf. *De statu et planctu Ecclesiae*, ii.30, fol. 72º: pictatiolas, id est, chartulas'], [...] quae vocant alvara, eis solventes. Et ab eis recedunt omnes lugentes et ululantes, et in Gallaecia parcados clamantes et dicentes, contra illud Psalmi: "qui devorant plebem meam sicut escam panis"; et iterum: "quia comederunt, etc [...]." Unde ant[hr]opophagi, id est, comestores hominum possunt dici, labores miserabilium laboratorum totius anni cum suis canibus et avibus et vilissimis ribaldis multis et meretricibus communibus et aliis quas vulgariter vocant soldadeiras, id est stipendiarias, quia

At sin number sixty-five, Álvaro accuses kings, in particular the *rex Castellae*, of extravagant expenses connected with the maintenance of themselves, their wives and their children, both legitimate and illegitimate. Out of pure vanity they provide their offspring with their own households as soon as they are born. The costs of this habit exhaust the entire kingdom. Paupers and countrymen are forced to flee the country, which is left depopulated. The kings' endless train of horses, wagons, servants and lackeys, noble and ignoble women scourges the country like a swarm of locusts.⁸¹

Álvaro evidently is referring to the situation created by Alfonso XI's extramarital relationship with Leonor de Guzmán, who had borne him several children, which he provided with extensive inheritances. Adultery was obviously something Álvaro thoroughly abhorred and to which he refers at other places as well; sin number twenty in his list is the imputation that kings, who already would have problems handling one woman, want to have more of them, a behaviour that is more fitting to horses and mules than to men. Because of the danger to their souls it involves and the scandal it arouses, adultery justifies their excommunication and deposition if they do not change their ways.⁸² Another reproach that is made to the kings of Spain in particular is that they offer hospitality to prostitutes and pay them stipends — their palaces resemble brothels, like the temple of Jerusalem.⁸³

It is likely that Álvaro's invectives reflect sincere anger. Still, one wonders if his attacks are purely motivated by moral indignation and social engagement. Alfonso's relationship with Leonor de Guzmán, combined with his favouring of the clan around her, was causing much political unrest.⁸⁴ Don Juan Manuel, the always troublesome senior member of the royal family, in a letter to the King of Aragón, claimed that the favours Alfonso bestowed on his illegitimate children seriously undermined the position of the heir to the throne, the *Infante* Pedro (years later it would turn out that he had been right, when Alfonso's bastard son

stipendium habent a rege et ab aliis magnatibus quos de loco ad locum sequuntur et suis ventribus et aliis suis superfluitatibus et carnalitibus expendentes.'

⁸¹ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 286.

⁸² Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 250.

⁸³ Pelayo, *Speculum*, I, 270, 272.

⁸⁴ Salvado de Moxó, 'Época de Alfonso XI', in *Historia de España*, ed. by Ramón Menéndez Pidal and José María Jover Zamora (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1947–; 2nd edn, 1990), XIII, pt 1, 279–428 (pp. 321–25); Luis Vicente Díaz Martín, *Pedro I, 1350–1369* (Palencia: La Olmeda 1995), pp. 33–38.

Enrique de Trastámara took Pedro's life and kingdom). Juan Manuel, who had his own agenda, used this as a valid excuse to rebel against his sovereign.⁸⁵

The affair affected foreign relationships as well. Alfonso's legitimate wife, Maria, was the daughter of the King of Portugal, Afonso IV. In the battle at the river Salado both kings had fought side by side, but only shortly before they had been at war with each other, partly as a result of Alfonso's unfaithfulness. Peace had only been restored after papal mediation. If Alfonso returned to his old habits, which he had sworn to give up, the Castilian-Portuguese alliance would be seriously threatened, and as a consequence, the continuation of the Reconquest on African soil, for which Álvaro longed. The re-Christianization of northern Africa was a dream shared by Franciscans and papacy alike. It is no coincidence that the Pope, Benedict XII, at about the same time was writing letters to the Castilian king that have the same tenor as Álvaro's *Speculum*: the King should not attribute his recent victory to his own strength, but to divine intervention. Only if he succeeded in resisting his carnal desires would he continue to enjoy divine favour and keep on conquering his enemies, who were the Church's enemies as well.⁸⁶ Álvaro probably was not only serving Franciscan and papal interests, but also his own. The Marinid invasion had gravely threatened his bishopric at the Algarve. When the Christians gained firm ground on Moroccan soil, Silves could rest assured. For Álvaro it would have been difficult to distinguish between his own interests and that of his church, or that of *the* Church. Not without reason has it been argued that Pope John XXII had appointed him to the see of Silves (which was facing serious problems) precisely because he was such a staunch defender of ecclesiastical rights.⁸⁷ This should warn us against categorizing Álvaro's list of sins in overly modern terms by making a sharp distinction between private and public interests, ecclesiastical and secular cares, or moral and political considerations. All the same, when read closely and placed in its proper context, Álvaro's condemnation of royal vice clearly turns out to be not purely motivated by moral concerns. As in the case of Juan Gil de Zamora's devotion to royal *mores*,

⁸⁵ Andres Giménez Soler, *Don Juan Manuel: Biografía y estudio crítico* (Zaragoza: Académica, Martínez-Audiencia, 1932), doc. no. 539, pp. 622–24.

⁸⁶ Benedict XII, *Lettres closes et patentes intéressant les pays autres que la France*, ed. by J. M. Vidal and Guillaume Mollat, 6 vols (Paris: Boccard, 1913–50), IV, cols 118–20, no. 2976 (27 December 1340). See also cols 158–59, no. 3078 (8 May 1341).

⁸⁷ José Antonio de C. R. de Souza, 'D. Álvaro Pelayo O. Min. y D. Alfonso IV de Portugal y las relaciones de poder', *Anales del Seminario de historia de la filosofía*, 51 (2003), 51–67.

the bishop's promotion of princely virtues not only reflects worries about the king's soul, but also more terrestrial concerns.

To conclude, in accordance with their expressly pronounced intentions, both Juan Gil de Zamora and Álvaro Pelayo amply discuss the princely virtues in their mirrors of princes. Good morals will enable their royal addressees to put their private and public affairs in order, so that they can eventually gain salvation. Both friars present themselves in their pastoral capacity. It, therefore, should not surprise us that they rebuke rulers for doing things that, in their eyes, endanger their souls. Moreover, in agreement with the idea that a king should not just 'rule himself' with the help of virtues, but his kingdom as well, they criticize rulers not only for errors that pertain to what is nowadays regarded as strictly moral territory, but also for social and political situations that do not meet their approval. In other words, discontent with royal policy is expressed in moral terms.

Sometimes one even gets the impression that Juan Gil and Álvaro wrote their mirrors precisely because it offered them a chance to express their grievances. The discussion of princely virtues provided them with the opportunity, if not the excuse, to tackle current issues. This, of course, is not to say that the ideal of the virtuous king was not valuable to them or other authors in its own right. Yet it does not seem unreasonable to argue that the popularity of the genre was partly due to the fact that it could serve as a vehicle to raise issues that were too dangerous to address in a different way. They might do so not just under the cover of timeless anecdotes and maxims, but also — in a discourse much more direct than that imagined by Ferster — under the cloak of exposing the 'sins' and 'vices' of kings, princes, and their favourites. For, since most authors of mirrors were clerics, it could not be held against them that they were worried about their masters' souls. Morals and salvation belonged to their expertise; they were on safe grounds. As writers they engaged in an activity that could be compared to that of the members of their order who acted as royal confessors.

It should be noted that not all writers of mirrors showed a critical attitude; the genre as such was neutral. Some authors were writing under royal auspices. From the kingdom of Castile we might mention the authors of the *Siete partidas*, written by order of Alfonso the Learned and containing many elements of a mirror of princes, or the author of *Castigos*, which was written under the name of King Sancho IV. These works show themselves unreservedly favourable toward kingship and are much less inclined to criticism. To be sure, this does not imply that they do not warn the king, who, if he rules unjustly, will be punished, both in this life and in the hereafter. Next to these 'royalist' writers there were men that, even if they had connections at court and maybe to a certain degree were

dependent on royal favour, were brave enough, or, if you prefer, mad enough, to denounce the crimes committed by the lords and rulers of their days, implicitly or explicitly, even those committed by the king himself.

Apparently many members of the 'mad' were Friars Minor. This can be explained by the aversion the founder of their order had shown to all earthly power and wealth, which made them regard princely rule and lordship as consequences of sin. Furthermore, the ideal of poverty taught them to sympathize with the 'poor', which included burghers and peasants who were unable to defend themselves against the arbitrariness of the powerful. Still, the fact that many critical authors belonged to the same religious order does not prove that criticism is, strictly speaking, foreign to the genre. Together with other mendicants, the Franciscans made a major contribution to it; if we reject this contribution, we would write off an important branch of the mirror of princes tradition. That would be unwise because, to finish with a wise old saying, repeated by many writers of mirrors, among them Juan Gil de Zamora, you cannot cut off a member of your own body, except with great pain.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ *DpH*, p. 46.

JUSTICE, TEMPTATION, AND THE LIMITS OF PRINCELY VIRTUE IN DANTE'S CONCEPTION OF THE MONARCH

Mary Elizabeth Sullivan

I. Introduction

Born in Florence in 1265, Dante Alighieri is best known for his epic poem *Divina commedia*, though he is also the author of a philosophical treatise (*Il Convivio*), a political treatise (*De monarchia*), and numerous other works. His own involvement in the turbulent politics of the Florentine commune resulted in Dante spending almost the last two decades of his life in exile. During his years away from Florence, Dante came to abandon his Guelph allegiances and embrace an extreme pro-imperialist position, setting out the blueprint for a consolidated world monarchy in *De monarchia*. At the same time as Dante was composing *De monarchia*, he was also at work on the *Divine Comedy*, vividly portraying the torments of hell and purgatory and the bliss of paradise. Throughout these works, Dante demonstrates a concern for the workings of justice, whether in the order of the monarchy or the divinely mandated torments of hell; however, rarely does one find this poet/politician using the term *justice* as an explicitly political virtue. In fact, there is very little discussion of any of the traditional *virtutes politicae* in Dante's writings. In contrast with many of his contemporary political thinkers, Dante does not feel the need to exhort the ruler to be virtuous or provide for his moral education; the ruler's virtue is actually of minimal concern.

How then does Dante believe there will be justice in the universal monarchy, if the prince need not be a man of exceptional personal virtue? I argue that the key, for Dante, lies in structuring the world's government in such a way that the

monarch experiences no temptation, and therefore, princely virtue becomes irrelevant. Dante's radical position on political justice has been overlooked in the past due to scholars' tendency to collapse the very distinct uses of 'justice' in Dante into a single uniform concept. This study will discuss the different ways in which Dante employs the term *justice* and relate them to his notion of political order. It will then explore why Dante's political justice diverges from his understanding of Aristotelian moral virtue. Finally, I will elaborate on my view of why Dante is not particularly concerned with the princely virtues.

II. Justice in Dante Scholarship

Many scholars have addressed the issue of justice in Dante's writing, some even suggesting that it provides the driving force for his philosophical thought. Although justice is an important concept to Dante, several of his commentators have overstated the coherence of Dante's 'theory of justice' and neglected to acknowledge the distinctions between moral, political, and divine justice. Among those authors who present Dante as a theorist of justice is Walter Ullmann, whose discussion of *De monarchia* renders justice the cornerstone of the universal monarchy:

The succinct term and notion of the *civitas humana* expressed universal mankind in its natural, that is, baptismally unregenerated, state presided over by the universal monarch, who for Dante represented the abstract idea of justice and law [...] over and above the nations stands the universally valid idea of law and justice conceived in human terms, the custodian of which is the universal monarch.¹

Ullmann locates 'justice conceived in human terms', in Dante, by which is understood a moral virtue, accessible to Christians and non-Christians alike. For Ullmann, such justice forms the animating force in Dante's conception of world government. John Scott likewise argues that Dante supported the idea of the attainability of justice on earth: 'We must constantly bear in mind [Dante's] belief that the Earthly Paradise indicates a goal, a state of justice here and now, attainable by humanity on earth under the guidance of the Emperor (in collaboration with the spiritual guidance provided by the Church), a goal that had in part been prepared for by the achievements of pagan Rome.'² Both Scott and Ullmann

¹ Walter Ullmann, *Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism* (London: Elek, 1977), p. 129.

² John A. Scott, *Dante's Political Purgatory* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), p. 184.

emphasize justice as the proper goal of the political regime, a goal toward which man can be led by human reason and princely guidance; justice is possible in the temporal realm and is the monarch's foremost responsibility.

Similarly, Etienne Gilson views justice as the primary earthly goal in Dante, referring to the purpose of practical morality as 'that purely natural and human end which is happiness in this life in a society regulated by the most human of the virtues — justice'.³ Gilson explicitly connects this human virtue found in *Convivio* to the political justice that Dante expounds in his *De monarchia*, which Gilson argues is intrinsically and authentically Aristotelian:

Now Dante was not only acquainted with *Ethica ad Nicomachum*, but he treasured it [...]. If, as all his work attests, Dante was animated by an ardent desire for justice and peace in the temporal sphere, it is understandable that this altogether admirable book, in which, even in St. Thomas's commentary with its Christian inspiration, the ideal of human temporal felicity secured entirely through the practice of the natural virtues was so clearly visible, was to him in a sense the Bible of the Lawgiver.⁴

Gilson goes on to proclaim that Dante, following the classical tradition, saw ethics as the basis for political thought, and derived his ethics almost exclusively from the writings of Aristotle. He concludes that, in Dante, and particularly *De monarchia*, 'Aristotle's thought is so clear that even the Christian amendments of St Thomas never prevent it from emerging.'⁵ A somewhat similar confusion can be found in the writings of Gilson's student, Charles T. Davis. Although Davis recognizes that Dante maintains a clear distinction between the 'moral virtues', available even to pagans, and the 'theological virtues', he does not seem to see the difference in Dante's treatment of justice as a moral virtue, justice as an attribute of God's Will, and justice in the political realm.⁶

Though less explicit in arguing for Dante's debt to Aristotle, the personal virtue of the prince is likewise at the heart of Ernst Kantorowicz's reading of Dantean monarchy, a system he sees as designed to maximize political virtue along with political power:

He visualized a huge political collective whose intellectual potentialities, through the agency of the four cardinal virtues, were guided to perfection by the Roman philosopher-monarch — admittedly a somewhat undefined and enigmatic personality, but

³ Etienne Gilson, *Dante the Philosopher*, trans. by David Moore (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1949), pp. 138–39 (first publ. in French, 1939).

⁴ Gilson, *Dante the Philosopher*, p. 218.

⁵ Gilson, *Dante the Philosopher*, p. 219.

⁶ Charles T. Davis, 'Dante and the Empire' in *The Cambridge Companion to Dante*, ed. by Rachel Jacoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 67–79.

undoubtedly meant to be a mirror of the *virtutes politicae*, a man owning all and desiring nothing and therefore capable at all times of actuating Justice as well as the other virtues.⁷

Kantorowicz asserts that Dante's theory of world monarchy is primarily a theory of princely virtue in action. For some scholars, Dante develops this position to the extreme. As A. P. d'Entreves argues, 'Dante was carried away by his enthusiasm. Under the stress of a tremendous emotion the Emperor had first appeared to him, in that now distant January of 1311, not only as a restorer of justice and peace, but as a new Messiah.'⁸ Dante's monarchy, in this account, is the very font of temporal justice.

Alternately, other scholars have highlighted the role played by the justice displayed prominently in the torments and delights of heaven, hell, and purgatory, that is, divine justice, which is, in effect, interchangeable with the correctness of God's will. Joan Ferrante, for example, notes the symbolism of the eagle in the realm of the just. Here, she points out that the Roman Empire is an emblem of justice because it implemented God's will in the world (not because of the political virtue of its rulers or even its citizens).⁹ The role of the divine will is likewise an important element in Allan Gilbert's understanding of Dante's justice; however, he believes the concept of justice found in the torments of the *Commedia* to be always compatible with Aristotelian justice.¹⁰ Gilbert manages this, in part, by focusing his study on the *Commedia*, and simply overlooks any contradiction between the vision of justice presented there and that presented in the *Convivio* or *De monarchia*. Gilbert correctly points out that divine justice permeates Dante's epic poem and is central to its coherence: 'Dante's vision is morally and intellectually acceptable only when the justice of the punishments he describes is accepted. If their justice be denied, the poem is chaos or burlesque. Its effectiveness and value as a whole depend on the truth and fitness of the treatment accorded to men by the divine government.'¹¹ However, Gilbert then conflates

⁷ Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 472–73.

⁸ Alessandro P. d'Entreves, *Dante as a Political Thinker* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 51.

⁹ Joan M. Ferrante, *The Political Vision of the Divine Comedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 53–55.

¹⁰ Allan H. Gilbert, *Dante's Conception of Justice* (New York: AMS, 1965), pp. 68–72, especially p. 72.

¹¹ Gilbert, *Dante's Conception of Justice*, p. 67.

this idea of divine justice with Aristotelian justice as discussed in the *Convivio*, citing Dante's mention of justice as 'the most human of the virtues' as it resides in the intellectual part of man, in other words, in the will.¹² Gilbert assumes that the justice of the human intellect, which Dante understood through Aristotle via Aquinas, is conceptually the same as the divine justice that permeates the *Commedia*.

The distinction between human and divine justice is not lost on John Took, though he sees greater convergence between the two than I have found. Took concedes that the princely role, as depicted in *De monarchia*, is conceived 'primarily in terms of peacemaking', though he makes clear his belief that Dante's monarch is no tyrant.¹³ Took then elaborates the notion of justice as the proper object of love. Nevertheless, Took does not articulate what Dante means by political justice, beyond the (rather shallow) idea of justice as peacekeeping. Although asserting the delineation between human and divine justice, Took still does not provide sufficient evidence of what Dante means by justice in the earthly, political sense.

In contrast, this chapter highlights the dissonance between how Dante uses the term *justice* when referring to moral virtue, an element of the divine, and finally, a political principle. Furthermore, I argue that political justice, for Dante, is not typically a product of the personal virtue (in the generally Aristotelian sense) and rationality of the prince. Instead, justice arises when men act in concert with the will of God, whose rationality is beyond the comprehension of the human mind unaided by revelation. Any discussion of justice in Dante must not ignore this fact.

III. Aristotelian Moral Justice

There is no doubt that the Aristotelian ethical scheme heavily influences Dante's philosophical and poetic writings; this is evident in his account of the vices in *Inferno*, and most clearly, in the discussion of virtue in the *Convivio*.¹⁴ In the

¹² Gilbert, *Dante's Conception of Justice*, pp. 85–86.

¹³ John Took, "Diligite iustitiam qui iudicatis terram": Justice and the Just Ruler in Dante', in *Dante and Governance*, ed. by John R. Woodhouse (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 137–51 (p. 147).

¹⁴ For an insightful discussion of where Dante relies on and departs from Aristotelian thought in the political schema of *De monarchia*, see Larry Peterman, 'Dante's *Monarchia* and Aristotle's Political Thought', in *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, 10 (1973), 3–40. See also

latter, after listing eleven ‘moral virtues’, Dante draws on Aristotle’s *Ethics* to describe for his audience the relationship between the virtues and the vices:

Each of these virtues has two related enemies, that is, vices, one through excess and the other through shortfall. These virtues constitute the mean between them, and they spring from a single source, namely from our habit of good choice. Hence we may say generally of all of them that they are a chosen habit residing in the mean.¹⁵

Dante’s notion of the moral virtues is therefore the Aristotelian idea of choosing the mean between two opposing vices. With this framework in mind, one can begin to examine the discussion of Aristotelian moral justice in Dante.

Dante defines justice in the *Convivio* as that virtue ‘which disposes us to love and conduct ourselves with righteousness in all matters’.¹⁶ It is striking that the number of actual instances in which Dante employs ‘justice’ in this sense is relatively small. Most of these are found in the fourth treatise of the *Convivio*. Dante’s first use of moral justice in this text occurs in his discussion of the Stoic philosopher Zeno’s contribution to the debate about the goal of human life. Dante here summarizes what he takes to be the Stoic understanding of existence: ‘The end of human life consisted solely of strict integrity — that is, in strictly, unreservedly following truth and justice, in not showing sorrow for anything or joy for anything, in not being responsive to any emotion.’¹⁷ Although this passage indicates that Dante does understand justice as a moral virtue, he does not sufficiently expand upon the topic to provide his reader with anything that could be termed a ‘theory of justice’.

Dante continues in an Aristotelian vein later in the fourth treatise, where he differentiates between practical and contemplative exercises of the mind. Justice is listed as one of the virtues needed for practical work. Dante follows the classical

Gennaro Sasso, *Dante, l'imperatore e Aristotele* (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 2002).

¹⁵ Dante Alighieri, *Il Convivio*, ed. by Gian Carlo Garfagnini (Rome: Salerno, 1997), pp. 325–26: ‘E ciascuna di queste vertudi ha due inimici collaterali, cioè vzi, uno in troppo e un altro in poco; e queste tutte sono li mezzi intra quelli, e nascono tutte da uno principio, cioè dall’abito della nostra buona elezione: onde generalmente si può dicere di tutte che siano abito elettivo consistente nel mezzo’; the English translations in the body of the text are taken from Dante, *The Banquet*, trans. by Richard H. Lansing (New York: Garland, 1990)

¹⁶ *Convivio*, iv.17, p. 325: ‘la quale ordina noi ad amare e operare dirittura in tutte cose.’

¹⁷ *Convivio*, iv.6, pp. 259–60: ‘Fine della vita umana esse solemente la rigida onestade: cioè rigidamente, senza resetto alcuna la verità e la giustizia seguire, di nulla mostrare dolore, di nulla mostrare allegrezza, di nulla passione avere sentore.’

Greek tradition in declaring contemplative exercise to be more worthy, yet he does not disparage practical life: 'The practical use of the mind consists in our acting in accordance with virtue (that is, uprightly) with prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice; the speculative use consists not in our acting but in reflecting upon the works of God and nature.'¹⁸ Again, this excerpt is consistent with Aristotelian justice but leaves the reader with little theoretical meat.

The final discussion of moral justice in the *Convivio* is contained in Dante's account of the virtues befitting older men. Here one encounters the most prolonged depiction of moral justice in the *Convivio* and the first instance in which Dante explicitly connects the virtue of justice with political rule:

It is also fitting in this age of life to be just, so that one's judgment and authority may be a light and a law to others. Because this singular virtue, namely justice, was perceived by philosophers in ancient times to display itself to perfection in this age of life, they entrusted the rule of the cities to those who were in this age of life; and therefore the council of rulers was called the 'Senate'.¹⁹

Unfortunately, Dante ends his discussion of justice at this point, with the remark, 'But since justice will be treated in the penultimate book of this work, let it suffice for the present to have touched on it briefly here.'²⁰ The *Convivio*, however, at least as it has been published since 1490, ends with the fourth treatise, depriving modern readers of a more intense look at Dante's understanding of justice as a moral virtue. What is present gives one the impression that Dante conceived of moral virtue in the broadly Aristotelian sense of a person habitually choosing the mean between two vices, justice being no exception. He also agrees with Aristotle on the delineation between active and contemplative virtues, with justice falling into the former category. Finally, Dante connects moral justice to the exercise of political power, especially through Roman republican institutions. Admittedly, Dante is sparing in his references to Aristotelian moral justice. However, this examination of Dante's definitions of moral virtue in general, and justice in

¹⁸ *Convivio*, iv.22, p. 348: 'Quello practicio si è operare per noi virtuosamente, cioè onestamente, con prudenza, con temperanza, con fortezza e con giustizia; quello dello speculativo si è non operare per noi, ma considerare l'opere di Dio e della natura.'

¹⁹ *Convivio*, iv.27, pp. 378–79: 'Convienesi anche a questa etade essere giusto, acciò che li suoi giudici e la sua autoritate sia un lume e una legge alli altri. E perché queste singulare virtù, cioè giustizia, fue vendutta per li antichi filosofi apparire perfetta in questa etade, lo reggimento delle cittadi commiserò in quelli che in questa etade erano; e però lo collegio delli rettori fu detto Senato.'

²⁰ *Convivio*, iv.27, pp. 378–79: 'Ma però che di giustizia nel penultimo trattato di questo volume si tratterà, basti qui al presente questo poco avere toccato di quella.'

particular, will be useful when considering the other forms of justice depicted in his writings, specifically, divine justice and political justice.

IV. Justice in Divine Judgement

Perhaps the best-known use of justice by Dante may be located in his depiction of the *giustizia* of divine judgement, as vividly portrayed in the *Commedia*. Justice in this sense is inextricably Judaeo-Christian and depends on the inherent rightness of the will of God. Such justice need not be justified to meager human reason: 'Therefore the sight that is grant to your [earthly] world penetrates within the Eternal Justice as the eye into the sea; for though from the shore it sees the bottom, in the open sea it does not, and yet the bottom is there but the depth conceals it.'²¹ This notion of justice is notably distinct from the Aristotelian definition discussed above, according to which the unaided reason of men can choose the virtuous mean. Divine justice is not comprehensible to the human mind and is right by definition, as is explained to the pilgrim Dante in paradise:

For thou saidst: 'A man is born on the banks of the Indus, and none is there to speak, or read, or write of Christ, and all his desires and doings are good, so far as human reason sees, without sin in life or speech. He dies unbaptized and without faith. Where is the justice that condemns him? Where is his fault if he does not believe?' Now, who art thou that wouldst sit upon the bench and judge a thousand miles away with short sight of span? [...] The Primal Will, which in itself is good, from itself, the Supreme Good, never was moved; whatever accords with it is in that measure just.²²

Too little attention has been paid to how drastically different this form of justice is from that mentioned in the *Convivio*. God is just not because his actions conform to some rational notion of virtue, but because it is logically impossible

²¹ Dante, *Paradiso*, xix.58–63, in *The Divine Comedy*, trans. and comm. by John D. Sinclair, 3 vols (London: Bodley Head, 1939; repr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961): 'Però nella giustizia sempiterna | la vista che richieva il vostro mondo, | com'occhio per la mare, entro s'interna; | che, ben che dalla prodo veggia il fondo, | in pelago nol vede; e nondimeno | éli, ma cela lui l'esser profondo.'

²² *Paradiso*, xix.70–81, 86–88: 'Ché tu dicevi: "Un uom nasce all riva/ dell'Indo, e quivi non é chi ragioni | di Cristo né chi scriva; | e tutti suoi voleri e atti boni | sono, quanto ragione umana vede, | senza peccato in vita od in sermoni. | Muore non battezzato e senza fede: | ov'è questa giustizia che 'l condanna? | ov'è la culpa sua, se ei non crede?" | Or tu chi se' che vuo' sedere a scranna, | per guidicar di lungi mille miglia | con la vedutacorta d'una spanna? | [...] La prima volontà, ch'è sommo ben, mai non si mosse. | Contanto é giusto quanto a lei consona.'

for him to be otherwise.²³ Dante even admits that while some of God's torments may seem cruel or unjust to the human mind, the Christian must accept that the divine will is always correct.

The long shadow of divine justice confronts the reader early in the *Commedia*. At the opening of Canto III of the *Inferno*, the inscription over the gates of hell proclaims that the 'woeful city' that Dante and Virgil are about to enter is itself a product of divine justice:

THROUGH ME THE WAY INTO THE WOEFUL CITY,
THROUGH ME THE WAY TO ETERNAL PAIN,
THROUGH ME THE WAY AMONG THE LOST PEOPLE.
JUSTICE MOVED MY MAKER ON HIGH,
DIVINE POWER MADE ME AND SUPREME WISDOM AND PRIMAL LOVE;
BEFORE ME NOTHING WAS CREATED BUT ETERNAL THINGS AND I
ENDURE ETERNALLY.
ABANDON EVERY HOPE, YE THAT ENTER.²⁴

Thus, throughout *Inferno*, when justice is presented, it is generally in the form of God's punishment of the wicked. Of many possible examples, it will suffice here to point to a few. In Canto VII, Dante describes his first vision of the fourth circle of hell thus: 'Then we descended into the fourth hollow, passing farther down the dismal slope which ensacks all the evil of the universe. Ah, Justice of God, who crams together all the new toils and pains that I saw?'²⁵ Further on, in the realm of the violent, Dante reports:

'As on this side thou seest the boiling stream diminish continually', said the Centaur, 'so I would have thee know that on the other, more and more, it deepens its bed till it comes again to the place where tyranny must groan. There Divine Justice stings that Attila who was a scourge on earth, and Pyrrhus, and Sextus, and eternally milks the tears, unlocked

²³ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.58.2, ad 3, in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882–), IX, 11.

²⁴ *Inferno*, iii.1–9, in *The Divine Comedy*: 'PER ME SIVA NELLA CITTÁ DOLENTE, | PER ME SI VANELL'ETTERNO DOLORE, | PER ME SIVA TRA LA PERDUTA GENTE. | GIUSTIZIA MOSSE IL MIO ALTO FATTORE: | FECEMILA DIVINA POTESTATE, | LA SOMMA SAPIENZA E 'L PRIMO AMORE. | DINANZIA A ME NON FUOR COSE CREATE | SE NON ETTERNE, E IO ETTERNA DURO. | LASCIATE OGNI SPERANZA, VOI CH'ENTRATE.'

²⁵ *Inferno*, vii.16–21: 'Cosí scendemmo nella quarta lacca, | pigliando pú della dolente ripa | che 'l mal dell'universo tutto insacca. | Ahi giustizia di Dio! Tante che stipa | nove travaglie e pene quant' io viddi? | e perché nostra colpa sí ne scipa?'

by the boiling, from Rinier of Corneto and Rinier Pazzo, who on the highways made such strife.²⁶

Finally, in the eighth circle, divine judgement falls upon the fraudulent, as is observed by the pilgrim Dante: 'We descended on to the last bank from the long ridge, still keeping to the left, and then my sight was clearer down into the depth, where the handmaid of the Sovereign Lord, unerring justice, punishes the counterfeiters whom she registers here.'²⁷ The demonstrations of divine justice depicted are certainly frightful in content and illustrate how the unerring judgement of God can seem harsh on sinners.

Purgatorio, likewise, portrays justice in the punishments meted out by the Divine will, but with a more hopeful tone, as the shades willingly accept their penalty, knowing that it is deserved and will eventually cease. Thus, Dante addresses those suffering on the fifth terrace: 'O elect of God, whose sufferings both justice and hope make less hard, direct us to the next stairway.'²⁸ And here the shade of Pope Adrian V explains to Dante:

What avarice does is here declared for the purging of the converted souls, and the mountain has no bitterer pain. Just as our eyes, fixed on earthly things, did not lift themselves on high, so justice here has sunk them to the earth; as avarice quenched our love of good so that our labours were vain; so justice here holds us fast, seized and bound in feet and hands, and as long as it shall please the righteous Lord so long shall we stay motionless and outstretched.²⁹

The *contropasso* of *Inferno* and *Purgatorio* serve as vivid representations of the operation of God's justice, but the *Commedia* is not the only work in which Dante

²⁶ *Inferno*, xii.127–38: "Sì come tu da questa parte vedi | lo bulicame che sempre si scema" | disse 'l Centauro "voglio che tu credi | che da quest'altra a più a più giú prema | lo fondo suo, infin ch'el si raggiunge | ove la tirannia convien che gema. | La divina giustizia di qua punge | quell' Attila che fu flagello in terra | e Pirro e Sesto; ed in eterno munge | le lagrime, che col bollor diserra, a Rinier da Corneto, a Rinier Pazzo, | che fecero alle strade tanta guerra."

²⁷ *Inferno*, xxix.52–57: 'Noi discendemmo in su l' ultima riva | del lungo scoglio, pur da man sinistra, | e alor fu la mia vista più viva | giú ver lo fondo, lá 've la ministra | dell' alto sire, infallibil giustizia, | punisce i falsador che qui registra.'

²⁸ *Purgatorio*, xix.76–78: 'O eletti di Dio, li cui soffriri | e giustizia e speranza fa men duri, | drizzate noi verso li altri saliri.'

²⁹ *Purgatorio*, xix.115–26: 'Quel ch'avarizia fa, qui si dichiara | in purgazion dell'anime converse, | e nulla pena il monte ha più amara. | Sì come l'occhio nostro non s'aderse | in alto, fisso alle cose terrene, | così giustizia qui a terra il merse. | Come avarizia spense a ciascun bene | lo nostro amore, onde operar perdési, | così giustizia qui streete ne tene, | ne' piedi e nelle amn legati e presi; | e quanto fia piacer del giusto sire, | tanto staremo immobili e distesi.'

displays his belief in the infallibility of divine justice. Dante's discussion in Book II of *De monarchia* of why the Roman Empire's claims were legitimate relies on the idea of trial by combat as a means by which the Will of God can be asserted in the world. Under this theory, the results of combat are, of necessity, just:

For, if these essential conditions of trial by combat have been respected — and if they have not it would not be trial by combat — is it not true that those who out of a need for justice have come to confront one another by mutual agreement through a passionate concern for justice have come to confront one another in the name of God? And if so, is not God in their midst, since he himself promises us as much in the Gospel? And if God is present, is it not impious to think that justice can fail to triumph — that justice which he himself so loves, as we noted above? And if justice cannot fail to triumph in trial by combat, is it not true that what is acquired through trial by combat is acquired by right?³⁰

The justice mentioned is divine justice, inherently unerring and incomprehensible to man. According to this theory, the victor is always in the right, as his triumph must be willed by God and therefore in accordance with justice. The passage shows the dramatic break between Dante's use of justice in a Christian sense and Aristotelian justice as employed in the *Convivio*. Justice is not dependent on the virtue of man, but on the will of God.

V. Political Justice

Having shown that there are at least two dramatically different meanings of justice for Dante, we are still left with the question of how Dante uses justice in the political realm, or, phrased differently, to determine what sort of justice is appropriate to the prince. As in the case of moral justice, the instances in which Dante addresses expressly political justice in his writings are few. At times, Dante's use of political justice seems quite close to his idea of moral justice, as expounded in the *Convivio*. In other passages, though, political justice appears to mean simply that political rulers can act as agents in the divine plan. To add to this confusion,

³⁰ Dante, *Monarchia*, ii.9, trans. by Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 86: 'Quod si formalia duelliservata sunt, alter enim duellum non esset, iustitie necessitate de cmmuni assensu congregati propter zelum iustitie nonne in nomine Dei congregati sunt? Et si sic, nonne Deus in medi illorun est, cum ipse in evangelio nobis hoc promictat? Et si Deus adest, nonne nefas est arbitrari iustitiam succumbere posse, quam ipse in tantum diligit, quantum superius prenotatur? Et si iustitia in duello succumbere nequit, nonne de iure acquiritur quod per duellum acquiritur?'

Dante also occasionally uses the term *giustizia* to refer to a ruler's legitimate jurisdiction. Political justice in Dante is conceptually ambiguous.³¹

The episode in which Dante's political justice most closely resembles the definition of justice given in the *Convivio* is Dante's retelling of Trajan's encounter with the poor widow in Canto X of *Purgatorio*. The carving which Dante describes for his reader is found at the entrance to the terrace of pride and is presented as an example of the emperor's great humility:

Depicted there was the glorious deed of the Roman prince whose worth moved Gregory to his great victory, — I mean the Emperor Trajan; and a poor widow was at his bridle in a posture of grief and tears [...]. The poor woman among all these seemed to say: 'Lord, avenge me for my son that is dead, for whom I am stricken'; and he to answer her: 'Wait now till I return'; and she: 'My Lord' like one whose grief is urgent, 'if thou return not?'; and he: 'He that is in my place will do it for thee'; and she: 'What shall another's goodness avail thee if thou art forgetful of thy own?'; he therefore: 'Now take comfort, for I must fulfill my duty before I go; justice requires it and compassion bids me stay.'³²

In this instance, justice may well refer to the Aristotelian moral virtue. The Emperor arrives at a just decision through his own human reason, emphasized by the fact that he is a non-Christian. The episode is also explicitly political, with Trajan stopping to fulfil his obligations as emperor. Likewise, the sphere of Jupiter in *Paradiso* shows justice to be a moral virtue of political leaders, as those rulers who Dante views as worthy are placed here in the 'sphere of the just'.³³ The message that these souls spells out in the heavens, 'DILIGITE IUSTITIAM QUI IUDICATIS TERRAM',³⁴ reinforces this idea. These passages are in keeping with the connection Dante drew in the *Convivio* between the justice of the elders and their ability to rule. However, Dante is not consistent in employing political virtue in this way. Dante's exposition of justice in Book I of *De monarchia* emphasizes the connection between justice and power differently from that in *Convivio*. In the

³¹ See Peter Herde, 'Dante als Sozialphilosoph', in *Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie der Mittelalters*, ed. by Erhard Mock and Georg Wieland (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 1990), pp. 83–101.

³² *Purgatorio*, x.74–93: 'Quiv'era storíata l'alta gloria | del roman principato il cui valore | mosse Gregorio alla sua gran vittoria- | i' dico di Traiano imperadore; | e una vedovella li era al freno, | di lacrime atteggiata e di dolore. | Intorno a lui pareva calcato e pieno | di cavalieri, e l'aguglie nell'oro | sovr'essi in vista al vento si movieno. | La miserella intra tutti costoro | pareva dicer: "Segnor, fammi vendetta | di mio figliuol ch'è morto, ond' io m'accoro". | Ed elli a lei rispondere: "Or aspetta | tanto ch' i' torni". E quella: "Segnor mio, | 'se tu non torni?"'

³³ Joshua, Trajan, Charlemagne, and the Godfrey of Bouillon are among those included on the list.

³⁴ *Paradiso*, xviii.91–93, p. 261: 'Love justice, you who judge the world' (Sap. 1. 1).

latter treatise, Dante argues that political power should be given to the elders *because they are more just*³⁵; in *De monarchia*, he argues that the world under a single monarch will be supremely just *because the monarch will have such great power*: '[If] someone does not have the power to give each person what is his, how will he act in accordance with justice? From this it is clear that the more powerful a just man is, the more effectively justice will be brought about by his actions.'³⁶ The causal sequence has been reversed. Furthermore, Dante contends that 'justice' should only be held by the monarch: 'Justice is at its strongest in the world when it resides in a subject who has in the highest degree possible the will and the power to act; only the monarch is such a subject; therefore justice is at its strongest in the world when it is located in the monarch alone.'³⁷ Justice in this instance clearly does not mean the Aristotelian moral virtue. Instead, Dante uses the term *justice* to refer to the legitimate right of a ruler to punish wrong-doing. Justice is not, therefore, a virtue pertaining to the person of the prince, but rather, constitutes a distinctive characteristic of the prince's office, to which no one else may lay claim. Remarkable as it may seem, these are the only major discussions of justice in *De monarchia*; there is no mention of topics such as how to select a just ruler or how properly to educate young future rulers. Beyond this constitutional arrangement, nothing is done to ensure justice, or any other political virtue.

VI. Justice Without Virtue

From the preceding analysis, one cannot conclude that it is plausible to refer to Dante as a theorist of justice, or, at least not as a theorist of justice as a political virtue. Although Dante evinces strong concern about justice, it was not as a *virtus politica*. Dante's relatively brief discussions of the virtues in the *Convivio* indicate that he grasped the meaning of Aristotelian virtues. It is also evident from Dante's references to writers such as Giles of Rome³⁸ that he would have been familiar

³⁵ *Convivio*, iv.27, pp. 378–79.

³⁶ *Monarchia*, i.11, pp. 24–27: 'Sine potenti tribuendi cuique quod suum est quomodo quis operabitur secundum illam? Ex quo patet quod quanto iustus potentior, tanto in operatione sua iustitia erit amplior.'

³⁷ *Monarchia*, i.11, pp. 26–27: 'Iustitia potissima est in mundo quando volentissimo et potentissimo subiecto inest; huiusmodi solus Monarcha est.'

³⁸ See *Convivio*, iv.24, pp. 361–62: 'E lasciando lo figurato che di questo diverso proesso dell'etadi tiene Virgilio nello Eneida, e lasciando stare quello he Egidio eremite ne dice nella prima parte dello Reggiamento de' Principi, e lasciando stare quello che ne tocca Tulio in quello delli

with the traditional mirror for princes genre and its emphasis on princely virtue. Why, then, did Dante decide in his writing to downplay the importance of virtue in his monarch? Why is moral education, a prevalent theme in so many contemporary accounts of just monarchy, not an important element of Dante's thought?

I contend that the reason for the absence of a serious discussion of princely justice, or princely virtue of any kind, in Dante's *Monarchia* lies in his conception of the *all-powerful* monarch. Dante states clearly in *De monarchia* that 'the thing most contrary to justice is greed'.³⁹ Political injustice is, therefore, the result of the ruler coveting the goods of another, to which he has no legitimate claim. While other political writers of the Middle Ages sought to prevent avarice by encouraging the prince to be virtuous and thus to restrain himself from acting on such impulses,⁴⁰ Dante devised a unique solution: remove the temptation to commit injustice. Dante's prince lacks nothing in terms of temporal goods or power; it is therefore impossible for him to seize anything unjustly, as everything already belongs to him by right:

To clarify the first of these it must be noted that the thing most contrary to justice is greed, as Aristotle states in the fifth book of the *Ethics* [...]. But where there is nothing which can be coveted, it is impossible for greed to exist, for emotions cannot exist where their objects have been destroyed. But there is nothing the monarch *could* covet, for his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean.⁴¹

In a manner parallel to the notion of divine will in the *Commedia*, the actions of Dante's monarch are almost just by definition, as it is logically impossible for him to seize something that is not already his. *De monarchia* addresses the problem of political justice with institutional measures rather than moral exhortations, and in this way, breaks with the emphasis on moral education of the monarch, so

Offici' (Leaving aside the allegorical meaning which Vergil applies to the *Aeneid*, and as well what Egidius the Hermit says about it in the first part of his book *The Regimen of Princes*, and likewise Tully in his book *On Offices*). This reference, while brief, does indicate knowledge of one of the exemplary works of the genre.

³⁹ *Monarchia*, i.11, p. 26: 'Quod iustitie mazime contrariatur cupiditas.'

⁴⁰ On the general question of princely virtue as a form of restraint on royal misconduct, see Bernard Guenée, *States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe*, trans. by Juliet Vale (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 70–72 (first publ. in French, 1971).

⁴¹ *Monarchia*, i.11, p. 26: 'Ad evidentiam primi notandum quod iustitie maxime contrariatur cupiditas, ut innuit Aristotiles in quinto *ad Nicomacum* [...]. Ubi ergo non est quod posit optari, impossibile est ibi upiditatem esse: destructis enim obiectis, passions esse non possunt. Sed Monarcha non habet quod posit optare: sua nanque iurisdictio terminator Oceano solum.'

dominate in his day. Walter Ullmann was correct in asserting that Dante was 'animated by an ardent desire for justice and peace in the temporal sphere';⁴² however, the mistake that he and several other scholars have made is overemphasizing the role of political virtue in Dante's plan for achieving this goal, while paying far too little attention to the radical institutional measures, designed to eliminate temptation, which he suggests.

Dante's vision of justice was tied to his hopes for peace in the nation of Italy and Europe as a whole; political life in the volatile Florentine commune had taught him the value of peace and security. From the solutions proposed in *De monarchia*, it also appears that he had become sceptical about the capability of the harmonious actions of virtuous princes to bring about this peace and justice. Instead of simply calling for the various rulers in Italy and elsewhere in Europe to exercise the virtues of justice, prudence, temperance, etc., Dante proposes an entirely institutional solution that renders princely virtue irrelevant. Justice will exist because the monarch cannot overstep his bounds (his power is unlimited) and will have the authority to easily settle disputes among lesser lords. The *system* will be just, whether or not the monarch is personally virtuous.

After a career in the unpredictable and often bloody political affairs of Florence, one may speculate that Dante developed serious doubts about the ability of the political virtues to restrain injustice. He therefore attempted to design a world government in which there could be justice without virtue. Dante's monarch cannot experience avarice because everything is already his by right; there is no temptation and therefore no injustice. Institutional design takes the place of moral education. Although Dante's position is extreme, his innovative remedy for the failure of virtue-reliant systems of government merits some credit from scholars of political theory. Dante did not overlook princely virtue; he designed a system in which it is not necessary.

VII. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the varied ways in which Dante employs the term 'justice' in his writings. I have also argued that the way in which Dante conceived of his world government led him to believe that the personal virtue of the monarch was not a necessary aspect of just rule. Dante understood justice in the broadly Aristotelian moral sense, although he did not often comment on this type

⁴² Ullmann, *Medieval Foundations*, p. 129.

of justice. Dante additionally articulated a concept of divine justice that was radically different from his understanding of Aristotelian virtue because for him, divine justice is a matter beyond the comprehension of human reason and cannot ever err in its execution. Those scholars who posit Dante as a theorist of justice have not adequately accounted for the distinction between these two forms of justice in Dante.

The notion of political justice in Dante is conceptually ambiguous. Although *Paradiso* contains references to justice as a princely virtue, *De monarchia*, the most overtly political of Dante's works, conceives of justice in such a way that the prince need not be virtuous, as there is no possible temptation for him to be unjust. The virtue of the ruler is, therefore, irrelevant to Dante's political theory. Although Dante is not opposed to princely virtue in any sense, it does not assume the critical role in his political writings that it does in the typical 'mirror for princes'. By designing a world government in which nothing can tempt the monarch to be avaricious, Dante is able to develop a notion of justice that is independent of political virtue.

VIRTUES AND EXEMPLA IN JOHN OF WALES AND JACOBUS DE CESSOLIS

Pamela Kalning (translated by Eric Kuchle)

I. The Relationship between Two Collections of Exempla

Written by the Italian Dominican Jacobus de Cessolis some time before 1337, the *Liber de moribus hominum et officiis nobilium sive de ludo scaccorum*¹ (henceforth referred to alternately as the ‘chess treatise’ and *Liber de moribus*) contains a large number of exempla and maxims contextualized by the structural order of the game of chess and, in particular, that of the societal groups and their respective virtues represented by individual chess pieces. Apart from this extraordinary framework, this collection also distinguishes itself by the fact that the exempla used are drawn primarily from antiquity. In contrast, exempla from Christian times or stories from the lives of the saints play,

¹ Citations from the chess treatise of Jacobus de Cessolis have been taken from *Das Schachzabelbuch Kunrats von Ammenhausen nebst den Schachbüchern des Jakob von Cessole und des Jakob Mennel*, ed. by Ferdinand Vetter (Frauenfeld: Huber, 1892). In some cases, I have referred to the edition by Marie A. Burt, ‘Jacobus de Cessolis: *Libellus de moribus hominum et officiis nobilium ac popularium super ludo scachorum*’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 1957). For the dating of the chess treatise and Jacobus de Cessolis himself see Thomas Kaeppli, ‘Pour la biographie de Jacques de Cessole’, *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum*, 30 (1960), 149–62; Jean-Michel Mehl, ‘Jeu d’échecs et éducation au XIII^{ème} siècle: Recherches sur le “Liber de moribus” de Jacques de Cessoles’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Université de Strasbourg, 1975), pp. 14–26; Oliver Plessow with Volker Honemann and Mareike Temmen, *Mittelalterliche Schachzabelbücher zwischen Spielsymbolik und Wertevermittlung: Der Schachtraktat des Jacobus de Cessolis im Kontext seiner spätmittelalterlichen Rezeption* (Münster: Rhema, forthcoming 2007), chap. 2.1.

at best, a marginal role.² Questions concerning the source(s) of these exempla have already been raised. Jacobus himself occasionally indicates the sources of some exempla, and his editor Ferdinand Vetter was already in a position to demonstrate the sources of many more. Jean-Michel Mehl asserted in his dissertation that Jacobus drew broadly from Vincent of Beauvais, John of Salisbury, and Valerius Maximus, sources which go temporally well beyond those explicitly mentioned in the text.³ Between these authors and Jacobus, one often finds cases of literal agreement in the representation of exempla.⁴ In spite of the acceptance of his use of these sources, I would like once again to take up the question of whether Jacobus might not indeed have taken recourse to yet another collection of exempla; the narrative arrangement of the chess treatise displays such strong parallels to the *Breviloquium de virtutibus antiquorum principum et philosophorum*⁵

² From among the one hundred and fifty exempla in the *Liber de moribus*, only five can be seen as oriented toward the tradition of fables: see *Das Schachzabelbuch*, cols 63/64, a verse about the lion, who, as strong as he is, still eventually becomes devoured by ants; cols 107/08–109/10, where chastity is symbolized by a hen; cols 325/26, the exemplum of the king of the bees who bears no sting; cols 477/78, where flies who eagerly fly to honey and wolves who enjoy feeding upon carrion both exemplify false friendship, and cols 639/40, where the ox and the elephant figure as exemplary models for the moderate intake of food. Exemplary stories from the Bible appear, with some frequency at least, in the third section of the text, i.e., to illustrate the duties of pawns. Stories from the lives of the Saints, however, are extremely rare; notable exceptions are the stories of Bernard of Clairvaux and the gambler (cols 721/22–723/24) and that of the hermit, who takes a lump of gold with her to the grave and consequently must suffer in the afterlife (cols 543/44–545/46). In addition, the miracle of St James (cols 649/50–653/54) certainly belongs in this category. Four exempla are taken from the recent past: the story of the faithful merchant Obertus of Genoa (cols 553/54–555/56), that of the deceitful stableboy (cols 647/48–649/50), the representation of the bridge gate of Capua (cols 667/68–669/70), and the references to Vergilius Lombardus, who became a famous man in spite of the modesty of his parents' house (cols 801/02).

³ Mehl, *Jeu d'échecs*, pp. 69–100 and 115–30. A summary is provided by Jean-Michel Mehl, 'L'Exemplum chez Jacques de Cessole', *Le moyen âge*, 84 (1978), 227–46.

⁴ See Gösta Hedegård, 'Jacobus de Cessolis' Sources: The Case of Valerius Maximus', in *Chess and Allegory in the Middle Ages*, ed. by Olle Ferm and Volker Honemann (Stockholm: Sällskapet Runica et Mediaevalia, 2005), pp. 99–159.

⁵ Cited after the *Summa Ioannis Valensis de regimine uite humane seu Margarita doctorum ad omne propositum* ([Venice]: Arrivabene, 1496). Albrecht Diem has placed his annotated digital version of the *Breviloquium* at my disposal, thus facilitating considerably my work with this voluminous text. This study assumes a fundamental agreement between the original manuscripts of the *Breviloquium* and the printed version. Jenny Swanson, *John of Wales: A Study of the Work and Ideas of a Thirteenth-Century Friar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), has

by the Franciscan theologian John of Wales⁶ that a closer look at the relationship between the two texts seems to be a valuable undertaking.

The *Breviloquium de virtutibus*, a collection of narrative exempla taken primarily from antiquity, associates each exemplum with a virtue, as do both the chess treatise and the collection *Facta et dicta memorabilia* of Valerius Maximus.⁷ John of Wales and Jacobus de Cessolis repeatedly refer to Valerius Maximus, and even where Valerius clearly does not function as the source for individual exempla, the type of exemplum remains the same.⁸ Unlike Jacobus, however, the Franciscan makes use of a system for structuring his text which stems from antiquity; he establishes the four classical cardinal virtues as an encompassing framework for the exempla and subdivides them further. In this practice, he betrays the influence

collated the incunabulum with MSS Oxford, Bodleian Library, Hatton 105 and Bodley 58. There exists, in addition, a secondary version of the *Breviloquium de virtutibus* which deviates clearly from the one used here; see Franziska Küenzlen and Pamela Kalning, *Die Schachbildlichkeit in Johannes Guallensis' 'Breviloquium de virtutibus'* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, forthcoming 2008). The thesis that the printed version is not the same as the original *Breviloquium* is defended by Anežka Vidmanová, 'Die mittelalterliche Gesellschaft im Lichte des Schachspiels', in *Soziale Ordnungen im Selbstverständnis des Mittelalters*, ed. by Albert Zimmermann, 2 vols (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979–80), II, 101–39; Anežka Vidmanová, 'Jacobus de Cessolis in sozialgeschichtlicher Sicht', in *Das Schachbuch des Jacobus de Cessolis: Kommentarband zur Faksimileausgabe Codex Palatinus Latinus 961 (Codices e Vaticanis selecti 74)*, ed. by Leonard E. Boyle (Zürich: Belser, 1988), 101–39; and Anežka Vidmanová, 'Osservazioni di un filologo su testi storico-filosofici del tardo Medioevo', *Listy filologické*, 113 (1990), 32–48.

⁶ The Franciscan appears in the research under a variety of names: Johannes G(u)allensis, John Waleys, John of Wales. For his life and works, see Swanson, *John of Wales*.

⁷ Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, ed. by Carolus Kempf (Leipzig: Teubner, 1888). On its tradition, see Dorothy M. Schullian, 'A Preliminary List of Manuscripts of Valerius Maximus', in *Studies in Honor of Ullman, Presented to Him on the Occasion of his Seventy-Fifth Birthday*, ed. by Lillian B. Lawler, Dorothy M. Robathan, and William C. Korfmacher (Saint Louis: Saint Louis University Press, 1960), pp. 81–95. The structural similarity between John of Wales's *Breviloquium de virtutibus* and Valerius Maximus has already been demonstrated by William A. Pantin, 'John of Wales and Medieval Humanism', in *Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn S.J.*, ed. by John A. Watt and others (Dublin: O'Lochlainn, 1961), pp. 297–319 (p. 299); cf. Burghart Wachinger, 'Pietas vel misericordia: Exempelsammlungen des späten Mittelalters und ihr Umgang mit einer antiken Erzählung', in *Kleinere Erzählformen im Mittelalter*, ed. by Klaus Grubmüller and others (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1988), pp. 225–42 (pp. 234–38).

⁸ For the case of Jacobus see Wachinger, 'Pietas vel misericordia', p. 234.

of both Cicero and Macrobius.⁹ In general, a large number of exempla are used to illustrate each virtue.

The *Breviloquium de virtutibus* is John of Wales's earliest work. The date of its origins has been fixed to the 1260s,¹⁰ thus possibly falling within the time which John spent in Oxford. He taught there from 1259 to 1262, and it has been proved that he was in Paris in June 1270 and again in the period between 1281 and 1285.¹¹ Twenty texts have been ascribed to him, all of which enjoyed a broad reception.¹² The works of the Franciscan may be seen in the context of his function as preacher, which may very well represent the background of this collection of ancient exempla. Because of his marked interest in stories from antiquity, John of Wales is seen as a precursor of the broad movement that occurred in the context of the university studies of the monks of the mendicant order, called the 'Classicizing Friars' in research.¹³

If one compares the exempla found in the *Breviloquium de virtutibus* to those of the *Liber de moribus*, many correspondences become apparent.¹⁴ Over seventy

⁹ Cf. Rosemund Tuve, 'Notes on the Virtues and Vices', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 26 (1963), 268–72. John uses Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis*, for his definitions and Cicero, *De inventione*, for the subdivision of the cardinal virtues; see Swanson, *John of Wales*, p. 46. For the subdivisions, see Table 1, below.

¹⁰ Swanson, *John of Wales*, pp. 4–40, especially p. 33: cross-references among the works of John of Wales afford a relative dating; the *Breviloquium de virtutibus* is the earliest work of the Franciscan, the *Communiloquium* his next. Beyond this, his usage of sources — in particular his non-use of Aristotle's *Politics* in these two early works — points to a dating for both works prior to 1270.

¹¹ For more on the biography of John of Wales see Swanson, *John of Wales*, pp. 4–14.

¹² For the reception and transmission of John's works see Swanson, *John of Wales*, pp. 201–89.

¹³ See Beryl Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960); Nigel F. Palmer, 'Das "Exempelwerk der englischen Bettelmönche"', in *Exempel und Exempelsammlungen*, ed. by Walter Haug and Burghart Wachinger (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1991), pp. 137–72. The work of John is unusual to the extent that he was the only Oxford member of a mendicant order who produced material for preachers; see David D'Avray, *The Preaching of the Friars: Sermons Diffused from Paris before 1300* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 150.

¹⁴ Both Vidmanová, 'Die mittelalterliche Gesellschaft' and, under reference to her work, Chiara Frugoni, 'Das Schachspiel in der Welt des Jacobus de Cessolis', in *Das Schachbuch des Jacobus de Cessolis*, pp. 35–77 (p. 36), already indicate that Jacobus must have known the *Breviloquium de virtutibus*. They support this claim, however, on the basis of a secondary text, which, according to varying textual references, is most likely to be found in Eastern Europe, which,

of the roughly two hundred stories and maxims related or cited in the *Breviloquium* are also to be found in Jacobus de Cessolis's chess treatise.¹⁵ It is therefore necessary to ask whether such correspondence points to a dependency of the texts upon one another.

In order to determine the nature of the intertextual relationship between these collections of exempla, it is useful first to examine correspondences in the textual microstructure of the exempla. Gösta Hedegård has made a detailed comparison of exempla in the chess treatise which seem to be borrowed from Valerius Maximus's *Facta et dicta memorabilia* with corresponding exempla in the *Breviloquium* of John of Wales.¹⁶ Though one must always be cautious with such diffusely transmitted exempla and bear in mind the unmistakable correspondences to the *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, the results of this comparison are nonetheless remarkable. He has been able to indicate both significant literal and structural agreements between the two texts. Some sort of intertextual dependency seems, in the light of Hedegård's observations, a probability.

A macrostructural examination, likewise, points to a certain affinity between the two texts. This is most apparent in the section devoted to the chess piece of the rook.¹⁷ After even a cursory inspection, one is already struck by the particular set of stories and virtues associated with the rook in contrast with other noble chess pieces. The rook, whose duty as vicegerent or bailiff it is to stand in for the king and take over his official duties, embodies a combination of different virtues one would also expect to find in the king or the judge.¹⁸ Under the heading of the concepts *iustitia*, *pietas*, *humilitas*, *patientia*, *paupertas voluntaria*, and *liberalitas*, stories are collected which demonstrate a broad spectrum of general models of rulership. In comparison to the set of virtues attributed to most other chess pieces, the set attributed to the rook is unspecific; its virtues could just as easily have been designated as being those of the king. We seem to be dealing here with a chess

however, additionally contains the allegory of chess, but not all exempla of the *Breviloquium*; cf. Küenzlen and Kalning, *Die Schachbildlichkeit*; Plessow, *Mittelalterliche Schachzabelbücher*.

¹⁵ See Table 1, below.

¹⁶ Hedegård, 'Jacobus de Cessolis' Sources'.

¹⁷ See Table 2, below. In view of their affinity to Valerius Maximus, some of the exempla in the chapter on the rook are discussed in Hedegård, 'Jacobus de Cessolis' Sources', and his results confirm my thesis regarding macrostructural similarities (which he calls 'sequential similarities').

¹⁸ Konrad von Ammenhausen reflects this already in his 1337 translation of the chess book into Middle High German, *Das Schachzabelbuch*, v. 9560–83; see also Wachinger, 'Pietas vel misericordia', p. 234.

piece to which Jacobus assigned virtues of rulership he found worthy of highlighting but had not yet assigned to any other noble chess pieces.¹⁹

The number of exempla dedicated to the rook is clearly greater than the number dedicated to the noble chess pieces treated prior to it. For the king, for example, Jacobus named, as a rule, a single exemplum to illustrate each virtue of rulership.²⁰ To illustrate *veritas*, he refers to the story of Alexander and the siege of Lampsacus.²¹ One is to understand Alexander in this context as a ruler committed to *veritas* even though the outcome does not correspond to his intentions. In connection with the detestable nature of mercilessness ('debet [...] inpietatem detestari'), Jacobus cites the story of the smith Perillus, who, because he attempts to anticipate the cruelty of a tyrannical ruler, is punished by him instead of being praised as he had hoped. The *iustitia* of the ruler is illustrated by the story of the buccaneer Diomedes, who equates his own behaviour with that of Alexander.²² For the *continentia* of the king, Jacobus gives the exemplum of Scipio, who refrains from dishonouring a captured slave after being informed that she is engaged.²³ Only the combination of the virtues of *clementia et misericordia* receives three exempla in the Latin chess treatise: The story of Pisistratus²⁴ illustrates the mildness of royal judgement over a deed motivated by love, and the

¹⁹ The remarkable role of the rook is mentioned by Heike Bierschwale and Oliver Plessow, 'Schachbrett, Körper, Räderwerk: Verräumlichte Gesellschaftsmetaphorik im Spätmittelalter', in *Raum und Konflikt: Zur symbolischen Konstituierung gesellschaftlicher Ordnung in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit*, ed. by Christoph Dartmann and others (Münster: Rhema, 2004), pp. 59–81 (p. 61, n. 24). Wolfgang Heinemann, 'Zur Ständedidaxe in der deutschen Literatur des 13.–15. Jahrhunderts', *PBB Ost*, 89 (1967), 290–403 (pp. 317–18), raises the question of why the rook was not seen as another type of burgher. The image of the tower would easily have allowed an association to burghers who protect city towers. He conjectures that, in this case, Cessolis followed the aristocratic principle: a social standing not distinguished by special prerogatives could not, according to a gradualistic scheme, appear as being in the same series as the *nobiles*. On the chess piece of the rook see Jean-Michel Mehl, 'Justice et administration d'après le Liber de moribus', in *Chess and Allegory in the Middle Ages* (see n. 4, above), pp. 161–72.

²⁰ Jacobus adopts a similar practice for the queen and the knight. The chapter about the judge (*Alphilus*) contains a larger number of exempla.

²¹ Cf. Frederic C. Tubach, *Index exemplorum: A Handbook of Medieval Religious Tales* (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedekatemia, 1969), no. 105; Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, VII.iii ext. 4.

²² Tubach, *Index exemplorum*, no. 113.

²³ Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta*, VII.iii.1.

²⁴ Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta*, V.i ext. 2.

examples of Arispus²⁵ and Pyrrhus²⁶ illustrate the forgiveness of the ruler vis-à-vis his critics. Since this topic had already been explicitly treated in the story of the invention of the game of chess found in the first section of the book, these latter stories refer, in their reiteration of the fundamental significance of the readiness of the ruler to accept criticism, to the very framework of the chess treatise.²⁷

In contrast to such sparing use of exempla in the chapter dedicated to the king, the abundance of exempla designated to the rook seems disproportionately large. The rook's *iustitia* is illustrated by seven exempla, which demonstrate how historical personalities act against their own interest in the service of justice (cols 301/02–319/20). For *pietas*, nine exempla are given, in which the themes of pity for the defeated enemy, mourning for the death of a servant, respect for veteran soldiers, and pity for captives appear (cols 319/20–329/39).²⁸ For the rook's virtue of *humilitas*, an ensemble of seven exempla concentrates on modesty in terms of the political power both of the judge and of the ruler (cols 333/34–341/42). The Tiberius story, with its exemplum of the flies, relates concretely to the amount of taxation set by the vicegerent (cols 337/38–339/40). The section on *patientia* contains eleven — in part, very short — exempla, in which exemplary figures either react to criticism with patience or withhold themselves from punishing the objects of their ire out of the fear that they will otherwise punish too severely (cols 343/44–351/52). The virtue of *paupertas voluntaria* is demonstrated by the examples of Antilogus, and Scipio Africanus and his brother (cols 353/54–355/56). *Liberalitas*, too, is provided with a small number of exempla; these show the willingness of the ruler to help those in need, not only materially, but also in terms of the exertion of personal influence (cols 355/56–359/60).

If one assumes that Jacobus de Cessolis used the *Breviloquium de virtutibus* as a source, it is possible to explain this disproportionate distribution of exempla. Indeed, the rook receives whole groups of exempla, the sequence of which corresponds to that of the *Breviloquium* without being identical to those of the

²⁵ Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta*, v.i ext. 2.

²⁶ Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta*, v.i ext. 3.

²⁷ Cf. Wolfgang Dittmann, 'Zur Erfindung des Schachspiels im "Schachzabelbuch": Die erzählte Primär-Rezeption bei Konrad von Ammenhausen', in *Erzählungen in Erzählungen: Phänomene der Narration in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit*, ed. by Harald Haferland (Munich: Fink, 1996), pp. 303–26.

²⁸ For the story of the suckling daughter see Wachinger, '*Pietas vel misericordia*', pp. 225–42.

texts named as the *Breviloquium*'s sources.²⁹ For example, four consecutive exempla of the rook's *pietas* correspond to four exempla found in close proximity and in the same order in John's chapter on *clementia*,³⁰ which functions in his work as a subclass of *temperantia*. A further example, 'Alexander seats an old soldier upon his chair,' is to be found in both texts a few paragraphs later.³¹ All eleven exempla of the *patientia* of the rook are also given by John for *patientia*, treated as an aspect of *fortitudo*.³²

The chess treatise's proposed dependency on the *Breviloquium* would not conflict with the accepted dating of the latter. As opposed to the *Breviloquium*, the dating of the origination of Jacobus's chess treatise is still vague at best. A *terminus post quem* for its completion is provided by the construction of the bridge gate of Capua under Frederic II between the years 1234 and 1239 (cols 667/68–669/70).³³ Testimony concerning the life of Jacobus, however, appears only somewhat later, namely between 1317 and 1322.³⁴ As a result, dating estimates for the chess treatise vary. While Mehl argued in his dissertation for an early dating, between 1259 and 1273,³⁵ most other researchers assume a later time for the work's origination, in view of the dates encompassing Jacobus's lifespan.³⁶

²⁹ See Table 2, below.

³⁰ *Summa de regimine uite humane*, fol. 252^v E (queen of the bees), F (Marcus Marcellus), F (Caesar weeps), and G (Paul raises a captive); *Das Schachzabelbuch*, cols 325/26–327/28. The concept *pietas* is used by John of Wales in a Christian sense.

³¹ *Summa de regimine uite humane*, fol. 253^{rb} N; *Das Schachzabelbuch*, cols 329/30.

³² These are *Summa de regimine uite humane*, fol. 255^{ra} I (Antigonos criticizes Alexander), K (Caesar's bald head), L (the criticized tyrant — 'If I were one, you wouldn't have dared to tell me so'), L (Scipio criticized as being cowardly), M (Vespasian laughs over criticism), 255^{va} N (Antigonos listens to insults); some exempla thereafter are not borrowed, but then once again 256^{ra} S (Anaxarcus bites his tongue off), and finally the consecutive exempla 257^{ra} H (Architas of Tarent refrains from punishment in his wrath), H (Plato refrains from punishment in his wrath I), I (Plato refrains from punishment in his wrath II), and the immediately following Seneca maxim.

³³ Carl Arnold Willemsen, *Kaiser Friedrich II. Triumphator zu Capua* (Wiesbaden: Insel, 1953), 7–9.

³⁴ See Kaeppli, 'Pour la biographie de Jacques de Cessole'.

³⁵ Mehl, *Jeu d'échecs*, pp. 21–25. Mehl bases his *terminus post quem* upon the dependence of the chess book on the *Speculum historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais, his *terminus ante quem* upon an attempt at an explanation of the planetary sphere in the hands of the king, which in his opinion hints at the time of the great Interregnum.

³⁶ See, e.g., Richard Eales, *Chess: The History of a Game* (London: Batsford, 1985), pp. 66 and 224; Raymond D. Di Lorenzo, 'The Collection Form and the Art of Memory in the "Libellus super

Even if one were to assume that Jacobus was already an old man in 1322, this is by no means a reason to assume he had worked on the text about chess more than sixty years earlier. Thus it is highly improbable that the chess treatise originated earlier than the *Breviloquium*. However, in view of the rapid circulation of material for preachers in the mendicant orders, to which one must count the collection of exempla of John of Wales, it is entirely possible that Jacobus would have known of the *Breviloquium* very shortly after its composition. It is equally plausible that he wrote his chess treatise only thereafter.

One must nevertheless bear the following in mind: If Jacobus de Cessolis in his assembly of ancient exempla for the chess treatise did indeed draw upon John of Wales, then he must, at least in some cases, additionally and directly have consulted the texts referred to by John in order to include them with more exact wording.³⁷ Considering the variety of collections of exempla, some still unedited, which date from the thirteenth century, it is not unthinkable that both authors could have based their collections upon a third source yet unidentified.³⁸ This third source, however, would have had to have already arranged its exempla in the order in which they are inserted into the rook chapter of the *Liber de moribus*. Therefore, until the opposite is proved, I will assume that such a source does not exist. It is also certain that Jacobus de Cessolis took exempla from other sources, too.³⁹ For the following line of argument I will look at the stories possibly taken from the *Breviloquium* only, trying to show what implications the organizing of material in the *Breviloquium* has for the structure of Jacobus de Cessolis chess treatise.

ludo schachorum” of Jacobus de Cessolis’, *Mediaeval Studies*, 35 (1973), 205–21 (p. 206). Jean-Michel Mehl, ‘La noblesse d’après Jacques de Cessoles’, *Byzantinische Forschungen*, 12 (1987), 523–35 (p. 524), also dated the composition to the period between approximately 1270 and 1280.

³⁷ As a rule, Jacobus is truer to Valerius Maximus’s wording than John, even in cases when John names Valerius as his source while Jacobus does not; cf. Hedegård, ‘Jacobus de Cessolis’ Sources’.

³⁸ Pantin, ‘John of Wales’, p. 299, considers works by William Peraldus, William of Auvergne, or the *Somme le roi* by Frère Laurent as possible models for the *Breviloquium*. The *Somme le roi* however, dated at 1279/80, cannot be viewed as a possible model. Pantin’s notion that florilegia were used is also rather unlikely: both the detailed citations and the fact that the references to ancient texts are traceable speak against this; cf. Swanson, *John of Wales*, p. 37.

³⁹ See Mehl, *Jeu d’échecs*, pp. 69–100 and 115–30; Hedegård, ‘Jacobus de Cessolis’ Sources’.

II. The Assignment of Virtues to Exempla

The discovery of the dependence of the chess treatise upon the collection of exempla of John of Wales allows one to regard the construction of the former in a new light. How did Jacobus treat the material at his disposal? Did he assign virtues to exempla in his own way? And what role does the ordering principle of the textual whole play in this context? The function of chess symbolism in the *Liber de moribus* is still a controversial question among researchers. Is Jacobus merely making use here of a mnemotechnical device for the visualization of didactic material,⁴⁰ does it serve as an ordering system with the primary function of underpinning social class structure,⁴¹ or is there yet another motivation behind Jacobus de Cessolis's specific structuring of his *Liber de moribus*?

Jacobus de Cessolis rearranges the exempla organized by John of Wales according to the four classical cardinal virtues (see Table 1). Thus Jacobus distributes the exempla used by John of Wales to illustrate *iustitia* among all five noble chess pieces, as well as the merchant (the fourth of the pawns). That which John assigns to *prudentia*, Jacobus attributes to the queen, the rook, and the seventh pawn (the vicegerent); exempla on *temperantia* are allotted to the king, the queen, the judge, the first, third, and fifth of the pawns (peasant, scribe, and doctor), and, in greatest abundance, to the rook. Finally, Jacobus allots the *fortitudo* exempla to the king and queen, the third and seventh pawn, and, again in great proportion, to the rook.⁴²

⁴⁰ The thesis on mnemotechnics has been put forward by Di Lorenzo, 'The Collection Form and the Art of Memory', pp. 205–21; Frugoni, 'Das Schachspiel', pp. 35–77; and Hans Petschar, 'Vorbilder für Weltbilder, Semiotische Überlegungen zur Metaphorik der mittelalterlichen Schachzabelbücher', in *Symbole des Alltags — Alltag der Symbole: Festschrift für Harry Kühnel zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. by Gertrud Blaschnitz and others (Graz: ADEVA, 1992), pp. 617–40. Plessow, *Mittelalterliche Schachzabelbücher*, chap. 5.6, argues against this thesis.

⁴¹ See, e.g., Heinemann, 'Zur Ständedidaxe', pp. 315–29 and 381–89; Volker Honemann, 'Gesellschaftliche Mobilität in Dichtungen des deutschen Mittelalters', in *Zwischen Nicht-Adel und Adel*, ed. by Kurt Andermann and Peter Johaneck (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2001), pp. 27–48 (pp. 42–44); Volker Honemann, 'Das Schachspiel in der deutschen Literatur des Mittelalters', in *Zeichen — Rituale — Werte: Internationales Kolloquium des Sonderforschungsbereichs 496 an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster*, ed. by Gerd Althoff (Münster: Rhema, 2004), pp. 361–81 (pp. 373–76). For a summary of the status of the research on the subject see Plessow, *Mittelalterliche Schachzabelbücher*, chap. 2. 3.

⁴² The correspondences among exempla relate to all figures of the chess allegoresis, not only to the noble chess pieces. Nevertheless, the amount of parallels among the noble chess pieces is

As a consequence of the new distribution, some exempla are furnished with other categories of virtues. For example, Jacobus saves the concept of *iustitia* for the king, the rook, and the merchant only; it does not appear in the discussion of the *alphilus*, the judge, about whose virtues it is stated instead 'debet iudex firmus esse et constans' (cols 169/70; The judge must be constant), 'attendant autem iudices, ne amore privato vel odio in iudicio moveantur' (cols 189/90; His judgement must not be influenced by love or hate), 'iram in iudicio fugiant' (cols 195/96; He must not pass judgement in ire), 'originem enim carnis a se trahentes eam puniant, ut legem patiantur in suis quam aliis promulgant' (cols 197/98; He must not take personal relations into consideration upon passing judgement) and 'contemplationi et lectioni scripturarum debent intendere' (cols 203/04; He must read and ponder the Scriptures). John evidently recounts different aspects of justice which concretely show how a just judge is to act. The laws of Lycurgus, recounted by John at the beginning of the section on justice, are referred to by Jacobus in order to give an example of the knight's virtue of championing the law. The subcategories of *iustitia*, for which John gives *liberalitas* and *amicitia*, are provided by Jacobus with corresponding subordinate concepts. The exemplum of Octavian having his children educated is deployed in the context of the queen's responsibility to educate her children. There is thus a marked divergence in the allocation of virtues to exempla. This divergence has to do on the one hand with the fact that, for John of Wales, *iustitia*, like the other cardinal virtues, encompasses different partial aspects which Jacobus in turn adopts for his own purposes. On the other hand, one must see this divergence as the natural result of Jacobus's practice of subdividing *iustitia* into different behavioural instructions, thus concretizing the didactic intentions underlying his work.

Exempla given by John on *prudentia* do not figure largely in Jacobus de Cessolis's treatise; of the stories or maxims, which appear in this section, Jacobus limits himself to six. The introductory section of the *prudentia* chapter, which contains general comments on the meaning of study, is almost completely left out by Jacobus. He only adopts the sentence 'Rex illiteratus est quasi asinus coronatus' in the context of the queen's responsibility to educate her children. While

considerably larger than among the pawns. This has certainly to do with the fact that the protagonists of ancient exempla are carriers of ruler's power. The odd fact that Jacobus leaves out the clerical order entirely is also explainable on the basis of his model: The profane exempla stories are hardly exemplary for ecclesiastics. The protagonists are mainly rulers or philosophers, upon which a Christian ruler might very well orient himself in his actions, but certainly neither a priest nor a monk.

contemplation, as illustrated by Carneades, who being lost in thought forgets even to eat, appears in John's text under the heading 'De prudentia philosophorum', it is described by Jacobus as the proper attitude of the good judge, who should read and ponder the Scriptures ('contemplationi et lectioni scripturarum intendere'). The example of Damocles, who has a sword hung over his head in order to be constantly reminded of his own transience, which figures in John's work as an expression of *providentia*, that is, the care for the future, appears in the chess treatise as an example of the *recta conscientia* of the seventh pawn and thus carries a religious connotation. Only the exemplum of Alexander the Great, who won his battles with the aid of experienced soldiers, takes its place in the chapter of the knight of the chess treatise under the heading of 'sapientia', which is most likely used as a synonym of *prudentia*. A look at the diverging use of terms for virtues seen in his adoption of examples from the chapter about prudentia makes it clear that Jacobus de Cessolis wished to make the function of expressing proper faith apparent through the very terms themselves, and that he particularly underscores the notion of *memento mori*.⁴³

This is also made clear by the reapplication of a further exemplum from the chapter about prudentia of the *Breviloquium*: whereas the exemplum of the king, who in removing his crown speaks of the burden that it represents to him, is taken by John of Wales as a token of *prudentia/intelligentia*, Jacobus de Cessolis understands it as an expression of the *humilitas* that behooves the rook as the king's deputy (cols 337/38). From the vantage point of the Dominican Jacobus de Cessolis, the example also illustrates the humble use of power; in contrast with

⁴³ The idea of *memento mori* appears in the chess book not only in the above-mentioned exempla, but rather also in connection with the first and eighth pawn. For the first pawn, the *agricola*, Jacobus gives the command *mortem timere non debent* (cols 399/400) just after discussing its necessary godliness (*cognoscere deum necesse est*, cols 381/82). In the context of the eighth pawn, which represents the gambler, the messenger, and the person, who loses everything he possessed, it seems that the responsible usage of money stands in the foreground. In the use of exempla, however, one sees that Jacobus finds a way to reframe the careful treatment of material things in salvational terms. In the exemplum of John of Cavacia (cols 705/06–715/16; the story is also known as 'Der Schlägel'; see Ulla Williams, 'Rüdeger der Hinkhofer', in *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters: Verfasserlexikon*, ed. by Kurt Ruh and others, 2nd edn, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1978–), VIII, 307–10. Jacobus correlates the acquisition of a material basis for living with the necessity of having requia recited. The story of St Bernard and the gambler (cols 721/22–723/24) underscores the readiness of the gambler to forgo his own salvation for the sake of the game more clearly than it does any question of purely material livelihood. In view of the precarious position in which these two figures are placed, one should probably regard the life oriented toward the Last Judgement as a required central virtue of the chess book.

Jacobus, the signification of this virtue in John's work, as it already had been in Valerius Maximus,⁴⁴ is held on a quite general level. The specifically Christian stamp inherent in Jacobus's conceptualization of the virtues is apparent here also. The general virtue of *intelligentia* is mentioned neither in connection with the king, nor with the rook. It does however appear as index both of the strategic behaviour of the knight and *ex negativo* of the queen, who is supposed to distinguish herself through keeping secrets, a practice which goes against the grain of her female nature. The exempla mentioned by John in connection with the *prudentia* of the remaining noble chess pieces become associated in the *Liber de moribus* explicitly with godliness.

The third classical cardinal virtue, *temperantia*, does not appear in Jacobus's text at all. This fact, however, is to be interpreted neither as owing to a lack of interest on Jacobus's part in the stories subsumed under that heading nor as an indication of an altered conception of the virtue in question. One must rather investigate more closely the more exact terms given by John of Wales as aspects of *temperantia*, that is, *continentia* (self-control, sexual abstinence) and *clementia* (mildness, leniency). Jacobus classifies exempla on *continentia* from the *Breviloquium de virtutibus* under varying virtue-related concepts. Aside from the concepts *continentia* and *continentia carnis*, Jacobus uses the more detailed concept *paupertas voluntaria* (cols 353/54), as well as the behavioural instruction 'debet iudex firmus esse et constans, ut non amore pecunie aut livore invidie aut carnis origine corrumpatur' (cols 169/70). John, in contrast, uses the concept *continentia* to refer generally to behaviour unmotivated by desire, also in connection with the acquisition of wealth. One finds, however, in Jacobus de Cessolis the additional concept of *castitas*, which more specifically points to moral purity than *continentia* does. Finally, modes of behaviour named by John, with the concept of *clementia* — that is, pity for the enemy and the symbolic elevation of an old soldier — are all found in Jacobus's text under the label of *pietas*. We thus find here once again a reaccentuation with clearly more religious connotational components.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, VII.ii ext. 5. The chapter in which one finds these exempla in Valerius Maximus bears the heading 'Sapienter dicta aut facta'.

⁴⁵ *Pietas* in the Christian sense is intimately associated with *misericordia* and also signalizes faith; *clementia* is used by ancients and medievals alike as a term for clemency/grace. For more on the conceptual distinction between *pietas* and *clementia* see Wachinger, '*Pietas vel misericordia*', p. 236.

Finally, *fortitudo* in the sense used by John of Wales — and moreover by Macrobius, upon whom John bases himself in this respect — is not only to be understood physically, but also and above all as inner strength.⁴⁶ Subordinate to *fortitudo* are *magnificentia*, *fidentia*, *patientia*, and *perseverantia*.⁴⁷ Jacobus, however, takes up ten examples, all of which he uses to illustrate the *patientia* of the rook (see above). Only one further parallel exists: The patience of Pyrrhus with his drunken critics is an expression of the *clementia et misericordia* of the king. The exempla used by John for *fidentia* do not appear at all in Jacobus de Cessolis's text. This fact could be ascribed to an alteration in a conception of *fidentia* no longer appropriate to ancient protagonists placed before the moral backdrop of the Christian Middle Ages, although even the concepts of *magnificentia* and *perseverantia* make no appearance in Jacobus de Cessolis's text.

The revaluation of two further exempla from the chapter on *fortitudo* are difficult to make sense of: the well-known story of the rape of Lucretia and the story of the old woman who prays for the long life of a tyrant. John ascribes to Lucretia, who takes her own life after being raped, the virtue of *fortitudo/perseverantia*; Jacobus, however, uses Lucretia as an example of the *castitas* and *honestas* befitting a queen (cols 131/32). John understands *perseverantia* as a form of constancy which serves to protect one from being either broken in the face of adversity or elevated through favorable circumstances ('Hac perseuerantia sit homo immobilis ne aduersitatibus frangatur nec prosperitatibus extollatur'; fol. 257^{va} M). The exemplum of Lucretia stands together with other exempla in which protagonists deliver themselves freely to death for the sake of a greater good (fol. 258^{vb} V). Jacobus de Cessolis distances himself, as does John, from Lucretia's suicide, centering the reader's attention rather on her chastity.⁴⁸ Jacobus thus decides in favour of a less complex virtue designation. The chastity of Lucretia, admittedly, can only be affirmed if one regards chastity as an inner attitude as opposed to putting the execution of a sexual act in the foreground. Jacobus's account and

⁴⁶ *Summa de regimine uite humane*, fol. 253^{va} R. The Bolognese jurist John of Legnano, *De bello, de repressaliis et de duello*, 28, ed. by Thomas E. Holland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1917), p. 239, engages under the heading *fortitudo* in an exhaustive discussion of situations which justify one to take flight.

⁴⁷ While *magnificentia* ('noble character'), *patientia*, and *perseverantia* are not modified in their meaning, the new Christian use of the concept *fidentia* is significant. What for the ancients meant 'self-assurance' and 'confidence' has come to mean 'fidelity' and 'faith'.

⁴⁸ Both concepts contain this element of meaning, though *honestas* is more broadly significant, potentially meaning not only decency and chastity, but also beauty and virtue.

valuation of Lucretia's actions draws explicitly on Augustine,⁴⁹ who uses the story to establish the will, as opposed to the deed, as the decisive criterion for moral judgement, whereby he distances himself from the view of antiquity. Such a premise is crucial for the understanding of Lucretia's chastity as it is portrayed in the chess treatise.

The second striking revaluation occurs in the story about the old woman, who is seen in the act of praying for the long life of a tyrant. The tyrant himself, upon hearing of this, asks the woman for the cause of her good will. She answers honestly that she prayed as a young girl that the tyrannical ruler in command at the time would die. Her prayer was answered, ushering in, however, a still worse ruler. Thus she prays now that the present tyrant remain, since it could always get worse.⁵⁰ In John of Wales's text, this story functions as an exemplum for *fortitudo/magnificentia*; in Jacobus's text, however, as the only exemplum for *veritas*, which represents an especially important virtue attributed to the third pawn, that is, the scribe.⁵¹ Valerius Maximus presents the story under the heading 'libere dicta aut facta' (VI.ii ext. 2). Here we find the definition of *magnificentia* again taken up by John: the 'achievement of great and sublime things with a wide and resplendent resolution of spirit' (Est autem magnificentia magnarum et excelsarum rerum cum animi ampla et splendida propositione agitatio et administratio; fol. 253^{vb} S). The praying woman fits into the mold of this concept if one interprets her honest answer as an expression of a free spirit and if one considers moreover that she brings herself through her honesty into mortal danger. In the new designation of her behaviour as *veritas*, one finds once again the simplification of the complex moral demands underlying John's use of concepts of virtue, this use being more faithful to the conceptuality of the ancients; the exemplum is condensed to the obvious observation that the old woman tells the tyrant the truth — and this in a surprisingly unusual, witty manner.

The cardinal virtue of *fortitudo*, finally, is required, according to Jacobus, only of the knight (cols 267/68–269/70) and the smith (cols 443/44, no exempla added). As is clear at least in the case of the *fortitudo* of the knight, Jacobus is not thinking merely of physical strength: 'Fortes milites necesse est esse, non tantum

⁴⁹ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, i.19, ed. by Bernhard Dombart and Alphons Kalb (CCSL, 47, p. 20).

⁵⁰ See Tubach, *Index exemplorum*, no. 1678. The exemplum appears occasionally in a variant form, in which bad husbands are played against each other instead of tyrant rulers.

⁵¹ *Veritas* is also a virtue of the king. It refers to the duty of the king to keep his word.

fortitudine corporis, sed etiam animi' (cols 267/68). To illustrate this conception of *fortitudo*, he tells the story of Codrus, the military leader, who sacrifices himself in battle so that his army as a whole can achieve victory (cols 269/70).⁵² Contrary to Jacobus's view, John of Wales regards the model behaviour of the military leader as an expression of *iustitia*, or more exactly of *providentia circa rempublicam*.⁵³ Both interpretations of the exemplary nature of Codrus point in some way to the duties of the soldier in battle. By the place taken by the story in the knight's chapter of the *Liber de moribus*, one clearly sees Codrus as one willing to act for a successful battle. Jacobus's decision to insert the story of Codrus specifically in the chapter on the knight thus makes perfect sense. As further contexts for this exemplum, one would be tempted to consider the chess piece of the king or the rook. However, the constellations of virtues corresponding respectively to these two nobly ranked chess pieces show that all representation of battle is foreign to them. The king is characterized in the chess treatise by his actions in times of peace. The rook's duties are primarily of an administrative nature. The only heading, through which a war-related action is subsumed under the rook, is *pietas*, by which is meant pity with the inferior enemy of battle. If one considers the matter from the vantage point of the intention to integrate the Codrus narrative into the chess treatise, the *fortitudo* of the knight appears indeed to be the only sensible context for this exemplum. If one looks from the opposite direction, one could ask whether there are other, more fitting exempla to illustrate *fortitudo*, a key virtue of the knight which simply must figure in the chess treatise's account of this piece. A look at the exempla of the *Breviloquium* yields two further references to *fortitudo* in battle, both inserted by John in the subsection 'De fidentia', in which the cardinal virtue of *fortitudo* is treated (fol. 254^{vb} F). The first exemplum is an account of how a man with a limp is censured for taking his place in the line of battle. The man answers that he intends to fight rather than to flee. The second exemplum is the comment of a soldier on the observation of the sun being obscured by the arrows of the Persians: 'A battle is fought better in the shadows anyhow.' Unlike the story of Codrus, both of these exempla are not personified, even though they do illustrate the self-sacrifice of the soldier. Perhaps this was a reason for Jacobus to prefer the Codrus exemplum over the two others. Seen as a whole, the chess treatise's assignment of virtues to exempla, as it differs from that of the *Breviloquium*, shows clearly a shift in accentuation in the former

⁵² Tubach, *Index exemplorum*, no. 1136; see Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta*, v.vi ext. 1.

⁵³ Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta*, v.vi ext. 1, brings the story under the rubric 'De pietate erga parentes et fratres et patriam'. He thus also emphasizes engagement for the *patria*.

work. One notices first and foremost a more strongly Christian usage of concepts of virtue, as well as a general preference of specifically Christian virtues in the face of the overtly ancient conceptuality underlying John of Wales's collection of exempla. Another fact that becomes clear is that while John uses the virtues more generally, Jacobus de Cessolis makes them more precise. This is shown, for example, by the exemplum of the king who speaks of the burden of his crown; instead of *intelligentia*, Jacobus de Cessolis uses *humilitas*. One may also speak of a simplification of a complex notion of virtue in the case of the woman who prays for the longevity of the tyrant, in which case Jacobus refers to *veritas* as opposed to *magnificentia*. Nonetheless, such simplification of complex notions of virtue does not immediately imply that the contextualization of individual exempla around certain virtues should thus also make more sense; that the contrary may be true is shown by the exemplum of Lucretia's chastity. It is merely the abstract concepts themselves that are clearer, as they are also better known. In contrast with the *Breviloquium de virtutibus*, which John of Wales wrote in an academic environment and, in all likelihood, destined for an academic audience, the collection of exempla of Jacobus de Cessolis was compiled with the practice of preaching in mind.

III. The Impact of Chess Imagery on the Conception of the Virtues in the 'Liber de moribus'

The most important difference between the respective conceptions of the virtues in the *Breviloquium* and the *Liber de moribus*, however, is to be found at the structural level. The total conceptual framework of Jacobus's chess treatise, that is, the allegoresis of chess, is bound up with the attribution of virtues to individual classes and social and professional groups. Jacobus formulates different duties for the king and his deputies than those for the innkeeper, the weaver, the scribe or the doctor. Thus, for example, whereas the virtue of *castitas* befits the king, the queen, the innkeeper, and the doctor, it holds no moral command over the judge, the knight, and the rook. *Amicitia* is required of the knight and the scribe, not however of the representatives of other social castes or of other trades. In reference to the eighth pawn, the gambler, no specific virtues are mentioned at all.⁵⁴ The Codrus exemplum shows how this new structural principle can affect

⁵⁴ See Christina Wagner-Emden, 'Studien zum Schachbuch des Konrad von Ammenhausen' (unpublished master's thesis, Universität Münster, 2004), pp. 141–43.

the allocation of virtues to exempla. Jacobus de Cessolis attributes the virtue of *fortitudo* to this exemplum instead of *iustitia/providentia*, thus demonstrating the importance of the former virtue for the knight in battle. It is thus in the context of this act of attribution that he functionalizes the Codrus exemplum. The association of virtues with specific classes or professions in the *Liber de moribus* is thus far from arbitrary: it is oriented on the respective function of a given group in society and the most important duties it fulfils in this framework. The queen is fitted with virtues essential to motherhood on account of her key duty of bearing and rearing children, the knight has the main responsibility of waging wars, and the judge is obliged above all to pass judgement fairly. The fact that these societal groups have other responsibilities, for example, that the knight is also active at court or that the judge might, as a family man, have a house built, must be excluded from the consideration of the chess treatise because of its conception and the orientation of its descriptions of virtues on socially defined duties.

Thus while John, writing in the abstractly general fashion of the Scholastics, treats the virtues as comprehended in a system, Jacobus's treatment of the virtues in the chess treatise is more concrete. He embeds the virtues, via their assignment to specific socially relevant activities, into contexts relevant to daily life. The text bears a similarity in its pragmatic character to ethical systems of antiquity, which were very closely connected with sociopolitical life. Jacobus's treatment of the four political virtues seems indeed to orient itself on such ancient models.⁵⁵ Through the structure of his *Liber de moribus*, Jacobus de Cessolis outlines more clearly the contours of the political virtues explained in the exempla and in the classical descriptions of virtue. This he achieves by constantly bearing in mind the relation of virtue to praxis.

The background of the chess treatise also gives an answer to the vexing question of why the priestly class is entirely lacking in Jacobus de Cessolis's picture of society;⁵⁶ ecclesiastics, after all, had been adequately represented by a chess piece

⁵⁵ Georg Wieland, *Ethica — scientia practica: Die Anfänge der philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981), p. 254, clarifies the practical orientation of the ancient notion of virtue using the example of generosity: 'Der Arme hat in Geldsachen keine Chance, die Tugenden der Freigebigkeit und der Großzügigkeit zu erwerben.' For the topic of political virtues see the contribution of István Bejczy in this volume.

⁵⁶ Frugoni, 'Das Schachspiel', p. 68, speculates about the reasons for Jacobus's leaving out the clergy: 'Die Tatsache verdient Beachtung, daß der Mönch Jacobus in seiner Abhandlung die Geistlichkeit aussparte, sei es aus Solidarität mit dem eigenen Stand oder aus gebotener Rücksichtnahme.' She refers in this context to the highly critical treatment of the clergy in moralizing interpretations of the game of chess preceding the chess book. Thomas Cramer,

in the *Moralitas de schaccario*, the forerunner of the *Liber de moribus* in its use of chess as a symbol of society. The *alphilus* is portrayed here as a bishop and his misconduct criticized in detail.⁵⁷ However, Jacobus having concretized the scheme of society he had found in the game of chess with the deeds of ancient rulers and philosophers taken from John of Wales's treatise on the cardinal virtues, there was no room left for the clergy. Firstly, ancient rulers and philosophers could hardly have been seen as models for the clergy, since they possess no knowledge of Christian doctrine.⁵⁸ Secondly, the duties of the ecclesiastic include especially the fulfilment of the Christian theological virtues of faith, love, and hope, none of which one finds among those established in the *Breviloquium*. These virtues are also entirely lacking in Jacobus's book, despite the work he put into adaptation and his stronger orientation on Christian values. It is therefore thoroughly consistent that Jacobus de Cessolis excludes the priestly class from the chess imagery of his *Liber de moribus*.

As a final point, one may discover a further added value of the chess treatise's framework for the conception of the virtues in the role played by the virtue of justice: *iustitia* is a virtue central to both collections of exempla. In the context of the model of cardinal virtues, it is represented already by Plato⁵⁹ and Augustine⁶⁰ as the most important of the four virtues, since it brings together the other virtues in correct proportion. Correspondingly, the *Breviloquium de virtutibus* devotes its first comprehensive chapter, which is a lengthy one, to *iustitia*. In the *Liber de moribus* too, this virtue plays a superordinate and central role. Justice is the most prominent virtue of the philosopher Xerxes; the establishment of this virtue is the

'Allegorie und Zeitgeschichte: Thesen zur Begründung des Interesses an der Allegorie im Spätmittelalter', in *Formen und Funktionen der Allegorie*, ed. by Walter Haug (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978), pp. 265–76 (p. 269), supports his theses on the difference between Jacobus's view of society and social reality with, among other things, the absence of the certainly not insignificant clergyman ('gewiß nicht bedeutungslosen Geistlichen').

⁵⁷ For the *Moralitas de schaccario* see Harold J. R. Murray, *A History of Chess* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913), pp. 421–28; Plessow, *Mittelalterliche Schachzabelbücher*, chap. 1.

⁵⁸ This is possibly also meant by Vidmanová, 'Jacobus de Cessolis', p. 108, when she writes that in the *Breviloquium* the identification of the *alphili* with the clergy was impossible due to content-related reasons: 'Die *Alphili* sind hier keine Bischöfe — im *Breviloquium* war die Identifizierung mit den Geistlichen aus inhaltlichen Gründen nicht möglich.'

⁵⁹ Plato, *Politeia*, 427e, 433b7–c2, 580d10–81a1.

⁶⁰ Augustine, *De Genesi contra manichaeos*, i.10 (PL, XXXIV, col. 204); cf. Kent Emery, 'Reading the World Rightly and Squarely: Bonaventure's Doctrine of the Cardinal Virtues', *Traditio*, 39 (1983), 183–218 (p. 212).

main reason for the invention by Xerxes of the game of chess and thus also of the allegory of chess. Additionally, the virtue of justice is demanded and illustrated very often throughout the text, as we have seen.

Above and beyond the mere naming of the concept of justice itself and its partial aspects, it is clear that *iustitia* as a concept can be realized in many different ways, that is, depending on the duties corresponding to the different social groups which find representation. For example, the justice of the king is different from that of the knight, and these are distinguished in turn from the justice of the peasant or of the merchant. The king is obliged to pass just laws and to tax his subjects justly. Jacobus clarifies the *iustitia* of the king using the exemplum of Diomedes. What, he asks, distinguishes the activity of a king from that of a thief if justice does not reign in the kingdom?⁶¹ Beyond this, it is expected of the king that he passes judgement in a way that does justice to each individual case and that he, when in doubt, shows clemency and mercy.⁶² The vicegerent (seventh pawn) is just when he keeps himself to the law and takes no more tax than is due to him.⁶³ In contrast, justice as attributed to the rook is represented as the unselfishly fair treatment of enemies; it is contrasted with acting in one's own interest (cols 303/04–317/18). Positive role models are placed in situations in which they even put up with their own death for the sake of justice. The knight should execute laws and fight on the side of the righteous.⁶⁴ The peasant, however, acts justly when he punctually hands over the tithe — this is motivated, according to Jacobus, by the virtue of godliness (cols 381/82). Above all, however, stands the notion of justice as the basic prerequisite for the functioning of society as a whole. Justice can be seen in this sense as the condition the state is in when each living person within its bounds does what he/she should do.⁶⁵ Since the activities corresponding to each social standing differ from each other, that which every individual must do on the part of justice varies accordingly. The allegoresis of chess realizes this abstract definition of justice as *suum cuique*, that is, the

⁶¹ *Das Schachzabelbuch*, cols 103/04: 'Quid enim sunt regna sine iusticia, nisy magna latrocinia, quia et latrocinia quedam sunt regna?' Jacobus de Cessolis makes explicit reference here, as does John of Wales, to Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, iv.4.

⁶² Cf., e.g., the exemplum of Pisistratus, cols 87/88.

⁶³ *Das Schachzabelbuch*, cols 677/78: 'Officiales corporis discreti sint, ne ultra, quam ratio postulat, extorqueant ab eumentibus et vendentibus.'

⁶⁴ *Das Schachzabelbuch*, cols 277/78: 'Laborare debent milites, ut leges iuste diligentius observentur.'

⁶⁵ For this notion see Plato, *Politeia*, 433a10.

condition of 'to each, his own' in which each individual's debt to and reward from the state is a predetermined quantum based on his/her social standing, to become one of the explicitly thematized aspects of justice.

Our comparison of the exempla in Jacobus de Cessolis's *Liber de moribus* with John of Wales's *Breviloquium de virtutibus* has shown that they bear significant similarities to each other. It is highly probable that Jacobus de Cessolis used the *Breviloquium* as his model. This probability is demonstrated most clearly through the arrangement of the exempla for the chess piece of the rook. Beyond this, one sees that John of Wales tends to adopt ancient notions of the virtues without consideration of the changes in signification which have taken place in their being carried over to a Christian framework. Jacobus de Cessolis changes the assignment of virtues to exempla in places where John makes use of ancient concepts of virtue, and he even leaves some groups of exempla out entirely, for example, the exempla for *fidentia*. In view of the fact that a treatise on ancient cardinal virtues functioned as the model for Jacobus de Cessolis's chess treatise, the class differentiation inherent to the latter receives extra significance. Namely, it implies both that the virtues are connected with social activities and offices and that the actions expressive of certain virtues can be distinguished according to social standing. Also, the absence of the clergy from the social classes accounted for in the *Liber de moribus* can be explained through its model; neither are theological virtues translatable into political concepts of virtue, nor do they permit illustration through exempla taken from antiquity. Finally, the social class structure inherent to Jacobus's chess treatise makes it possible to read another dimension of justice into it, namely that of justice as an expression of the *suum cuique*, of an organization of a public whole, in which each individual does what he or she should and keeps to the duties specific to his or her class.

Table 1: The Structure of the *Breviloquium*: Correspondences among the Exempla Sets of the *Breviloquium* and the *Liber de moribus*

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
Pars I. 'De iustitia'		
Cap. 1. 'De iustitia in possidendo'	Alexander and the pirate	<i>rex/iustitia</i>
Cap. 2. 'De iustitia in statuendo leges iustas'	Lycurgus's laws	<i>miles/legibus armatam</i>
Cap. 3. 'De observatione legum'	Zaleukos	<i>alphilus/ legem patere in suis</i>
	The sword in the senate	<i>alphilus/legem patere in suis</i>
	Analogy of the spider	<i>alphilus/legem patere in suis</i>
	Themistocles's wrongful counsel	<i>rochi/iustitia</i>
Cap. 4. 'De providentia circa rempublicam'	Marcus Regulus	<i>rochi/iustitia</i>
	Codrus	<i>miles/fortitudo</i>
	Plato on the common good	—
	Cato on industriousness	—
	Lucius Valerius's burial	<i>rochi/bumilitas</i>
	Athilius Regulus — fieldwork	—
	Quintius from peasant to dictator	—
	A rich consul is discharged from office	—

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	Curtius: possess gold or rule over men	—
	Cornelius Scipio wants no office	<i>rochi/humilitas</i>
	Helyo against inherited rights	—
	Solomon on the suitability for being a judge	—
	The poor judge and the rich, miserly judge	<i>alpbilus/firmitudo et constantia</i>
	Brutus has his sons killed	—
	Torquatus kills his son	—
	Cicero on the family and the welfare of the state	—
	Two wise men upon the sea	
Cap. 5. 'De iustitia erga inimicos'	The teacher of the Faliscans	<i>rochi/iustitia</i>
	Timocrates	—
	Fabricius and the treacherous doctor	<i>rochi/iustitia</i>
	Alexander weeps over the death of Darius	—
	Cicero on the common good	
Cap. 6. 'De partibus iustitie'		
<i>liberalitas</i>	Titus: it is improper for anyone to depart from the prince in sadness	<i>rochi/liberalitas</i>
	Titus is unhappy when he has not given anything all day	<i>rochi/liberalitas</i>

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	Alexander's generosity	—
	A Cynic is asked for a talent	4. <i>popularis/avaritiam cavere</i>
<i>innocentia</i>	Titus has nothing to regret	—
	Solinus: the people elect the king	—
<i>amicitia et concordia</i>	Siege by Hannibal	—
	Damon and Physias	<i>miles/fidelitas</i>
<i>vera amicitia</i>	Friendship for honour	—
	Friendship as a treasure	
	The naked Graces	
<i>pietas et religio</i>	Women sacrifice in white	
	Alexander's sacrifice	
<i>De affectu et humilitate</i>	Trajan and the widow	—
	Bernhard: the seven pillars of justice	—
<i>obedientia et reverentia</i>	Julius Caesar is denied the triumphal procession	
<i>consilium et auxilium</i>	Denied help, denied payment	—
	Wise counsel is always moderate	—
	Hunger is a sharp sword	
<i>disciplina et custodia</i>	Alexander's small army was victorious	—

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	Titus's small army was victorious	
	Aurelius's son	
<i>pater debet filios cohercere</i>	Ocravian teaches his sons the art of war	—
	Ocravian has his daughters learn to treat fabric	<i>regina/scientia litterarum</i>
	Family fathers must provide order	—
	Jerome turns three clerics from the table	
<i>verum iudicium</i>	Cambyses	<i>alphilus/iram in iudicio fugere</i>
Pars II. 'De prudentia'		
Cap.1. 'Quod prudentia debet esse in principibus'	The Roman's intelligence	—
	Plato's philosopher-ruler	
	<i>rex illiteratus</i>	<i>regina/scientia litterarum</i>
	Famous teachers of famous rulers	
	Philipp recruits Aristotle	—
	The Wisdom of Solomon	—
	Democritus's library	—
	Theodosius studies at night	—
	Divine laws	—

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	Bernard's letter to Pope Eugene	
Cap. 2. 'De prudentia philosophorum'	Carneades lost in thought	alphilus/contemplationi et lectioni scripturarum intendere
	Solon's death	—
	Socrates too poor to learn	—
	Archimedes in thought	—
	Themistocles's daughter	
	Socrates throws money away	—
Cap. 3. 'De memoria'	Honours for the general	—
	Vilifications for the general	
Cap. 4. 'De intelligentia'	King speaks with his crown	<i>rochi/humilitas</i>
	Spegyppus and the flatterer	—
	Celius Baldus on flatterers	—
	Thimogoras is sentenced to death for flattery	—
	The human pain of Alexander	—
	Alexander is mortal	—
	<i>memento mori</i>	repeatedly
	Quintus Curtius on Alexander	

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
Cap. 5. 'De providentia'	Xerxes's army	—
	Monument of transience	—
	Pondering death	—
	Plato: pondering death	—
	Alexander is mortal	—
	Philosophers at Alexander's grave	—
	Dionysius – the sword of Damocles	7. <i>popularis/recta conscientia</i>
	Aristotle in the hour of his death	—
Cap. 6. 'De reliquis prudentie partibus'	Cicero on counsel	—
	Alexander chooses experienced fighters for battle and wins	<i>miles/sapiens debet esse et expertu</i>
	Vices disguised as virtues	—
	The Trojan Horse looked like the bravery of Minerva	—
Pars III. 'De temperantia'		
Cap. 1. 'De continentia'	Solomon: give the kings no wine	—
	Alexander eats bread	—
	Scipio Aemilianus eats bread	—
	Cato drinks the oarsmen's wine	—

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	Hannibal does not rest	—
	The army spares the apple tree	—
	Masimissa eats while standing	—
	Augustus eats simple dishes	—
	Roman women drink no wine	1. <i>popularis/continentia</i>
	Alexander in the desert	
	Cornelius Scipio prevents lust	5. <i>popularis/castitas corporis</i>
	Spurina destroys his face	3. <i>popularis/honestas et continentia</i>
	Another young man does the same	—
	Alexander ignores the engaged woman	—
	Scipio returns unraped the bride of a nobleman	<i>rex/continentia carnis</i>
	Xenocrates and the whore	5. <i>popularis/castitas corporis</i>
	Pythagoras in Cortona	—
	Duellio stinks	<i>regina/castitas et honestas</i>
	Scipio brings from Africa only his name	<i>rochi/paupertas voluntaria</i>
	The same for Scipio's brother	<i>rochi/paupertas voluntaria</i>
	Curio eats from a wooden plate	—
	Curio does not touch the loot after the victory	—

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	Fabricius Lucinus sends back gifts	—
	Quintus Tiberus refuses gold and silver	<i>rochi/paupertas voluntaria</i>
	Anathocles treats gold like clay; the aristocracy of virtue	—
	Roman officeholders who cannot give their daughters a dowry	<i>alphilus/firmitudo et constantia</i>
	St Augustine: poverty is preferable to wealth	—
	Juvenal: wealth leads to crime	—
	Caesar and the veteran	<i>rochi/liberalitas</i>
	Antigonus himself lends a hand	—
	The fourfold continentia was effective for the philosophers	—
	The Academy in Athens	—
	Diogenes and Alexander	<i>alphilus/firmitudo et constantia</i>
	Diogenes' abstinence	—
	Diogenes' death	—
	Socrates the Theban throws money away	—
	Stipho's lack of want	—
	Anaxagoras on happiness	—

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
Cap. 2. 'De clementia'	The bee-king with no sting	<i>rochi/pietas</i>
	Marcus Marcellus weeps over the misery of his enemies	<i>rochi/pietas</i>
	Caesar weeps over the death of Pompeius	<i>rochi/pietas</i>
	Pompeius has pity on the defeated and crowns him again	—
	Paulus raises a captive	<i>rochi/pietas</i>
	Release without ransom	—
	Caesar's clementia	—
	Affable tyrant	—
	Alexander places an old knight upon a chair	<i>rochi/pietas</i>
	Alexander and Pyrrhus	
Cap. 3. 'De modestia'	Titus has nothing to regret	
Pars IV. 'De fortitudine'		—
Cap. 1. 'De magnificentia'	Seneca is no slave to his body	—
	Free captives	—
	Belinus and Pompeius	—
	Philipp passes a wrong judgement in his drunkenness	—

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	The woman who prays for the long life of a tyrant	3. <i>popularis/veritas</i>
	Calistrenes with Alexander	—
	Diogenes eats cabbage	—
	Darius and Alexander	
Cap. 2. 'De fidentia'	Alexander trusts Philippos the doctor	—
	Plato trusts Xenocrates	—
	The limping man in battle (does not flee)	—
	The soldier who fights in the shadows (does not flee)	—
	Only women need the protection of walls	
Cap. 3. 'De patientia'	Antigonus accuses Alexander of lust	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Alexander and the pirate	<i>rex/iustitia s.o.</i>
	Caesar's baldness	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Criticized tyrant	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Scipio, criticized	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Theodosius on insults to his name	—
	Vespasian on the accusation of greed	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Antigonus, insulted	<i>rochi/patientia</i>

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	Aristippus, insulted	—
	Cyrtius, insulted	—
	Diogenes on fools	—
	Sokrates bears with Xanthippe	—
	Theodorus Syreneus is crucified	—
	The sacrifice for Alexander	—
	Pompeius burns his finger	—
	Zeno tortured	—
	Zeno bites the ear of his torturer	—
	Anaxarcus' tongue	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Leonidas struggles	—
<i>in iniuriarum remissione erant predicti antiqui</i>	Caesar forgot nothing but injustice	—
	Cato, struck in the face	—
	Philippus insulted	—
	Alexander's enemy	—
	Antigonus	—
	Pisistratus and drunken critics	—

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	Sokrates struck	
	Diogenes spit on	
	Pirrhus, Convivium	<i>rex/clementia et misericordia</i>
	Augustus does not punish insulter	
	Seneca: injustice forgotten	—
<i>in disciplinarum et correctionum moderatione viguit in antiquis</i>	Archita of Tarent refrains from striking in anger	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Plato refrains from striking in anger	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Plato leaves punishment to someone else	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Seneca: maxim	<i>rochi/patientia</i>
	Plutarch: maxim	
	Trajan: do not put out watery eyes or rip out long nails	—
Cap. 4. 'De perseverantia'	Fabricius honourable	—
	Socrates: The wise man is invulnerable	—
	Two barrels in the house of Jupiter (fortune and misfortune)	—
	Fools: passion; wise men: measure	—
	Stoics in a storm	—

<i>Breviloquium</i>	Exemplum	<i>Liber de moribus</i>
	The greatest fortune is the lack of misfortune	—
	Mucius has himself burned	—
	Fabricius lives in poverty	—
	Rutilius suffers exile	—
	Regulus has himself tortured	—
	Socrates takes the poison	—
	Caro takes death upon himself	—
	Socrates's death	
	Women who prefer death to rape	—
	Lucretia	<i>regina/castitas et honestas</i>
	Anaxagoras upon hearing of a death	—
	Xenophon upon hearing of a death	—
	Bias of Priene, possession in the heart	—
	Paulinus of Nola, possession in the heart	—
Pars V. 'De ordinatione virtutum'		—

Table 2: The Rochi in the *Liber de moribus* and Its Parallels

Jacobus de Cessolis	Exemplum	John of Wales	Further Parallels
1st virtue: <i>iustitia</i>	Themistocles unjust counsel	<i>iustitia/De observatione legum</i>	Valerius Maximus, VI.v ext. 2
	Marcus Regulus	<i>iustitia/providentia circa rempublicam</i>	Augustine, <i>De civitate Dei</i> , i.15
	Hannibal fails to keep his word		Cicero, <i>De officiis</i> , iii.32
	The teacher and the Faliscans	<i>iustitia/iustitia erga inimicos</i>	Valerius Maximus, VI.v.1
	Fabricius and the treacherous physician	<i>iustitia/iustitia erga inimicos</i>	Annaeus Florus, i.18
2nd virtue: <i>pietas</i>	Counter-examples from Lombardy		
	The daughter breast-feeding her mother	<i>Communiloquium</i>	Valerius Maximus, V.iv.7
	The bee-king without a stinger	<i>temperantia/clementia</i>	Seneca, <i>De clementia</i> , i.19
	Marcus Marcellus weeps over the misery of his enemies	<i>temperantia/clementia</i>	Valerius Maximus, V.i.4
	Julius Caesar weeps over the defeat of Pompeius	<i>temperantia/ clementia</i>	Valerius Maximus, V.i.10
	Pompey has pity with his defeated enemy		Valerius Maximus, V.i.9
	Paulus raises a kneeling captive	<i>temperantia/clementia</i>	Valerius Maximus, V.i.8
	Caesar mourns over the death of his servant Cato		Valerius Maximus, V.i.10

Jacobus de Cessolis	Exemplum	John of Wales	Further Parallels
	Virgil teaches the princes to keep the peace		Augustine, v.12
	Trajan responds to the reproach of too great <i>pietas</i> with <i>pietas</i>		John of Salisbury, iv.8
	Alexander places an old knight upon his chair	<i>temperantia/ clementia Communiloquium</i>	Valerius Maximus, v.i
3rd virtue: <i>humilitas</i>	Publius Valerius tears down his house because it stands higher than the others		Valerius Maximus, IV.i.1
	Sallust: maxim		
	Fabius gives up inherited rights	<i>iustitia/providentia circa rempublicam</i>	Valerius Maximus, IV.i.5
	Fabius does not want to become a judge	<i>iustitia/providentia circa rempublicam</i>	Valerius Maximus, VI.iv.1
	A kings speaks to his crown about its burden	<i>prudentia/intelligentia</i>	Valerius Maximus, VII.ii ext. 5
	Tiberius keeps his vicegerents in office as long as possible; in addition: exemplum of the flies		Flavius Josephus, Antiqu. 18
	Die Romans kill the government-eager Vitellius and force Vespasian into office		

Jacobus de Cessolis	Exemplum	John of Wales	Further Parallels
4th virtue: <i>patientia</i>	Alexander accepts blame from Antigonus with patience	<i>fortitudo/patientia</i>	
	The same is told of Caesar, who is blamed for his baldness	<i>fortitudo/patientia</i>	John of Salisbury, iii.14
	Caesar scolded because of his descent		
	Caesar, criticized as a tyrant (If I were one, you would not dare to tell me)	<i>fortitudo/patientia</i>	John of Salisbury, iii.14
	Scipio Africanus is accused of being a coward and reacts with composure	<i>fortitudo/patientia</i>	John of Salisbury, iii.14
	Vespasian responds to critique jestingly	<i>fortitudo/patientia</i>	Suetonius
	Antigonus hears the critique of his people through the wall and reacts with composure	<i>fortitudo/patientia</i>	Seneca, <i>De ira</i> , iii.22
	Anaxarchus bites off his tongue	<i>fortitudo/patientia</i>	Valerius Maximus, iii.iii ext. 4
	Archita Tarentino refrains from striking in anger	<i>fortitudo/patientia</i>	Valerius Maximus, IV.i ext 1
	Plato refrains from striking in anger (2 variations in a row told)	<i>fortitudo/patientia</i>	Valerius Maximus, IV.i ext 2; Seneca, <i>De ira</i> , iii.12
	Seneca: maxim	fortitudo/patientia	Seneca, <i>De ira</i> , iii.12

Jacobus de Cessolis	Exemplum	John of Wales	Further Parallels
5th virtue: <i>paupertas voluntaria</i>	Scipio Africanus defends himself against praise	<i>temperantia/continentia</i>	Valerius Maximus, III.vii.1
	The same for Scipio's brother	<i>temperantia/continentia</i>	
	Anthilagos cares not for gold and silver	<i>temperantia/continentia</i>	John of Salisbury, v.17
	St Augustine: maxim		
6th virtue: <i>liberalitas</i>	Titus: noone should depart from the prince in sadness	<i>iustitia/liberalitas</i>	Suetonius, Titus 8; John of Salisbury, iii.14
	Caesar personally engages himself in the war	<i>Communiloquium</i>	
	A veteran demanding and receiving personal help from Caesar	<i>temperantia/continentia</i>	John of Salisbury, iii.14

THE OPPOSITE OF LOVE: ROYAL VIRTUE, ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, AND POPULAR DISCONTENT IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Cary J. Nederman

I. Introduction

It hardly overstates the case to say that European political authors during the Middle Ages were obsessed with the moral virtues of their rulers. Good government was considered to be a gift from God, but one which could be merited by a conscientious effort to educate and encourage the mighty to adopt a suitable set of personal qualities and behaviours. Hence, not only didactic writings (such as the ubiquitous princely ‘mirrors’), but also works of chivalric literature, technical scholastic treatises, sermons, tracts of moral theology — any form of composition that might directly or indirectly aid in the instruction of kings and other great lords — devoted extensive attention to praising and promoting the virtues necessary for pious rule. Changes in the intellectual and discursive landscape of medieval ethical and political teaching, such as the progressive recovery and circulation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, did not fundamentally alter the situation. Contrary to Walter Ullmann’s shopworn vision of an emphasis on citizenship and republican virtue replacing the valorization of personal monarchy in the later Middle Ages,¹ Aristotle’s writings became largely a vast new resource to be mined for accounts of the nature and

¹ See Cary J. Nederman, ‘What Is Dead and What Is Living in the Scholarship of Walter Ullmann’, *Pensiero politico medievale*, 2 (2004), 11–19.

operation of the virtues in the activity of ruling subjects.² Of course, there was much to debate within this general framework. Which virtue or virtues should be preeminent among princes? How did the cardinal virtues compare to the so-called Christian virtues as standards for governance? What constituted the most reliable method of inculcating moral goodness in rulers? How were monarchs lacking wholly or partly in the qualities necessary for virtue to be treated? But with surprisingly rare exceptions, the presumption that the origins of good government rested on the personal moral character of the supreme official (whether emperor, king, princeling, or even civic magistrate) went unchallenged.

How might such an obsession be explained? Obviously, the absence of institutionalized mechanisms of constitutional control, which might set limits on the ability of a ruler to act autonomously, plays a role. Such fixed and recognized limitations were part of the system of official accountability that had formed a central feature of many city communities in the classical world; in the modern world, they would emerge again in several different forms. Despite the attempts by some well-meaning but misguided recent scholars to locate such institutionalized constitutionalism in the Middle Ages (or more specifically, the conciliar doctrines and practices of medieval churchmen),³ the expectation that government would be conducted according to an established and public legal and judicial system rested mainly for medieval thinkers upon their belief that a morally upstanding ruler would temper and restrain his will in accordance with virtue.⁴ Ultimately, the prince answered to God, as medieval authors never tired of reminding their readers: the Lord would avenge perfectly and completely all injuries done by evil rulers to their subjects. Indeed, this might readily become a justification for quietism in the face of misrule, since the recipients of harm should bear their damage as a divinely ordained test or punishment which it would be impious to question or resist.

² As is made plain by Antony Black, *Political Thought in Europe, 1250–1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 45–47. A useful historiographical overview is provided by Ronald W. Truman, *Spanish Treatises on Government, Society and Religion in the Time of Philip II: The 'De Regimine Principum' and Associated Traditions* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 12–31.

³ Most recently, Francis Oakley, *The Conciliarist Tradition: Constitutionalism in the Catholic Church, 1300–1870* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁴ A prime example is afforded by the political doctrines found in the legal treatise usually ascribed to Henry de Bracton; see Cary J. Nederman, 'Bracton on Kingship Revisited', *History of Political Thought*, 5 (1984), 61–77.

Yet the insistence on personalized morality as an adequate assurance of good government — or alternatively, on the deferral of rectification to the afterlife — by no means enjoyed universal endorsement by medieval thinkers. In particular, I think that some writers, perhaps under the influence of a materialistic (or at any rate, earthbound and economic) conception of the duties of governors that began to emerge in the later Middle Ages, became willing to countenance public displays of discontent and even rebellion — not merely on the part of a few feudal nobles, but arising from the lesser rungs of urban and rural society.⁵ In my view, one may detect in some treatises a reinterpretation of the royal virtues from purely moral and religious qualities to characteristics that pertain directly to responsibility for the physical well-being of subjects and which thus may be measured by public sentiment (as well as by divine justice).⁶ Hence, there is a modified identification of the nature of the bond that obtains between ruler and ruled: the latter may judge for themselves, on the basis of clear-cut economic hardship, when the former lacks virtue; subjects are thus not necessarily guilty of impiety or treason should they impose their judgement upon their political superiors in self-defence or retaliation for injuries suffered. What is particularly interesting about this shift in focus is that it occurs almost entirely through the redefinition of the standard terminology associated with royal virtue, rather than through the introduction of new language.

Conventionally, medieval theorists expressed the relationship that inhered between a king and his subjects was through the language of *amor* and *caritas*, that is, 'love' and 'charity' (the two are virtual cognates). Of course, Augustine had emphasized 'love' as the basis for all human association, although the only 'true' love was love of God, which did not partake of or inhere in mundane concerns such as government.⁷ Medieval authors, however, deployed the language of 'love' in a more positive sense to describe the arrangement of temporal politics and

⁵ Here I part company with Claire Valente, *The Theory and Practice of Revolt in Medieval England* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), who concentrates almost entirely on aristocratically fomented rebellions and the justifications given thereof. For an alternative view, see Lillian M. Bisson, 'The Cry of the Poor: Unrest and Rebellion among the Peasants', which comprises Chapter 7 of her *Chaucer and the Late Medieval World* (New York: St Martin's, 1998), pp. 143–63.

⁶ Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, pp. 46–47, emphasizes the different between 'economic' and 'spiritual and moral' functions of kingship as a purpose of government.

⁷ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, xix.24, ed. by Bernard Dombart and Alfons Kalb (CCCL, 48, p. 400).

polities. In particular, the virtuous king loves his people and he is loved by them in turn. John of Salisbury in the mid-twelfth century offered a quintessential account of how the love that obtains between the ruler and his subjects has the effect of creating a singularity of mind, ‘one perfect and great harmony out of pursuits that appear discordant.[...] Above all, the favor and love of subjects, which is produced by divine favor, is the best instrument of all governance. And yet love without respect is not advantageous because the people will retreat into illegalities once the stimulus of justice ceases.’⁸ Likewise, Dante’s *De monarchia* claims that ‘in him in whom rightly ordered love can be found to the greatest degree can justice be found at its most powerful; such a one is the monarch [...]. Charity [...] seeks God and man and, in consequence, seeks man’s good.’⁹ According to the standard trope, then, the ‘love’ that obtains in political order stands in relation to God and betokens, in particular, just rule; it correlates to religious and moral rectitude.

I contend that some later medieval theorists transformed their understanding of the bond of love, however, in accordance with the more earthly purposes they ascribed to government. Love became shorthand for a balanced equilibrium between crown and community, according to which the king assured and protected the wealth held by the people, and provided conditions for its enhancement whenever possible, while his subjects in turn obeyed the ruler and supported his policies. Of course, the regulative ideal of mutual love was not always — indeed, was not often — attained, with the result that discord and discontent occurred. In particular, given the elevation of the promotion of material well-being to a central goal of government, kings who overstepped their fiscal boundaries by imposing taxes or other forms of revenue generation that exceeded custom or law risked incurring the loss of their subjects’ love. The reasons and remedies for such loss of love became a major theme of later medieval writings about the nature and function of royal government. In broad outline,

⁸ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, iv.8, ed. by Katharine S. B. Keats-Rohan (CCCM, 118, p. 260–61): ‘caritatis operibus unam faciat perfectam et maximam armoniam [...]. Utique gratia et amor subditorum, quam divina producit gratia, optimum instrumentum est omnia gerendorum, sed et amor sine disciplina non proficit, quia cessante iustitiae stimulo populus se in illicita resoluit.’ All translations mine unless noted otherwise.

⁹ *The Monarchia Controversy*, trans. by Anthony K. Cassell (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), p. 121; ‘Cui ergo maxime recta dilectio inesse potest, potissimum locum in illo poteste habere iustitia; huiusmodi est Monarchia [...] karitas vero [...] querit Deum et hominem, et per consequens bonum hominis’: Dante Alighieri, *De monarchia*, I.xi.13–14, ed. and trans. by Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 18.

rulers were counselled that prosperity occasioned love and cushioned them from the displeasure and disobedience of their people. Consequently, economic stewardship and prudent management formed the cornerstones of loving concord between kings and subjects: the king who manages his own affairs so as to restrain his hand from the goods of his subjects deserves love. The king who fails to defend (indeed, undermines) the economic rights of those under his dominion renounces his claim on their affection. Indeed, the latter sort of ruler can reasonably expect opposition to his regime.

Before I develop and defend these claims in greater detail, let me emphasize why I take them to be historically plausible. The fourteenth century, on which I shall concentrate, witnessed tremendous political upheaval. In particular, English and French kings and their minions (to whom so much political advice writing was directed) were the direct targets of civil resistance and political rebellion — and not just by ambitious members of rival noble dynasties. Untitled and untutored urban dwellers and rural rustics organized to express their dissent toward royal policies (and often toward the clerical hierarchy that supported the crown as well). The Jacquerie in France (1356) and John Ball's Rebellion (1381) in England afford but the best-known instances of widespread popular unrest that threatened the peace and stability of the Western European monarchies. Accountability was determined at the public point of a pitchfork rather than in the privacy of the ballot box. And kings indeed felt the pressure that such uprisings were capable of exerting. In turn, the unsettled times made for especially trenchant political commentary. Why were peasants and burghers revolting? What might be done to deter discontent? The iconic view of medieval society as rigidly organized according to 'the three orders' (those who fight, those who pray, those who work) or hierarchically arranged along the lines of human anatomy (the lower limbs and organs submitting to the rule of head or heart) had long since been undermined or replaced — if indeed it ever described a reality rather than depicting an unattainable aspiration.¹⁰ The so-called 'commercial revolution' that swept through Europe after 1100 radically altered social values as well as economic practices among all strata of society. As early as the twelfth century, political thinkers began to examine seriously the role of government — especially the king and his officials — as the primary economic steward of the country, alongside military, judicial, and sacral functions. By around 1300, Giles of Rome, the author of the 'best-selling' medieval advice book for rulers, *De regimine principum*, could

¹⁰ See Cary J. Nederman, 'Body Politics: The Diversification of Organic Metaphors in the Later Middle Ages', *Pensiero politico medievale*, 2 (2004), 59–87.

insist uncontroversially upon the maintenance and enhancement of prosperity among the central responsibilities of the king. Indeed, for Giles, the other duties of the monarch — to uphold law and virtue — are only possible once preservation of wealth is assured.¹¹ To describe the later Middle Ages as an era of economic nationalism — in theory as well as in practice — does not seem at all implausible.¹²

I believe that later medieval authors took cognizance of these changing circumstances.¹³ I illustrate this claim by examining in detail two treatises which, on the one hand, employ the standard language of princely virtue and communal love but which also import economically oriented conceptions of governance that license public resistance. First, I examine a theory formulated in England of how the absence of certain royal virtues sets the limits of the love of a people toward its ruler and permits public opposition to his reign. This is found in the two versions of the *Speculum regis Edwardi III*, dated to 1331 and 1332 respectively, and written in Latin by William of Pagula, an Oxford-schooled parish priest.¹⁴ Second, I consider an anonymous French vernacular treatise composed in 1347, *L'estat et le gouvernement comme les princes et seigneurs se doivent gouverner* (hereafter *L'estat et le gouvernement*), which was translated into English during the following century with the title *The III Consideracions Right Necesserie to the Good Governaunce of a Prince*.¹⁵ This tract presents a quite straightforward economic

¹¹ John F. McGovern, 'The Rise of New Economic Attitudes — Economic Humanism, Economic Nationalism — during the Later Middle Ages and Renaissance, A.D. 1200–1500', *Traditio*, 26 (1970), 217–54 (p. 231).

¹² See Diana Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 117–25; also Cary J. Nederman, 'Economic Nationalism and the "Spirit of Capitalism": Civic Collectivism and National Wealth in the Thought of John Fortescue', *History of Political Thought*, 26 (2005), 266–83.

¹³ Sverre Bagge, 'Kirken, bøndene og motstandsretten i Norge i middelalderen', *Historisk tidsskrift*, 84 (2005), 385–410, has detected a similar interest in the material conditions of the poor in Scandinavia at about the same time.

¹⁴ I have translated both versions in *Political Thought in Early Fourteenth-Century England: Treatises by Walter of Milemete, William of Pagula, and William of Ockham* (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2002), based on the Latin text, mistakenly attributed to Simon Islip, published by Joseph Moisant, *De speculo regis Edwardi III* (Paris: Picard, 1891); for full information about the authorship of the treatise, see my *Political Thought in Early Fourteenth Century England*, pp. 65–68.

¹⁵ The French original remains in manuscript. The Middle English translation has been edited by Jean-Philippe Genet in *Four English Political Tracts of the Later Middle Ages* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977), pp. 174–219; Genet consulted not only the English manuscripts

theory of popular political behaviour: the people love the king and embraces his laws when his virtues shine forth by managing his own holdings and the realm in general with fiscal good sense. I treat these works as illustrative of a larger shift in intellectual and discursive frames that emerged during the later Middle Ages. Similar examples might be evinced, such as Christine de Pizan's *Livre du corps de policie* (1405; translated into English during the fifteenth century), which discusses royal love in like fashion.¹⁶ My point is that princely virtues are at least in some cases being reconfigured to match the economic realities and the political mood of late-medieval Western Europe — a shift that, while subtle, is unmistakable and paves the way for more overtly economic theories of government that characterize early-modern thought.

II. '*Speculum regis Edwardi III*'

One of the most extensive later medieval analyses of the relationship between the ruler and the economic condition of his realm may be found in two seldom-examined treatises, whose authorship was once uncertain but is now safely ascribed to the English theologian, canonist, and parish priest William of Pagula. These twin tracts, commonly known by the collective title *Speculum regis Edwardi III*, seem to have been composed in 1331 and 1332. Although, for purposes of simplicity, I will treat the two texts as a single unit, it should be noted that the second recension is not simply a revision of the first. Rather, the former constitutes an entirely new treatise which restates essentially the same grievances as its predecessor, but develops its case in the larger context of royal administrative and fiscal practices. Yet in both versions, the argument is entirely directed to the hardships endured by the peasant population of the realm, that vast majority who lacked a literate political voice loud enough to be heard among magnates and royal officials. A parish vicar for much of his career,¹⁷ William was highly qualified to recount the complaints of the humblest segments of English society and to record

but also the two extant French manuscripts (one partial). When the English version departs from its French exemplar, Genet gives the French in his notes. My modern English translation in the present paper is based on the Genet edition of the English along with the French departures.

¹⁶ Christine de Pizan, *Livre du corps de policie*, iii.3, ed. by Angus J. Kennedy (Paris: Champion, 1998), p. 94.

¹⁷ For William's biography, see Leonard E. Boyle, 'The *Oculus Sacerdotis* and Some Other Works of William of Pagula', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, ser. 5, 5 (1955), 81–110.

the level of displeasure with and resistance to the Crown. And there is no question that William's sympathy lay with the grievances that he observes and reports.

Because William affects the style of a 'mirror of princes' tract, he couches his warning about the economic depredations of the English peasantry caused by royal policy in language that seems wholly conventional on first glance. The first recension (A) commences with a plea for Edward III to act justly in order 'to serve the honor of God and the utility of the kingdom, and also in order to acquire the love of the people'.¹⁸ In William's view, love and justice are of a single piece: the just king imitates divine justice and hence is 'loved by God', as a consequence of which 'all men who follow you will call you a just man; they will venerate and love you'.¹⁹ The second recension (B) opens with a more urgent overtone: as a mortal being, the king (like any human) must be mindful that the moment of his death impends and that the failure to redress evils in his kingdom immediately may impact the state of his soul. At the same time, Edward III is reminded that the English populace welcomed his presence 'humbly [...] graciously [...] devoutly [...] joyously' and 'stood by you and aided you in everything you did against your rebels'.²⁰ By implication, he owes his present position to the love of his people and his future status to the judgement of God. These are tropes familiar to any knowledgeable reader of princely advice books: the king is simultaneously beholden both to God and to his people, and his virtue ensures his fidelity to both of his constituencies.

Unlike most medieval mirrors, however, William's treatise specifies a concrete and clear action on the part of the king that casts in doubt his virtue and thus his place in the nexus of love. The target of William's wrath in the *Speculum regis Edwardi III* is the practice of royal purveyance, the alleged prerogative of the king to provide for his household and troops when touring the realm by confiscating local goods or purchasing them at a fixed, non-negotiable price. Beginning around 1300, purveyance gradually came to be employed by the English Crown as a form

¹⁸ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 1: 'discrecius de ea poteria ordinare ad honorem Dei et utilitatem regni, et etiam ad amorem populi adquirendum.' The translation may be found in Nederman, *Political Thought in Early Fourteenth-Century England*, p. 73. References to the Latin text refer to the Recension (A or B) and section number, followed by the page in my English version.

¹⁹ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 1, pp. 73–74: 'amabis enim Deum, [...] omnes homines appellabunt te virum justum quem sequentur, venerabuntur et diligunt.'

²⁰ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 1, p. 106: 'humiliter [...] graciose [...] devote [...] letantur [...] in omnibus factis tuis contra rebelles tuos, tecum astitit et iuvavit.'

of arbitrary indirect taxation.²¹ In order to meet the growing costs of royal military activity costs, the king's array was sent into the countryside, where it could lay claim to provisions at a cheap rate or even for free. The consequences of purveyance were unequally distributed. It was often the moveable goods, and occasionally the labour power, of the peasantry that were appropriated by royal agents in their forays into rural villages. Purveyance struck mainly at the poorest of the crown's subjects. Although there is some question about whether William's attack on purveyance accurately reflects practices current in the early 1330s,²² the issue at hand is not the historical facticity of the grievances he expresses. Rather, the present interest in the *Speculum regis Edwardi III* derives from the theoretical force of his argument that the royal use of purveyance constitutes an injustice, namely, theft — that is, a form of coercion — since the person subject to the exaction has no choice in the matter.

In order to defend the proposition that the king and his servants are in effect guilty of robbery, William repeatedly and adamantly privileges volition. He begins with an idea, formulated in a largely conventional manner, that each person 'is to be the lord (*dominus*) of his things, so that nothing is seized from his goods against his will'.²³ *Dominium* connotes an exclusive realm of power over one's property with which no other individual may rightfully interfere. 'In this world', William declares, 'men ought to be free to do for themselves and theirs, according to their will'.²⁴ Robbery is an infringement of this basic liberty, since lordship entails the freedom to do as one wishes with what one legitimately possesses. Hence, William asserts it as a universal and binding standard of conduct that 'no goods should be seized against the will of their lords to whom they belong'.²⁵ For anyone (even the king) to violate this constitutes an unjust act;²⁶ unlike other medieval authors,

²¹ For the historical background, see Nederman, *Political Thought in Early Fourteenth-Century England*, pp. 64–65.

²² This issue is taken up by Cary J. Nederman and Cynthia J. Neville, 'The Origins of the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*', *Studi medievali*, ser. 3, 38 (1997), 317–29.

²³ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 16, p. 118: 'quilibet sit dominus rerum suarum, ut sic de bonis suis nihil capiatur contra voluntatem suam.'

²⁴ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 5, p. 79: 'homines in hoc mundo ubi debent esse homines liberi ad faciendum de se et suis, secundum suam voluntatem.'

²⁵ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 8, p. 111: 'nihil capiatur contra voluntatem dominorum quorum sunt bona.'

²⁶ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 4, pp. 131–32.

who held that in times of extreme necessity, rulers may take the good of subjects without permission, William never makes such a concession.

Thus, the supposed 'privilege' of purveyance inherently endangers the central royal virtue of justice. 'How can there be justice or equity these days', William asks, 'when something is bought for a lower price than the seller wishes to receive for it and when consent is constrained, inasmuch as buying and selling arise from the law of nations (*ius gentium*)? For where there is no consent, there is not sale but extortion, not justice but seizure, not equity but falsehood and iniquity.'²⁷ Likewise, should an individual not wish to sell her goods at all, William asserts that no political privilege can override or cancel that will, even if an adequate price is paid. William narrates a (possibly apocryphal) story about a 'poor woman' from whom a royal servant forcibly purchases a hen, the eggs from which the woman needs to sustain herself and her offspring. Not only is she paid a pittance for her hen, but she had no wish to sell the bird at any price—even an inflated one.²⁸ It is as much an act of injustice for the king's minions to demand the purchase of an item at a 'fair' price as at one below the market level. When the liberty to sell or not as one sees fit is curtailed, the consequence is the violation of one's property rights: objects are in effect taken by force, without the will or approval of their rightful owners.

Both recensions of the *Speculum regis Edwardi III* argue that the king should dispense with purveyance and other exactions by which he maintains himself and his household at the expense of the poor. William states his case through moral and religious language that would have been unexceptional; the king is warned that the commission of evil endangers his salvation; and theft, which is coextensive with purveyance, is precisely the sort of evil about which the king ought to worry.²⁹ Indeed, what makes purveyance especially dangerous to the health of the king's soul is that it involves stealing from the poor — whom the ruler should be especially concerned to protect³⁰ — in order to extend his own holdings, which God has already multiplied many-fold. The king therefore proves

²⁷ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 1, p. 74: 'Sed que est illa justicia vel equitas his diebus, emere res aliquas pro minori precio quam venditor velit eas dare, sum empeio et vendicio sunt de jure gentium, et conruntur consensus? Non enim est ibi consensus, non vendicio set extorcio, non justicia sed rapina, nulla equitas sed falsitas et iniquitas.'

²⁸ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 43, p. 131.

²⁹ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 6–7, pp. 79–81.

³⁰ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 31, pp. 126–27.

himself ungrateful to God and unworthy of salvation.³¹ William recurrently invokes the frailty of all human life, including the king's; since no one can predict with certainty when death will occur, every person should remain in a constant state of repentance.³² Otherwise, should death transpire unexpectedly, damnation and eternal punishment are the prospects for the ruler who has not corrected his evils toward his poverty-stricken subjects. The message is clear enough: 'You should wish to be loved by God and by the people, and also to be honored', conditions requiring that 'those serving you take nothing against the will of the sellers'.³³ A ruler whose actions stand opposed to a living bond endanger the state of their souls for mere passing material comfort.

In turn, moral and theological strictures in the *Speculum regis Edwardi III* are supplemented by recognition of the impact of the king's economic management upon the economic well-being of subjects. William thus highlights the interdependence of moral categories (justice and piety) and government fiscal policy. It is materially self-destructive, as well as spiritually dangerous, for Edward III to continue to follow policies that seriously impoverish his subjects. The welfare of the head of the realm stands in an inextricable reciprocal relation to the temporal good of the rest of the communal body. One major consequence of the prises is interference with the labourers' cultivation of their own lands. This occurs in two ways. First, the confiscation of victuals cuts into supplies required for planting future harvests. As William explains, the king's agents 'seize bread, beer, fowls, cocks, beans, oats, and many other things, for which practically nothing is paid; and because of extortions of this kind, many poor people will not have what they need to sow their fields'.³⁴ As a result, arable land goes fallow. Second, enforced labour contracts — for little or no payment — prevent peasants from working their own lands. Recounting his own experiences in the Windsor Forest region, William tells of officials who ordered into service the goods and labour of the neighbourhood farmers, promising (but failing) to compensate them for their work: 'On account of this diabolical deed, the lands of the poor were not cultivated, not planted, and the poor did not have any [surplus] goods by which

³¹ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 30, p. 126.

³² *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 1–3, pp. 103–08.

³³ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 2, p. 75: 'velis a Deo et a populo diligi, et etiam honorari, bonum et utile videtur quoad servientes tui nichil caperent contra voluntatem venditorum.'

³⁴ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 9, p. 82: 'capiunt panem, cervisiam, aueas, gallinas, fabas, avenas, et multa alia, pro quibus quasi nichil solvitur; et propter huiusmodi extorsiones, multi paupers non habebunt unde possunt terras suas seminare.'

they were able to sustain burdens of this sort.³⁵ In William's view, therefore, purveyance strains rural resources to the point at which agricultural production begins to decline.

The *Speculum regis Edwardi III* also narrates how these royal exactions have sometimes forced subjects to the brink of penury.

A poor man comes to the market with one ox at a price of one mark, since he has to pay one mark on a certain day or lose his land. His ox is seized by your ministers and nothing is paid to him, on account of which he loses his land, because he did not pay his debt on the day appointed. Some men, then, whose sheep and oxen are taken do not pay their debts to their creditors on the appointed day, as a result of which they incur perjury and excommunication and are reputed to be dishonest, and many evils happen on account of these seizures.³⁶

Time and again, William observes, purveyance is directly to blame for the impoverishment and eventual starvation of subjects.³⁷ By indifference to the consequences of his servants' actions, Edward III is implicated in the 'murder' of his people: 'You, through your ministers, through all sorts of deeds done by them, take away from your subjects bread, beer, wheat, oats, and other innumerable things, on account of which many die.'³⁸ Little wonder that William elsewhere describes the king's conduct as, in effect, 'making war' on the inhabitants of his own realm.³⁹ It remains entirely conjectural whether or not this is simply hyperbole. By acting in such an uncharitable manner toward his subjects, the ruler demonstrates the absence of his virtue and the breakdown of the bonds that tie him to God and his kingdom.

³⁵ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 15, p. 87: 'Et propter huiusmodi facta diabolica, terre pauperum non coluntur, nec seminautur, nec habent paupers aliqua bona per que possunt huiusmodi onera sustinere.'

³⁶ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 14, p. 86: 'Venit unus pauper ad nundinas cum uno bove, precii unus marce, et debet unam marcam solvere ad certum diem sub amissione terre sue. Bos suus capitur a ministeris tuis et nichil sibi solvitur, propter quod terram suam amittit quia non solvit debitum suum ad diem fixum. Aliqui etiam, quorum oves et boves capiuntur non solvunt debita sua creditoribus suis, ad diem certum, propter quod incurrunt perjurium, excommunicationem, et reputantur falsi homines, et multa mala accident propter huiusmodi captiones.'

³⁷ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 3, pp. 75–77; A 37, p. 97; B 43, p. 131.

³⁸ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 16, pp. 87–88: 'Sed tu, per ministros tuos, per multimodes commissiones eis factas, aufers a subditis tuis panem, cerviciam, avenum, fenum, et alia innumerabilia propter que multi moriuntur.'

³⁹ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 37, p. 128.

By contrast, William offers the suggestion that a loving king will be rewarded materially by adoring subjects. There is, William says, historical precedent for such spontaneous popular generosity: 'In the time of the last King Henry [III], all sorts of food, wheat, oats, and all necessities were carried to his gate, since he himself seized nothing against the will of the sellers, since he bought and paid as one of the people.'⁴⁰ While the author's recounting of Henry III's reign as peaceful and amicable is surely a distortion, historical accuracy is entirely irrelevant to the moral point of the example. The *Speculum regis Edwardi III* strives to convey the lesson that the king who does right by his people also does well for himself. The principle of political reciprocity, expressed in terms of mutual love between king and people, is not only a bridle on royal abuse of power but also a spur to fiscal self-restraint. Ultimately, the ruler who demands less of the fruits of his subjects' labour will be wealthier and safer than one who is constantly grasping at their goods.

To demand goods and services with little or no payment from already impoverished subjects is, to William's mind, wholly self-defeating for the ruler. The *Speculum regis Edwardi III* advises its addressee that, should he persist in his oppressive policies, 'you will not be king in your land, nor will you find food and drink and other things necessary for you.'⁴¹ William warns of a twofold threat to the king: he will encounter political resistance to his authority as well as circumvention of his economic demands. Rural denizens achieve the latter mainly by stealth. When villagers hear of the approach of the royal entourage, 'at once on account of fear they hide fowls, roosters and other goods, or they get rid of them, or they consume them by eating and drinking, lest they lose them upon [the king's] arrival.'⁴² Thus, the royal household does not succeed in supplying its needs in any case and its mission fails.

The threat of rural social unrest and insurrection is, according to William, even more dangerous to the continued authority of the ruler. As the *Speculum regis Edwardi III* says to the king:

⁴⁰ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 39, p. 98: 'Nam tempore Regis Henrici ultimi, omnimoda victulia, fenum, evena, et omnia necessaria portabantur ad portam suam, quia ipse nichil capiebat contra voluntatem venditorum quia emit et solvit sicut unus de populo.' See also B 6, p. 110.

⁴¹ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 9, p. 111: 'tu non eris rex in terra tua, nec invenies esculenta et poculenta et alia tibi necessaria.'

⁴² *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 6, p. 109: 'cum aliquid audiunt de tuo adventu tristantur, et statim pre timore abscondunt aueas, gallinas et certa bona; vel alienant, seu in esculentis et poculentis consumunt, ne ea amittant in tuo adventu.'

Carefully consider the honor paid to you by the men of this land [...]. Do not forget how the English people made you king. Therefore, be like one of them [...] I advise that you should procure food and drink and other things necessary to you just like one of the people (*sicut unus de populo*).⁴³

By the last phrase, presumably, William means paying full value for victuals and buying them consensually. To behave in this way is to build a reciprocal bond of love between ruler and people, one which ensures the political stability and tranquillity of the realm and the throne:

If, therefore, you wish to save your kingdom for yourself and your son, it ought to be that you make yourself loved by the people, but you will never be loved by the people as long as you wish to seize the things of others at a price lower than the seller wishes to receive for them.⁴⁴

William warns Edward that, if he continues to employ purveyance, 'many evils may happen to you and your kingdom', as a result of which the king and his officials 'will perish'.⁴⁵ The *Speculum regis Edwardi III* likens the position of the unloved king within the kingdom to that of a head which cannot lead its own body: 'Your people [...] are not of one mind with you, although they seem to be of one body with you; and indeed, if they had a leader, they would rise up against you, just as they did against your father. Then in truth you would not have a multitude of people with you.'⁴⁶ Kings who 'have extended their hand towards the goods and income of others' find that 'the people rise up against them and they are almost wiped from the earth. And therefore be warned, and heed, lest you forget what happened to your father.'⁴⁷ The persistent references to the

⁴³ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 16, p. 118: 'intime cogitares honorem tibi impensum ad hominibus huius terre [...] non tradas oblivioni qualiter gens anglicana constituerunt te regem; esto ergo quasi unus ex ipsis [...]. Consulo ergo, ut emas esculenta et poculenta et certa tibi necessaria, sicut unus de populo'; cf. B 1, p. 106.

⁴⁴ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 34, p. 95: 'Si ergo veils conservare regnum tuum tibi, et filio tuo, oportet quod facias te diligi a populo, sed nunquam diligeris a populo, dummodo capere volueris res aliquas, leviori precio, qua, venditor velit eas dare.'

⁴⁵ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 10, p. 83: 'multa mala tibi et regno suo evenient [...] tu et illi peribitis.'

⁴⁶ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, A 11, pp. 83–84: 'populo tuo [...] tecum non sunt mente, licet tecum videantur corpore, et forte, si caput aliud haberent insurgerent contra te, sicut contra patrem tuum fecerunt, et sicut in veritatem non haberes tecum aliquam populi multitudinem.'

⁴⁷ *De speculo regis Edwardi III*, B 38, p. 129: 'reges extenderunt manus suas ad res et redditus aliorum [...] insurrexit populus contra eos, et nomina eorum de terra penitus deleverunt. Ed ideo cave tibi, et adverte ne tradas oblivioni quid accidit patri tuo.'

unfortunate Edward II are painful reminders that recent precedent exists for the popular discontent foreseen by William. This need not be interpreted as a threat. Rather, William seems to intend such remarks as a kind of empirical generalization: rulers who willfully break the bond of love with their people by pursuing policies that are economically detrimental and manifestly unjust find themselves confronted with rebellious subjects. Kings who govern their realm in a manner consonant with the earthly well-being of their subjects are obeyed and loved in turn.

III. 'L'estat et le gouvernement comme les princes et seigneurs se doivent gouverner'

William of Pagula employed the language of love in order to achieve an overt and pressing goal: the prevention of the impoverishment of rural denizens and the depopulation of the English countryside. The unapologetically polemical intent of his treatise may leave readers with the impression of a certain lack of systematic and reflective use of the language of princely virtue that had been refined in the past. The author of the French tract *L'estat et le gouvernement*, by contrast, seems to be more conventional in the use of moral discourse. This is unsurprising, given that the book's introductory poem explains that its composition was commanded in 1347 by 'un prince de royal noblesse' in order to gather together knowledge and wisdom concerning 'l'estat et le gouvernement de seigneurie temporelle'.⁴⁸ The work thus has a courtly origin that surely demanded greater discretion in the use of invective and moral condemnation than William employed. Yet the circumspection found in *L'estat et le gouvernement* does not mean the absence of a critical edge similar in purpose to the *Speculum regis Edwardi III*. The French author enumerates royal virtues, to be sure, but the analysis refers mainly to points of princely fiscal management and administration rather than to moral or religious generalizations. At the same time, the tract grounds the virtues explicitly in the bonds of 'charity' and 'love' that unite a ruler with both God and his people. In sum, there are noticeable and significant thematic similarities between two writings conceived and composed in otherwise different contexts — a fact that suggests to me how commonplace it had become by the middle of the fourteenth

⁴⁸ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, in *Four English Political Tracts of the Later Middle Ages*, p. 210. For some speculation about the authorship of the *L'estat et le gouvernement comme les princes et seigneurs se doivent gouverner*, see *ibid.*, pp. 177–78.

century to filter concerns about the economic well-being of a kingdom through the customary categories of princely virtue.

The structure of *L'estat et le gouvernement* bears a general resemblance to the famous mirror of Giles; it is organized into three parts (hence, the title *The III Consideracions Right Necesserye to the Good Governaunce of a Prince* given to the fifteenth-century English translation), around the themes of self-governance, household stewardship, and political dominion. But where Giles organized his *De regimine principum* around a Christianized Aristotelian conception of 'felicity', the French author cautions his noble reader to recollect that in his life as in his death, there is no fundamental difference: 'the princes and other great lords have no greater assurance of health and long life than have poor subjects', which ought to act as a call to that humility without which 'no man may attain to salvation nor be loved by God'.⁴⁹ Just as William warns King Edward to take care lest in his pride he pretends to an immortality that he does not possess, so the treatise counsels that a humble outlook leads the powerful to 'charity, which is the sovereign of all virtues. For charity is the true love of God and likewise of His creatures.' Love of God and love of subjects are so conjoined in good governance that the pious and virtuous prince cannot help but rule well.⁵⁰ The treatise later emphasizes this point even more unmistakably, referring to 'two wells or two fountains' from which spring all the benefits of virtuous rule:

The first fountain is the love of God, the other is love of the people subject to him [the prince]. And if he keeps to the two fountains, which would be right, fair and good, he shall have peace and good governance in his land. And these two fountains are permanently associated, for he who loves God loves his people. And he who loves the people of God loves God and God loves him. So the prince ought especially and singularly to take heed that he does nothing against the commandment of God, nor anything against reason, to the grief and prejudice of his people so as to give them cause to hate him and curse him.⁵¹

Love constitutes both a check on and a spur to the ruler. On the one hand, the prince (a term that the treatise employs generically to include not just kings but all manner of powerful lords) who acts within the bounds of love is rewarded with popular submission and support. On the other hand, breaking the bond of love leads directly to public disapprobation. The meaning of 'love' in this passage

⁴⁹ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, p. 181.

⁵⁰ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, pp. 181–82.

⁵¹ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, p. 199.

might seem sufficiently vague that one could understand it to designate a purely spiritual phenomenon, leaving the consequences of misrule to be dealt with entirely in the afterlife by the judgement of God upon a prince's soul. While this reading comports with the more traditional conception of princely virtue as primarily moral and theological in bearing, the author of *L'état et le gouvernement* in fact focuses almost entirely on the earthly consequences of a loving relationship between God, ruler, and people.

The temporal orientation of the treatise may be deduced, first of all, from the relative weight placed on the three factors necessary for good government. The discussion of the prince's own condition, built upon a reminder of his humility and mortality, is by far the briefest in the work. The ruler who 'knows himself' realizes the precious and precarious predicament of human life, and submits to his fate accordingly by conducting himself mildly; personal virtues are otherwise not addressed.⁵² The second and third sections of the book, by contrast, are longer and more detailed, offering advice primarily concerning the management of the prince's realm so as to assure his subjects of their physical well-being. Indeed, awareness of the likely complaints that a populace might make against their leader and planning in advance how to appease them seem to constitute the main touchstones of a properly administered territory.

The second part of *L'état et le gouvernement* addresses the ruler's stewardship over his own properties and revenues. The author asserts that there are, in turn, three aspects ('ordinances') of manorial management as the subject pertains to public administration: the first is the maintenance of the ruler and his family, the second is charitable donation, and the third is saving for unforeseen future needs. In each case, the proper use to be made of the prince's own goods is clearly circumscribed, according to the treatise, by the material welfare of the subjects consistent with his love of them. Thus, when providing for the needs of his immediate household, the greatest danger is the application of superior authority to treat subjects inequitably and to take income in excess of what is owed. For this reason, 'among lords, above all other things, it should be seen and well considered that officers take nothing of the goods of subjects other than at a just and mutually agreed price and without long withholding or delay of payment, for it is an entirely good and great honor to every lord when he pays truly and well what he spends and when he does not nourish himself at the expense of others.'⁵³

⁵² *L'état et le gouvernement*, pp. 182–83.

⁵³ *L'état et le gouvernement*, p. 184.

Likewise, 'great blame, hatred of God, great sin, and the malediction of the people' attaches itself to lords 'who commit injury against others'.⁵⁴ Concentration on the impact of domain management upon the well-being of subjects takes up almost the entire discussion of the management of the prince's household; divine command, along with natural and civil law, are invoked to protect subjects against their lords. The prince who cannot administer his estates so as to conserve the rightful income of their residents is ill-equipped to govern the political community.

In a similar fashion, the ruler is advised to use a portion of his incomes on 'deeds of charity'. Typically, of course, this counsel encompassed almsgiving, an act 'which purchases the grace of God and the love of the people'.⁵⁵ Moreover, the prince should be liberal in the conferral of gifts upon the deserving among his servants and subjects, though taking care not to be profligate in his liberality lest he spend beyond his means. The magnification of public repute is the goal toward which the prince should strive:

[I]t is entirely necessary that the prince clearly consider himself and his deeds, by which he is held wise and sagacious, respected and honored, praised and loved by his subjects, and feared by his enemies and those envious of him, who are both ready and happy to lay in wait and plot against the prince is they can take any occasion or can find the time at which the prince neither holds nor is beheld reputable for wisdom and sagacity.⁵⁶

This remarkable statement suggests the tenuous grasp that a ruler has on his office and hints darkly at the need for constant preparation against courtly intrigues — a concern that we might associate with Machiavelli, but which was in fact already widely disseminated by advice-books following in the wake of the popular *Secretum secretorum*, which circulated as a genuine work by Aristotle during the later Middle Ages.⁵⁷ The prince's 'good works' do not purely and simply serve the goal of his salvation. Instead, they ensure a sufficient measure of public support (love) that the ruler can maintain his grip upon his position. The unmistakable lesson is that he who does good for his people does well for himself — precisely the reciprocal and interdependent nature of the loving bond between ruler and ruled.

⁵⁴ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, pp. 184–85.

⁵⁵ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, p. 185.

⁵⁶ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, p. 186.

⁵⁷ On the *Secretum secretorum* and its medieval dissemination, see Steven J. Williams, *The Secret of Secrets: The Scholarly Career of a Pseudo-Aristotelian Text in the Latin Middle Ages* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

The third and final element of competent household management requires the prince to make provision for future contingencies by safeguarding and building a treasury. The author of *L'estat et le gouvernement* insists that this should not be confused with avarice. Rather, the king who judiciously saves some of his revenues 'for the safeguarding of himself, his lands and his subjects and for other things useful and appropriate' in fact performs a great good for his subjects, since he is able to provision an army against military threats 'without taking or encroaching upon the goods of the poor and of his subjects forcibly and against their will'. Indeed, it is predicted that the ruler's people will voluntarily aid him in his armed exploits for defence of his territory and position if he uses his own resources and refrains from burdening his subjects.⁵⁸ Again, the intent of the advice is entirely practical: a prince who accumulates a substantial treasury 'shall be held to be a good prince and he shall be loved and respected by all his subjects, and feared and dreaded by others. And thus none of his enemies shall suffice in power to move greatly against him.'⁵⁹ Even if someone were so foolhardy as to oppose the ruler, the love of subjects, accorded to him precisely on account of his concern for their economic welfare, forms an adequate assurance of his victory against his adversaries or enemies. (It is exactly this advice, of course, that Machiavelli would ridicule in *Il principe*.)

The most extensive of the three parts of *L'estat et le gouvernement* is what might be termed the 'political' section, that is, the principles according to which the ruler directly governs 'his realm, his land, and his subjects', to which the initial considerations are in some ways preparatory.⁶⁰ This is the highest calling of all lords, and its guiding precept is, once more, love — the love of God and the love of the people. And what is the primary token of a prince who demonstrably stands in such a bond of love? The author states, 'The lord should in no way burden the people nor forage among his people to make them barren of such things as they must have to live upon, for he is not a good keeper who destroys the thing that he is supposed to guard.'⁶¹ This basic tenet — that the shepherd should not fleece the flock — runs throughout the discussion of lordly duties: the ruled do not exist for the sake of their ruler, but the ruler for the sake of the ruled; and the prince ought, in imitation of the Supreme Lord, to prepare to sacrifice himself to save his

⁵⁸ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, p. 187.

⁵⁹ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, p. 188.

⁶⁰ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, p. 188.

⁶¹ *L'estat et le gouvernement*, p. 190.

people.⁶² These are well-established teachings, of course, but they are infused with the quite concrete definition that the bond is violated when the lord engages in 'taking from them [viz., the people] what they should have to live upon', the goods upon which their sustenance depends.⁶³

With these general prefatory remarks in mind, the text then turns to the four specific virtues required for good governance by the prince, which are specified as wisdom, providence, justice, and mercy. Each of these receives a brief definition and quite thorough illustration and application — another indication of the practical mindset of the author. Wisdom is determined to be a gift from God, deriving from fear of his power that gives rise to love of the divine.⁶⁴ Wisdom is displayed when the ruler draws to his court wise counsellors and when he refrains from frivolous recreations.⁶⁵ By providence is meant the ability to execute those actions that are determined to be in accordance with wisdom.⁶⁶ The primary sign of the provident ruler is the careful selection of loyal and virtuous advisors who will speak the truth and disdain flattery.⁶⁷ Justice is defined in accordance with the Roman legal dictum of a fixed will to give to each what is due as his right.⁶⁸ Justice receives more complete attention than any other royal virtue in *L'état et le gouvernement*, suggesting that for the author it is the quintessential quality of political command. The just prince in particular eschews his own 'profit' in preference for his 'love especially and principally [of] the common profit of the people and of subjects'.⁶⁹ This or similar phrasing is employed repeatedly throughout the discussion of justice: 'love' of common profit outweighs all self-regard for the just ruler, whereas the unjust ruler or tyrant places his own will or pleasure before all else. The point is not per se a novel one; it follows the language one usually finds in standard medieval mirrors and political treatises.⁷⁰ But the

⁶² *L'état et le gouvernement*, pp. 189 and 190.

⁶³ *L'état et le gouvernement*, p. 189.

⁶⁴ *L'état et le gouvernement*, p. 191.

⁶⁵ *L'état et le gouvernement*, pp. 192–93.

⁶⁶ *L'état et le gouvernement*, pp. 193–94.

⁶⁷ *L'état et le gouvernement*, pp. 194–95.

⁶⁸ *L'état et le gouvernement*, p. 196.

⁶⁹ *L'état et le gouvernement*, p. 197.

⁷⁰ See Cary J. Nederman, 'Imperfect Regimes in the Christian Political Thought of Medieval Europe: From the Fathers to the Fourteenth Century', *Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph*, 57 (2004), 525–51.

primary specific example given of the conduct of the tyrant at present is economic oppression: he 'intends nothing for the honorable wealth and profit of his land, but instead his singular and delightful pleasure is to be acquainted with strangers and not to love his subjects, to take riches and money, causing extortions and evils to his subjects'.⁷¹ The unjust ruler removes the goods of his people, whether into his own coffers or those of his (foreign) friends; the subjects lose those possessions required for their survival. Finally, mercy seems to be regarded as an offshoot of or supplement to justice. Mercy is that virtue which tempers the prince's desire to restore to each his due, especially in cases where he himself is the person against whom trespass has been made. The merciful ruler is more prepared to bestow forgiveness upon those who do injury to him than those who do harm to his people, and he thus earns the favour of those in his care, who may rest assured that he will seek their benefit before his own.⁷²

One feature consistent across the accounts given of each of the princely virtues is the drawing of a direct connection between the absence of good qualities and the resulting political instability and revolt. The author of *L'état et le gouvernement* appears to be conveying a not-entirely veiled threat: vicious rulers risk the ruin of their own dominion. Hence, a prince who lacks wisdom (the biblical Roboam is cited) may expect the people to refuse obedience to him and to place themselves in the hands of another governor.⁷³ An improvident ruler trusts foreign counsellors likely to be 'rebels'.⁷⁴ The Bible likewise teaches that 'for the lack and default of justice, the realm, once it fails, will be transposed and fall into the hands of strange people and to the enemies of any king who will not do justice [...] for this cause a king or a prince who will not do justice shall soon be without lordship'.⁷⁵ Finally, a ruler whose mercy is misguided 'is likely to fall into the peril of rebellion by his subjects or else to suffer a great war among the inhabitants belonging to the parties' in his realm.⁷⁶ In short, a vicious prince who does not properly and thoroughly love his subjects will find himself abandoned by them and can only reasonably expect to be forced from his office. It may be that this is ultimately God's judgement, but its immediate and clear cause is popular

⁷¹ *L'état et le gouvernement*, pp. 198–99.

⁷² *L'état et le gouvernement*, pp. 200–01.

⁷³ *L'état et le gouvernement*, p. 192.

⁷⁴ *L'état et le gouvernement*, p. 194.

⁷⁵ *L'état et le gouvernement*, p. 197.

⁷⁶ *L'état et le gouvernement*, p. 201.

dissatisfaction. And the major source of such discontent for *L'estat et le gouvernement* can evidently be traced to economic deprivation as much or more than moral outrage or religious fervour. The author seems to understand very well that men are more inclined to lose their love and surrender their obedience when their survival is compromised by misadministration and evil government.

IV. Conclusion

In his recent popular history, *The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism and Western Success*, Rodney Stark develops a broadly sketched case that the medieval struggle against tyranny in theory and in practice constituted one of the indispensable stepping-stones toward the emergence of full-blown modern economic life.⁷⁷ Without evaluating the many flaws in Stark's general thesis, the foregoing paper illustrates that some moral and political thinkers did indeed equate the struggle for the economic rights of the people with forms of opposition to political interference with the possession and accumulation of private wealth. More to the point, the conception of princely virtue, expressed in traditional language, came to be realigned with an ideal of government viewed as the promoter of the economic welfare of the subjects over whom it ruled.

Nor were the authors of the *Speculum regis Edwardi III* and *L'estat et le gouvernement* simply outlying voices. Rather, their identification of the conventional Christian political value of 'love' with royal concern for earthly material benefit of the people echoed a theme that became increasingly commonplace during the later Middle Ages. Better known theorists of the period — from Brunetto Latini and Marsilius of Padua to Christine de Pizan and John Fortescue — shared similar conceptions of the economic dimensions of political community and the attendant requirements placed on rulers to serve the temporal good of its members.⁷⁸ I do not mean to imply, of course, that loftier goals of spiritual and moral reform and

⁷⁷ Rodney Stark, *The Victory of Reason: How Christianity led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success* (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 71–99.

⁷⁸ As I have documented in a series of essays: 'Commercial Society and Republican Government in the Latin Middle Ages: The Economic Dimensions of Brunetto Latini's Republicanism', *Political Theory*, 31 (2003), 644–63; 'Community and Self-Interest: Marsiglio of Padua on Civil Life and Private Advantage', *Review of Politics*, 65 (2003), 395–416; 'The Expanding Body Politic: Christine de Pizan and Medieval Political Economy', in *Au champ des écritures: Actes du IIIe Colloque International sur Christine de Pizan (Lausanne, 18–22 juillet 1998)*, ed. by Eric Hicks (Paris: Champion, 2000), pp. 383–97; and 'Economic Nationalism'.

improvement were gradually eliminated from late-medieval theories of government. Rather, virtues such as justice were expanded to embrace more overtly earthly considerations without any contraction in the duty of a prince to enforce customary Christian values — hence, the inclusion of God's role in the bond of love that united ruler and people. The tendency to treat the pursuit of spiritual fulfilment and of bodily security as mutually exclusive and perhaps antithetical activities — which one finds both in the Augustinian doctrine of the 'two cities' and in modern dichotomies between 'secular' and 'religious' ends — does not seem to have occurred to (or at any rate, disturbed) many medieval authors. Instead, one could be a good Christian ruler while governing one's subjects simultaneously for the welfare of their bodies and their souls.

CLEMENS PRINCEPS: CLEMENTIA
AS A PRINCELY VIRTUE IN MICHAEL
OF PRAGUE'S *DE REGIMINE PRINCIPUM*

Michael Hohlstein

I. Introduction

Within the field of medieval advisory literature, those texts which in historical scholarship are commonly called *Fürstenspiegel* (rather than 'mirror(s) of princes') claim a prominent position.¹ Among the little-studied specimens of continental European *Fürstenspiegel* literature, which blossomed from the thirteenth century in particular,² is the treatise *De regimine*

I would like to thank István Bejczy (Radboud University Nijmegen) and Marian Richling (Bielefeld) for their help in composing this article. All translations are mine unless noted otherwise.

¹ The definition of the genre is the object of debate; see Ulrike Graßnick, *Ratgeber des Königs: Fürstenspiegel und Herrscherideal im spätmittelalterlichen England* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), pp. 41–44. Susan Tipton, *Res publica bene ordinata: Regentenspiegel und Bilder vom guten Regiment: Rathausdekorationen in der frühen Neuzeit* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1996), pp. 26–27, recommends the use of the general term *Regentenspiegel* ('mirrors of regents') in order to grasp all texts which provide counsel for rulers, regardless of the exact status of the rulers addressed in each case.

² For an introduction to the extensive literature on *Fürstenspiegel* in the later Middle Ages, see apart from the studies mentioned in the previous note: Wilhelm Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters* (Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1938); Bruno Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel in Deutschland im Zeitalter des Humanismus und der Reformation: Bibliographische Grundlagen und ausgewählte Interpretationen: Jakob Wimpfeling, Wolfgang Seidel, Johann Sturm, Urban Rieger* (Munich: Fink, 1981); Cary J. Nederman, 'The Mirror Crack'd: The *Speculum Principum* as Political and Social Criticism in the Late Middle Ages', *European Legacy*, 3.3 (1988), 18–38;

principum seu de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus pro eruditione principum composed in 1387 by the Carthusian monk Michael of Prague (d. 1401). A number of authors have dealt with this work and although they agree on Michael's apparent lack of originality, they do not deny him all creative force. In his 1959/72 edition of the first book of the treatise, William Storey emphasized that the tract 'disclaims originality and leans heavily on authorities'.³ At the same time, he admitted that Michael's 'specific moral end, his choice of materials, and their arrangement into an ordered pedagogical whole were the products of his own ingenious and orderly mind'.⁴ Without knowing Storey's work, which at the time had not yet been published, Erwin Herrmann in 1971 made the following statement:

The treatises of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries [are] for the most part extensive compilations, little specialized [...]. As a rule, they — like Michael's *Fürstenspiegel* — aim too much at instructing the Christian in general and evoke the impression of representing catechisms for Christian noblemen. They lack clear instructions, unequivocal rules, and proximity towards politics.[...] For long stretches, the text [of Michael, MH] rather represents a tract which is determined by ascetics and addressed to any layman; by no means, it first and foremost represents a political instruction.⁵

Herrmann nevertheless pointed out that the Carthusian monk displayed considerable skill in combining the Aristotelian tradition with the thought of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) and added that some passages could be called his intellectual property due to the way in which he developed clemency as a derivative of temperance and fortitude.⁶ Finally, James Hogg observed in 1981 that Michael of Prague presented his moral didactics in a convincing manner, but still had 'no new insights to offer'.⁷

Hans Hubert Anton and others, 'Fürstenspiegel', in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, 10 vols (Zürich: Artemis; Munich: LexMA, 1980–99), IV (1987), 1040–58 (also covering vernacular traditions).

³ William G. Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus pro eruditione principum' of Michael the Carthusian of Prague: A Critical Text and Study*, *Analecta Cartusiana*, 6 (Salzburg: Hogg, 1972), p. 11. The book was originally defended as a doctoral thesis at Notre Dame University in 1959.

⁴ Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*, p. 38.

⁵ Erwin Herrmann, 'Der Fürstenspiegel des Michael von Prag', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 91 (1971), 22–45 (pp. 30–31).

⁶ Herrmann, 'Der Fürstenspiegel des Michael von Prag', p. 32.

⁷ James L. Hogg, 'Michael of Prague', in *Die Kartäuser in Österreich*, ed. by James L. Hogg, *Analecta Cartusiana*, 83, 3 vols (Salzburg: Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Universität Salzburg, 1980–81), III, 118–30 (p. 122).

The ambivalence of judgements about Michael's *De regimine principum* is characteristic of the study of later medieval *Fürstenspiegel* in general. Traditionally, *Fürstenspiegel* are not reputed for offering original and innovative contents. Even in recent specialized scholarship, the genre is sometimes called 'intellectually unstimulating', 'static and a-historical',⁸ and consisting of 'standardized texts'.⁹ According to Ulrike Graßnick, who compared the later medieval development of the genre in Latin, French, and English, 'the abstract character [...] and the trans-situational approach towards developing models of princely action' simply belong to the nature of the genre; but she also points out that *Fürstenspiegel* constitute pragmatic texts.¹⁰ Cary Nederman highlights the dynamic character of the texts as a primary focus of scholarly interest:

They contain a rich and complex discourse about political affairs, the significance of which was far more apparent to medieval and Renaissance than to modern readers. Rather than dwelling on the sameness and abstractness of the tracts, current scholarship stresses their diversity, recognizing that specula were not universally written in the Latin language, nor were they exclusively prose works, nor did they always address the same audience or offer identical advice about the ruler and his office.¹¹

The opposed claims as to the genre's static or dynamic character create a tension in historical research on medieval *Fürstenspiegel*. It is within the same tension that I position my analysis of Michael of Prague's *De regimine principum* in the next two sections of this article. The first section below provides information about some general, formal, and thematic aspects of the text. The second section concentrates on Michael's understanding of *clementia* in particular. In it, I shall argue that *De regimine principum* does by no means exhaust itself in the adoption of tradition and convention, but rather assumes a distinctive character of its own by its emphasis on clemency as a central princely virtue.

⁸ Tipton, *Res publica bene ordinata*, p. 25.

⁹ Graßnick, *Ratgeber des Königs*, p. 11.

¹⁰ Graßnick, *Ratgeber des Königs*, pp. 332–33; for the 'pragmatism' of the texts, see also pp. 68–72. Graßnick states in her conclusion, following Bourdieu's sociology: 'Fürstenspiegel prägen die Denk- und Wahrnehmungskategorien im literarischen und politischen Feld und damit deren Strukturen, gleichzeitig sind sie unter den strukturellen Bedingtheiten dieser Felder entstanden. Die Texte spiegeln das gesellschaftliche Werte- und Normsystem wider und wirken auf dieses zurück. Sie sind somit Teil des Austauschprozesses kultureller Muster im sozialen Raum und Träger des kulturellen Gedächtnisses' (p. 334).

¹¹ Nederman, 'The Mirror Crack'd', pp. 18–19.

II. Michael of Prague and His 'De regimine principum'

It is impossible to write a detailed biography about Michael of Prague due to a lack of information about his early years. The exact date at which he joined the Carthusian monastery of Mariengarten in Prague, which was founded in 1342, remains in the dark; we do not even know with certainty whether he is identical with the Michael who was prior of the Carthusian monastery in the years 1356 and 1379. Agreement only exists with regard to fact that he served as curate of Mariengarten in 1382. In the same year he also acted as visitor of the southern German province of the Carthusians. Between 1386 and 1387, he was prior of the Austrian monastery Aggsbach for about one year. Afterward he returned to Prague, but in 1390 he left his monastery of initiation for good in order to become prior of Geirach in Slovenia, a function he retained until his death on 27 September 1401.¹² During the time he served as prior of Aggsbach, Michael wrote a *Remediarum abiecti prioris seu praepositi* for the consolation of his predecessor who had been removed from office. In 1387, within the course a few months after returning from Aggsbach to Prague, he wrote *De regimine principum*.¹³ He must have composed his *Liber de custodia virginittatis* before that date, since he refers back to it in his *Fürstenspiegel*.

De regimine principum consists of a prologue and four books of unequal length which are each devoted to one cardinal virtue. Only the prologue and the first book, on the virtue of prudence, are available in a modern edition.¹⁴ Five manuscript copies of the work have come down to posterity. The temporal sequence of the two oldest, fourteenth-century copies remains unclear. Storey considers a parchment manuscript which in 1622 migrated from the Bibliotheca

¹² For biographical information on Michael of Prague, see Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*, pp. 1–8; Herrmann, 'Der Fürstenspiegel'; Hogg, 'Michael of Prague', pp. 118–20; Franz Josef Worstbrock, 'Michael von Prag', in *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters: Verfasserlexikon*, ed. by Kurt Ruh and others, 2nd edn (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1978–), VI, 509–13. Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*, p. 3, and Hogg, 'Michael of Prague', p. 118, are inclined to believe that Michael actually was prior of Mariengarten in Prague in 1356. Herrmann does not mention this possibility at all.

¹³ For the works of Michael of Prague, see Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*, pp. 9–19, and Worstbrock, 'Michael von Prag', pp. 510–13.

¹⁴ In Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*. The critical edition of the whole work as announced by James Hogg in his 'Editor's Preface', p. v, unfortunately never appeared.

Palatina into the Vatican Library to be the oldest version.¹⁵ By contrast, Herrmann identifies a manuscript preserved in the Library of the Metropolitan Chapter in Prague as coming close to the original version of 1387; in his view, the copy in Rome is a duplicate of the Prague manuscript which may have been produced as early as 1390. The three fifteenth-century manuscripts are preserved in the State Library of Berlin (one copy) and the Bavarian State Library at Munich (two copies: one from 1424, which came from the Augustine abbey Polling, and one from 1431, written in the Benedictine abbey of Saint Emmeran in Regensburg). An early manuscript which is recorded in the medieval library catalogue of the Benedictine abbey of Reichenbach am Regen (Upper Palatinate, Bavaria) is now lost.¹⁶ All surviving manuscripts mention Rupert (Ruprecht) the Younger, Duke of Bavaria, as the addressee of the tract. So far, historians have not reached final agreement about the identity of this Wittelsbach prince. The majority of them opt for Rupert II (d. 1398), Count Palatinate at the Rhine since 1390, on whom his contemporaries bestowed the cognomen 'the Severe' on account of his struggle against the cities in his county and the persecutions of heretics and Jews he initiated. Others propose Rupert III (d. 1410), who succeeded Rupert II as Count Palatinate in 1398 and became king of the Holy Roman Empire in 1400.¹⁷

De regimine principum is arranged in the form of a fictitious dialogue between Rupert and Michael, a device which the Carthusian considered 'more joyful and

¹⁵ See Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*, p. 108, referring to MS Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 725; for a survey of the manuscripts, see *ibid.*, pp. 104–08. The remaining four MSS are Prague, Metropolitan Chapter Library, G XII (1003), fols 1^r–119^v; Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14347, fols 1^r–150^r (Polling), and Clm 11478, fols 256^r–337^r (Saint Emmeran); Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Cod. lat. 943, fols 1^r–183^r. I inspected the two MSS from Munich. My quotations follow Clm 14347.

¹⁶ See Herrmann, 'Der Fürstenspiegel', p. 29, n. 3.

¹⁷ Apart from Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*, p. 23, the following authors opted for Ruprecht II: Martin Grabmann, *Studien über den Einfluß der aristotelischen Philosophie auf die mittelalterlichen Theorien über das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat* (Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1934), p. 38; Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, p. 356; Rudolf Ohlbaum, *Johann Rode aus Hamburg: Vom deutschen Geistesleben in Böhmen um 1400*, *Sudetendeutsches historisches Archiv*, 5 (Prague: Deutsche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften und Künste in Prag, 1943), p. 19; Worstbrock, 'Michael von Prag', p. 509. Herrmann, 'Der Fürstenspiegel', pp. 22–24, believes that Ruprecht III was the addressee; Gustav Sommerfeldt, 'Die Stellung Ruprechts III. von der Pfalz zur deutschen Publizistik bis zum Jahr 1400', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, 22 (1907), 291–319 (pp. 316–18) came to the same conclusion.

more beneficiary for the reader'.¹⁸ Although this remark would suggest that Michael addressed himself through Rupert to a larger audience,¹⁹ the work was actually commissioned by Rupert himself, as Michael makes unequivocally clear in his prologue. Conscious of the fact that somebody born as a king but lacking sufficient virtue to do justice to the dignity of the royal office would be a bad ruler, Rupert asked Michael to write a treatise on the four cardinal virtues and urged him repeatedly to finish it quickly.²⁰

The cardinal virtues of *prudentia*, *iustitia*, *fortitudo*, and *temperantia*, which Rupert apparently thought indispensable for princely rule, were first mentioned as a quartet in Plato's *Republic*. From patristic times they were assimilated to Christian thought; in the later Middle Ages, they held a firm place in Christian theology and even philosophy, even if the four virtues do not appear as a quartet in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* which dominated academic moral thought from the mid-thirteenth century.²¹ The four virtues had an eminently political significance, since they were considered to guarantee the good in human relations. It remained for the Galician archbishop Martin of Braga (d. 579/80) to introduce them as central princely virtues in his *Formula vitae honestae*, addressed to the Suebian king Miro (d. 582). The treatise may go back to a lost text of Seneca and

¹⁸ See Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, Prol., p. 113: 'Hoc opus autem per modum dyalogi quasi collocutionem quandam unius querentis, alterius respondentis conscripsi, quia istum stilum delectabiliorem et utiliorem lectori existimavi.'

¹⁹ As believes Herrmann, 'Der Fürstenspiegel', p. 31.

²⁰ Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, Prol., p. 110: 'Itaque illustrissimus ac virtuosissimus princeps dominus Ropertus Iunior, dux Bavarie, sollicitus semper antiquorum et bonorum principum quorum laus est in Scripturis divinis et cronicis per vestigia incedere et, sicut ingenite nobilitatis et principalis dignitate gloria ita et virtutum prerogativa cupiens insignis esse, sciens quod inutiliter regnat qui rex nascitur si non virtute animi rex efficiatur, dignatus est a me tantillo aliquod scriptum de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, principi quoad regimen et statum suum congruens, humili dignacione exposcere et illud me tardius reddentem crebrius sollicitando movere.'

²¹ For the cardinal virtues in the Middle Ages, see Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, 6 vols (Gembloux: Duculor; Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1942–60), III and IV; Sybille Mähl, *Quadrigena virtutum: Die Kardinaltugenden in der Geistesgeschichte der Karolingerzeit*, Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 9 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1969); for their reception in philosophical ethics, see István P. Bejczy, 'The Cardinal Virtues in Medieval Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1250–1350', in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200–1500*, ed. by István P. Bejczy (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

is in any case so permeated by his thought that numerous medieval readers, including Michael of Prague, ascribed it to the ancient philosopher.²²

In order to explain that the *virtutes cardinales* form the kernel of princely ethics, Michael refers to the *exemplum summi Gubernatoris*. In his view, secular rulers have to follow the example set by God. As the Lord rules over the world on the basis of a quaternary of virtues (*sapientia, clementia, iustitia, and potentia*), so those ruling on earth should line up their office in accordance with these virtues. The prince can thus secure the stability of his rule on the one hand while promoting public welfare (*bonum commune*, the goal of good government) on the other.²³ Michael's argument reminds one of the theory of Macrobius, who located the cardinal virtues in the divine mind as *virtutes exemplares* from which they derived on a human level as *virtutes politicae*.²⁴ However, Michael's *sapientia, clementia, iustitia, and potentia* are only partly synonymous with the cardinal quartet. In fact, Michael adopted his list from Bonaventure's *Breviloquium*.²⁵ Wisdom, clemency, justice, and potency thus seem to figure in Michael's treatise as divine models for the cardinal virtues as guidelines of princely government.

In his prologue, the part of *De regimine principum* which he wrote last, Michael sums up the literary source material he used on behalf of his treatise (his list is not exhaustive, for his use of Bonaventure's *Breviloquium* is not acknowledged). The

²² See Martin of Braga, *Formula vitae honestae*, ed. by Charles W. Barlow, in *Martini episcopi Bracarensis opera omnia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 204–50. Currently, I am preparing an article on the reception of the text in the late Middle Ages.

²³ Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, i.2, pp. 125–27: 'Necesse est quod omne quod est directivum alterius ipsum mediante aliqua virtute dirigat [...]. Tanto autem excellencius et efficacius virtus cuiuslibet directivi seu regentis ad finem perducit quantu virtuti summi Rectoris conformior fuerit. Omnis enim causa secundaria eo est activior quo magis appropinquat ad causam primam. Constat autem quod supremus Gubernator universi [...] quadruplici virtute mundum regit mirabiliter et conservat, scilicet sapiencia, clemencia, iusticia, potencia [...]. Virtus autem principis regentis, ut excellencius et efficacius ad finem qui est commune bonum perducatur, debet conformari summo et optimo Gubernatori Deo qui excellentissime omnia regit et gubernat. Discat igitur princeps virtutem directivam summi Gubernatoris regentis universum imitari quoad principatum suum [...]. Quod ille virtutes principi pre ceteris virtutibus inquantum princeps sint necessarie patet ex eo quia sine illis nec principatus suus erit stabilis nec aget bonum communitatis [...]. Patet ergo quod oportet quemlibet principem ad exemplum summi Gubernatoris sapiencia, clemencia, iusticia, potencia, disponere principatum suum, sine quibus, ut ostensum est, non procuratur commune bonum.'

²⁴ See the contribution of István Bejczy in this volume.

²⁵ See Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, vii.7, in *Opera omnia*, ed. by Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), v, 288–91.

Carthusian monk obviously had knowledge of other *Fürstenspiegel* and lists the two most influential specimens of the late-medieval period, *De regno ad regem Cypri* of Thomas Aquinas and *De regimine principum* of Giles of Rome (d. 1316).²⁶ Michael indeed adopted several theories from these works; thus, his argumentation in favour of monarchy as the best form of government largely derives from *De regno*.²⁷ However, Michael also deliberately tried to stand out from his two predecessors. According to his own words, he was little interested in giving advice about founding cities, waging war, and similar practical matters. As a Christian moralist, he wrote in order to show how Christian rulers should proceed in order to avoid sin. Accordingly, he put his trust in the authority of the saints rather than in the philosophers' rational proofs.²⁸

Although Michael indeed made frequent use of hagiographical and biblical examples in order to convince Rupert, he obviously could not do without learned knowledge in defining the cardinal virtues. Each book of his treatise starts with explanations about the name and meanings of the cardinal virtue under discussion which generally are heavily indebted to the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas. Michael's quotations of ancient pagan and Christian authorities such as Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Macrobius, and the Church Fathers are often transmitted through the *Summa* as well.²⁹ Michael's subdivisions of the cardinal virtues are likewise based on the work of Aquinas, but in some cases Michael made his own selections. His list of *virtutes iusticie annexe* (*religio, pietas, gratia, vindicatio, observantia,*

²⁶ See Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, Prol., p. 113: 'Nec quemquam moveat cum plures libri de regimine principum olym a solemnissimis viris conscripti sint — nam beatus Thomas scripsit librum De regimine regni ad regem Cypri; Egidius Romanus scripsit librum De triplici regimine principis.' For the literature used by Michael of Prague, see Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*, pp. 37–50; Hogg, 'Michael of Prague', pp. 122–23.

²⁷ Cf. Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, i.1, pp. 121–24a, and Thomas Aquinas, *De regno ad regem Cypri*, i.2–6, in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882–), XLII, 449–71 (pp. 451–56).

²⁸ Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, Prol., pp. 113–14: 'Isti enim secundum moralem rationem solemnissime scripserunt multaue probaverunt regibus competere que sepius reges pagani magis quam cristiani solent observare, ut scilicet qualiter sit fundanda civitas, qualiter disponendus exercitus ad bellum, quomodo instruenda acies, quomodo civitas oppugnanda, si magis in bello conveniat hostes ferire punctim vel cesim, multaue similia, de quibus hic nichil dicitur quia ista etiam quinque, si non taliter fierent, principem peccati reum non facerent. Hic autem dicitur de hiis que principibus cristianis taliter facienda vel non facienda incumbunt, quod si aliter facerent, et sue dignitati derogarent et ut sepe peccatum incurrerent. Unde et iste liber probat magis dicta sua auctoritatibus sanctorum quam rationibus philozophorum.'

²⁹ See Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*, pp. 40–42.

veritas) is shorter than Aquinas’s catalogue of the *partes potentiales* of justice, which also includes *affabilitas*, *liberalitas*, and *epieikeia*. With regard to fortitude, Michael’s assessment again deviates from the *Summa*. Comparing the subdivisions of this virtue as proposed by Cicero (*magnificentia*, *fiducia*, *patientia*, *perseverantia*) and Macrobius (*magnanimitas*, *fiducia*, *securitas*, *magnificentia*, *constantia*, *tolerantia*, *firmitas*), Aquinas concluded that the qualities listed by Cicero comprised those of Macrobius. Michael of Prague, however, makes a selection of qualities from both lists (*magnanimitas*, *magnificentia*, *patientia*, *perseverantia*).³⁰ As for *prudentia*, Michael acknowledges its Ciceronian subdivision into *intelligentia*, *providentia*, and *memoria* as well as Aquinas’s distinction of monastic, economical, and political prudence, but he sets greater store by his personal differentiation between *prudentia cordis*, *prudentia oris*, and *prudentia operis*, which corresponds to Augustine’s triple distinction of sins of thought, word, and deed.³¹

In a nutshell, Michael of Prague presents the following scheme of virtues in *De regimine principum*:

Cardinal virtue	Components	Parts/affiliated virtues
<i>prudentia</i>	<i>prudentia in corde</i> <i>prudentia in verbo</i> <i>prudentia in opere</i>	<i>memoria</i> <i>intelligentia</i> <i>providentia</i>
<i>temperantia</i>		<i>continentia (sobrietas, castitas)</i> <i>clementia</i> <i>modestia</i>
<i>iustitia</i>	<i>iustitia distributiva</i> <i>iustitia commutativa</i>	<i>religio</i> <i>pietas</i> <i>gratia</i> <i>vindicatio</i> <i>observantia</i> <i>veritas</i>

³⁰ Cf. Storey, *The ‘De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus’*, p. 119–20, and Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.123.5 and 128, *Opera*, X, 11–13, 51–53.

³¹ For a more detailed analysis see Storey, *The ‘De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus’*, pp. 68–74.

<i>fortitudo</i>		<i>magnanimitas</i> <i>magnificencia</i> <i>patientia</i> <i>perseverantia</i>
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Before dealing with Michael’s emphasis on *clementia* as a princely virtue in more detail, the Carthusian’s contribution to one central problem of the medieval discourse on virtue — namely, the question of how to acquire virtue — has at least shortly to be reported. Theologians in Michael’s time recognized acquired virtues on the one hand, infused virtues on the other. As to the existence of infused moral virtues, opinions were divided: Thomas Aquinas recognized them, but from the late thirteenth century, many theologians held that moral virtues only existed as naturally acquired habits.³² Michael seems to have departed from Aquinas in that he regarded prudence as an acquired virtue only. However, the prince should in his view combine acquired prudence with the gift of wisdom; both for acquiring prudence and receiving wisdom, the study of Scripture was helpful.³³ Wisdom thus not only figures as a divine model of human prudence in Michael’s treatise, but is also directly infused as a gift of the Holy Ghost. As the divine orientation of princely government is thus guaranteed, Michael does not need infused moral virtues any more.

III. ‘*Clementia*’ as a Princely Virtue

There can be little doubt that Michael of Prague in *De regimine principum* regards *clementia* as a central princely virtue. First, he describes clemency as especially becoming to the prince and even states that it is clemency which guarantees that a ruler also has the gifts of the other virtues.³⁴ Second, clemency is one of the four virtues of divine rule (*sapientia, clementia, iustitia, potentia*) that earthly rulers

³² See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 459–535, and IV, 739–807.
³³ See Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, i.6, pp. 146–47, and the assessment of Storey, *The ‘De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus’*, pp. 61–63 (who does not note the difference vis-à-vis Aquinas).
³⁴ Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, ii.3, fol. 35^r: ‘Hec item virtus specialiter ad principem spectat quia eum non mediocriter ornat’; ii.11, fol. 53^r: ‘Hec virtus principem virtuosum maxime decet quia ea habita signum est quod habeat etiam aliorum virtutum dona.’

should emulate above all. Third, Michael goes so far as to upset the order of the four cardinal virtues observed by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome in order to give a more prominent place to temperance, the cardinal virtue which includes clemency. In the prologue Michael explains that he has divided his work into four books which each discuss one cardinal virtue. Prudence is the subject of the first book, temperance of the second, justice of the third, fortitude of the fourth. Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, however, discussed the cardinal quartet in the order prudence-justice-fortitude-temperance, something for which both men offered several explanations. According to Aquinas, prudence set reason right while justice translated the precepts of reason into action. Fortitude and temperance were secondary virtues in the sense that they merely removed the obstacles which held back the just will from following reason: fortitude by checking the fear of mortal danger, temperance by restraining irrational pleasure. As pleasure constituted a lesser obstacle to virtue than mortal danger, temperance occupied the last place among the cardinal virtues.³⁵ Moreover, Aquinas and Giles both argued that whereas justice pertained to human dealings with others and fortitude concerned wars fought for the common good, temperance merely concerned the well-being of the individual.³⁶

Michael of Prague is perfectly aware of his violation of the customary order of the cardinal virtues: 'I have not preserved the order of the virtues', he admits in the prologue, 'for temperance is usually put last among the four virtues.'³⁷ But he believes he has a very good reason for his intervention: he wants to discuss clemency, which is affiliated with temperance, before dealing with justice.³⁸ In fact, clemency figures in *De regimine principum* as a counterweight to judicial severity. Michael followed Christian rather than Aristotelian traditions in this

³⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.123.1 and 12, *Opera*, x, 3–4, 25–26; cf. Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.5 (Rome: Zanetti, 1607; repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1967), pp. 58–60.

³⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.141.8, *Opera*, x, 131–32; Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.15, p. 90.

³⁷ Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, Prol., p. 112: 'In secunda parte dixi de temperancia, nec servavi ordinem virtutum, cum temperancia inter quatuor virtutes ponatur in ultimo loco communiter.'

³⁸ Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, Prol., p. 113: 'cuius causa est quod de clementia, que temperancie adiungitur, volebam dicere priusquam de iusticia.'

respect; scholastic authors like Thomas Aquinas certainly recommended moderation in the exercise of corrective or punitive justice, but rather in the name of *epieikeia* (a quality introduced in *Nicomachean Ethics* (v.14) as a corrective to the rigorous application of law) than of clemency.³⁹ From patristic times, however, *iustitia* and *miserericordia* (occasionally replaced with *pietas* or *clementia*) were perceived as the two poles of virtuous rule; justice could not exist without mercy, and vice versa.⁴⁰ Michael's considerations on clemency indeed centre around the notions of forgiveness and compassion. Under reference to numerous Augustinian writings, Michael develops an ideal of the Christian ruler who dispenses justice with leniency rather than out of revenge, not in order to let crimes pass unpunished but in the hope of improving the delinquents. 'The just prefers to correct rather than punish his enemy', as Michael put it.⁴¹ To be sure, Michael did consider *vindicatio* a part of justice, but he accepted Aquinas's distinction between *vindicatio licita* and *vindicatio illicita*.⁴²

Significantly, Michael refers back to clemency when discussing justice and points out that clemency protects against *vindicatio illicita* which arises 'from an impulse of anger or from cruelty'.⁴³ In Michael's understanding, *clementia* serves as a safeguard against passions such as hatred or wrath and guarantees that the ruler heals with his punishment. Referring to Cicero, Michael introduces

³⁹ See Günter Virt, *Epikie — verantwortlicher Umgang mit Normen: Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zu Aristoteles, Thomas von Aquin und Franz Suarez* (Mainz: Grünewald, 1983), especially pp. 91–171.

⁴⁰ See Philippe Buc, 'Pouvoir royal et commentaires de la Bible', *Annales ESC*, 44 (1989), 691–713; Philippe Buc, *L'ambiguïté du livre: Prince, pouvoir et peuple dans les commentaires de la Bible au moyen âge* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1994), pp. 27, 46, 53, 177–79, and 185–86. Martin of Braga, *Formula vitae honestae*, 9, p. 250, already pointed to the importance of keeping the mean in the exercise of justice: 'Iustitia postremo eo mediocritatis tibi tenore regenda est, ne ductu iugiter leni immotam semper animi rationem negligentia subsequatur, dum neque de magis neque de minimis errantium vitiis corrigendi curam geres, sed licentiam peccandi aut adludentibus tibi blande aut inludentibus proterve permittes; neque rursum nimiae rigiditatis asperitate nihil veniae aut benignitati reservans humanae societati dirus appareas.'

⁴¹ Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, ii.14, fol. 62^r: 'Quia iustus [et, MH] magis cupit inimicum suum corrigi quam puniri' = Augustine, *Enarrationes in psalmos*, lxxviii.14, ed. by Eligius Dekkers and Johannes Fraipont (CCSL, 39, p. 1107).

⁴² *De regimine principum*, iii.21, fol. 118^r; cf. *ibid.*: 'Non dixi quod vindicta esset semper mala et illata sed qualiter sit licita est sciendum sicut dicit Thomas Iia Iie q. 108 a. 1'. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.108.1, *Opera*, IX, 410–11.

⁴³ *De regimine principum*, iii.21, fol. 118^r ('ex subita passione ire vel ex crudelitate').

clementia as the virtue which restrains impulsive hatred.⁴⁴ Later on he repeats this definition, supplementing it with two definitions of Seneca which likewise centre around restraint of vindictive impulses, especially regarding one's inferiors (one of these definitions is ascribed to Hugh of Saint Victor, although Aquinas quoted it as Seneca's; perhaps the popular *Manipulus florum* of Thomas of Ireland, composed in 1306, has caused the misattribution).⁴⁵ Positively defined, clemency consists in the preparedness to help, to forgive, and to have compassion, as Michael argues with the help of another spurious quotation of Hugh of Saint Victor (this time, Thomas of Ireland is likely to have been Michael's source).⁴⁶ Instead of being greedy, cruel, and severe, a mild prince supports the poor and grants protection to widows and orphans. The Bible itself recommends clemency as a princely virtue, as Michael points out, for 'Mercy and truth preserve the king, and his throne is upholden by mercy' (Prov. 20. 28).⁴⁷ Clemency principally distinguishes a good ruler from a tyrant, whose rule is determined by greed,

⁴⁴ *De regimine principum*, ii.3, fol. 35: 'Secunda pars temperancie secundum Tullium est clemencia quam ita describit Clementia est virtus per quam motus animi in alicuius odium temere concitati communitate vel hylaritate retinentur'; cf. Cicero, *De inventione*, ii.54, ed. by Eduardus Stroebel (Leipzig: Teubner, 1915), p. 149: 'clementia, per quam animi temere in odium alicuius iniectionis concitati comitate retinentur.'

⁴⁵ *De regimine principum*, ii.11, fol. 53: 'Clementia ergo secundum Tullium est virtus per quam animus concitatus in odium alicuius benignitate retinetur. Similiter Hugo diffinit eam sic Clemencia est temperancia animi in potestate ulciscendi vel lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem. Similiter Seneca dicit Clementia est que alieno sanguini tanquam suo parci et scit homine non esse prodige utendum'; cf. Seneca, *De clementia*, ii.3, ed. by Carolus Hosius, in *L. Annaei Senecae opera quae supersunt*, i.ii (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), p. 245; Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*, lxxviii.30, ed. by Otto Hense (Leipzig: Teubner, 1938), p. 371. Cicero's and Seneca's definitions are quoted by Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ii.ii.157.1, and 3, *Opera*, x, 266–67 and 269. Thomas of Ireland, *Manipulus florum*, lemma Mansuetudo M, ed. by Chris L. Nighman (<http://info.wlu.ca/~wwwhist/faculty/cnighman/index.html>) ascribes the second definition to Hugh; cf. Pseudo-Hugh of Saint Victor, *De anima*, iv.16 (PL, CLXXVII, col. 189B): 'Clementia est benignitas superioris erga inferiores.' On *De anima*, see Ermenegildo Bertola, 'Di alcuni trattati psicologici attribuiti ad Ugo da S. Vittore', *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, 51 (1959), 436–55.

⁴⁶ *De regimine principum*, ii.11, fol. 53: 'Dicit Hugo de Sancto Victore quod clemens dicitur animus quando est promptus ad subveniendum, facilis ad remittendum, tener ad conpaciendum.' The quotation appears with the attribution to Hugh in Thomas of Ireland, *Manipulus florum*, lemma Mansuetudo N; it is absent from the *Summa theologiae* of Aquinas.

⁴⁷ *De regimine principum*, ii.11, fol. 53: 'Scio bene quod clementia valde competit principi iuxta illud quod scriptum est "Misericordia et veritas custodiunt regem et firmabit clemencia thronus illius."'

excessive severity, and cruelty, as Michael argues following Isidore of Seville.⁴⁸ To the *clemens princeps*, the tyrant is opposed as a *pessimus atque improbus rex*.

Michael of Prague was certainly not the only late-medieval political writer to insist on clemency in relation to princely justice. In the *Policraticus* John of Salisbury considered both mercy and justice to be necessary for the good ruler. When exercising coercive force the prince must find the mean between justice and mercy. It belongs to his clemency to mitigate judicial severity.⁴⁹ Even nearer to Michael's treatment of clemency comes *De eruditione principum* (1265) of the Dominican friar William Peraldus. Peraldus recommended clemency as a princely virtue in terms similar to Michael's and claimed, like Michael, that clemency made the difference between a king and a tyrant.⁵⁰ Moreover, he established a close connection between *clementia* and *iustitia*. Clemency exercises a moderating influence on both the prince's leniency and his thirst for revenge. On the one hand, it protects against excessive mildness which may lead to anarchy; on the other hand, it keeps the prince's vindictive impulses in check. This, in fact, is clemency's principal function. It safeguards the prince against impatience or inordinate passions which may precipitate acts of revenge.⁵¹ Whereas leniency

⁴⁸ *De regimine principum*, ii.3, fol. 35^r: 'Quid autem sic tyrannus est sciendum quod dicit Ysidorus Aput veteres inter regem et tyrannum nulla discrecio fuit quia fortes reges tyranni vocabantur.[...] Et subiungit Ysidorus lam inquit postea in usum accidit tyrannus vocari pessimos atque improbos reges luxuriose dominationis cupiditatem et crudelissimam dominationem in populis exercentes. Hec Ysidorus. Ex quibus verbis Ysodori patet quod in tyrannide tria includuntur, scilicet avaritie cupiditas dominationis austeritas et crudelitas.' Cf. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX*, III.iii.19 and IX.iii.20, ed. by Wallace M. Lindsay, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911).

⁴⁹ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, iv.8, ed. by Katharine S. B. Keats-Rohan (CCCM, 118, p. 261): 'Alterum namque iustitiae, alterum pietatis est, quae adeo principi necessariae sunt [...]. Meditatur ergo iugiter sapientiam et de ea sic iustitiam operatur quod lex clementiae semper est in lingua eius. Et sic clementiam temperat rigore iustitiae quod lingua eius iudicium loquitur.'

⁵⁰ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum*, i.14, in *S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia*, ed. by Robertus Busa, 7 vols (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), VII, 89–121 (p. 94): 'Clementia multum decet principem. Est autem clementia, ut dicit sapiens: virtus per quam animus in odium alicujus temere concitatus, benignitate retinetur: secundum Senecam: clementia est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi, vel potestate superioris adversus inferiorem in poenis constituendis. In hoc conveniunt fideles et infideles, quod clementia necessaria sit principi.[...] Item clementia efficit ut inter regem et tyrannum sit differentia.'

⁵¹ *De eruditione principum*, i.14, p. 94: 'Ad virtutem clementiae pertinet mediocritatem servare in parcendo et ulciscendo [...]. Princeps maxime debet esse temperatus in ultione propriarum

(*clementia*) belongs to human nature, cruelty (*crudelitas*) turns man into a wild beast. Peraldus urges rulers to be conscious of the precious nature of their subjects' souls (*nobilitas animorum*) as well as of their blood, shed in vain when harsh justice prevails.⁵² The Franciscan monk Gilbert of Tournai (d. 1284) developed similar arguments in his *Eruditio regum et principum*, addressed to King Louis IX of France. Like Michael of Prague, he quoted Proverbs 20. 28 to stress that clemency reinforced princely rule.⁵³ Gilbert was convinced that clemency did not weaken justice, but served as its necessary counterbalance, whereas verdicts inspired by wrath resulted in unduly severe punishment.⁵⁴

While Michael may have used the *Fürstenspiegel* of Peraldus and Gilbert as sources, he can have found some essential teachings about clemency in the works of the two authors he cited so often in his prologue: Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome. According to Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, which Michael repeatedly quotes in his discussion of mercy and clemency (possibly he copied Cicero's and Seneca's definitions of clemency from it), exterior punishment is subject to leniency (*clementia*) which should avoid disproportional revenge resulting from wrath.⁵⁵ Accordingly, Aquinas in *De regno* presented cruelty as a characteristic of tyrants; good rulers combine the zeal for justice with leniency produced by meekness and clemency.⁵⁶ Much in the same vein, Giles of Rome in *De regimine principum* urged judges, kings, and princes to act with clemency and gentleness,

injuriā [...]. Clementia principem servat, ne impatientia, vel aliqua alia inordinata affectio ultionem praecipiet.⁵⁷

⁵² *De eruditione principum*, i.14, p. 94: 'Et notandum est quod sunt septem quae principem incitare debent ad clementiam. Primum est humana natura, crudelitas vero hominem bestialem facit [...]. Secundum est nobilitas animorum qui regendi sunt [...]. Tertium est exemplum: inter exempla vero praecipuum est exemplum summi principis, scilicet Dei [...]. Quartum est humani sanguinis pretiositas, quo parcissime utendum est [...]. Quintum est finis, propter quem principes sunt super alios constituti, scilicet ut hominibus medeantur: unde verecundum est principi, si eum occidit, cui mederi debuit [...]. Sextum est quod clementia principi securitatem dat et in praesenti, et in futuro [...]. Septimum est quod clementia regnum roborat: unde dicitur Proverb. 20, de rege, quod *roboratur clementia thronus eius*.'

⁵³ Gilbert of Tournai, *Eruditio regum et principum*, II.ii.2, ed. by A. de Poorter (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1914), pp. 67–68.

⁵⁴ *Eruditio regum et principum*, III.iv, pp. 86–88.

⁵⁵ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.143.1, 157.1, and 3, 159.1, *Opera*, x, 138–39, 266–67, 269, and 285.

⁵⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *De regno*, i.12, *Opera*, XLII, 464: 'ex altero iustitiae in eo zelus accenditur [...] ex altero vero mansuetudinis et clementiae lenitatem acquirit.'

not in order to neglect justice but because neither peace nor public welfare could be preserved without *clementia*, *benignitas*, and *misericordia*.⁵⁷ Yet at the same time Aquinas and Giles allowed the prince to act with severity if circumstances required it. In their view, the prince is only subject to natural law, while positive (man-made) law is subject to him. Even excellent human laws cannot be just in every single case, as Aristotle already pointed out. The ruler should therefore not strictly adhere to the written law but always consider the particular circumstances of every case which laws, consisting of general definitions, necessarily disregard. Judging in accordance with reason and natural law, the prince should sometimes apply the written law to the letter (a case of *aequitas*), sometimes observe greater rigour than the written law allows, and sometimes show greater clemency. When applied in accordance with reason, *severitas* and *clementia* may both surpass positive law, but not justice itself.⁵⁸ Michael of Prague did not recommend such freedom of judgement; in his understanding, *clementia* mainly serves as a safeguard against passions such as hatred or wrath and guarantees that the ruler heals with his punishment.

One might infer from these examples, which could easily be multiplied, that Michael's discussion of clemency is not innovative, the more so as the majority of his statements on the subject derive from ancient, biblical, patristic, and medieval authorities. One should acknowledge, however, that Michael selected his quotations from a wider array of sources than has thus far been assumed (his dependence on Bonaventure and Thomas of Ireland has not been acknowledged before) and displayed a considerable creativity in rearranging and integrating them. Moreover, his conscious adaptation of the sequence of the cardinal virtues in combination with his awarding a prominent position to *clementia* as a central princely virtue is certainly original. I know of no other medieval *Fürstenspiegel* that proceeds similarly. True enough, more than a century before Michael wrote his *De regimine principum*, William Peraldus already discussed the cardinal virtues in the order prudence-temperance-fortitude-justice in his *Summa de virtutibus*, the most widely divulged treatise on the virtues of the later Middle Ages. But

⁵⁷ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, III.ii.23, p. 305: 'Patet ergo quomodo decet iudices esse magis clementes quam severos. Et sic hoc decet iudices, multo magis decet reges et principes, quibus congruit ampliori bonitate pollere. Decet itaque eos esse clementes et benignos, non quia iustitiam deserant, quia sine ea pax regni et bonus status civium non potest consistere; sed salvato communi boni et pace regni quantum possibile est debent ad misericordiam declinare.'

⁵⁸ See *De regimine principum*, III.ii.29, pp. 314–16; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.ii.96.6 and II.ii.120.1–2, *Opera*, VII, 187, and IX, 468–70.

William's reasons have nothing to do with those advanced by Michael;⁵⁹ moreover, William did not write his *Summa* for a princely audience.

What can have been Michael's motives for arranging his text in such a way as to make clemency the outstanding princely virtue? It is hard to provide a satisfactory answer, but keeping in mind that *Fürstenspiegel* contain an 'implicit criticism of rulers'⁶⁰ — indeed, Michael bemoaned the fact that the princes of his day no longer observed the cardinal virtues⁶¹ — the emphasis on *clementia* might be understood as 'camouflaged criticism'⁶² of his addressee. Both Rupert II 'the Severe' and Rupert III were regarded as strict rulers by contemporaries.⁶³ Being firmly embedded in theological and philosophical traditions, Michael of Prague's *De regimine principum* thus not only reveals a surprising literary creativity but also a potential relevance for contemporary princely government.

⁵⁹ See William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus*, III.iii.1, in *Summae virtutum ac vitiorum* (Lyon: Beringer, 1554), I, 322: 'Et primo de temperantia et fortitudine, quam de iustitia, quia temperantia, et fortitudo ad iustitiam disponunt et praeparant, sicut cupiditas quam temperantia refraenat et timor cui fortitudo resistit iustitiam a suo officio impediunt.'

⁶⁰ See Graßnick, *Ratgeber des Königs*, p. 331.

⁶¹ Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, Prol., pp. 111–12.

⁶² Nederman, 'The Mirror Crack'd', p. 19. Nederman analyzes some rare examples of late-medieval political writings overtly criticizing contemporary rulers.

⁶³ See Storey, *The 'De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus'*, p. 76.

JEAN GERSON ON VIRTUES AND PRINCELY EDUCATION

Yelena Mazour-Matusevich and István P. Bejczy

Although Jean Charlier de Gerson (1363–1429), recognized in modern scholarship as ‘one of the greatest theologians and mystical writers of the Middle Ages’,¹ never personally tutored European kings, he expressed his views on royal education in a couple of epistolary treatises addressed to the preceptors of two different French dauphins. The first letter, *Claro eruditori*, was written between 1408 and 1410 on the request of Jean d’Arsonval (d. 1416), canon of the Sainte-Chapelle and tutor and confessor of Prince Louis (1397–1415), Duke of Guyenne, the oldest son of King Charles VI. The second letter, *Erunt omnes docibiles*, was probably composed in 1417 for the newly appointed preceptor — perhaps the physician Jean Cadart (d. 1449) — of Louis’s younger brother Charles (1403–61), who would ascend the throne in 1422 as Charles VII.²

¹ Brian P. McGuire, ‘Introduction’, in Jean Gerson, *Early Works*, ed. by Brian P. McGuire (New York: Paulist, 1998), pp. 1–58 (p. 1).

² The letters are edited as opera 42 and 86 in *Œuvres complètes de Jean Gerson*, ed. by Palémon Glorieux, 10 in 11 vols (Paris: Desclée, 1960–73), II, 203–15 and 335–38; for their dates and addressees, see Maria Luisa Picascia, ‘Messaggi al precettore del Delfino: *Tractatus e Instructiones* di Jean Gerson’, *Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome: Moyen âge — Temps modernes*, 99 (1987), 235–60 (pp. 235–36). In his edition, Glorieux dates the letters to 1417 and 1429, which would imply that they were written for the tutors of Charles (VII) and Louis (XI), respectively; see also his ‘Tableau chronologique’, *Œuvres*, IX, 593 and 598. However, the correct dates were already established by Antoine Thomas, *Jean Gerson et l’éducation des dauphins* (Paris: Droz, 1930), who was followed by Glorieux himself in ‘La vie et les oeuvres de Jean Gerson: Essai chronologique’, *Archives d’histoire littéraire et doctrinale du moyen âge*, 25–26 (1950–51), 149–92 (pp. 174 and 183). Thomas attributed *Claro eruditori* to Jean

In accordance with Gerson's pedagogical objective, described in the first letter as 'eruditio ad religionem et virtutes',³ we will analyse in this article Gerson's religious conception of princely education in both texts, with particular attention for the role of the virtues and their political significance. The first letter is considerably longer and much more detailed than the second and will therefore constitute the main object of our analysis. In fact, Gerson refers back to it in the second letter in order to avoid repetitions.⁴

Gerson's epistolary treatises differ in several respects from the established genre of 'mirrors of princes'. First of all, they do not address the princes themselves but their tutors. The second letter in particular discusses the proper attitude of the dauphin's preceptor rather than the attitude to be taken by the future king himself; Gerson's main theme in *Erunt omnes docibiles* is how to handle the *docibilitas* of the prince in such a way as never to annoy or upset him. Moreover, the treatises do not contain edifying stories or examples from history or literature, although *Erunt omnes docibiles* recognizes their pedagogical value (but the highest authority rests with the Bible, the doctrine of the Church and its expounding in theology, Gerson hastens to add);⁵ neither do they contain any trace of panegyrics. The most striking characteristic of the treatises, however, is Gerson's apparent lack of attention for political life in the strict sense, quite in contrast to his speeches delivered at court (*Vivat rex, Diligite justitiam, Veniat pax*, etc.), which deal with the crisis of royal power in France. In the epistolary treatises, Gerson's concern is almost exclusively with the moral and spiritual well-being of the prince.

d'Arsonval; Jacques Krynen, *Idéal du prince et pouvoir royal en France à la fin du moyen âge (1380–1440): Étude de la littérature politique du temps* (Paris: Picard, 1981), p. 76, attributed both letters to Jean, under reference to Thomas. However, Jean d'Arsonval died in 1416 whereas the second letter cannot have been written before 1417, when Charles became dauphin after the death of his brother Jean de Touraine. Jean Cadart was physician to Charles from the prince's early years and became court physician and royal councillor upon Charles's ascent to the throne.

³ *Claro eruditori*, p. 203.

⁴ See *Erunt omnes docibiles*, p. 336. The reference appears in the paragraph on the literature to be studied by the dauphin. *Claro eruditori*, pp. 212–13, indeed contains a detailed bibliography for the dauphin; see below, pp. 228–30.

⁵ *Erunt omnes docibiles*, p. 337. As Krynen, *Idéal du prince*, p. 89, observes, 'Tous les miroirs abondent en histoires, contes ou légendes célébrant la perfection morale et les hauts faits des rois de France.' Gerson's texts, discussed by Krynen on pp. 76, 79–83 and 101–03, clearly constitute exceptions in this respect.

Admittedly, the happiness of kingdoms was traditionally supposed to depend on the ruler's personal qualities (the *raison d'être* of many mirrors of princes lies in this very idea), but Gerson does not fall back on this argument in order to justify his approach. He rather seems to have put the salvation of the prince's individual soul above the welfare of the kingdom because spiritual affairs mattered more to him than things temporal. To judge by the rhetoric of the two letters, the goal of kingship was not so much to serve the country's prosperity as to serve God and thus to gain eternal beatitude. As *Erunt omnes docibiles* has it, the dauphin should first of all be warned that the task of educating him

is chiefly undertaken to serve him not as a human being, but to serve God on behalf of the celestial kingdom and divine justice, that is, on behalf of the merit of eternal life rather than a perishable reward.⁶

Gerson's preference of pastoral over political categories is striking even by medieval standards. Indeed, his two treatises can be seen, and will be analysed here, as particular specimens of Gerson's overall aim 'to summarize more than a millennium of spiritual wisdom for a broad audience', as Bernard McGinn has put it.⁷

Gerson's effort to reach the lower strata of medieval society — uneducated people, women and children in particular — has recently come to the foreground in scholarly literature.⁸ But how can this popularizing effort have conducted the composition of his two epistolary treatises concerning the education of the future monarchs of France? The answer is that Gerson considers the dauphins as human beings who are morally and intellectually just as fallible as the common run of men. The prologue of *Claro eruditori* refers in so many words to the folly

⁶ *Erunt omnes docibiles*, p. 336: 'principaliter fiat ad serviendum sibi non tamquam homini sed Deo propter regnum coelorum et justitiam ejus, hoc est propter meritum vitae aeternae potius quam propter stipendium periturae substantiae.'

⁷ Bernard McGinn, 'Preface', in Gerson, *Early Works*, xiii–xvi (p. xv). See also Marc S. Burrows, *Jean Gerson and 'De consolatione theologiae' (1408): The Consolation of a Biblical and Reforming Theology for a Disordered Age* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991), p. 36: 'Gerson transforms what might be called a strictly professional spirituality into more comprehensive terms.'

⁸ See notably D. Catherine Brown, *Pastor and Laity in the Theology of Jean Gerson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Daniel Hobbins, 'The Schoolman as Public Intellectual: Jean Gerson and the Late Medieval Tract', *American Historical Review*, 108 (2003), 1308–37; Yelena Mazour-Matusevich, *L'âge d'or de la mystique française: De Jean Gerson (1363–1429) à Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (1450?–1536)* (Paris-Milan: Archè-SARL, 2004), especially pp. 193–305.

(*stultitia*) and proneness to evil proper to all boys including young Prince Louis,⁹ while the first chapter of the letter exhorts the dauphin to pray God for wisdom by repeating the following words of Salomon (1 Reg. 3. 7–9):

I am but a child, and know not how to go out and come in; and thy servant is in the midst of the people, which thou hast chosen, an immense people, which cannot be numbered nor counted for multitude. Give therefore to thy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy people, and discern between good and evil. For who shall be able to judge this people, thy people, which is so numerous?

The prayer continues with quotations from the Book of Wisdom, according to which the prince is to confess himself as ‘a weak man [...] falling short of the understanding of judgement and laws’ (Sap. 9. 5) while his future task is precisely to be a just ruler and lawgiver.¹⁰

Erunt omnes docibiles likewise upholds Salomon as a model to the dauphin (as does Gerson’s speech *Diligite iustitiam*, dating from 1408). Yet even in this letter, Gerson does not turn to biblical imagery in order to remind the prince of his lowly state:

The Lord Dauphin should frequently be encouraged to consider [...] how all humans, be they poor or rich or kings, are born under the same condition, and that therefore nothing is better for great men than gentleness, clemency and humility towards their brothers and equals in the fate of future beatitude.¹¹

As Gerson said in *De consolatione theologiae*: ‘This is the trap into which many great men fall, for, being great, they are not humble in their own eyes.’¹² The only aspects of the dauphin’s situation which are particular to him are his heavy future responsibilities, which Gerson in *Claro eruditori* presents as a burden rather than as elements of majesty. Who would dare to call kingship happy, asks Gerson, while

⁹ *Claro eruditori*, p. 203: ‘cum stultitia colligata sit in corde ejus sensusque et cogitatio prona sint in malum.’ See also Picascia, ‘Messaggi al precettore del Delfino’, p. 243.

¹⁰ *Claro eruditori*, pp. 204–05. Glorieux gives the reference to 1 (3) Reg. 3. 7–9 but fails to observe that the rest of the prayer is taken from Sap. 9. 1–7 and 10.

¹¹ *Erunt omnes docibiles*, p. 338: ‘Commoneatur frequenter idem dominus Dalphinus recogitare [...] quomodo sunt omnes homines tam pauperes quam divites et reges sub eadem conditione nati; et ideo nihil melius hominibus magnis humanitate, clementia et humilitate circa fratres et coaequales sibi in sorte beatitudinis futurae.’

¹² *De consolatione theologiae* (opus 449), in *Œuvres*, IX, 229: ‘Hic est laqueus magnorum virorum, dum magni non humiles sint in oculis suis, dum magis propriae quam alienae innituntur prudentiae.’ The translation is taken from Dennis D. Martin, *Fifteenth-Century Carthusian Reform: The World of Nicholas Kempf* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), p. 127.

it is exposed to countless dangers which may cause not only temporal but eternal death? It is actually a miracle when kings do not succumb under the weight of their crown, more to be feared than to be acclaimed.¹³

Relief in this situation can only come from above, *ex alto*.¹⁴ It is by God's grace ('*ex sola dignatione misericordis gratiae tuae*') and not by his own merit that the prince is called to reign, and only by God's grace may his reign be conducive to the final destination of human life, '*ad gloriam paradisi et ad evitacionem inferni*'.¹⁵ In order to obtain a graceful state of kingship, the prince must humiliate himself before God like Salomon by acknowledging his ignorance and imploring God's wisdom. Both treatises emphasize this necessity from the outset, but only *Claro eruditori* lays out an ensuing programme for the prince's moral and religious education. The prince must not only ask wisdom from God (section 1) and consider the dangers inherent to kingship (section 3), but also make serious study (section 4) of intellectual culture (sections 4, 5) and the essential doctrines of Christian religion (section 6) in order to develop due attitudes toward the fourfold reign for which he is responsible (sections 2, 4). We will analyze this programme in the next two sections of this article.

Gerson's distinction of four reigns or kingdoms is an original element in late-medieval political literature which in the letter *Claro eruditori* has the effect of enhancing the chancellor's shift of attention from politics proper to the religious prerequisites of good kingship. The first kingdom, situated above the prince (*supra te*), is the kingdom of heaven, his true fatherland, abode of his ancestors and future descendants, where Prince Louis is called to co-reign in eternity. The second kingdom (*circa te, juxta te*), modelled after the first, is the Church, the only doorway to heaven for the dauphin himself and all others. The third kingdom is personal and located *intra te*, following Christ's dictum 'the kingdom of God is within you' (Luc. 17. 21) and Seneca's view (often quoted in mirrors of princes) that the highest power is the ability to govern oneself. Finally, the fourth kingdom is France. It comprises the three estates (*militantes, clerici, burgenses*) which constitute the arms, the eyes, and the feet, respectively, of the mystical body of the *regalis politia*. It is the prince's highly difficult task, impossible to fulfil without the assistance of divine grace, to aspire after the first kingdom, to honour the

¹³ *Claro eruditori*, p. 208.

¹⁴ *Claro eruditori*, p. 208: 'Mirum si non illud oppresseris. Et opprimes, scio, nisi supervenerit levamen ex alto.'

¹⁵ *Claro eruditori*, p. 204; *Erunt omnes docibiles*, p. 338.

second, to rule the third, and to protect the fourth. God will ask the prince to account for his conduct in all four kingdoms, and his salvation will depend on it.¹⁶

In order to understand this passage properly, it is essential to note that Gerson develops here a variant of a scheme he introduced in his sermon *Adorabunt eum* addressed to King Charles VI in 1391.¹⁷ In this earlier text, Gerson distinguished three kingdoms: *personnel*, *temporel* (the state), and *espirituel* (the Church), thus omitting the celestial kingdom. Each kingdom belonged to one estate in particular: the personal kingdom to the *peuple* (though in fact to every human creature), the temporal kingdom to the *chevalerie*, and the spiritual kingdom to the *clergie*.¹⁸ According to Gerson, Charles VI exercised supreme authority in all three kingdoms, including even the Church; it was not for nothing that the French monarch was called *roy esprituel* by virtue of being anointed in Reims, and *roy tres crestien* because of his relentless defence of the faith in the kingdom of France.¹⁹ In *Claro eruditori* Gerson does not mention these royal epithets, and rather, presents the dauphin as an outsider to ecclesiastical rule, as the phrases *iuxta te* and *circa te* suggest. Prince Louis owes respect to the Church but is not called to wield power over it. Neither does the future king reign supreme in the celestial and personal kingdoms (in the latter case, reason has royal power). He only has authority over the three estates within the limits of the temporal kingdom of France, which Gerson ranks fourth and last, suggesting that the religiously defined duties of the dauphin toward his heavenly destination, the Church, and his own personality weigh heavier than his future political rule. Moreover, the dauphin shares these religiously defined duties with all other human beings, which again makes him much like an ordinary believer. His own salvation as well as the salvation of his subjects depends on grace and ecclesiastical mediation, two powers escaping royal control.

The sections on study in *Claro eruditori* are closely related to the overall theme of wisdom. Celestial wisdom herself remains invisible, explains Gerson, but to those who seek her she will send *lectio studiosa*, who is wisdom's handmaid. *Lectio studiosa* offers sound advice for governing the four kingdoms, especially when accompanied by her sister *profunda meditatio* or *attenta consideratio*. After enumerating four efforts which the prince should make in order to profit from

¹⁶ *Claro eruditori*, pp. 205–07.

¹⁷ *Adorabunt eum* (opus 342), in *Œuvres*, VII, 519–38.

¹⁸ *Adorabunt eum*, p. 523; see also p. 520: the personal kingdom 'appartient a toute humaine creature, car chascun se doit gouverner deurement, et par ainsi sera digne d'estre roy appele.'

¹⁹ *Adorabunt eum*, pp. 522–23.

studying (he should compose an extensive library, read at fixed daily hours, concentrate exclusively on serious and decent writings, and translate his readings into moral conduct) and emphasizing the necessity of taking counsel from worthy advisers, Gerson concludes section 4 of his letter with a renewed call to pray to God for wisdom. Section 5 contains a list of recommendable books which the dauphin 'must make sure to possess',²⁰ while section 6 again consists of a prayer to Wisdom (now explicitly identified with Christ), since no study will be profitable without Christ giving insight.²¹ The knowledge asked from Christ in this last section is concrete and specific. In fact, Gerson lists the subjects which figured in more or less identical order in contemporary catechetical literature: the twelve articles of the faith, the Ten Commandments, the precepts of the New Testament, a series of septenarii — the petitions of the Pater Noster, the deadly sins, the principal virtues (theological and cardinal), and their celestial correlates, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the beatitudes, the works of mercy, the sacraments — and the fruits of the Spirit. The treatise ends with a final appeal to Christ to reveal what must be believed, to command what should be done and to inspire the prince's *scire, posse et velle* in such a way as to make Prince Louis confident of the Day of Judgement.

The last section is not related in any specific way to the theme of royal government. It contains the catechetical lessons which pastoral authors offered to every Christian believer since the early thirteenth century. This, however, lends support to our view that Gerson's conception of princely education falls within his larger design of popularizing theology. He addresses the dauphin of France as a member of the flock entrusted to the clergy for guidance on the path to heaven. Basically, princely education serves the same aims as religious education in general: an understanding of one's religious duties and the development of a contemplative attitude in order to gain merit with God. We can agree with Maria Luisa Picascia that Gerson's educational thought in his two letters is marked by a *reductio ad religionem* and even a *reductio ad theologiam*, though not in the sense that the prince is urged to turn from the life of the court (as a place of decay) to the university (as a place of wisdom).²² Neither courtly nor academic life receive explicit attention in the texts; in fact, the paragraph in *Claro eruditori* urging the prince to take advice from a maximum number of counsellors (a view which

²⁰ *Claro eruditori*, p. 212: 'libri quos necessario fac habeas.'

²¹ *Claro eruditori*, pp. 213–14: 'Adsis ergo jugiter puero tuo Tu, Sapientia Dei Patris, Jesu Christe [...] quia nisi te aperiente sensum nullae intelliguntur scripturae, nulla lectio proficiet.'

²² See Picascia, 'Messagi al precettore', pp. 247–48.

Gerson likewise expressed in *Vivat rex*, pronounced in the Louvre in 1405) rather puts the court into a favourable light.²³ Gerson's ideal prince does not make a horizontal movement from the court to the university, but rather a vertical movement from his own ignorance to God's wisdom. In conformity with Gerson's dual commitment to affective and speculative theology, the prince must seek God's wisdom along two ways: prayer and study. Achieving this movement is necessary for every believer, only more impelling for the dauphin because of the dangers inherent in his position.

What role does Gerson assign to the virtues in the programme of moral and religious education as outlined in his two epistolary treatises? Even though explicit references to humility are few in both texts,²⁴ the theme of humility is obviously fundamental to Gerson, since it is by humiliating himself before God that the prince may begin to learn wisdom — and also begin to acquire the other virtues, whose unique source is God, as *Claro eruditori* makes clear.²⁵ Many authors of the High and late Middle Ages considered humility the *fundamentum virtutum*;²⁶ similarly, humility appears in Gerson's texts as the basic attitude for the prince's instruction *ad religionem et virtutes*. In *Erunt omnes docibiles*, Gerson refers to gentleness (*humanitas*), clemency, and humility as virtues to be developed by the dauphin; other lists of princely virtues do not occur in this writing. By contrast, *Claro eruditori* contains such lists. The first one appears in the passage describing Prince Louis's rule of his personal kingdom. In this kingdom, reason wields royal power,²⁷ assisted by 'inner, innate and acquired

²³ See *Claro eruditori*, p. 211; *Vivat rex* (opus 398), in *Œuvres*, VII, 1164.

²⁴ See *Claro eruditori*, p. 207 ('Nam tanto esse humilior atque ad serviendum promptior quisque debet ex munere quanto se obligatiorem conspiciit in reddenda ratione'); *Erunt omnes docibiles*, p. 336 ('orationes humiles et continuas'), p. 338 ('nihil melius hominibus magnis humanitate, clementia et humilitate').

²⁵ *Claro eruditori*, p. 204: the prince confesses how God made him 'de filio irae filium adoptionis et gratiae per infusionem Spiritus Sancti in fide, spe et caritate, cum ceteris virtutibus et donis animam meam ornantibus atque firmantibus'.

²⁶ See, e.g., Jan van Ruusbroec, *Ornatus spiritualis desponsationis*, 2 (*Die geestelike brulocht* in Geert Groote's translation), ed. by Henricus Douwes and Rijcklof Hofman (CCCM, 172, p. 176); Thomas à Kempis, *Sermones ad novicios regulares*, 5, *Opera omnia*, ed. by Joseph Pohl, 7 vols (Freiburg i.Br.: Herder, 1902–22), VI.i, p. 44.

²⁷ The paramount position of reason in the personal kingdom accords not only with *Adorabunt eum* (see below, p. 232), but also with *L'école de la raison* (opus 304), in *Œuvres*, VII, 106, written by Gerson for his students, where reason teaches and governs every other ability.

virtues' (*virtutes ipsae interiores, tam insitae quam acquisitae*) in the role of military commanders and counsellors; the five corporeal senses take the position of servants (*servi*). The order in this kingdom is perverted if the corporeal elements submit rational power and 'if, moreover, seditious vices take the place of the virtues, like when malice defeats the best counselling prudence, when lust slays continence, when cowardice or temerity kill fortitude, when finally iniquity removes justice from the throne of judgment.'²⁸

Gerson employs here the classical scheme of the four cardinal virtues with *continentia* substituting *temperantia*, which was far from unusual in medieval moral literature; the chancellor alludes, moreover, to Cicero's second *Oratio in Catilinam*, in which the cardinal virtues are faced by a similar series of vices.²⁹ Although Gerson habitually quoted the classics even in the context of theology, his flirt with ancient moral philosophy and his insistence on the rational command of one's inner life, motivated by two quotations of Seneca,³⁰ comes as a surprise in *Claro eruditori*. One could have expected the chancellor to emphasize the dauphin's dependence on divine grace and the necessity of charity, in accordance with the general outline of his treatise. Possibly, his exploring the theme of reason has a particular historical resonance: further on in the treatise, Gerson describes how a lack of due control by the head of state will lead to dissension and overall *insania* in the body politic³¹ — an observation which might refer to the mental illness of King Charles VI and its effects on French political life around 1408/10. Still, it is remarkable that in a treatise focusing on the dauphin's moral and religious education, the rule of one's inner kingdom, the *maximum imperium* of man, is described as a rational process aided by 'innate and acquired virtues', the more so as theologians agreed in Gerson's day that virtue in

²⁸ *Claro eruditori*, p. 206: 'si praeterea pro virtutibus vitia seditiosa succedunt, ut si prudentiam consiliatricem optimam vincit malitia, si continentiam luxuria jugulat, si fortitudinem ignavia vel temeritas enecat, si justitiam demum iniquitas de iudicii throno deturbat.'

²⁹ See Cicero, *Orationes in Catilinam*, 2.25, ed. by Peter Reis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1938), p. 22: *iniquitas, luxuria, ignavia, temeritas; ignavia* opposes prudence (not noticed in Glorieux's edition).

³⁰ *Claro eruditori*, p. 206: 'Et quis illic rex sub Deo statutus est? Utique ratio libera de quo dictum est ab uno sapientum: si vis omnia tibi subicere, subice te rationi tamquam regi.' The reference is to Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*, 37.4, ed. by Otto Hense (Leipzig: Teubner, 1938), p. 116: 'Si vis omnia tibi subicere, te subice rationi; multos reges, si ratio te rexerit' (not noticed in Glorieux's edition). Shortly before, Gerson refers to the view of the philosophers 'quod se regere est maximum imperium'; cf. Seneca, *Ad Lucilium*, 113.30, p. 546: 'Imperare sibi maximum imperium est.'

³¹ *Claro eruditori*, p. 208.

its truest sense was either infused or elevated by charity. Does Gerson break a lance here for political virtues in the Aristotelian sense, that is: for sociopolitical habits developed by human beings on the basis of their natural powers?

The idea of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance as political virtues of nonreligious origin was certainly not alien to Gerson's thought. Between 1400 and 1415, Gerson composed a separate treatise on the cardinal virtues titled *De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus*. The treatise mainly consists of definitions of the virtues, their species, and the vices opposing them. These definitions seem partly to derive from the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas and are in any case strongly influenced by Aristotelian views. Gerson calls prudence an acquired intellectual habit and defines some of its parts as sociopolitical qualities.³² Moreover, Gerson's extensive analysis of the political situation of France in *Vivat rex* follows the scheme of the cardinal virtues, on which orderly civil and political life is said to depend; by contrast, the spiritual life of the king depends on the theological virtues.³³ However, Gerson identifies in this text the order created by the cardinal virtues not only as *iustitia legalis* (an Aristotelian concept identical with virtue in general) but also as the love of God, since this love determines every virtue.³⁴ Natural and theological categories even seem to converge altogether in another political speech of Gerson, *Diligite iustitiam*. In order to emulate the justice of God, declares Gerson, royal justice should comprise faith, hope, and love as well as the three other cardinal virtues which perfect the natural potencies of the mind; it is actually the theological virtues which engender prudence, fortitude, and temperance.³⁵

The importance Gerson attached to the cardinal virtues in political life is also evident from the list of recommended books included in *Claro eruditori*, where ancient and medieval works on virtue and ethics occupy a prominent place. After

³² *De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus* (opus 436), in *Œuvres*, IX, 142. Gerson's division of prudence corresponds to that of Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, III.iii.1, pp. 555–59, but his definitions are different.

³³ *Vivat rex*, pp. 1149–80 (political life and cardinal virtues), 1180–84 (spiritual life and theological virtues). The king must observe all four virtues in politics; furthermore, the counsellors must be prudent, the knights courageous, the judges just, and all temperate.

³⁴ *Vivat rex*, p. 1149. Yuri M. Malinin, 'Ideya prava vo frantsuzskoï obshchestvennoï mysli pozdnego srednevekov'ya (XIV–XV veka)' (The Concept of Law in French Political Thought of the Late Middle Ages (Fourteenth to Fifteenth Centuries)), in *Pravo v srednevekonom mire*, ed. by Ol'ga Var'yash (Moscow: Institut vseobshche Istorii, 1996), pp. 153–75 (p. 155), argues that love in combination with justice figures as a counterweight to the strict application of law in *Vivat rex*. Malinin believes that for Gerson, love supersedes the idea of law.

³⁵ *Diligite iustitiam* (opus 348), in *Œuvres*, VII, 602–03 and 614.

the Bible and the *Postilla* of Nicholas of Lyra, two treatises on virtues and vices appear on Gerson's list: a *tractatus de vitiis et virtutibus*, which probably refers to the double *Summa de vitiis* and *Summa de virtutibus* composed around 1240 by the Dominican friar William Peraldus, and a *Summa regis* in French, to be identified with the *Somme le roi* written in 1279 for King Philip II of France by his Dominican confessor Laurent. The *Summa de virtutibus* of Peraldus is not addressed to a royal audience, but the sections on the cardinal virtues contain many examples from ancient rulers; Peraldus's overall perspective is Christian, however. The *Somme le roi* is a catechetical work discussing roughly the same themes as Gerson in the final section of *Claro eruditiori*, but it puts so much emphasis on the (cardinal and other) virtues and the vices that it was often called *Somme* (or *Livre*) *des vices et des vertus*.

Gerson's list continues with works on saints and martyrs, the *Speculum historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais, some patristic items, and a fairly large selection of the chancellor's own writings including his speeches *Vivat rex*, *Diligite justitiam*, and *Veniat pax*, which reveal Gerson's desire to have a lasting influence on French politics. The list also comprises Gerson's pastoral and spiritual works *Miroir de l'âme*, *La science de bien mourir*, *La montaigne de contemplation*, and *La mendicité spirituelle*. These works were composed for a broad, vernacular audience. This is especially true for the last two texts, addressed to Gerson's sisters and written for women in general. The inclusion of these humble and humbling texts in the reading list of the future king underlines Gerson's premise to embrace the highest social strata in his effort to popularize theology.

Next follows a series of works in which the cardinal virtues figure as sociopolitical instruments: *De regimine principum* of Giles of Rome, a *libellus De quatuor virtutibus*, and Aristotle's *Economics*, *Ethics*, and *Politics* in French translation. *De regimine principum*, written for Prince Louis's ancestor Philip IV, contains ample discussions of the cardinal virtues as the principal moral qualities underlying kingship, as several other contributions to this volume show; Giles even resumed the twelve virtues of Aristotle's *Ethics* (the intellectual virtue of prudence and eleven moral virtues) under the scheme of the four cardinal virtues. The *libellus De quatuor virtutibus* may be identified with the most widely divulged medieval text on the cardinal virtues, the *Formula vitae honestae* of Martin of Braga, written in the late sixth century for King Miro of the Sueves. The work survives in over seven hundred medieval manuscripts, about one-third of which date from the fifteenth century. In the Later Middle Ages, the *Formula* was usually attributed to Seneca. The text may indeed go back to a lost work of Seneca and in any case discusses the cardinal virtues from a secular perspective, as social

attitudes to be adopted by laymen irrespective of their religious background.³⁶ The three works of Aristotle are related to public life, with the *Ethics* concentrating on virtues. Although Aristotle did not employ the scheme of the cardinal virtues in his *Ethics*, many of the work's medieval commentators did so (as did Giles of Rome).³⁷ Only after these works follow the other classics on Gerson's list, consisting of historiography, military affairs, and diverse moral writings, some of which again discuss virtues (Seneca's *De clementia*, Cato, Aesopus).³⁸ Classical and Christian virtue ethics adapted to kings thus plays an important role in the dauphin's reading programme composed by Gerson, and the cardinal virtues take a considerable share in it.³⁹

Yet, according to the central didactic passage of *Claro eruditori*, it is not the cardinal virtues that Prince Louis should primarily develop. Specifying the fruits of study, Gerson explains that *lectio studiosa* in combination with *profunda meditatio* or *attenta consideratio* will result in gathering four virtues which will enable the prince to adopt an appropriate attitude toward the four kingdoms distinguished earlier in the letter. Although Gerson could easily have connected the four kingdoms with the four cardinal virtues whose political relevance he appreciated, the four virtues he introduces here are *oratio devota*, *institutio sancta*, *disciplina temperata*, and *justitia moderata*. Each of these virtues is related to one of the four kingdoms: *oratio devota* will lead to acquiring the kingdom of heaven, *institutio sancta* to the stabilization of ecclesiastical rule, *disciplina temperata* organizes the interior kingdom, and *iustitia moderata* is needed to govern the

³⁶ See Martin of Braga, *Formula vitae honestae*, Praef., ed. by Claude W. Barlow, *Martini episcopi Bracarensis opera omnia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 204–50 (p. 237): 'non illa ardua et perfecta quae a paucis et egregiis deicolis patrantur instituit, sed ea magis commonet quae et sine divinarum scripturarum praeceptis naturali tantum humanae intellegentiae lege etiam a laicis recte honesteque viventibus valeant adimpleri.'

³⁷ See Roberto Lambertini, 'Tra etica e politica: La *prudencia* del principe nel *De regimine* di Egidio Romano', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 3 (1992), 77–144 (pp. 83–91); István P. Bejczy, 'The Cardinal Virtues in Medieval Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1250–1350', in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200–1500*, ed. by István P. Bejczy (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

³⁸ See also the reading list Gerson composed in 1400 for his students in *Lettre aux messieurs de Navarre* (opus 5), in *Œuvres*, II, 31–32, which combines classical and Christian authorities.

³⁹ Picascia, 'Messagi al precettore', p. 259, divides the reading list into four sections which in her view are each connected to one of the four kingdoms. Her attempt strikes us as unconvincing. Moreover, she does not notice the prominent position of virtue ethics in Gerson's list.

kingdom of France.⁴⁰ The following table represents the relations established in *Claro eruditiori* between princely rule and virtue:

<i>Regnum</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Task of prince</i>	<i>Virtue</i>	<i>Function of virtue</i>
<i>coeleste</i>	<i>super te</i>	<i>aspirare, tendere</i>	<i>oratio devota</i>	<i>acquirere regnum</i>
<i>Ecclesiae</i>	<i>circa te, iuxta te</i>	<i>honorare, colere</i>	<i>institutio sancta</i>	<i>stabilire regnum</i>
<i>personale</i>	<i>intra te</i>	<i>moderari</i>	<i>disciplina temperata</i>	<i>moderari regnum</i>
<i>temporale, politicum</i>	<i>sub te</i>	<i>tueri, protegere</i>	<i>iustitia moderata</i>	<i>gubernare regnum</i>

In case of the celestial and ecclesiastical kingdoms, Gerson seems to replace the cardinal virtues of sociopolitical content with concepts related to the spiritual aspects of royal authority and, generally, to the religious obligations of individual believers. One may assume that *oratio devota* ('devout prayer,' but also: 'pious speech') is an obligation of every Christian. *Institutio sancta* (literally: 'holy conduct', 'sacred disposition') is probably to be interpreted as a most respectful attitude toward the Church, since the responsibility of the prince in relation to the *regnum Ecclesiae* consists in honouring and venerating it. Paying due respect to ecclesiastical rule obviously has a political connotation in the case of a future king of France. The remaining two virtues, *disciplina temperata* and *iustitia moderata*, do not in themselves have a religious connotation. By their names both virtues express the principle of moderation which according to ancient and medieval moral thought was inherent to any virtue; in *Vivat rex*, Gerson identified this principle with the virtue of temperance.⁴¹

⁴⁰ *Claro eruditiori*, p. 209: 'Attende quod lectio docet orationem quae deservit regno coelorum ut acquiratur; lectio docet institutionem sanctam quae deservit ecclesiastico regno ut stabiliatur; lectio docet disciplinam temperatam per quam regnum tertium personale moderatur; lectio docet iustitiam moderatam per quam regnum temporale et politicum gubernatur.'

⁴¹ *Vivat rex*, p. 1175: 'Atrempance. Selon son nom elle est a moderer et garder toute en mesure. Ne quid nimis; nul trop n'est bon sans mesure.' For the Latin phrase see Seneca, *Dialogi*

A comparison with Gerson’s sermon *Adorabunt eum* is again revealing as to the chancellor’s shifting concerns in princely education. In the 1391 text Gerson identified, under reference to Aristotle, three pairs of virtues which should help the king to govern wisely (*sagement gouverner*) in the three kingdoms under his control. In the personal realm, *noble cuer et franche voulente* helped him to submit the capital sins; in the temporal realm, *loyal amour et vraye charite* guaranteed the unity of the body politic; in the spiritual realm, *ferme foy et vraye credulite* served the preservation of orthodoxy and religious unity. These pairs of virtues were seated on the throne of reason, the throne or bed of justice, and the throne of academic theology, respectively. To put these findings into a table:

Realm	Estate	Virtue	Throne of the virtue	Function of the virtue
personal	people	<i>noble cuer et franche voulente</i>	reason	fight capital sins
temporal	nobility	<i>loyal amour et vraye charite</i>	justice	bring political unity
spiritual	clergy	<i>ferme foy et vraye credulite</i>	theology (<i>science divine</i>)	preserve religious unity

Apart from the absence of the kingdom of heaven, the major difference with the arrangement of *Claro eruditori* is the active role of the king in ecclesiastical matters, inspired by virtues which take their basis in theology. In fact, the king appears in *Adorabunt eum* as the strong-arm of the Sorbonne, called to enforce with spiritual and other arms the decisions of the chancellor and his colleagues. By contrast, *Claro eruditori* depicts the dauphin as an ordinary believer with a passive relation to theology in that he is encouraged to accept the principal truths of the faith. As to the personal realm, the sovereign position of reason in *Adorabunt eum* is congruent with *Claro eruditori*, even though the first text defines the corresponding virtues and their function in terms of open contest rather than temperate rule. But the greatest similarity exists in the sphere of the temporal realm, the domain of politics in the strict sense. Both *Adorabunt eum*

vii.xiii.5, ed. by Emil Hermes (Leipzig: Teubner, 1923), p. 210: ‘Et voluptas nocet nimia: in virtute non est verendum, ne quid nimium sit, quia in ipsa est modus.’

and *Claro eruditori* associate the moral dimension of political life with the virtue of justice, which Gerson in *Diligite iustitiam* called the foremost quality of rulers.⁴² According to *Adorabunt eum*, love is the central virtue of earthly politics. Love must be understood here as benevolence and natural affection, not as Christian charity; accordingly, the examples and authorities quoted by Gerson in this context all stem from classical antiquity. But love alone is not enough, warns Gerson: it must be combined with justice in order to avoid favouritism. Modified by justice, the king's *loyal amour* toward his subjects engenders four daughters: love (since love reproduces itself), *seurte* (affection for the king on the part of his subjects), *misericorde et clemence*, and *liberalite*. The third daughter is the principal warden of justice:

La tierce fille est misericorde et clemence; et est celle qui principalement garde le lit de sa mere, qui est lit de justice. Ainsi le temoigne le Saige: clementia roboratur thronus eius, scilicet regis. Qui a bonne amour a son peuple ne peult que de ses meschiefs, tribulations et indigencez nait misericorde. Et pleust a Dieu, sire, que bien le sceussiez. Il est certain que loyal amour est cy avecques vous si ceste fille a compassion en amour.⁴³

Mercy and clemency, presented here as the pillars of justice, actually counted in the Christian tradition as restraints of justice. Many patristic and medieval authors distinguished *iustitia* and *miser cordia* as two opposed aspects of political power, with *iustitia* standing for the punishment of wrongdoers and *miser cordia* for desisting from due punishment by way of favour.⁴⁴ In contrast to the majority of canon and civil lawyers, medieval theologians and religious authors tended to prefer mercy over the strict application of laws, often advancing the argument that God would do likewise when judging our souls.⁴⁵ Accordingly, Gerson urged Charles VI in *Adorabunt eum* to have compassion with the shortcomings of his subjects rather than take harsh measures and sow discord. Love and justice thus

⁴² See *Diligite iustitiam*, p. 600: 'justice qui est la propriété propre a seignorie ou dominacion'; the royal court is 'fontaine de justice.'

⁴³ *Adorabunt eum*, p. 529. The Latin quotation is from Prov. 20. 28.

⁴⁴ See Philippe Buc, *L'ambiguïté du livre: Prince, pouvoir et peuple dans les commentaires de la Bible au moyen âge* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1994), pp. 27, 46, 53, 177–79, and 185–86.

⁴⁵ For the concepts of equity and justice in medieval legal and theological thought, see Ennio Cortese, *La norma giuridica: Spunti teoretici nel diritto comune classico*, 2 vols (Milan: Giuffrè, 1962–64), II, 1–37; Pier Gi. Caron, 'Aequitas' romana, 'miser cordia' patristica ed 'epicheia' aristotelica nella dottrina dell' 'aequitas' canonica (dalle origini al Rinascimento) (Milan: Giuffrè, 1971); Theodore J. Ziolkowski, *The Mirror of Justice: Literary Reflections of Legal Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); István P. Bejczy, 'Law and Ethics: Twelfth-Century Lawyers on the Virtue of Justice', *Viator* 36 (2005), 197–216.

tempering each other lead to something much similar to *iustitia moderata*, the quality Gerson identifies in *Claro eruditori* as essential for royal government.⁴⁶

The concept of *iustitia moderata* reminds one of another notion regularly occurring in Gerson's writings: *aequitas*, or equity, derived from Aristotle's idea of *epikeia*. In the *Regulae mandatorum*, Gerson claims that 'equity, which the Philosopher named *epikeia*, supersedes rigorous justice.'⁴⁷ Zofia Rueger has carefully analyzed Gerson's idea of equity which in her eyes is extraordinary for a couple of reasons. The first is Gerson's remarkable attention to individual (attenuating) circumstances, which even made him extend the famous definition of the canon lawyer Hostiensis (*aequitas est iustitia dulcore misericordia temperata*) to 'Est autem aequitas justitia pensatis omnibus circumstantiis particularibus, dulcore misericordiae temperata'.⁴⁸ The second reason is that Gerson considered equity the norm rather than the exception in making political and judicial decisions. Rueger observes, however, that the application of equity seems restricted in Gerson's writings to canon law and ecclesiastical government rather than worldly justice and royal politics.⁴⁹ We have some reason to revise this latter statement. In *De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, Gerson discusses the concept of equity as a subspecies of the moral virtue of justice:

Epikeia or *epiekya* or equity or interpretative justice is the kind of justice by which a person inclines to obey the law in some particular case, taking into account his own understanding or the probable understanding of the legislator, after carefully weighing off all circumstances.⁵⁰

There is no restriction here to canon law; in fact, the sociopolitical context of the treatise rather suggests that equity applies to civil life. Moreover, Gerson's emphasis on justice tempered by love (in *Adorabunt eum*) or *iustitia moderata* (in *Claro eruditori*) demonstrates that he did create room for a virtue very similar to

⁴⁶ See also Malinin, 'Ideya prava', p. 157, who considers Gerson's treatment of justice typical for late-medieval theologians in its tendency to replace law with Christian morality.

⁴⁷ *Regulae mandatorum*, in *Œuvres*, IX, 95: 'Aequitas quam nominat Philosophus epikeiam, praeponderat juris rigori.'

⁴⁸ *Regulae mandatorum*, pp. 95–96.

⁴⁹ Zofia Rueger, 'Gerson's Concept of Equity and Christopher St. German', *History of Political Thought*, 3 (1982), 1–30 (especially pp. 9–16).

⁵⁰ *De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, p. 152: 'Epikeia seu epiekya vel aequitas vel justitia interpretativa, est justitia qua quis inclinatur obedire legibus, respiciendo ad intellectum quem habebat vel verisimiliter habuisset legislator in particulari hoc casu, circumstantiis omnibus hinc inde ponderatis.'

equity in the domain of secular government. Moderate or merciful justice even stands out in these two texts as the prime political virtue of the French monarchs. Accordingly, Gerson inserted a long digression in *Diligite iustitiam* in order to demonstrate that ‘justice se doit faire par amer bien’. The digression contains a remarkable plea for restricting death penalties to a minimum.⁵¹ Although the chancellor denounced both extremes of bad judgement — ‘severity, austerity or judicial rigour’ and ‘foolish mercy’ — as vicious,⁵² he obviously preferred the latter as the lesser of two evils, in accordance with medieval theological tradition.

Although the Bible introduces the cardinal virtues as being taught by Wisdom (Sap. 8. 7), Gerson presented these virtues first of all as naturally acquired, sociopolitical qualities, recognizing, however, their congruence with religious ethics. Moderate or merciful justice, which in secular government takes the place of Aristotelian equity, is no exception in this respect: it is a political virtue compatible with, and modified by, Christian morality. Gerson’s attention to the moral rather than the legal aspects of justice permitted him to put moderation over harshness, in accordance with the demands of charity.

The religious cast of political life is likewise apparent from a passage in *Claro eruditori* which connects princely rule in general with divine justice. Discussing the first (celestial) kingdom, Gerson inserts the following remark: ‘Obviously, then, you must completely devote yourself to this kingdom of God, to be sought before the others, and to his justice, so that all other things accrue to you.’⁵³ The reference to divine justice accords with the general devotional character of *Claro eruditori*. This devotional character stands in sharp contrast to the exaltation of

⁵¹ *Diligite iustitiam*, pp. 611–12. See also *Requête pour les condamnés à mort* (opus 323), *Œuvres*, VII, 341: ‘Dieu ne veult pas que tous maux soient punis en ce monde car aultrement il n’auroit que juger en l’aulture.’ The *Requête* is mainly a plea for granting confession to the condemned before their execution.

⁵² *De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, p. 152: ‘Severitas vel austeritas vel rigor iudicii, spectat ad hoc vitium per excessum. Stulta misericordia vel nimius dulcor, spectat ad hoc vitium per remissum’; *Diligite iustitiam*, p. 603: ‘En sa justice fera justice sans excéder en trop grande rigidité, ou decouler en trop grande langueur; sera fourme, sans fourvoier ca et la, a dextre ou a senestre.’

⁵³ *Claro eruditori*, p. 205: ‘Quidni igitur te totam ad hoc regnum Dei primo quaerendum et iustitiam ejus extenderis ut cetera omnia adjiciantur tibi.’ We read *totum* for *totam*, even though the reading *totam* also occurs in the edition of *Claro eruditori* in Jean Gerson, *Opera omnia*, ed. by Louis Ellies du Pin, 2nd ed, 5 vols (The Hague: De Hondt, 1728), III, 226–35 (p. 228). Cf. *Diligite iustitiam*, pp. 600, 602, and 614 for the view that royal justice should take divine justice as its model.

royal government in *Adorabunt eum*, which does not include the heavenly kingdom among the king's realms. In *Erunt omnes docibiles*, devotional elements prevail even more strongly. The only mention of justice in this text occurs in connection with the celestial kingdom and concerns divine justice in the Pauline sense, that is, justification of the soul by God's grace.⁵⁴ Apart from the reference to *Claro eruditori* and its list of recommendable books, *Erunt omnes docibiles* merely recommends elementary religious education through humble prayers, moral tales in combination with the teachings of the Bible and theology, the veneration of saints and angels, and instruction in the ten commandments. The only virtues to be upheld to the dauphin are *humanitas*, *clementia*, and *humilitas*. Yet these three virtues are precisely qualities precluding harsh, abusive, or arbitrary forms of government. Even in the devotional setting of *Erunt omnes docibiles*, Gerson's preoccupation with merciful justice remains perceptible.

Gerson's two epistles are indicative of the general evolution of his thought toward a more contemplative and evangelical theology. Ultimately, the political perspective is all but entirely lost; religious qualities gradually take the place of sociopolitical virtues, even though they may result in the same, merciful type of government. Far from separating private morals and public good, Gerson truly and increasingly believed that 'things that he [the theologian] understands through theology can be carried, in unceasing rumination, into the *affectus* of the heart and realized in works'.⁵⁵ Gerson's epistolary treatises to the preceptors of the dauphins represent his attempt to transmit religious truth by touching the reason and the heart of the future monarchs of France. Instead of Plato's king-philosopher, his ideal monarch is a king-theologian exemplified by Salomon, fully immersed in contemplation and humble devotion to the Ruler of the universe.

⁵⁴ See the quotation in n. 6., above

⁵⁵ *De consolatione theologiae*, p. 237: 'ea quae per theologiam intelligit, traducat per jugem ruminationem in affectum cordis, et executionem operis'; translation following Martin, *Fifteenth-Century Carthusian Reform*, p. 83.

PRINCELY VIRTUES IN *DE FELICI
PROGRESSU* OF MICHELE SAVONAROLA,
COURT PHYSICIAN OF THE HOUSE OF ESTE

Gabriella Zuccolin

I. Introduction

Michele Savonarola (1385–1466), court physician in Ferrara during the 1440s and grandfather of the better-known religious and political reformer Girolamo Savonarola (1452–98), addressed to the princes of the House of Este a number of treatises not only medical in nature but also religious, historical, moral, and political. For Savonarola, the court seems to have constituted a privileged place capable of embodying a perfect relation between knowledge and power through the coordination of several disciplines — moral, political, medical-scientific, physiognomic, historical, and philosophical — and the delineation of a coherent and unified pedagogical programme that transcended traditional disciplinary boundaries,¹ even if his medical treatises were more

I wish to thank Carla Casagrande (Università degli Studi di Pavia) for her advice and especially Chris Chambers and Elena Spallanzani, who helped me in translating this paper.

¹ It was far from uncommon for physicians in this period to engage in broader humanist culture, e.g., in historiography; see Nancy G. Siraisi, 'Anatomizing the Past: Physicians and History in Renaissance Culture', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 53 (2000), 1–30; Chiara Crisciani, 'Historia ed exempla: Storia e storie in alcuni testi di Michele Savonarola', in *Il principe e la storia*, ed. by Tina Matarrese and Cristina Montagnani (Novara: Interlinea, 2005), pp. 53–68. See also the essays by Crisciani, Siraisi, and Pomata in *Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by Gianna Pomata and Nancy G. Siraisi (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); *History, Medicine,*

appreciated by posterity than his remaining literary production.² The entire Ferrarese production of Savonarola can in fact be read as an extensive *speculum principis*. It is no coincidence that the chronology of his works partially corresponds to the order of subjects of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Secretum secretorum*.³

Three of Savonarola's treatises — *De felici progressu*, *De vera republica*, and *De nuptijs*⁴ — give substantial attention to princely virtues, in particular to prudence, the most political of all. This article will concentrate on *De felici progressu*, Savonarola's major political work. *De felici progressu* is a Latin treatise written between 1454 and 1461 and extant in only one known manuscript (Modena, Biblioteca Nazionale Estense, α. W. 2.15). Like many of Savonarola's writings, the text remains unedited. The work has also come down in a vernacular version — it is in fact uncertain which version was written first — that has been edited by Maria Aurelia Mastronardi on the basis of the only known manuscript (Ravenna,

and the Traditions of Renaissance Learning, ed. by Nancy G. Siraisi (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming). Savonarola's connections with famous humanist educators, notably Giovanni Conversini of Ravenna, may explain his interest in pedagogical problems. Moreover, physicians conceived of medicine (centred on the body in its relation with the soul as well as the natural and social environment) as a science containing everything to promote human well-being, including political abilities, especially if the subject of their care was the prince. In Quattrocento northern Italy, many court physicians had advisory and other confidential functions, e.g. Guido Parato, Giovanni Matteo Ferrari da Grado, and Benedetto Reguardati at the Sforza court; Pantaleone da Confienza in Piedmont; Ugolino da Montecatini and Pierleone da Spoleto in Florence.

² While some of his medical works were frequently printed, his moral-political and religious writings survive in unique dedication copies for the House of Este.

³ For a first development of this idea, see Jole Agrimi, review of Michele Savonarola, *Libreto de tute le cosse che se manzano: Un libro di dietetica di Michele Savonarola, medico padovano del sec. XV*, ed. by Jane Nystedt (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1982), *Aevum*, 58 (1984), 358–65 (p. 360). See also Chiara Crisciani, 'Michele Savonarola, medico: Tra università e corte, tra latino e volgare', in *Filosofia in volgare nel Medioevo*, ed. by Nadia Bray and Loris Sturlese (Louvain-la-Neuve: FIDEM, 2003), pp. 433–49.

⁴ Michele Savonarola, *De felici progressu illustrissimi Borsii Estensis ad marchionatum Ferrarie, Mutinae et Regii ducatum comitatumque Rodigii*, MS Modena, Biblioteca Nazionale Estense, α. W. 2.15; Savonarola, *De vera re publica et digna saeculari militia*, MS Modena, Biblioteca Nazionale Estense, α. W. 6.6; and Savonarola, *De nuptiis Batibecho et Serabocha*, ed. by P. Biamini, 'Peccati di lingua alla corte estense: Il *De nuptiis Batibecho et Serabocha* di Michele Savonarola', *Schifanoia*, 11 (1992), 101–79.

Biblioteca Classense Cl. n. 302).⁵ Composing Latin and vernacular redactions of the same work was not unusual in Italy at the time, nor was it atypical for Savonarola. Several of his other medical, moral, and political writings testify to his bilingual approach.

II. *De felici progressu*

De felici progressu develops the typical themes of the prince's journey toward knowledge and education (and thus to virtue) and the pedagogy of good government. In the treatise, the prince can find a set of virtues and vices, a representation of himself and his court with which to confront himself, and a moral and political ideal to which he is invited to adapt himself. Several literary forms and genres are moulded together in this structurally articulated piece of work: the *speculum principis*, the *laudatio urbis*, the confrontation of the arts, the *regimen sanitatis*, and the historical chronicle. In the first part of his treatise, Michele Savonarola imagines witnessing the events that precede and follow the investiture of Borso of Este (1413–71) as Marquis of Ferrara in 1450, taking the occasion for developing an ample debate on the best form of government as well as the virtues of the ideal prince. The second part contains a detailed narration of the visit to Ferrara of Emperor Frederic III in 1452 and his solemn investiture of Borso of Este with the duchy of Modena and Reggio. The third and last part is a short treatise on good government.

Following an outdated perspective warped by the dichotomy between Florentine 'civic humanism' and the 'courtly humanism' of Northern Italy,⁶ it

⁵ Savonarola, *Del felice progresso di Borso d'Este*, ed. by Maria Aurelia Mastronardi (Bari: Palomar, 1997). I am deeply indebted to Mastronardi's analysis of the vernacular version in the introduction to her edition (pp. 6–55). The vernacular version has also come down in an eighteenth-century transcript (MS Padua, Biblioteca civica, C.M. 604) that was probably copied from the Ravenna MS, since in the Ravenna MS we can read this note: 'Hic codex exscriptus fuit anno 1772 mense Aprile de domo Savonarola patritia patavina' (fol. 48^v).

⁶ For the prolific debate that developed on these themes see Hans Baron, *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in the Age of Classicism and Tyranny* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955); Hans Baron, *Humanistic and Political Literature in Florence and Venice at the Beginning of the Quattrocento: Studies in Criticism and Chronology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955); Jerrold E. Seigel, *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism: The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom: Petrarch to Valla* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). There is a strong connection between 'civic humanism' as defined by Baron, and what we can define as 'courtly humanism' or 'despotic

would be easy to confine *De felici progressu* to the all-inclusive genre of 'encomiastic literature' and characterize it as a specimen of passive and uncritical praise of a lord by a subaltern man of letters. In reality, Savonarola's work goes beyond the dimension of panegyric, thanks to the complex use of topoi and classical patterns as well as to his careful style of writing that holds a middle ground between literary conventionality and a critique of contemporary events. It is in fact possible to point out a double reading-level in *De felici progressu*: the level of reality, where the moralist physician's censure of the prince and his court is more than evident, and the level of ideals, including the legitimization of political power. In the text this apparent antinomy materializes in the contrast between Borso and his brother and predecessor Leonello (1407–50). Leonello appears as an illuminated prince who aspired to an ideal government, which he was unable to obtain, and who unfortunately died young, while Borso is essentially depicted as a man of arms, only partially educated in letters and too keen on hunting.⁷ In the dispute between reality and ideals, we find Savonarola's most profound pedagogical intent: to outline a model of rule, more ethical than political, marked by justice and liberality but above all by prudence, that should find application, whenever possible, in the political life of Ferrara and thus in its history.

In the first and third parts of *De felici progressu*, the reprise of Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum* — a work characterized by a monarchically orientated reading of Aristotle's ethical and political views mediated through the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas — is massive. *De regimine principum* is actually the only work Savonarola mentions as worthy of being read to the prince; we know that Borso's and Leonello's father, Niccolò III of Este (1383–1441), already

humanism'. Associating the first with republicanism can be misleading because the humanists at the courts tried to influence their lords in the running of the civil life and its values; see Paul O. Kristeller, 'The Moral Thought of Renaissance Humanism', in, *Renaissance Thought II: Papers on Humanism and the Arts* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 20–68 (p. 47).

⁷ Leonello, who ruled Ferrara from 1441, was educated by the humanist Guarino Veronese. During his reign Ferrara was a lively centre of Renaissance culture, filled with painters, architects, and humanist scholars. Borso was indeed less educated than his brother, having spent a lot of time attending military campaigns, but he surely was immensely popular and displayed great skill in establishing a perfectly respectable public image. Werner L. Gundersheimer, *Ferrara: The Style of Renaissance Despotism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 69, compares Leonello to Marcus Aurelius and Borso to Augustus: like Augustus, Borso in a way let himself be deified during his life and so sagaciously manipulated the communication media that it is difficult for historians to form a true judgement of him.

owned an elegant exemplar of the work.⁸ Savonarola used Giles's text as a kind of uniform schema but not in a mechanical way, since he selected only certain parts of the work and left out others, thus leaving a pattern of acceptances and omissions full of meaning. Notably the third part of *De felici progressu* follows some chapters of *De regimine principum* almost *ad litteram*, yet there are substantial differences. For instance, in the part on choosing sage councillors, Savonarola added a chapter specifically concerning the choice of pages, servants, and young courtiers.⁹ The chapter dedicated to the table of the prince repeats Giles's digression on the topic, but Savonarola enriched it with personal opinions¹⁰ — after all, he was also the author of a treatise on dietetics expressly required by Borso.¹¹ Moreover, Savonarola's wish for a practical use of his ethical model affected his presentation and choice of register.

⁸ Also, the court library of Ferrara held a copy of Aristotle's *Politics* and John of Ravenna's *De dilectione regnantium* at the time in which Savonarola was writing; see Adriano Cappelli, 'La biblioteca estense nella prima metà del secolo XV', *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana*, 14 (1889), 21–30. In the immediate following years, in the same library, we find one extra copy of *De regimine principum*; see Giulio Bertoni, *La Biblioteca Estense e la cultura ferrarese ai tempi del duca Ercole I* (Turin: Loescher, 1903), pp. 1–31.

⁹ The chapter is titled 'Quales iuvenes in domicellos principes eligere debent et qui ab eis reiciendi sunt et qualis pincerna esse debet', *De felici progressu*, iii.7, fol. 41'. This is the order of the chapters of the third part of Savonarola's work: I, Qualiter principes habere se debent ut gens sibi commissa ab eis debite regatur; II, Qui ad instruendos filios bonos mores principes per maxime studiosi esse debent; III, Ad quas scientias principum nati sunt invitandi; IV, In quo quae a principibus habenda sunt aperiuntur, ut eorum principatus digna conservatio fiat; V, De eligendorum consiliariorum qualitate; VI, Quo modo princeps habere se debeat ut a populis ametur et ab eis timeatur; VII, Quales iuvenes in domicellos principes eligere debent et qui ab eis reiciendi sunt et qualis pincerna esse debet; VIII, Qui tempore cenae aut prandii principe coram, recumbentes aut ministrantes in colloquiis abundare non debent; IX, In quo declaratur si vita hominum praesens brevior sit ea quae antiquitus esse consuevit. They represent a sort of summary of Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum* (Rome: Zanetti, 1607; repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1967), notably of Books II.ii.1–9, pp. 287–314; II.iii.19–20, pp. 395–99; III.ii.19–20, pp. 500–05.

¹⁰ After the chapter titled 'Qui tempore cenae aut prandii principe coram, recumbentes aut ministrantes in colloquiis abundare non debent' (*De felici progressu*, iii.8, fol. 42'), that repeats almost *ad litteram* the chapter of *De regimine principum* titled 'Quod in mensis regum et principum, et universaliter nobilium, tam racumbentes quam ministrantes, non decet in eloquijs abundare' (Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, II.iii.20, p. 398), Michele Savonarola adds a chapter, which is lacking in the work of Giles of Rome, to discuss the medical question if human life is shorter than in past times: 'In quo declaratur si vita hominum praesens brevior sit ea quae antiquitus esse consuevit.' Cf. *De felici progressu*, iii.9, fol. 43^v.

¹¹ See Michele Savonarola, *Libreto de tutte le cosse*.




Fig. 1: Opening page of Michele Savonarola, *De felici progressu*, MS Modena, Biblioteca Nazionale Estense, α. W. 2.15, fol. 1^r.

The contents of Giles of Rome's work are expressed and illustrated through dialogues, *dubitationes*, and anecdotes that undo the rigid scholastic divisions of *De regimine principum*, making it theatrical, so to speak. Savonarola put into his work typical expressive strategies of contemporary courteous literature in order to make his treatise not only useful but also pleasurable.

In the following two sections we will concentrate on the princely virtues as presented in *De felici progressu*. First, we will examine Savonarola's programme of virtues in general. His presentation is not as systematic as Giles of Rome's, but this does not mean that it is less incisive. Second, we will analyze the virtue of prudence and its parts, since it is this virtue which for Savonarola comes first. As Savonarola constantly wrote under reference to *De regimine principum*, we will be able to establish the originality of his position in comparison to Giles of Rome's.

III. Additional Virtues and 'Conditions' of the Ideal Prince

'Browsing through the volumes of the philosophers', Michele Savonarola finds fifteen virtues that make a prince worthy of being elected. First of all, he must be prudent; also, he should be just, temperate, strong, liberal, magnificent, magnanimous, keen on honour, humble, mild, friendly, sincere, cheerful, eloquent, and handsome. He first discusses these virtues on a theoretical level and then exemplifies them, on more than one occasion, in the person and works of Borso of Este. Savonarola avers that he found these fifteen virtues in Aristotle,¹² but it is certain that this is not the case. He rather modelled himself on Giles of Rome, who in *De regimine principum* deduced twelve moral virtues from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*¹³ and tried to integrate these into the scheme of the four cardinal virtues which was in fact alien to Aristotle's thought.

¹² *De felici progressu*, fol. 16': 'Quas quindecim numero codicem Aristotilis discurrendo comperi. Dicamus itaque in primis principem principatu dignum prudentem natura esse oportere, iustum, temperatum, fortem, liberalem, magnificum, magnanimum, honoris gloriaeque cupidum, humilem, mansuetum, amicabilem, veracem, iucundum et eloquentem, quibus si corporis species unita erit equidem is dignus erit imperio, ut nullus eo gloriosior haberi posse arbitretur.'

¹³ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, l.iii.3, p. 51: 'Philosophus circa finem V [*sic pro* II] Ethicorum praeter Prudentiam et Iustitiam, enumerat 10 virtutes morales, videlicet, Fortitudinem, Temperantiam, Honoris amatiuam, Magnanimitatem, Largitatem, Magnificentiam, Mansuetudinem Veritatem et Affabilitatem et Eutrapeliam, quam bene vertibilitatem vel societatem appellare possumus. Igitur, computata Iustitia et Prudentia, duodecim sunt virtutes morales.'

To the virtues accepted by Giles, Savonarola added humility, beauty, and eloquence. The first among these, humility, though absent from Giles's general catalogue, is in fact considered necessary for a ruler in *De regimine principum* and two whole chapters of the work are dedicated to its treatment.¹⁴ In Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, humility and pride appear as vices between which the virtue of magnanimity is located. However, a scholastic tradition culminating in the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas conciliated the virtue of magnanimity with the Christian virtue of humility, presenting these virtues as two faces of the same medal.¹⁵ Savonarola manifestly follows this tradition.¹⁶ By way of example, he relates that all citizens of Ferrara can witness Borso's humility, for he has often been seen listening to the begging of 'the poor woman' who stops him in the streets.¹⁷

Savonarola particularly insists upon beauty, the second virtue added to the list of Giles. In order to underline its importance, he quotes Virgil ('Gratior est virtus veniens in corpore pulcro', *Aeneis*, v.344) and Homer ('Species Priami digna est imperio', *Iliad*, xxiv.631–32).¹⁸ These topoi from classical literature take on a special meaning which goes beyond the level of rhetorical ornamentation if we

¹⁴ These are Chapters I.ii.25 and 26, titled 'Quod humilitas dici debet honoris amativa, et quod omnis magnanimus est humilis' and 'Quid est humilitas, et circa quae habet esse, et quod decet reges et principes esse humiles'. See Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.26, p. 127: 'Nullus est vere magnanimus nisi sit bonus et humilis, et semper magnanimitati est annexa humilitas: quare si decet reges et principes esse magnanimos, decet eos esse humiles.'

¹⁵ See René-Antoine Gauthier, *Magnanimité: L'idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne* (Paris: Vrin, 1951), especially pp. 443–88.

¹⁶ *De felici progressu*, fol. 18^r: 'Humilitatem princeps colere debet, cum dicat Dominus: "beati humiles quoniam eorum est regnum caelorum". Humilis in rebus honorificis ultra id quod ratio dictat non prosequitur verum inter superbiam et deiectionem medium se ponit, superbiam reprimens et deiectionem moderans. Magnanimitati quidem semper est humilitas anexa, quamobrem eum humilem esse decet qui magnanimus esse cupit. Verum id maxime in principe probo ut suae celsitudinis gradum ita diligat ita cultum suae humilitatis teneat ne incidat in contemptum.'

¹⁷ *De felici progressu*, fol. 26^r: 'Ut quid ad eius magnanimitatem humilitatemque me convertam, cum eorum omnium fideles testes sumus tantam et mansuetudinem suam esse cernimus ut cum spatiandi gratia civitatem perambulat ad mulierculae unius preces saepenumero se sistat illi humili et indefessas aures prebens. Et cum omnia haec nobis ex se manifesta siant, ulteriori ergo probatione egere non putavi.'

¹⁸ *De felici progressu*, fol. 19^r: 'Nam ad gratuitatem et splendorem humanarum virtutum corporis species non parum opis afferre semper mihi visa est, dicente Virgilius "Gratior est virtus veniens in corpore pulcro", propterea Homerus "Species Priami digna est imperio".'

realize that Savonarola is the author of a physiognomic treatise dedicated to Borso's brother, Leonello.¹⁹ According to *De felici progressu*, harmony and grace of the body mirror the nature of the soul. Borso's good looks confirm his moral qualities, just as the beauty of Ferrara is a natural consequence of the virtues of its prince. The identification of the town with the ruling dynasty is nearly complete: the exaltation of Ferrara, its wonders, and the magnificence of its daily life stresses the symmetry between perfect rule and the blossoming of city life. Naturally, *laudatio urbis* is another classical theme which Quattrocento humanist culture adapted into the political and ideological atmosphere.²⁰

Eloquence is perhaps the most important virtue added by Savonarola to Giles of Rome's list of virtues. Princes and military leaders must develop prudence and eloquence hand in hand, modelling themselves on the great rulers of the past. The supreme example, reported by Savonarola, of the perfect fusion of military skill and letters, *imperium* and *litterae*, is Julius Caesar.²¹ The Platonic quotation 'Happy would the world be if the sages would rule', a real topos in the political literature of humanism, is used by Savonarola almost as a refrain.²² The

¹⁹ Michele Savonarola, *Speculum phisionomie*, MS Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat. VI.156 (2672). The work is also extant in MSS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 7357 and Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Haenel 3472. See Johannes Thomann, *Studien zum 'Speculum phisionomie' des Michele Savonarola* (Zürich: Copy Quick, 1997); Gabriella Zuccolin, *Michele Savonarola 'medico humano': Lo 'Speculum phisionomie'* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Università degli Studi di Salerno, 2007).

²⁰ See Maria Corti, 'La città come luogo mentale', *Stumenti critici*, 8 (1993), 1–18; Eugenio Garin, 'La città ideale', in Garin, *Scienza e vita civile nel Rinascimento italiano* (Bari: Laterza, 1965), pp. 33–56; Cesare Vasoli, 'Considerazioni sulla *Laudatio Florentinae urbis* di Leonardo Bruni', in Vasoli, *Studi sulla cultura del Rinascimento* (Manduria: Laicata, 1968), pp. 48–68. Leonardo Bruni's *Laudatio Florentinae urbis* is edited in Hans Baron, *From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni: Studies in Humanistic and Political Literature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 232–63.

²¹ *De felici progressu*, fol. 2^v: 'Nam et quorundam sententiam extat, qui litterarum dignitatem plurimum extollunt, Caesarem non minus gloriose litteris quem armis triumphasse[...]. Nam imperatoris verba tanta cum gravitate et eloquenti persuasionem prolata veluti pungentia calcarea et acuti enses ab armatis habeantur ut ad omnia quae eorum imperator cupit illos reddat promptiores, ex quibus facile iudicantur principes et imperatores ad studia eloquentiae filios invitare debere[...]. His ergo inducamus principes et armatorum imperatores ne dum eloquentia verum et prudentia predicos esse oportere ut unum naturale alterum accidentale faciamus[...]. Ideoque in civitatibus eloquentiam sine prudentia plurimum nocere videmus.'

²² See for example *De felici progressu*, fol. 6^v: 'Preterea Plato dicere ausus est, tum demum orbem beati esse cum aut sapientes regnare aut regentes sapere coepissent'; fol. 8^v: 'Propterea a

preeminence of letters over arms is a well-known theme in Quattrocento humanism.²³ In Savonarola's case, the typically humanist connection of *sapientia*, *eloquentia*, and *prudentia* is deepened so as to suggest a unity of *virtus*, *humanae litterae*, and the exertion of power.²⁴ The comparison between the characters of Leonello, the cultivated prince and ideal embodiment of the philosopher-ruler from Plato's *Republic*, and his brother Borso, the newly inaugurated prince only partially educated in letters, emerges clearly in this context. By aid of literary education and occasional criticism, Savonarola urges Borso to go beyond the logic of arms and fight the decline of the present, in particular of his court.

It is important to note that Savonarola neither thinks it possible to find a prince who observes all fifteen virtues (it is like finding a 'white crow', an image dear to him),²⁵ nor believes it necessary for a ruler to be so incredibly well equipped.

Platone bene scriptum est: florerent itaque civitates si aut philosophi imperarent aut imperantes philosopharent'; fol. 34^r: 'Quare Plato felices Res. Pu. si philosophantes regerent, aut regentes philosopharent'; fol. 37^r: 'Propterea Plato: beatum orbem fieri dicebat si regnantes philosopharent.'

²³ On this subject see Antonia Tissoni Benvenuti, 'Le armi e le lettere nell'educazione del signore nelle corti padane del Quattrocento', *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome, moyen âge — temps modernes*, 99 (1987), 435–46; Francesco Tateo, 'Le armi e le lettere: Per la storia di un *topos* umanistico', in *Acta conventus neo-latini Torontonensis: Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies, Toronto, 8–13 August 1988*, ed. by Alexander Dalzell and others (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1991), pp. 63–81.

²⁴ *De felici progressu*, fol. 6^r: 'Non bonum patriae esse potest absque principis sapientia haec autem omnia minime absque florenti virtute haberi possunt. Toga autem magisque arma ad haec omnia vendicanda longe magis operatur. Quasobres plane fatendum erit togam in principe ipsis armis commendandam magis esse. Tumque recte dixisse dicemus qui scripsit — Homo sine scientia est sine lege provintia. Ea propter Averrois maximus comentator Alexandri auctoritate scripsit — hominem litteris ornatum tantum a litteris carentequantum vivus a mortuo distat [...]. Quibus facile inducitur principum filios ad capescendas litteras magno cum studio invitandos esse quae principibus equidem maximo accedunt ornamento estque litterarum dignitas magno apprecianda thesauro Principes ad prudentiam caeterasque virtutes nec non ad gloriam sibi vendicandam maximo preparant cum honore, nam plurimorum sapientum hominum consuetudine homines prudentiores virtuosioresque redduntur. Princeps igitur qui bonis litteris graecis latinisque eruditus evasit philosophorum scripta dignissima contemplatus et veterorum historias sic ex eis doctior prudentiorque factus suo regimini melius consulere sciet.'

²⁵ *De felici progressu*, fol. 19^r: 'His autem omnibus corporis principis species si unita erit equidem inter principes omnes veluti alba cornix habendum erit.[...] Haec pace vestrum dixisse volui ut apertus eligendi principis conditiones ab omnibus clariores habeantur, utque si has omnes haud earum pars maior in aliquo eligendo invenirentur illum in principem nostrum eligere minime a nobis dubitandum erit.' Savonarola often uses the image of the white crow in his

In order to exercise government properly, it is enough to have the most important of the virtues.²⁶ Here again we have an important difference with the *De regimine principum*. In accordance with the ancient theory of the necessary connection of the virtues (a theory which found universal approval in thirteenth-century scholasticism), Giles of Rome used a whole chapter to argue that the perfect king must be in possession of all the listed virtues.²⁷ Recognizing that in real life it is impossible to find a perfect prince, and that Borso in particular is a man with many faults, Savonarola appears to have thought it necessary nevertheless to crystallize the image of the ruler as ideal perfection in order to establish an ethical-political model which could make the prince aim for the best. This is why the author of the *De felici progressu* contradicts his earlier statement that it is impossible to find a prince who observes all the virtues mentioned and returns to the level of ideals, where Borso possesses all the listed virtues, and even something more.

Another important point of departure from Giles of Rome is in fact that Savonarola not only speaks about 'virtues' when referring to the credentials of a good prince, but also, more generally, about 'conditions'. Thus in Borso he finds eighteen conditions that makes him worthy of being a ruler. Apart from possessing the whole range of virtues (the twelve figuring in Aristotle's *Ethics* plus humility, beauty, and eloquence), he is of noble birth (the sixteenth condition); he has been elected (the seventeenth condition; in the construction of Savonarola, who apparently followed an ascendant conception of power, Borso was elected by a popular assembly); finally (the eighteenth condition), everybody has some obligations toward him because of the benefits they have enjoyed before the investiture of the prince.²⁸ Borso's blue blood, his political qualities, and the

medical works to illustrate the rarity of worthy physicians or good patients who strictly follow all medical prescriptions.

²⁶ *De felici progressu*, fol. 20^r: 'qui princeps noster esse possit aut earum principalior pars maior, quod si quempiam talem esse contingat illum in principem nostrum eligere minime hesitandum erit.'

²⁷ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.31, p. 139. The chapter is titled 'Quod maxime decet reges et principes omnes virtutes habere et quod, si una carent, nullam habent.'

²⁸ These last three conditions are better clarified and explicated in the vernacular variant of the work. See Michele Savonarola, *Del felice progresso di Borso d'Este*, p. 135: 'Si che, facendo in luy nostra eletione, parme, salvendo sempre ogni miglior iuditio, che quello in nostro principio elezer dobbiamo, che, discorrendo le conditioni dicte, le quale da Aristotile son quindecim arecordate, io in questo degno huomo ne ritrovo dexeotto, como chiaramente intenderete'; p. 158: 'Che avendo luy, come diremo, decesepte conditioni de vero principio, questa obligatione è tanta, che biem

favourable attitude of the city and its institutions became real leitmotifs of the political publications of Ferrara at the time in order to disperse the overshadowing illegitimacy of Borso's reign, which had given Ferrara stability and continuity. The illegitimate son of Niccolò III, Borso was not even mentioned in his father's testament. Niccolò had designated as his heirs Leonello (although he, too, was an illegitimate son) and all his descendants; in the absence of the latter, the reign would fall to Ercole and Sigismondo, the legitimate offspring of Niccolò's third marriage. At the sudden and premature death of Leonello in 1450, Borso, who after a brief military career had sided with his brother in the management of the state, seized power beyond the testamentary dispositions, taking advantage from the young age of the legitimate heir Niccolò (son of Leonello) and the absence of Ercole and Sigismondo, who had been sent to the Neapolitan court to complete their education.²⁹ In Savonarola's view, Borso, both of noble birth and acclaimed by the people, offers a solution to the debate as to whether a prince should come into power by inheritance or election, because he fulfils both conditions.³⁰

Like many other contemporary political writings from Ferrara, Savonarola's *De felici progressu* is concerned with the self-representation of the prince and the legitimization of his power rather than with mere encomium.³¹ The first step in the legalization of Borso's reign is the assumption of the prince's personal ethic as

reponere la debi in luy cum le altre, facendo la decima otava, come dicto è, sì che questo huomo ne vi trovay tre più di quelle che Aristotile e li altri philosophi connumerano in ogni degno principio.'

²⁹ See Gundersheimer, *Ferrara*, pp. 62–72.

³⁰ *De felici progressu*, fol. 20^r: 'Ornatissimi cives, principatum non sanguini sed virtuti dandum esse philosophi auctoritate dicebatur, ego quidem sententiam hanc in presentiarum non accusabo sed hanc longe magis probo si sanguini et virtuti principatus simul dari possit, nihil eo eligibilis esse posse quam obrem paucis claudens cum plurimum temporis in sermonibus efluxerit, illustrem Borsium nominabo virum equidem his doctibus ornatum quem apud nos tenemus ex sanguine principum nostrorum natum. Nam si illum in principem nostrum eligerem sic sanguini et virtuti principatus noster dabitur'; fol. 21^r: 'Tantae electionis dignum facio sic sanguini et virtuti principatum dabimus ut nihil supra nobis melius esse possit dixi.'

³¹ On this central theme see Maria Aurelia Mastronardi, 'Retorica e ideologia alla corte di Borso d'Este: L'*Oratio de laudibus Borsii* di Ludovico degli Arienti', *Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università degli studi della Basilicata*, 8 (1993–94), 313–35; Mastronardi, 'L'immagine di Ferrara nella letteratura estense', in *Acta conventus neo-latini Abulensis: Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies, Avila, 4–9 August 1997*, ed. by Roda Schnur and others (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval And Renaissance Studies, 2000), pp. 423–30; Mastronardi, '... Redeunt Saturnia regna': Città ideale ed età dell'oro nella Ferrara estense', *Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università degli studi della Basilicata*, 8 (1998), 153–81.

a justification. The second is the observation of how Borso is at the same time a prince of noble birth, so that the dynastic lineage is assured, as well as elected by an assembly and acclaimed by the people, a procedure understood in most of Italian *signorie* at that time to prove the ruler's loyalty, even if at a mere nominal level, to the communal institutions. Finally, the ratification of Borso's reign by imperial investiture serves as a confirmation of the legitimate nature of his power.

IV. The Virtue of Prudence

Like Giles of Rome, Michele Savonarola considered prudence as the paramount virtue of a king. As Roberto Lambertini has noticed, Giles's giving prudence the first place among the princely virtues constitutes a novel element in the high medieval tradition of *specula principis*. John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, for instance, exalts the virtue of justice, while prudence appears as the virtue of precaution rather than the heart of ethical and political life. As a consequence, the virtue of prudence is absent from the book which describes the ideal king. Likewise, Vincent of Beauvais did not pay any attention to *prudentia* as a princely virtue either in *De eruditione filiorum regaliū* or in the uncompleted *De morali principis institutione*, even though he carefully summarized the most important current doctrines on the cardinal virtues in his *Speculum doctrinale*; his image of the ideal prince in fact rests on the virtues of *potestas*, *sapientia*, and *bonitas*. Likewise, Vincent's confrere William Peraldus extensively discussed the cardinal virtues in his widely disseminated *Summa de virtutibus*, but in his *De eruditione principum* he disregarded them and described instead seven different princely virtues: *sapientia*, *bonitas*, *nobilitas*, *humilitas*, *veritas*, *clementia*, and *pietas*. Generally, in the *specula* antedating *De regimine principum*, it was the biblical and philosophical idea of a wise and just king that prevailed.³² By contrast, a number of high medieval theologians including Thomas Aquinas considered prudence the queen of the cardinal and other moral virtues — but then these theologians did not primarily discuss prudence from a political point of view, even though Aquinas

³² See Roberto Lambertini, 'Tra etica e politica: La prudentia nel De regimine di Egidio Romano', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 3 (1992), 79–144. See also Lambertini, 'A proposito della "costruzione" della oeconomica in Egidio Romano', *Medioevo*, 14 (1988), 315–70; Lambertini, 'Philosophus videtur ponere trea rationes: Egidio Romano lettore ed interprete della *Politica* nel terzo libro del *De regimine Principum*', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 1 (1990), 277–325.

certainly recognized its political relevance.³³ Reinforcing this latter tendency, Giles introduced a practical, political understanding of prudence and gave it the first place among the princely virtues: the king cannot be king without prudence.

In *De regimine principum* prudence appears as a cardinal, an intellectual, and a moral virtue. Classified as a cardinal virtue together with strength, temperance, and justice, prudence differs from these because of its strong cognitive dimension. Following in the footsteps of Thomas Aquinas, Giles distinguishes prudence from the other virtues as an intellectual quality, on the basis of its privileged relation to *ratio*, and he depicts this *ratio* as eminently practical.³⁴ Prudence is the virtue of practical reason which chooses the means to reach an aim, and thus presumes knowledge as well as ability of judgement and prediction. Then Giles places prudence among the moral virtues *large accipiendo*,³⁵ endorsing Aquinas's view that prudence is 'media inter virtutes morales et intellectuales'. The cognitive function of prudence becomes the directive of moral action, prudence is a dianoetic virtue that assumes the possession of the ethical virtues, an intellectual

³³ See, e.g., Alan of Lille, *De arte praedicatoria*, 24 (PL, CCX, col. 161A): 'Caeterarum cardinalium virtutum regina est prudentia. In ea formam inveniunt, ab ea modum requirunt, sine ea, quae virtus esse videtur, decidit in fatuitatem quod bonum esse apparet, labitur in temeritatem. Prudentia est quae docet quid cogitandum, quid qua intentione agendum, quomodo ad finem perducendum. Haec metitur vires humanas, haec ponit cogitationibus metas, haec dirigit motus mentis, intuitus rationis, haec ponderat bona, examinat mala'; Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, III.xxxiii.2.5, ed. by Pierre F. Mandonnet and M. Ferdinand Moos, 4 vols (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929–47), III.ii, pp. 1068–69, especially 1068: 'prudentia inter alias virtutes cardinales principalior est, et ad ipsam reducuntur omnes aliae quasi ad causam.' In *Summa theologiae*, II.ii. 47–56, in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882–), VI, Aquinas discusses prudence without giving it the first place among the virtues, recognizing however its special importance for princes at II.ii.50.1, *Opera*, VI, 287–89: 'Respondeo dicendum quod sicut ex supradictis patet, ad prudentiam pertinet regere et praecipere. Et ideo ubi invenitur specialis ratio regiminis et praecepti in humanis actibus, ibi etiam invenitur specialis ratio prudentiae. Manifestum est autem quod in eo qui non solum seipsum habet regere, sed etiam communitatem perfectam civitatis vel regni, invenitur specialis et perfecta ratio regiminis, tanto enim regimen perfectius est quanto est universalius, ad plura se extendens et ulteriorem finem attingens. Et ideo regi, ad quem pertinet regere civitatem vel regnum, prudentia competit secundum specialem et perfectissimam sui rationem. Et propter hoc regnativa ponitur species prudentiae.'

³⁴ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.5, p. 59: 'cum ergo in intellectu practico principalior virtus sit prudentia.'

³⁵ *De regimine principum*, I.ii.2, p. 50.

virtue serving as a guide for all moral virtues.³⁶ Prudence can indeed be numbered among the moral virtues, the more so as it is a feature of good men only, as Aristotle says in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.³⁷

Giles divides prudence into five *species* (*singularis*, *oeconomica*, *politica*, *regnativa/legispositiva*, and *militaris*). This division, which has left no trace in *De felici progressu*, involves the complex theme of the relation between moral and political life. Aristotle expressed himself on the relation between *phronesis* and politics in terms far from univocal.³⁸ Thomas Aquinas, recognizing the potential tension between different kinds of prudence and the unitary nature of this virtue, tries to clarify the question in his discussion on the *partes subiectivae* of prudence in the *Summa theologiae*. The ambiguity of prudence is due to its being considered both as a *genus* and as a *species*. Prudence as a *species* can be divided according to its different objects. The virtue consists of *regere se ipsum* (*prudentia simpliciter dicta*) as well as *regere multitudinem*; to *regere multitudinem* belongs *prudentia oeconomica* (governing the family), *prudentia regnativa* (in the prince) and *prudentia politica* (in subjects).³⁹ In

³⁶ Giles's characterization of prudence begins thus, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.6, p. 60: 'Quantum autem ad praesens spectat, prudentiam ad quinque comparari possumus, videlicet, ad virtutes morales, quarum est directiva; ad virtutes intellectuales, respectu quarum est praeceptiva; ad materiam, circa quam versatur, ad scientiam et ad artem, a quibus distinguitur.' And so it ends, p. 63: 'Prudentia ergo, quia nullus potest esse prudens nisi sit bonus et habeat voluntatem rectam, non est ars, sed virtus. Ex omnibus ergo his, de ipsa prudentia unam communem descriptionem formare possumus, dicendo, quod prudentia est virtus intellectualis, directiva virtutum moralium, praeceptiva secundum inventa, et iudicata secundum universales maximas, particularia contingentia agibilia concernens, praesupponens rectitudinem voluntatis.'

³⁷ *De regimine principum*, I.ii.2, p. 47: 'Prudentia autem secundum Commentatorem super libris Ethicorum, media est inter virtutes morales et intellectuales; computari tamen potest cum virtutibus moralibus: nam prudentia non est nisi in hominibus bonis, sicut nec virtutes morales; pravi enim homines et si possunt esset scientes, astuti et versipelles, prudentes tamen esse non possunt, ut suo loco patebit. Inde est ergo quod dicitur 6. Ethicorum, quod impossibile est prudentem esse non existentem bonum.' Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.47.

³⁸ For an analysis of the complex relation between prudence and politics, see Roberto Lambertini, 'Est autem politica et prudentia, idem quidem habitus: Appunti sul rapporto tra prudentia e politica in alcuni interpreti medievali del VI libro dell'*Etica nicomachea*', *Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics*, 4 (2002), <http://www.units.it/~etica/2002_2/indexlambertini.html>. See also Lambertini, 'Il Filosofo, il principe e la virtù: Note sulla ricezione e l'uso dell'*Etica Nicomachea* nel *De regimine principum* di Egidio Romano', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 2 (1991), 239–79.

³⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.48.1, in *Opera*, VI, 263: 'Partes autem subiectivae virtutis dicuntur species eius diversae. Et hoc modo partes prudentiae, secundum quod proprie

short, for Giles as well as for Aquinas, prudence, by exercising control over our cognitive and operative faculties, is the virtue of making choices with respect to what we ought to do, and it belongs to princes in particular.⁴⁰ Adapting the views of Aquinas to his *speculum principis*, Giles puts special emphasis on *prudencia regnativa* or *legispositiva* as the part of prudence connected with active politics and exalts it as the virtue, indispensable to a king, that enables one not only to support oneself but also the entire community.⁴¹ The author of *De regimine principum* knowingly poises himself on a political level and underlines the governing function of the virtue of prudence for the whole political-ethical ambit.

Despite the absence of the category of *prudencia regnativa* or *legispositiva* in *De felici progressu*, Michele Savonarola puts himself on the same political level, introducing prudence directly as a virtue that regards not only the private but also the common good, and highlighting its guiding function for all moral virtues.⁴²

sumuntur, sunt prudentia per quam aliquis regit seipsum, et prudentia per quam aliquis regit multitudinem, quae differunt specie, ut dictum est, et iterum prudentia quae est multitudinis regitiva dividitur in diversas species secundum diversas species multitudinis. Est autem quaedam multitudo adunata ad aliquod speciale negotium, sicut exercitus congregatur ad pugnandum, cuius regitiva est prudentia militaris. Quaedam vero multitudo est adunata ad totam vitam, sicut multitudo unius domus vel familiae, cuius regitiva est prudentia oeconomica; et multitudo unius civitatis vel regni, cuius quidem directiva est in principe regnativa, in subditis autem politica simpliciter dicta.'

⁴⁰ In twelfth- and thirteenth-century moral thought, a tension seems to run between a purely cognitive conception of *prudencia* and a conception which stresses its function of choosing and decision-making. Several great *summae* of the thirteenth century try to resolve the tension by acknowledging a plurality of meanings of the term *prudencia*. See Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, 6 vols (Gembloux: Duculot; Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1942–60), III, 253–80; see also Carla Casagrande, 'Virtù della prudenza e dono del consiglio', in *Consilium: Teorie e pratiche del consigliare nella cultura medievale*, ed. by Carla Casagrande, Chiara Crisciani, and Silvana Vecchio (Florence: Sismel, 2004), pp. 1–14. For the solutions of William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, and Albert the Great, see Pierre J. Payer, 'Prudence and the Principles of Natural Law: A Medieval Development', *Speculum*, 54 (1979), 55–70.

⁴¹ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, III.iii.1, p. 555–56: 'Possumus autem, quantum ad praesens spectat, distinguere quinque species prudentiae: videlicet prudentiam singularem, oeconomicam, regnativam, politicam sive civilem, et militarem. Dicitur enim aliquis habere singularem vel particularem prudentiam, quando scit seipsum regere et gubernare, et haec est minor prudentia quam oeconomica et regnativa, nam minus est scire regere seipsum, quam scire regere familiam, et civitatem, aut regnum.'

⁴² *De felici progressu*, fol. 16^r: 'Et inde quae premiserat prosequens ea cum rationibus muniebat Principem natura prudentem in primis esse oportere inquiebat cum ceteras virtutes omnes quae hominum operationes in bonum laudabilemque exitum prudentia ipsam dirigat. Est principatus

Notwithstanding the treatise's lack of theoretical analysis on this theme, which hinders the possibility of a detailed comparison with Giles's positions, Savonarola develops in an original way Plato's well-known analogy between the ruler and the steersman (*Republic*, 6, 488b) by making prudence the helm that directs the ship. On the vessel which stands for the people, princes are pilots; by using the steering wheel of prudence, they guide the vessel in the right direction dictated by the prince's obligations to God.⁴³ For Giles of Rome prudence likewise requires love of God, because it is God who entrusts princes with the government of his people, an impossible duty without the exercise of prudence.⁴⁴

Savonarola in fact distinguishes two kinds of prudence, or rather, he affirms that prudence must go in two different directions, worldly and divine.⁴⁵ In his description of Borso's prudence, he substantiates and exemplifies both aspects of the virtue. When listing the samples of Borso's prudence in religious affairs, the tone of the treatise becomes emphatic and pressing. Savonarola apparently had some difficulty in assembling sufficient creditable facts demonstrating Borso's piety. He points only to Borso's reading of the Divine Office at the canonical hours, as if he were a priest; to his desire to found a great Certosa in Ferrara; and to his generous donations to the friars of San Spirito as well as to churches in the neighbourhood.⁴⁶ The prudence of the Prince of Este in secular affairs is much

dignum celebratumque officium quo gentem sibi commissam regere atque gubernare principes sciant illamque in bonum finem semper dirigere. Quare Aristotiles: "illos existimamus esse prudentes qui sibi et alijs bene providere sciunt."

⁴³ *De felici progressu*, fol. 16^v: 'Princeps veluti quidam nauta in navis habendus est, et ut navis populus, prudentia autem ut clavus. Nam ut navem clavo nauta dirigit sic princeps populo prudentia, quare nil pestilentius civitatibus esse potest quem ab insipiente principe regi, et de prudentia a me satis actum esse volo, si in postremis de ea dixero, maxime principem decere se Dei ministrum cognoscere et gentem sibi commissam in Deum dirigere. Nam qui Deum non timet minime prudens esse potest, propheta dicente: "initium sapientiae est timor Domini."

⁴⁴ See Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, l.i.12, p. 39: 'Maxime autem Deus requirit a regibus et principibus ut per prudentiam et legem populum sibi commissum iuste et sancte regant. Regibus ergo et principibus ponenda est felicitas in actu prudentiae, non simpliciter sed ut est imperatus a charitate.'

⁴⁵ *De felici progressu*, fol. 26^v: 'Est prudentiae principis prima pars Dei gloriosi ministrum se esse nosce in illumque ut in verum finem opera sua omnia dirigere [...]. In principe Borsio prudentiae pars altera relucens cum ad expedienda rei publice negotia omnia solertissimus habeatur omnia cum ratione intelligens ut nihil ab eo nisi consilio cautione et experientia probetur.'

⁴⁶ *De felici progressu*, fol. 20^v: 'Et in eam primam suae prudentiae partem prosequar quae cultui divino datur. Is Deum summe colens officium romanae curiae ritu suis in horis canonicis legit ut

more evident. Savonarola recalls that Borso not only assisted his brother Leonello in ruling the town during long periods, but also as a young man had successfully taken command of twelve hundred knights, in 1431, during the war between Venice and Milan, twenty years before the beginning of his reign.⁴⁷

The particular moral-political ‘curving’ of *De regimine principum* in relation to its main source also becomes evident if we consider the division of prudence into *partes*. Giles distinguishes eight *partes prudentiae*: *memoria*, *providentia*, *intellectus*, *ratio*, *solertia*, *docilitas*, *experientia*, *cautio*.⁴⁸ The list of Giles goes back to the catalogue of eight *partes integrales* of prudence proposed by Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa theologiae* (although Giles replaced *circumspectio* with *experientia*); Aquinas, in turn, tried to harmonize the divergent divisions of prudence by Macrobius, Cicero, and Pseudo-Andronicus.⁴⁹ But Giles differentiated himself from his model by giving to the single parts of prudence a political signification. While Aquinas connected five parts of prudence with the principle of cognition and three with the prescription of rules (*praeceptio*),⁵⁰ Giles proposes a different classification. Considering the fact that prudence is the ability to conduct oneself or others toward good ends, Giles explains that in the analysis of prudence four things should be taken into account: the good things toward which prudence

nulla dies vacua transeat. Alterum memorijs vestris revoco, quemque dignum in constituendum dominarum Corporis Christi templum contulit auxilium equidem posse suum eo in tempore superans in quo circiter centum virgines monacate resident, in dies in horas que pro bono rei publicae nostrae suppliciter Deum exorantes, quantaque in templum Augustini liberalitatem habuerit.’

⁴⁷ *De felici progressu*, fol. 20^v: ‘Et in his moram non contrahens alteram suae prudentiae partem paucis perstringam, dum decimum et septimum annum nundum consumasset, venetorum dominium suae tenerae aetatis prudentiam intelligens tricentorum equorum imperatorem creare primum non dubitavit. Cumque in annos suae iuvenilis aetatis paulisper processisset tanti iuvenes prudentiam senatus is miratus eum dignorem imperatorem creare statuit illi mille et ducentorum equorum regimen imperii tribuens. Ecce Borsii suae maximae prudentiae fidelissimi testes.’

⁴⁸ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.8, p. 66.

⁴⁹ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, III, 186–91, for thirteenth-century attempts to harmonize diverse traditional divisions of prudence. Aquinas accepted the six *partes* of Macrobius (*ratio*, *intellectus*, *docilitas*, *providentia*, *circumspectio*, *cautio*), adding to these *memoria* (from Cicero, *De inventione*) and *solertia* or *eustochia* (from ‘Aristotle’). The positions of Giles and Aquinas are carefully compared by Lambertini, ‘Tra etica e politica’, pp. 109–18.

⁵⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II.ii.48.1, *Opera*, VI 261. Related to *prudentia cognoscitiva* are *memoria*, *ratio*, *intelligentia*, *docilitas*, and *solertia*; related to *prudentia praeceptiva* are *providentia*, *circumspectio*, and *cautio*.

conducts, the way in which conduction proceeds, the person who conducts, and the people who are conducted.⁵¹ *Memoria* and *providentia* concern good things in the past and in the future which must be considered together because knowledge of the past makes it possible, in some way, to foresee the future. As for method, *intellectus* provides the knowledge of first principles and *ratio* the capacity of drawing due conclusions. As a conductor of others, the prince needs *solertia* as a personal attitude but also *docilitas*, the capacity of listening to the counsel of experts. Finally, *experientia* consists in the knowledge of the prince about the *particulares conditiones* of the people entrusted to his care, while *cautio* refers to his ability to distinguish between the appearance and the reality of these conditions.

A comparison of Giles's discussion of the parts of prudence with Savonarola's treatment of the same subjects reveals a substantial agreement between both authors while at the same time it highlights Savonarola's originality. As in the case of the fifteen princely virtues, Savonarola contends that Aristotle directly inspired him with the list of eight *species* of prudence, while in reality he directly copied the catalogue from *De regimine principum*.⁵² Equally evident is his dependence on Giles for his characterization of the individual *species*. Still, Savonarola unmistakably adds his own accents. First of all, he repeatedly draws a parallel between politics and medicine. In his view, princes, like physicians, should have reached an advanced age before assuming their responsibilities, because *cautio* and *experientia* are aptitudes that can only be acquired day by day. Every case to be treated in medicine or in politics is different, so that only ample practice confers the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood.⁵³

⁵¹ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, I.ii.8, p. 66: 'Nam ex hoc aliquis dicitur esse prudens, quia est sufficiens dirigere se, et alios in aliqua bona, sive in aliquos bonos fines. Quatuor ergo est ibi considerare, videlicet, bona, ad quae dirigit: modum, per quem dirigit: personam dirigentem, et gentem, quam dirigit.'

⁵² *De felici progressu*, fol. 7^r: 'Et cum in principe prudentiam tantum commendaverit interrogabis fortasse: quae quot ut principem habere deceat si prudentia hac frui debet huic equidem degnae petitioni, Aristotilis sententia respondet octo illa in numero esse oportere. Ut primum *memoriam* faciat, alterum *providentiam*, tertium *intelligentiam*, quartum *rationem*. Quibus haec quatuor addit: *solertiam*, *docilitatem*, *experientiam* videlicet et *cautionem*, hec quidem prudentiae species sunt' (my emphases).

⁵³ *De felici progressu*, fols 7^r–8^r: 'Preteritorum *memoriam* prudens habere debet, non quidem ut illa mutare possit, verum ut quae futura sunt lucidius speculetur. Nam futura preteritis ut ad multum simillima esse consueverunt, ideoque Exopus: "preteriti ratio scire futura facit". De his namque futuris *providentiam* principem habere opus est, quoniam futura bona excogitans vias

Second, Savonarola exemplifies the *species* of prudence by attributing them to Borso of Este. According to Savonarola, nobody is more qualified to rule Ferrara than Borso, a man who has been initiated from an early age into politics and warfare (*experientia*), manifests diligence in state affairs (*cautio*), examines every tiny detail (*solertia*), and is willing to accept the good advice of others (*docilitas*). Thus by presenting Borso as a perfect ruler, Savonarola upholds a model of good government on the one hand (his attributing good qualities to Borso may in fact be intended as an encouragement for Borso to acquire, retain, or develop these qualities) while he legitimizes Borso's reign on the other. Savonarola's most characteristic lessons for Borso, however, are attached to the *species* of *memoria*. In his view, it is essential for the prince to retain the memory of the past because it is that memory — preserved in books of history — that teaches virtue. The examples of great men of the past are indispensable to ruling prudently in the present.⁵⁴ On the basis of Giles's medieval views, Savonarola again establishes the typically humanistic connection between prudence and the *studia humanitatis*. Savonarola explicitly criticizes Borso's father, Niccolò III, for having interrupted

querit aptiores quibus illa adipisci valeat et ventura mala animo revolvens, obstacula querit atque componit quibus hiis ne eveniant se opponere possit. Non minus *intelligentem* quem prudentem esse decet, ut leges suo in regimine necessarias intelligat et consuetudines noscat quae ad statum civitatis pacificum beatumque esse pertineant, ut cives suos in commendabilem et optimum finem dirigat. Ideoque et *rationalem* esse dixit, ut quid quae ut eis ex legibus aut consuetudinibus operari congruat intelligat. Hominem namque *solertia* plurimum decorat atque *docilitas*. Nam tanto in culmine dignitatis positus, ad regendos populos sibi commissos media quibus ad ea bona perveniat populis utilia maxima sui ex parte ut inveniat querere debet. Cum itaque nemo sibi soli satis sit ut excogitare valeat quaecumque in rei publicae utilitatem evenire possunt, hinc principem docile esse oportet, quoniam et aliorum consilium intelligere. Prudentis quidem proprium et aliorum consilia non spernere et veterum et probatorum virorum sententiis adherere, nonque sibi soli credere. Cumque particulares gentium sibi commissarum consuetudines principem nolce deceat, sic illum *experientia* ornatum diximus esse oportere, quae de particularibus rebus hominum est doctrina, ut illas ad meliorem finem dirigere sciat. Nam neque medicus neque princeps, quamvis precepta artis noverit, sine usu et exercitatione quocumque magna laude dignum consequi poterit. Ut hoc ex loco accipiam principes et medicos senes esse decere. Principes praesertim cum in dies in horasque ipsis coram vera falsis sepenumero commisceantur ne ex facile credulitate falsorum apparentium in mala rei publicae prolabantur. Non *cautus* homo esse potest qui in canis capillis suae aetatis partem non consumpserit, isque facile inducatur' (my emphases).

⁵⁴ *De felici progressu*, fol. 3': 'Sunt itaque litterarum studia a filiis principum non omittenda, cum litteris prediti in populo veluti fulgentia siderea in caelo habeantur [...]. Littere generosos animos nutriunt et illos ad virtutem preparant ad bonaque opera ut non mediocri gloria ex eis et arma fulgeant.'

his son's studies,⁵⁵ and he concludes with the practical advice to amend the mistake. For a prince like Borso who has no Latin, the ideal of prudence requires that he either studies the works of good authors in vernacular translations, or permanently hires men of letters assigned to instruct him in the stories and *exempla* of the past. The model to follow here is obviously the couple Aristotle and Alexander.⁵⁶ Never losing sight of his pragmatic intent, Savonarola does not insist on intellectual development as an ideal in itself, but prefers to stress the practical values and the actual benefits that an education which encloses history can provide. Politics and ethics constitute a branch of practical knowledge; the lessons of history fit well into this context.

It is precisely for this last reason that Savonarola's *De felici progressu*, primarily concerned with the moral education of a political ruler, is aptly cast for the most part in the form of a historical chronicle. Materializing the fertile connection of history and education typical of humanism, Savonarola's narration of past events has a distinct normative trait about it, with constant attention for pedagogical items. Moreover, history not only teaches lessons for future action, but also erects monuments for those who live in the present. History, emphasizes Savonarola, keeps the memory of princes alive by recording their deeds. Indeed, princes only survive in later times if historians conserve their memory beyond the brevity of life and the chances of fortune.⁵⁷ Savonarola's own work of history, which serves such

⁵⁵ *De felici progressu*, fol. 6^v: 'Et hunc locum non deserens felicem genitorem tuum pace prius petita paulisper accusabo qui cum ad capescendas litteras te ingenio clarum memoriosum et ipsa natura prudentem esse intelligeret quod longiori litterarum studio te non contulerit.'

⁵⁶ *De felici progressu*, fol. 6^v: 'Principem cui letteralis sermo negatur duorum alterorum facere illum oportere ut aut litteratos apud se continue teneat aut quae a litteratis scripta sunt materno eloquio translata perlegat et in his sedulo studium dare, et memoriae revocare velis mi domine quantus splendor Allexandro Magno accesserit Aristotilis consuetudo atque doctrina.'

⁵⁷ *De felici progressu*, fol. 6^v: 'Pro qua [Nicolaus III] adipiscenda Guieum Capellum virum equidem bonis litteris peditum aetate gravem et moribus honestum vobis in praeceptorem deligebat, facile intelligens litterarum dignitatem principibus splendorem plurimum afferre. Memoriae revocabat quantum splendoris litterae Caio Caesari attulerint. Nam ex Comentariorum suis in quibus persaepe conversabatur toto in orbe maxima cum dignitate splendere illum intelligebat qua ex re sibi facile persuasus est principes decere litteras etiam non ignorare'; fol. 9^v: 'Quid si obstabitur vulgare opinionem qui pluris videntur arma quem togam facerespondebitur illos virtutis dignitatem ignorare fortunae bona pluris facientes, o demens vulgus, cum ex alieno quem ex suo homines magis splendere putat. Nunquid philosophorum sententiarum vulgare opinio preferenda erit Aristoteles quidem honorem esse scripsit reverentiae exhibitionem premiumque virtutis, ut virtuti soli et non fortunae honor conveniat et quomodo splendor absque virtute erit qui absque honore minime esse potest.'

high ethical, political, and especially educational purposes, unfolds in the manner of a chronicle, attentive to particulars carefully recorded by Savonarola himself, who 'saw what happened'. *De felici progressu* presents itself as a description of the truth, as history which always teaches and exhorts, in conformity with the ideal of eloquence, that is, of narrating events and ideas with persuasive efficacy in order to enhance the reader's wisdom. The man of letters thus becomes an active and knowing elaborator of ideologies.

Savonarola's adaptations and exemplifications of the views of Giles of Rome have their function in this context. His pattern of princely virtues differs somewhat from Giles's model, but is made historically more concrete thanks to its application to Borso of Este. In *De felici progressu*, the figure of Borso coincides with the ideal image of the virtuous prince. Savonarola's eighteen conditions for worthy government and his understanding of their particulars represent a political attempt to confer on the real figure of the prince both an ideal and an exemplary value.

PIETY, WISDOM, AND TEMPERANCE IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY: A COMPARISON OF VERNACULAR AND LATIN MIRRORS FOR PRINCES

Georg A. Strack

I. Introduction

The term ‘mirror for princes’ is not easy to define,¹ but, in essence, can be used to describe texts depicting an ideal ruler and dedicated to a prince with the purpose of advising him. Such treatises had been composed from Carolingian times up until the eighteenth century.² In the German Empire of

¹ Hans H. Anton, ‘Petrarca und die Tradition der Herrscher- und Fürstenspiegel’, in *Das Wichtigste ist der Mensch: Festschrift Klaus Gerteis*, ed. by Angela Giebmeyer and Helga Schnabel-Schüle (Mainz: von Zabern, 2000), pp. 229–51 (pp. 229–30): ‘Eine Begriffsbestimmung nach literarischen Kriterien im strengen Sinn ist nicht möglich.’ However, he sharply criticizes the definition used in *Fürstenspiegel der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by Hans-Otto Mühleisen and others (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1997), and in Michael Philipp and Theo Stammen, ‘Fürstenspiegel’, in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, ed. by Gert Ueding, (Tübingen: Niemeyer; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftlichen Buchgesellschaft, 1992–), III, 495–507. See also Hans H. Anton, ‘Gesellschaftsspiegel und Gesellschaftstheorie in Westfranken/Frankreich: Spezifik, Kontinuitäten und Wandlungen’, in *Specula principum*, ed. by Angela de Benedictis (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1999), pp. 51–120 (p. 53).

² See Wilhelm Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters* (Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1938); Bruno Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel in Deutschland im Zeitalter des Humanismus und der Reformation: Bibliographische Grundlagen und ausgewählte Interpretationen: Jakob Wimpfeling, Wolfgang Seidel, Johann Sturm, Urban Rieger* (Munich: Fink, 1981); Ulrike Graßnick, *Ratgeber des Königs: Fürstenspiegel und Herrscherideal im spätmittelalterlichen England* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004).

the fifteenth century, which roughly covered the then German-speaking area, vernacular mirrors for princes dominated until about 1450; after that date Latin mirrors prevailed. This essay argues that vernacular texts were influenced by the efforts for religious reform in fifteenth-century Germany, and are, therefore, based on theological concepts, while the Latin mirrors, written after about 1440 mostly by Italians living in Germany, referred to ideas derived from early humanism, a movement aimed at the reform of learning and education by concentrating on classical Latin texts. After an introductory paragraph on the relevant sources, this thesis will be proved by exploring the different treatment of three princely virtues: piety, wisdom, and temperance. The virtue of piety is explained in the vernacular mirrors with reference to the Mass, the Eucharist, and confession, issues that were in the focus of religious reform. The Latin mirrors likewise deal with piety, but derive their arguments from classical literature, as is typical for early humanism. Another virtue treated differently is wisdom, which the Latin authors define in the context of poetry, history, and rhetoric, that is, the studies of humanism. By contrast, vernacular texts discuss wisdom in terms of religion. While they display a positive attitude toward history, they tend to be critical of rhetoric and poetry. Finally, the differing contexts of religious reform and Italian humanism are reflected in the portrayal of a third virtue, namely temperance. Texts from both currents advise the prince to moderate his desire for food and drink, but cite different examples and show diverging attitudes toward the moderation of speech and laughter.

II. *The Sources*

Bruno Singer lists twenty-one mirrors for princes composed in fifteenth-century Germany. Recently two more mirrors have been added, attributed to Johannes Hinderbach and Francesco Todeschini-Piccolomini.³ However, Hinderbach merely addressed a manuscript of Aeneas Silvius's *De liberorum educatione* to the mother of Maximilian I, while Todeschini-Piccolomini dedicated a copy of

³ Johannes Helmrath, 'Vestigia Aeneae imitari: Enea Silvio Piccolomini als "Apostel" des Humanismus: Formen und Wege seiner Diffusion', in *Diffusion des Humanismus: Studien zur nationalen Geschichtsschreibung europäischer Humanisten*, ed. by Johannes Helmrath and others (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), pp. 99–141 (p. 114); Christof Dahm, 'Pius III', in *Biographisch-bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, ed. by Friedrich Wilhelm Bautz (Hamm: Bautz, 1970–), VII (1975), 661–64 (p. 663).

De regno by Dion Chrysostomus to Maximilian himself.⁴ Furthermore, two works on Singer's list must be excluded for our present purpose, because they are mirrors for a mayor and a bishop and not for a prince.⁵ Finally, three vernacular texts from 1400–70 and three Latin treatises written in the last decade of the fifteenth century cannot be discussed here, since they remain unedited. This essay is therefore based on six vernacular and seven Latin treatises that are available in printed editions. This ample selection includes the longer and more widely disseminated mirrors, so that the results of this study can claim to be representative of the mirrors of fifteenth-century Germany.

I begin with an introduction of the sources in a chronological order and thus with the vernacular mirrors. Most of these treatises are adaptations of the *Secretum secretorum*, a Latin translation of an Arabic tenth-century text.⁶ Though assumed to be a work of Aristotle throughout the Middle Ages, it has indeed very little in common with this philosopher's work. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose an important Aristotelian influence in the vernacular mirrors.⁷ Disregarding the

⁴ E. Hannak, 'Ein Beitrag zur Erziehungsgeschichte Kaiser Maximilians I. aus dem Jahre 1466', *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für deutsche Erziehungs- und Schulgeschichte*, 2 (1892), 145–63; Alfred A. Strnad, 'Hinderbach, Johannes', in *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters: Verfasserlexikon*, ed. by Kurt Ruh and others, 2nd edn (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1978–), IV, 41–44 (p. 44); Alfred A. Strnad, 'Pius III und Österreich', *Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift*, 116 (1968), 175–425 (p. 187).

⁵ Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, pp. 57 and 66. On mirrors for bishops see Markus Müller, 'Fürstenspiegel und Bischofsspiegel: Der Beitrag Jakob Wimpfeling's', in *Humanisten am Oberrhein: Neue Gelehrte im Dienst alter Herren* ed. by Markus Müller (Leinfelden-Echterdingen: DRW, 2004), pp. 303–13.

⁶ The most recent edition is Hiltgart von Hürnheim, *Mittelhochdeutsche Prosaübersetzung des 'Secretum secretorum'*, ed. by Reinhold Möller (Berlin: Akademie, 1963). See also *Secretum secretorum cum glossis et notulis*, ed. by Robert Steele, Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, 5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920); Friedrich Wurms, 'Studien zu den deutschen und den lateinischen Prosafassungen des pseudo-aristotelischen *Secretum secretorum*' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Universität Hamburg, 1970), p. 21; Mario Grignaschi, 'La diffusion du *Secretum secretorum* (Sirr-Al-'Asrar) dans l'Europe occidentale', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 48 (1980), 7–70.

⁷ As suggested by Hans H. Anton, 'Fürstenspiegel: Mittelalter', in *Der neue Pauly*, ed. by Hubert Cancik and others, 16 vols (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1996–2003), XIV, 76–81 (p. 79): 'in "Fürstenlehren" und "Fürstenregeln" aus dem 15. Jh. [wurden] oft über Aegidius antike Vorlagen wie Aristoteles rezipiert.'

chapters about medicine and astrology, just the chapters containing advice for princes were gleaned from the *Secretum*. The first example is the *Fürstenregel* composed by an anonymous writer around 1400 for William of Austria.⁸ Johannes Rothuet wrote a second German version of the *Secretum* in 1437 for Duke Albert of Bavaria-Munich, the *Fürstenlehre*.⁹ The author was counsellor at Albert's court and dean of the Augustine canons of Indersdorf.¹⁰ Both texts are integrated in the *Bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, a compilation that was probably made around 1450 for Duke Louis of Bavaria-Landshut. The unknown compiler enlarged these mirrors by adding a treatise about the four cardinal virtues, the *Buch von den vier Angeltugenden*. This large and widely disseminated text — about ten complete manuscripts are still extant — has been edited by Gerd Brinkhus.¹¹ A further vernacular mirror, recently edited by Annemarie Bartl, is the *Tugendregel*, a work which is probably not derived from the *Secretum* and whose author, addressee, and exact date of composition are unknown.¹² Between 1455 and 1457, the poet Michel Beheim, who had some theological knowledge, wrote a short poem for Ladislaus of Hungary, which was obviously inspired by the *Secretum*.¹³ He focuses, however, on counsellors and their virtues rather than on

⁸ Gerd Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation des 15. Jahrhunderts: Untersuchung und Textausgabe* (Munich: Artemis, 1978), pp. 44 and 61; edition pp. 82–101.

⁹ First edition: *Die Fürstenlehren des Johannes von Indersdorf für Herzog Albrecht III. von Baiern-München (1436–1460) und seine Gemahlin Anna*, ed. by Eugen Gehr, in 'Die Fürstenlehren des Johannes von Indersdorf für Herzog Albrecht III. von Baiern-München (1436–1460) und seine Gemahlin Anna' (inaugural dissertation, Universität Freiburg im Breisgau, 1927); current edition in Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, pp. 101–44.

¹⁰ Bernd Haage, 'Der Traktat "Von dreierlei Wesen der Menschen"' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Universität Heidelberg, 1968), pp. 150–52 and 159; Bernd Haage, 'Johannes von Indersdorf', in *Verfasserlexikon* (see n. 4, above), IV, 647–51; Johannes Schneider, 'Das 15. Jahrhundert: Der Ausklang des Mittelalters', in *Handbuch der bayerischen Kirchengeschichte*, ed. by Walther Brandmüller, 3 vols (St Ottilien: EOS, 1991–99), I, 720–53 (p. 728).

¹¹ *Buch von den vier Angeltugenden*, in Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, pp. 144–68. See also Gerd Brinkhus, 'Fürstenspiegel Wiewol all menschen erstlich entsprungen aus ainer wurczel Adam', in *Verfasserlexikon* (see n. 4, above), II, 1027–29.

¹² Annemarie Bartl, 'Der Tugend Regel: Ein anonymer deutscher Fürstenspiegel des 15. Jahrhunderts: Untersuchung und Edition', *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, 111 (1989), 411–45. For the vernacular treatises mentioned here, see also Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, pp. 53–59.

¹³ Albrecht Classen, 'The Autobiographical Voice of Michel Beheim', *Fifteenth-Century Studies*, 17 (1990), 33–56 (p. 42); Ulrich Müller, 'Beheim, Michel', *Verfasserlexikon* (see n. 4,

the prince himself.¹⁴ An anonymous author composed the *Wie man sein Königreich bewahren soll*, a short satiric dialogue between a good and a bad counsellor discussing in about three hundred and twenty verses the obligations of a prince.¹⁵ Of greater interest for this essay than these poetic texts are three other vernacular treatises, which, however, have not been edited so far, but which, as Singer's abstracts indicate, would provide further arguments for our thesis.¹⁶

In addition to these vernacular texts, we will take into account the Latin mirrors of fifteenth-century Germany, most of which were written by Italian humanists. Firstly, the works of Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, later pope Pius II, the so-called 'apostle of humanism' in Germany. Aeneas, who lived at Frederic's court and served him as diplomat on several political missions, composed his first mirror for Duke Sigmund of Tyrol in 1443.¹⁷ Even more influential was his second treatise, *De liberorum educatione*, written in 1450 for Prince Ladislaus of Hungary who was a ward of Frederic III.¹⁸ This treatise soon became one of the most important Latin mirrors for princes and had great influence on pedagogical thought.¹⁹ Petrus Antonius de Clapis composed three other Latin treatises at the court of Heidelberg. After having studied under Gian Mario Filelfo, the author

above), II, 672–80 (p. 674).

¹⁴ Michel Beheim, *Wie ain kung regiren sol sagt dis getiht*, ed. by Hans Gille and Ingeborg Spreewald, *Die Gedichte des Michel Beheim*, 3 vols (Berlin: Akademie, 1968–72), II, 600–10; Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, p. 53.

¹⁵ Printed in Johann C. Fichart, 'Altdeutsche Lieder und Gedichte aus der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts', *Frankfurtisches Archiv für ältere deutsche Litteratur*, 3 (1815), 316–23; Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, p. 59.

¹⁶ Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, pp. 56, 58 and 69–70.

¹⁷ Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, *Über Lesen und Bildung*, ed. by Rudolf Wolkan, in *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini*, I.1, *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*, II.61 (Vienna: Holder, 1909), pp. 222–36. See also Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, p. 63; August Buck, 'Humanistische Bildung: Enea Silvio Piccolomini an Herzog Sigmund von Österreich', in *Interpretation: Das Paradigma der europäischen Renaissance-Literatur*, ed. by Klaus W. Hempfer and Gerhard Regn (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983), pp. 394–404.

¹⁸ The most recent edition and translation is Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, *De liberorum educatione*, ed. and trans. by Craig W. Kallendorf, *Humanist Educational Treatises* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 126–259.

¹⁹ August Buck, 'Der italienische Humanismus', in *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte*, ed. by Christa Berg and others, 6 vols (Munich: Beck, 1991–98), I: *Fünfzehntes bis siebzehntes Jahrhundert: Von der Renaissance und der Reformation bis zum Ende der Glaubenskämpfe*, ed. by Notker Hammerstein, pp. 1–56 (p. 45); Helmrath, 'Vestigia', p. 126.

left Italy and came to the court of Count Palatine Frederic I, to whom he dedicated his first treatise, the *De dignitate principum*, in 1464.²⁰ On Frederic's command, he wrote his second treatise, *De conservacione principatus*, for Charles the Bold of Burgundy in 1466.²¹ In the same year, he composed *De virtutum civitate* for Duke John of Cleves, probably in thanks for the Duke's generosity.²² The last humanist author from Italy to be considered here is Domenico de Domenichi, Bishop of Brescia and theological counsellor of the curia in Rome. He was connected to the court of Vienna since his mission as nuncio in 1463 and wrote an admonitory letter to Maximilian I in 1472.²³ After this date, we have no further mirrors for princes in Germany until 1490/94, when Antonio da Conti and Dietrich Gresemund composed two Latin texts. These remain unedited, but Singer's abstracts suggest that they continue the traditional humanistic concepts of princely virtues and do not contradict our thesis.²⁴ Finally, in 1498, Jakob Wimpfeling wrote the *Agatharchia* for Louis, the grandnephew of Frederic I. Since this is an excerpt of another treatise of his, the *Philippica*, it contains similar ideas of princely virtues.²⁵ Wimpfeling is not only the last author of mirrors for princes in fifteenth-century Germany, but also the exception to the rule: being a theologian and early humanist in Heidelberg, he wrote in Latin, but was also influenced by the vernacular tradition and ideas of religious reform.²⁶

²⁰ *Petrus Antonius de Clapis (ca. 1440–1512): Ein italienischer Humanist im Dienste Friedrich des Siegreichen von der Pfalz*, ed. by Veit Probst (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1989), pp. 155–76.

²¹ *Petrus Antonius de Clapis*, ed. by Probst, pp. 179–212.

²² *Petrus Antonius de Clapis*, ed. by Probst, pp. 214–60; cf. Martina Backes, *Das literarische Leben am kurpfälzischen Hof zu Heidelberg im 15. Jahrhundert: Ein Beitrag zur Gönnerforschung des Spätmittelalters* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992), p. 127.

²³ Heribert Smolinsky, 'Dominici, Domenico (Domenico de' Domenichi)', in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, 67 vols (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 1960–2006), XL, 691–95; *Ein Prinzenspiegel für den jungen Maximilian I*, ed. by Hubert Jedin, *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, 43 (1961), 52–61; cf. Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, pp. 71–72.

²⁴ Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel*, pp. 72–74.

²⁵ Singer, *Die Fürstenspiegel in Deutschland*, pp. 227–49; interpretation, pp. 173–225.

²⁶ Dieter Mertens, 'Jakob Wimpfeling (1450–1528): Pädagogischer Humanismus', in *Humanismus im deutschen Südwesten: Biographische Profile*, ed. by Paul Gerhard Schmidt (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1993), pp. 35–57 (p. 46).

III. *The Princely Virtue of Piety*

Piety is a main concern of all mirrors for princes written in fifteenth-century Germany. Nevertheless, humanists writing in Latin and vernacular authors show quite divergent approaches to this virtue. Vernacular texts present many aspects of a prince's religious life but never define piety. Nonetheless, their contents do fit the definition of Berndt Hamm, who explains piety as the realization of certain Christian precepts, traditions, or practices in daily life.²⁷ When regarding fifteenth-century Germany and its struggle for church reform, it is not surprising to find mirrors for princes dealing with piety. The 'theology of piety' was a crucial aspect in the religious thought of the time. Church reformers adhering to this current wanted to bridge the gap between laymen and scholastic theology, therefore making use of the vernacular. Influenced by ideas of Jean Gerson, they tried to lead theology back from abstract scholastic problems to issues directly relevant to salvation.²⁸ This characteristic applies to Johannes Rothuet of Indersdorf, who was quite concerned with church reform in fifteenth-century Bavaria and, among other things, wrote a vernacular prayer book for a laywoman.²⁹ Moreover, all vernacular mirrors deal with the Christian tradition of the Mass, the Eucharist, and confession in the context of religious reform.³⁰

²⁷ Berndt Hamm, 'Frömmigkeit als Gegenstand theologiegeschichtlicher Forschung: Methodisch-historische Überlegungen am Beispiel von Spätmittelalter und Reformation', in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 74 (1977), 464–97 (p. 466).

²⁸ Berndt Hamm, *Frömmigkeitstheologie am Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts: Studien zu Johannes von Paltz und seinem Umkreis* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1982), p. 132; Hamm, 'Von der spätmittelalterlichen reformatio zur Reformation: Der Prozess normativer Zentrierung von Religion und Gesellschaft in Deutschland', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, 84 (1993), 7–81 (p. 16); Hamm, 'Frömmigkeit als Gegenstand', pp. 478–81; Christoph Burger, 'Theologie und Laienfrömmigkeit: Transformationsversuche im Spätmittelalter', in *Lebenslehren und Weltentwürfe im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit: Politik, Bildung, Naturkunde, Theologie*, ed. by Hartmut Boockmann and others (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), pp. 400–20 (p. 405).

²⁹ Ulrich Faust, 'Die Raudnitzer Chorherrenreform und ihre Verbreitung in Bayern', in *Handbuch der bayerischen Kirchengeschichte* (see n. 10, above), I, 537–39; Franz Xaver Haimerl, *Mittelalterliche Frömmigkeit im Spiegel der Gebetbuchliteratur Süddeutschlands* (Munich: Zink, 1952), pp. 152–57; Brigitte Weiske, 'Bilder und Gebete vom Leben und Leiden Christi: Zu einem Zyklus im Gebetbuch des Johannes von Indersdorf für Frau Elisabeth Ebran', in *Die Passion Christi in Literatur und Kunst des Spätmittelalters*, ed. by Walter Haug and Burghart Wachinger (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1993), pp. 113–68.

³⁰ Therefore, the description of the *Fürstenspiegelkompilation* as a book for edification — see Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 9; Brinkhus, 'Fürstenspiegel Wiewol all

Johannes reminds the prince to attend Mass on Sundays and holidays, on which days he should not play cards, dance, sing, or hunt.³¹ The *Tugendregel* likewise express the importance of attending divine service regularly; moreover, the prince is required to have the utensils and clergymen necessary for the service with him, even when travelling. This text gives quite exact information about how the prince should behave in church. Right upon entering, he should sprinkle himself with holy water and say his first prayer. After that, he is allowed to kiss the Bible, which was actually a priest's privilege. During Mass, he should pray instead of giving audience.³² Many other texts of the fifteenth century contain similar admonitions.³³ Like the church reformers, the authors of vernacular mirrors tried to make believers concentrate on what was actually happening during the holy service, proclaiming that the 'fruits of the mass', that is, its positive effects on the soul, could only be gained when the prince attended the service with special devotion.³⁴

Church reformers in fifteenth-century Germany also complained about superficiality in the veneration of the Host.³⁵ Actually, the sacrament of the Eucharist stood in the centre of the divine service and every Christian was bound to receive it at least once a year.³⁶ Since the elevation of the Eucharist had been introduced in the twelfth century, however, watching the Host gained more and

menschen', p. 1029; Ursula Schulze, Hans H. Anton, and others, 'Fürstenspiegel', in *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, 10 vols (Zürich: Artemis; Munich: LexMA, 1980–90), IV (1987), 1040–58 (p. 1051) — is not convincing. The prince's external religious life is at stake rather than affective piety.

³¹ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 108.

³² Bartl, *Der Tugend Regel*, pp. 429–30. Also in Jakob Wimpfeling, *Agatharchia*, p. 245.

³³ See Miri Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 153–54.

³⁴ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 111; cf. Heiko A. Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 277–78.

³⁵ Morimichi Watanabe, 'The German Church Shortly before the Reformation: Nicolaus Cusanus and the Veneration of the Bleeding Hosts at Wilsnack', in *Reform and Renewal in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: Studies in Honor of Louis Pascoe*, ed. by Thomas M. Izbicki and Christopher M. Bellitto (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 208–23 (p. 220).

³⁶ Hans B. Meyer, *Gottesdienst der Kirche: Handbuch der Liturgiewissenschaft*, 8 vols (Regensburg: Pustet, 1983–99), IV, 227–29.

more importance.³⁷ While the Latin prayers of the priest during the Eucharist were increasingly neglected, seeing the Host was, among other things, assumed to protect one from sudden death.³⁸ As a reaction to this superficial practice, the anonymous compiler of the *Fürstenspiegelkompilation* integrated a whole *Sermo de corpore Christi* into his text to inform the prince about the actual meaning of the Eucharist.³⁹ The text emphasizes the aspect of spiritual nourishment, as does the first German vernacular explanation of the Mass, written in 1480.⁴⁰ Louis of Bavaria-Landshut thus received an interpretation of the Eucharist prevalent in fifteenth-century theology. In addition, the author reminds the prince that the Eucharist deceives all his senses but the sense of hearing, because, while he sees, touches, and tastes only bread and wine, which are actually God himself, only the words spoken by the priest do not deceive him. The Eucharist thus reverses the process by which, during the Fall, the snake tricked the sense of hearing but not the other senses.⁴¹ The idea of putting special trust in the sense of hearing, which had already been formulated in the thirteenth-century hymn *Adoro te devote*,⁴² sustains in the mirror the exhortation of the prince to take the words of the priest to heart, in conformity with prevailing ideas on religious reform.

Fifteenth-century religious reformers insisted on frequent confession in particular.⁴³ Johannes Rothuet of Indersdorf — confessor of the Bavarian duke — advises the prince to confess regularly in order to ensure a successful reign. His words actually suggest that it is more important for a ruler to have a learned and

³⁷ James F. McCue, 'Liturgy and Eucharist: West', in *Christian Spirituality*, ed. by Bernard McGinn, 3 vols (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988–89), II: *High Middle Ages and Reformation*, ed. by Jill Raitt (1989), pp. 427–38 (p. 433).

³⁸ See Rubin, *Corpus Christi*, p. 148.

³⁹ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, pp. 111–18, see the editor's note, pp. 52–54.

⁴⁰ *Die älteste deutsche Gesamtauslegung der Messe: Erstaussage ca. 1480*, ed. by Franz R. Reichert (Münster: Aschendorff, 1967), p. 191.

⁴¹ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, pp. 114–16.

⁴² *Hymnographi latini: Lateinische Hymnendichter des Mittelalters*, 2 vols, ed. by Guido M. Drevs (Leipzig: Reisland, 1905–07; repr. New York: Johnson, 1961), I, 589.

⁴³ See Sven Grosse, *Heilungswissheit und Scrupulositas im späten Mittelalter: Studien zu Johannes Gerson und Gattungen der Frömmigkeitstheologie seiner Zeit* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994), p. 176; Richard Kieckhefer, 'Major Currents in Late Medieval Devotion', in *Christian Spirituality* (see n. 37, above), II, 75–108 (p. 102); Isard W. Frank, 'Beichte: Mittelalter', in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, 36 vols (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976–2004), V (1980), 414–21 (pp. 414 and 417–19).

God-fearing confessor than to uphold justice in markets and towns.⁴⁴ The work of Johannes was enlarged by the compiler of the *Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, who integrated a mirror of confession written by Henry of Langenstein, a theologian who was concerned with church reform and conciliarism during the great schism.⁴⁵ According to this text, deeds which the prince should confess include showing a lack of respect to the clergy, collecting exorbitant taxes, making free men into serfs, or acting against the lords of his realm.⁴⁶ The author enumerates fifteen qualities of 'good confession', among which are humility, remorse, and the intention to improve. He underlines the necessity of regular confession by pointing out that Holy Scripture demands it, that confession is the only way to gain God's forgiveness, and that dying without confession means losing salvation.⁴⁷ In addition to the Mass and the Eucharist, confession is a third example for the intention of the mirrors to intensify the prince's religious life in accordance with the theology of piety.

After about 1450, the diffusion of humanism in Germany gained intensity. Scholars like Petrus Antonius de Clapis and Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini came from Italy and spread new ideas by, among other things, writing mirrors for princes.⁴⁸ Though their focus was on learning and education, they were also members of the clergy and favoured the concept of a pious prince. Nevertheless,

⁴⁴ See Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, pp. 107–08: 'Es zugehört einem fürstenn, das er in steten, märckten und in allen gerichtten ain gerecht ordnung halt, dardurch reich und arm versorgt sein, doch vor allen dingen, das sein sel auch wol uersorgt sey, das geschicht, wenn er hat ain gelerten, gotforchtigen peichtvater, der nicht anders suchen ist, denn dy ere gots und das hail seiner sel, unangesehen zeitlich gab oder führung zu gots gaben; dem selben sol er offft peichten, so wirt er unterweist in gar vil stugken, die ainem weltlichen fursten notdurfftig sein zu wissen, und sol im gevolgig sein.' On confessors at fifteenth-century courts see Martin Kintzinger, 'Viri religiosi et literati: Kleriker am Fürstenhof im späten Mittelalter', in *Vita Religiosa im Mittelalter: Festschrift für Kaspar Elm*, ed. by Franz J. Felten and Nikolas Jaspert (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), pp. 543–62 (pp. 551–56), wrongly assuming (p. 562) that only with the arrival of the Jesuits as confessors, mirrors for princes emphasized the obligation of rulers to confess.

⁴⁵ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 52; Hamm, *Frömmigkeitstheologie*, p. 36.

⁴⁶ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 109.

⁴⁷ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 111, cf. Grosse, *Heilungswissheit*, p. 178; Kieckhefer, 'Major Currents', p. 102.

⁴⁸ Johannes Helmrath, 'Diffusion des Humanismus: Zur Einführung', in *Diffusion des Humanismus*, pp. 9–29 (p. 21); Helmrath, 'Vestigia Aeneae imitari', pp. 125–26

their approach to the virtue of piety differs from that of the vernacular texts. While neither author says anything about the Eucharist or confession, Petrus Antonius at least deals with the Mass in his mirror for the Count Palatine, who is reminded to care well for divine service and religious ceremonies.⁴⁹ He repeats this advice in his treatise for the Duke of Cleves, who should always consider that he has been created by God, to whom he owes everything. Therefore, he should employ the best singers, who praise the Lord with their sweet voices during holy service.⁵⁰ The focus of Petrus Antonius is therefore on church music rather than on issues of religious reform.

Aeneas Silvius is also concerned with the pious prince, who should 'not think that religion is subject to' him, but that he is 'subject to the authority of the priesthood in the things that belong to God', as is illustrated by the examples of Constantine and Theodosius.⁵¹ In the chapter on the Christian education of a prince, Aeneas does not mention the virtues but explains that a prince must know 'the Lord's Prayer, the Ave Maria, the Gospel of John, the Creed', as well as 'the names of the mortal sins, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, the Ten Commandments, the Works of Mercy, and finally the way of saving the soul and leading it to heaven'. The reason is that 'after this life there is another which is joyful and sweet for the good, bitter and full of trouble for the evil.' This intention to prevent a prince from oppressing the church and to teach him the elementary knowledge necessary for a Christian life is similar to that of the vernacular mirrors, as is the admonition to mind eternity. Nevertheless, there is a certain difference in the way of argumentation, because Aeneas refers to Socrates and Cicero as authorities for the Christian belief of the 'two courses for souls departing from the body' that 'not only the Sacred Books but also pagan literature' prove.⁵² This combination of Christian tradition and pagan literature is quite typical for early humanists. Aeneas may have taken inspiration from Leonardo Bruni's translation of St Basil's letter, which he explicitly cites in this paragraph.⁵³ Domenico de Domenichi presents another example of the humanist combination of traditional piety and classical literature, because he praised Frederic III for his pilgrimage to Jerusalem

⁴⁹ Petrus Antonius, *De dignitate*, p. 166.

⁵⁰ Petrus Antonius, *De virtutum civitate*, p. 239.

⁵¹ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 167.

⁵² Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 163.

⁵³ Cf. Hans Baron, *From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni: Studies in Humanistic and Political Literature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 160–61.

in 1436 in words borrowed from Juvenal.⁵⁴ While sharing the traditional conception of a pious prince, the Latin authors derive their arguments not from the discussion on religious reform, but from classical Latin texts that served as the focus of early humanism. Only at the end of the fifteenth century does the Latin-writing German author Jakob Wimpfeling express his concern about the reform of ecclesiastical institutions such as dome chapters.⁵⁵ As examples of pious princes he cites, in accordance with the vernacular tradition, the German king Henry II, but also, like the Italian humanist Aeneas, the Roman emperors Constantine and Theodosius.⁵⁶

IV. The Princely Virtue of Wisdom

Wisdom had taken a prominent place among princely virtues since Carolingian times.⁵⁷ Mirrors for princes in fifteenth-century Germany also treat this virtue differently. For the Latin authors, princely wisdom guarantees good rule. Petrus Antonius refers to this concept, speaking of *prudencia*,⁵⁸ which is to be gained in the *studiis scientie*.⁵⁹ His understanding of *prudencia* seems to come close to the concept of *sapientia* of Aeneas Silvius.⁶⁰ For this author, studying the litterae is the condition for being a sapiens prince, and only such a prince may aptly rule.⁶¹ The princely virtue of prudence or wisdom is thus connected to learning and education. Especially the *studia humanitatis*, that is, the study of poetry, history, and rhetoric,

⁵⁴ Domenico de Domenichi, *Prinzenspiegel*, p. 58.

⁵⁵ Jakob Wimpfeling, *Agatharchia*, pp. 239 and 243.

⁵⁶ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 107; Jakob Wimpfeling, *Agatharchia*, pp. 231 and 244.

⁵⁷ Hans H. Anton, *Fürstenspiegel und Herrscherethos in der Karolingerzeit* (Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1968), pp. 254–56; Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña, 'Rex scholaribus impendebant: The King's Image as Patron of Learning in Thirteenth-Century French and Spanish Chronicles; A Comparative Approach', *Medieval History Journal*, 5 (2002), 21–36 (pp. 22–23); Karl Ubl, *Engelbert von Admont: Ein Gelehrter im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus und christlicher Überlieferung* (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2000), p. 62.

⁵⁸ Petrus Antonius, *De dignitate*, pp. 164 and 185; cf. pp. 199, 202, and 208.

⁵⁹ Petrus Antonius, *De virtutum civitate*, pp. 230–31; *De conservacione*, p. 199.

⁶⁰ Aeneas Silvius, *Über Lesen und Bildung*, p. 227.

⁶¹ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 126.

will foster princely wisdom.⁶² Aeneas even explicitly defends the study of poetry against theologians, who fear such study might 'corrupt the holy morals of Germany'.⁶³ Refuting this reproach, Aeneas cites widely accepted authorities like Plato and Cicero and, furthermore, the apostle Paul and the church father Jerome, who combined poetry with Christianity.⁶⁴ Poems written about carnal love and vices should however not be given to the young prince. Nevertheless, Aeneas explains, again citing Basil's letter, that whenever poets 'recount the words or deeds of outstanding men' the prince 'ought to be moved and inspired with his whole mind, and should strive to be as far as possible like them'.⁶⁵ Following this moral principle, he excludes poets like Propertius and Catullus from the list of books for the prince, while strongly recommending Virgil.⁶⁶

History, the *magistra vitae*, is especially useful for a wise prince, because historical texts can give examples of how to seek good and avoid evil.⁶⁷ This idea, which is central to the humanistic theory of history, is also found in Petrus Antonius, in the *Prinzenspiegel* of Domenico, and in Wimpfeling's *Agatharchia*.⁶⁸ While only the German humanist takes medieval kings and authors into consideration, Petrus describes in detail the historical knowledge of the ideal

⁶² Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 221; Buck, 'Der italienische Humanismus', pp. 15–16; Eckhard Kessler, 'Die Pädagogik der italienischen Humanisten im Kontext des späten Mittelalters', in *Lebenslehren und Weltentwürfe* (see n. 28, above), pp. 160–80 (p. 172); Ubaldo Pizzani, 'Discipline letterarie e discipline scientifiche nel *De liberorum Educatione* di Enea Silvio Piccolomini', in *Pio II e la cultura del suo tempo*, ed. by Luisa Rotondi Secchi Tarugi (Milan: Guerini, 1991), pp. 313–27.

⁶³ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 209.

⁶⁴ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, pp. 211–19.

⁶⁵ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 217.

⁶⁶ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, pp. 221–23; similarly: *Über Lesen und Bildung*, pp. 229–30. Cf. Albert R. Baca, 'The Educational Theory of Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini', in *Acta conventus neo-latini Turonensis: Troisième congrès international d'études néo-latines*, ed. by Jean-Claude Margolin (Paris: Vrin, 1980), pp. 369–76 (p. 371).

⁶⁷ Rüdiger Landfester, *Historia magistra vitae: Untersuchungen zur humanistischen Geschichtstheorie des 14. bis 16. Jahrhunderts* (Geneva: Droz, 1972), p. 57; Rainer A. Müller, 'Historia als Regentenhilfe: Geschichte als Bildungsfach in den Fürstenspiegeln des Konfessionellen Zeitalters', in *Les princes et l'histoire du XIV^e au XVIII^e siècle*, ed. by Werner Paravicini and others (Bonn: Bouvier, 1998), pp. 373–99.

⁶⁸ Petrus Antonius, *De dignitate*, p. 171; Domenico de Domenichi, *Prinzenspiegel*, p. 61; Jakob Wimpfeling, *Agatharchia*, pp. 235 and 240.

prince, ranging from the times of the Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans to the first foundations of kingdoms by the Lombards. The ideal prince who is able to connect his knowledge of ancient (but not medieval) times with the present will care better for the future than those who only have their personal experience to draw upon.⁶⁹ Likewise, Aeneas Silvius believes that only the works of classical Latin authors such as Livy or Sallust have useful lessons to offer, but not the medieval chronicles of Hungary or Bohemia.⁷⁰ The extension of personal experience with ancient rather than medieval history is another important aspect of the humanistic concept of a wise prince.⁷¹

According to our Latin authors, a prince should not only study classical poetry and history in order to prove his wisdom, but also master rhetoric.⁷² For Petrus Antonius, a wise ruler must be *eloquentissimus*.⁷³ In his *De virtutum civitate*, the humanist enhances the rhetorical abilities of the ideal prince, John of Cleves, describing how he held a speech before a battle in front of his soldiers and emphasized the justice of their cause and the depravity of the enemy, in accordance with rhetorical theory.⁷⁴ Though Aeneas admittedly states some limitations, especially for a young prince, who should never speak without thinking or be loquacious,⁷⁵ his judgement of eloquence and rhetoric is surely not quasi

⁶⁹ See Petrus Antonius, *De virtutum civitate*, pp. 231–34; cf. Aeneas Silvius, *Über Lesen und Bildung*, p. 229; Keßler, 'Die Pädagogik', p. 170.

⁷⁰ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 225.

⁷¹ Cf. István P. Bejczy, *Erasmus and the Middle Ages: The Historical Consciousness of a Christian Humanist* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 14–16.

⁷² Buck, 'Der italienische Humanismus', p. 2; David Robey, 'Humanism and Education in the Early Quattrocento: The *De ingenuis moribus* of P. P. Vergerio', *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 152 (1980), 27–58 (p. 31); Johannes Helmrath, 'Rhetorik und "Akademisierung" auf den deutschen Reichstagen im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert', in *Im Spannungsfeld von Recht und Ritual: Soziale Kommunikation in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit*, ed. by Heinz Duchhardt and Gert Melville (Cologne: Böhlau, 1997), pp. 423–46 (p. 427); Edward P. Mahoney, 'From the Medievals to the Early Moderns: Themes and Problems in Renaissance Political Thought', in *Les philosophies morales et politiques au moyen âge*, ed. by B. Carlos Bazán and others, 3 vols (New York: Legas, 1995), I, 193–225 (p. 194).

⁷³ Petrus Antonius, *De dignitate*, p. 155.

⁷⁴ Petrus Antonius, *De virtutum civitate*, p. 245–46. See Björn Hambsch, 'Feldherrnrede', in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* (see n. 1, above), III (1996), 225–38 (pp. 226 and 230); Norbert Ohler, *Krieg und Frieden im Mittelalter* (Munich: Beck, 1997), pp. 253–55.

⁷⁵ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, pp. 173–77.

deprimente, as Pizzani thought.⁷⁶ He emphasizes that ‘those who excel others in the art of speaking procure the greatest praise for themselves’. Eloquence ‘was the one art that gave Ulysses, though unwarlike, mastery over the combative Ajax. For after Achilles was slain, it was not the strong arm but the flowery tongue that carried off his weapons.’⁷⁷ Rhetoric is obviously quite useful in a conflict, and, therefore, a wise ruler should exercise his faculty of speech from his childhood on. He must train his voice to overcome his ‘contemporaries in beauty and gravity of speech’. Then he will ‘emerge the victor both in this and in every praiseworthy endeavor’.⁷⁸ In addition, a prince should gain knowledge of Latin and of all the languages of his subjects. Only then will he be able to talk personally with the people about confidential issues, thus gaining their sympathy. The prince who does not speak for himself during an audience is more like a subject than like a king.⁷⁹ Wimpfeling likewise favours the study of eloquence and recommends the lecture of Aeneas’s *De liberorum educatione*.⁸⁰ According to all the Latin authors, the study of rhetoric, history, and poetry should lead the prince to wisdom and make him a good ruler who knows the moral examples from the Latin poets, learns lessons for the future from Roman historians, and wins his subjects for his aims by aid of classical rhetoric. The concept of wisdom in the Latin texts is obviously derived from the *studia humanitatis* that lay at the basis of early humanism.

The vernacular mirrors, on the other hand, display a different notion of wisdom, influenced by theological concepts and by their different attitude toward the role of the studies. The *Buch der Angeltugenden* defines wisdom as the ability to distinguish between the good and the bad, and, in accordance with the Italian humanists, as the guarantee of good rule.⁸¹ The same virtue is of crucial importance for Michel Beheim, who, however, sees the roots of wisdom in the fear of God rather than in learning and education.⁸² The *Fürstenregel* agrees with this conception and in the chapter ‘on the prince’s wisdom’, values only the study of

⁷⁶ Pizzani, ‘Discipline letterarie’, p. 325.

⁷⁷ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 173.

⁷⁸ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 177.

⁷⁹ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 171.

⁸⁰ Jakob Wimpfeling, *Agatharchia*, pp. 236–37 and 240.

⁸¹ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 149.

⁸² Michel Beheim, *Wie ain kung regiren sol*, pp. 600–01.

history, because of its use for the prince's future reign.⁸³ Johannes Rothuet likewise underlines the importance of history in his *Fürstenlehre* and insists that the prince should notably study the deeds of his ancestors⁸⁴ — which implies that he should study the recent (medieval) rather than the ancient past. Poetry, which Aeneas defended against theologians, is condemned, because it is through listening to the advice of priests and their sermons, not through tales read at a courtly dinner, that the prince can gain wisdom.⁸⁵ The short 'treatise on reading' that follows in some manuscripts of the *Fürstenspiegelkompilation* deals exclusively with the reading of the Holy Scriptures.⁸⁶ By contrast, the *Buch der Angeltugenden* stresses the importance of wisdom for a prince under reference to ancient philosophers like Aristotle and Plato. Moreover, the emperor Theodosius is mentioned as an example of a wise prince, because he fought during the day and read as much as possible — especially Roman law — during the night. Nevertheless, the Bible is still the most important work used in this text. Citing the Old Testament, the author says that a prince 'should read it every day of his life to fear God and know his commandments'.⁸⁷

While historical books seem acceptable for a wise prince in the vernacular texts, the reading of poetry is not, and neither is the study of eloquence. The *Buch der Angeltugenden* discusses the prince's speech in the chapter on wisdom and states that a prince must always speak carefully and make his speech short. Wisdom must temper the prince's speech, because every word that is spoken without care and purpose must be accounted for at the Last Judgement. The *Secretum secretorum* is cited to warn the prince not to speak a lot or associate with his subjects, especially with the common people, since this would endanger the royal dignity.⁸⁸ This restrictive view of the prince's eloquence is repeated in the *Fürstenlehre* of Johannes Rothuet, who explains that 'people should always long

⁸³ Michel Beheim, *Wie ain kung regiren sol*, p. 83.

⁸⁴ Landfester, *Historia magistra vitae*, p. 59; Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, pp. 91 and 103.

⁸⁵ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, pp. 83 and 90; see also pp. 95 and 154.

⁸⁶ Gabriela Signori, 'Schädliche Geschichte(n)? Bücher, Macht und Moral aus dem Blickwinkel spätmittelalterlicher Fürstenspiegel', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 275 (2002), 593–623 (pp. 622–23).

⁸⁷ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 150.

⁸⁸ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, pp. 150–53.

for royal words and never get enough of them'.⁸⁹ The *Tugendregel* describes how a wise prince should communicate during an audience, namely, through interpreters who are informed about foreign customs and are able to speak foreign languages. Communication in general should not be practiced in rhetorical speech but in written letters.⁹⁰ The *Fürstenregel*, though sharing the concept of a wise prince who does not say much, gives at least the advice to speak without screaming and articulate clearly.⁹¹ All vernacular authors borrow the sections against princely loquacity from their source, the *Secretum secretorum*, while omitting passages which would provide arguments for an eloquent king.⁹² Consequently, these sources do not share the enthusiasm for princely eloquence that Italian humanists tried to establish in fifteenth-century Germany.⁹³ They are, rather, concerned about the dignity of a prince who speaks directly to his subjects, which is exactly what Aeneas Silvius recommends as a way of gaining popular sympathy. Though vernacular as well as Latin mirrors for princes see in a wise prince the condition of good rule, they diverge in their concept of wisdom. For the vernacular authors, who are obviously influenced by theological ideas, wisdom is not mainly a result of study. They explicitly reject poetry and think only history appropriate for a wise prince. The most important reading, however, is the Bible, because it inspires fear of God and hence leads to wisdom.

V. The Princely Virtue of Temperance

Italian humanism and religious reform influenced not only the discussion of piety and wisdom, but also the treatment of temperance, which had been counted as a princely virtue since Merovingian times.⁹⁴ Alluding to the Aristotelian conception of virtue as a middle ground between two vices, Thomas Aquinas argued that

⁸⁹ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 103.

⁹⁰ Bartl, *Der Tugend Regel*, pp. 432 and 426; cf. Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 91.

⁹¹ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 92.

⁹² *Secretum secretorum*, p. 34.

⁹³ See also *Wie man sein Königreich bewahren soll*, in Fichart, 'Altdeutsche Lieder', p. 320.

⁹⁴ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 163; Hans-Werner Goetz, 'Selbstdisziplin als mittelalterliche Herrschertugend', in *Disziplinierung im Alltag des Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by the Institut für Realienkunde des Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), pp. 27–56 (pp. 43–44).

temperance, as a *virtus generalis*, encourages man to seek the golden mean in everything. As a *virtus specialis*, however, it concerned the moderation of the sense of touch, that is, of food, drink, and sexual pleasure, in accordance with Aristotle's conception of temperance. The fifteenth-century mirrors generally discuss temperance in the second sense.⁹⁵ The *Buch der Angeltugenden* says that 'the temperate man has no desire for more food or drink than nature requires'.⁹⁶ He takes neither too much nor too little and does not live to eat and drink, but eats and drinks to live. The author adds an anecdote (probably borrowed from Thomas Aquinas)⁹⁷ about Philosenus of Erixius who wished to have a crane's throat so as to enjoy the taste of food for a longer time. He explains that men like Philosenus have a wrong idea of happiness, which consists in 'the unification with God'. Hence, gluttony is actually due to a false concept of Christian life. In addition, the author warns the prince not to drink too much, because it will damage his memory and make him prone to sin. Under reference to Aristotle, the author warns that a drunk man can easily be tempted, but not a sober person. Many kings neglected this advice, such as Holofernes, who was killed after having drunk too much wine. As this use of a biblical example illustrates, the *Buch* deals with temperance in a theological context of sin and salvation: 'In the same way that intemperance in eating, drinking, and sexuality is a pleasure for the devil, the virtue of temperance makes the evil sad.'⁹⁸ The destiny of an intemperate person is, consequently, hell, which is described in the treatise as a place full of darkness, fear, and the screaming and crying of the desperate.⁹⁹

Discussing the virtue of temperance, the vernacular sources also take the prince's sexuality into account.¹⁰⁰ Citing the restrictive view of the *Secretum* almost literally, the *Fürstenlehre* warns the prince to avoid fornication, which is a habit of swine causing destruction of the body, the shortening of life, and

⁹⁵ On the temperance of the prince's counsellors rather than the prince himself: Michel Beheim, *Wie ain kung regiren sol*, p. 605.

⁹⁶ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 162–63; likewise *Wie man sein Königreich bewahren soll*, in Fichart, 'Altdeutsche Lieder', p. 318.

⁹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, 3.20, in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882–), XLVII, 184.

⁹⁸ *Buch von den vier Angeltugenden*, p. 164: 'Und zu gleicher weis als unmässigkeit in essen und in trincken und unschkeuschait den tewfelerfrewt, also die tugend mässigkeit bekümert den pösen.'

⁹⁹ *Buch von den vier Angeltugenden*, p. 167.

¹⁰⁰ *Wie man sein Königreich bewahren soll*, in Fichart, 'Altdeutsche Lieder', p. 321.

effemination.¹⁰¹ The *Fürstenregel* shares this concern and argues moreover that lust ‘takes one from God to the voluptuousness of the world’.¹⁰² Likewise using religious terms in the discussion of sexuality, the *Buch der Angeltugenden* describes sexual intemperance as a kind of blindness that affected Samson, David, and Salomon, all figures of the Old Testament.¹⁰³ In fact, the exposition on temperance in the *Buch* rests entirely on religious thinking. Every Christian should follow the example of Christ, who was the epitome of temperance. Moreover, a temperate life must be the destiny of humanity after the loss of Paradise and its pleasures. Interestingly enough, the moderation of speech forms part of such a life, because ‘in society, the temperate is a man of few words’.¹⁰⁴ Consequently, temperance as a specific virtue comprises not only the moderation of eating, drinking, and sexuality, but also of speech, in accordance with the *Buch*’s conception of wisdom. Generally, the vernacular treatises discuss the princely virtue of temperance as much in the light of theological concepts as the virtues of piety and wisdom.

The approach of the Latin authors is different. In his *De virtutum civitate*, Petrus Antonius defines temperance only as a general virtue, explaining that it supports the intellect of a prince and subdues his passions.¹⁰⁵ Aeneas Silvius also deals with temperance as a specific virtue, especially related to the moderation of eating and drinking. He warns the prince to avoid too much food, citing the same example of the person who longed for a crane’s throat as does the *Buch der Angeltugenden*.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, he states that many people would live to eat and drink, but should rather eat and drink to live. A sort of common ground with the vernacular mirrors becomes thus apparent, but the theological frame of thought is absent. Instead of being referred to sin and salvation, temperance in eating is

¹⁰¹ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 102.

¹⁰² Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 93: ‘zeucht von got und naigt zu aller werltlicher üppigkait.’

¹⁰³ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 163.

¹⁰⁴ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 165: ‘Der mässig man ist in gesellschaft [...] lüczel wort.’

¹⁰⁵ Petrus Antonius, *De virtutum civitate*, pp. 249–50. Without any details in Petrus Antonius, *De dignitate*, pp. 161 and 170.

¹⁰⁶ The name of this person, however, is Sardanapalus, who was an Assyric king. This variation of Thomas Aquinas’s sentence can also be found in John de Marignolis, *Kronika Marignolova*, ed. by Josef Emler, *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum*, 3 (Prague: Dattel, 1882), pp. 492–602 (p. 518) — perhaps one of the medieval Bohemian historians Aeneas criticized.

discussed in terms of national characteristics, a typical humanist preoccupation.¹⁰⁷ The risks of being intemperate in eating are greater in Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia, because nothing 'in these regions [...] is more trumpeted than culinary luxury and the glory of sumptuous dining'. However, Aeneas concedes that 'the table should be regulated one way in Italy, where the heat kills hunger, but otherwise in Germany, where the cold arouses the appetite'.¹⁰⁸ The inclination to intemperance is, consequently, due to different climates and national habits rather than to a false conception of a Christian life, as in the vernacular texts.

The different approach of the humanists also makes itself felt in their choice of models of temperance. Aeneas Silvius drew his examples from Roman history, not from the Bible, and cites even the German king of 1450, Frederic III, as a pattern of sobriety.¹⁰⁹ This humanistic custom of exemplifying abstract moral principles in contemporaries is absent from the vernacular sources.¹¹⁰ It can also be found in Wimpfeling's *Agatharchia*, but not in the chapter on temperance, where classical and biblical examples prevail.¹¹¹ Domenico refers exclusively to Frederic III as an example of temperance, especially in the consumption of wine.¹¹² His son Maximilian I should emulate him, because a prince who serves primarily his stomach is a pleasure to Cloto and Lachesis, the Fates. While the authors of the vernacular mirrors remind the princes that intemperance is a pleasure for the devil, most of the Latin texts uphold the ideal of a temperate prince under reference to classical literature or contemporaries. The differences with the vernacular texts become especially clear in Aeneas Silvius's plea for temperance in drinking. Again alluding to national differences, he says that a prince 'must be fortified against the evil influence of wine, not by avoidance as the Egyptians do, nor by swilling as the Bohemians prefer', but by moderation in use. Even banquets which take place in the prince's presence should be regulated

¹⁰⁷ See Herfried Münkler, 'Die politischen Ideen des Humanismus', in *Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen*, ed. by Iring Fetscher and Herfried Münkler, 5 vols (München: Piper, 1985–93), II, 553–613 (pp. 580–88).

¹⁰⁸ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, pp. 145–49.

¹⁰⁹ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 147.

¹¹⁰ John M. McManamon, *Funeral Oratory and the Cultural Ideals of Italian Humanism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 2–4.

¹¹¹ Jakob Wimpfeling, *Agatharchia*, pp. 232 and 236–37.

¹¹² Domenico de Domenichi, *Prinzenspiegel*, pp. 58–60; cf. Karl-Friedrich Krieger, 'Der Hof Kaiser Friedrichs III. — von außen gesehen', in *Deutscher Königs Hof, Hoftag und Reichstag im späteren Mittelalter*, ed. by Peter Moraw (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2002), pp. 167–90 (pp. 170–71).

by the rules of temperance; however, 'let there be no sadness nor gloomy countenances, but let laughter at times also be present.'¹¹³ Aeneas explains that Christ, who is said to have never laughed, cannot be an example for the prince in this particular context, since Christ was not acting as a human being. By contrast, vernacular mirrors that see the best example for temperance in Christ consider laughing a sign of weakness which princes should avoid.¹¹⁴ The Latin mirrors do not treat the prince's sexuality in detail. While Petrus Antonius omits the topic completely, Aeneas claims that his reader, Ladislaus of Hungary, is too young to be taught about the dangers of love.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, the exclusion of erotic poetry from his list of recommendable books betrays a concern for the moderation of the prince's sexuality. Domenico briefly warns the prince about Venus, who poses the same dangers as Bacchus: weakening men and shortening their lives.¹¹⁶ The vernacular texts make the same point, although they never speak of Venus but explicitly mention *unkeusch*, that is, lust, and its consequences for salvation. Closer to the vernacular treatises is Wimpfeling, who again cites the examples of Samson, David, and Salomon, and warns that a prince becomes impious if he does not temper his desire for sex.¹¹⁷ In sum, vernacular and Latin texts share the idea of a prince who moderates his desire for food, drink, and sex. The humanistic background of the Latin authors, however, makes the majority of them use different concepts and examples in order to advocate this virtue. Moreover, they do not deal with the moderation of speech in this context and show a less rigid view on the prince's laughter.

VI. Conclusion

Vernacular and Latin mirrors for princes written in fifteenth-century Germany treat the princely virtues of piety, wisdom, and temperance in quite different ways. In accordance with the theology of piety, vernacular authors introduced the idea of a pious prince who regularly attended Mass, listened attentively to the prayers during the Eucharist, and confessed frequently. Wisdom, in their conception, had

¹¹³ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, pp. 151–53.

¹¹⁴ Brinkhus, *Eine bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation*, p. 94; Bartl, *Der Tugend Regel*, p. 432; cf. Goetz, 'Selbstdisziplin', p. 47.

¹¹⁵ Aeneas Silvius, *De liberorum educatione*, p. 149.

¹¹⁶ Domenico de Domenichi, *Prinzenspiegel*, p. 59.

¹¹⁷ Jakob Wimpfeling, *Agatharchia*, p. 232.

its basis in the fear of God and was fostered through listening to priests and reading the Bible; the study of history could help to gain wisdom, but rhetoric was regarded with distrust. The moderation of sex, food, and drink as required by temperance are religiously motivated in the vernacular texts. The Latin mirrors composed by Italian humanists adhered to the idea of a pious, wise, and temperate prince, but the authors took their arguments and examples primarily from classical Latin authors, even when discussing piety. Unconcerned with confession and the Eucharist, they discussed piety on a smaller basis than the vernacular authors; apparently reluctant to talk about sexual matters, they limited temperance to moderation in food and drink, or to the principle of moderation in general. However, the most notable change is found in the early humanists' concept of wisdom. Not the fear of God but the study of the Roman historians, orators, and poetry would produce a wise and eloquent prince. Even Jakob Wimpfeling, who discussed piety and temperance in a way rather typical for the vernacular texts, shared this new conception. The humanist ideas on wisdom may even have had an impact on the actual conduct of fifteenth-century emperors. While Frederic III was only interested in history and spoke very little,¹¹⁸ his son Maximilian I, educated with the help of the *De liberorum educatione*, favoured poetry and inspired a golden age of humanistic speech in Germany.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Alphons Lhotsky, 'Die Bibliothek Kaiser Friedrichs III', *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 58 (1950), 124–35 (p. 134); Karl-Friedrich Krieger, *Die Habsburger im Mittelalter: Von Rudolf I. bis Friedrich III.* (Stuttgart: Urban, 1994), p. 170.

¹¹⁹ Helmuth, 'Rhetorik', p. 440; Dieter Mertens, 'Rede als institutionalisierte Kommunikation im Zeitalter des Humanismus', in *Im Spannungsfeld von Recht und Ritual* (see n. 72, above), pp. 401–21 (p. 418).

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INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS

Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale, 226:
14n; 232: 19n

Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.I.14: 84n

Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Cod. lat. 943: 205n

Besançon, Bibliothèque municipale, 434:
53n

Bologna, Biblioteca universitaria, 1625: 77–
78nn, 80–82nn, 84n, 87n, 92n, 94–
95nn, 97n

Bruges, Grootseminarie, 406: 12n

Brussels, Koninklijke Bibliotheek / Biblio-
thèque royale, 5614–16: 52n, 60n, 64n

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San Marco 452: 84n, 92n

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Conventi soppressi E.VI.1046: 17n

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Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Haenel 3472:
245n

Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf.:
80n, 89–90nn, 92n, 94n, 96n

Modena, Biblioteca Nazionale Estense, α .
W. 2.15: 238, 241n, 242, 243–48nn,
252–57nn; α . W. 6.6: 238n

Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm
11478: 205n; Clm 14347: 205n, 210n,
212–14nn

Oxford, Bodleian Library, Bodley 58: 141n;
Hatton 105: 141n

Padua, Biblioteca civica, C.M. 604: 239n

Padua, Biblioteca universitaria, 853: 16n

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat.
3150: 18n, 30n; lat. 7357: 245n; lat.
10633: 12n; lat. 14556: 13–14nn; lat.
14886: 14n; lat. 15970: 16n; lat. 16089:
77–78nn, 80–82nn, 84n, 87–89nn, 92–
95nn, 97n

Prague, Metropolitan Chapter Library, G
XII (1003): 205n

Ravenna, Biblioteca Classense, Cl. n. 302:
238–39

Stuttgart, Württembergische Landesbiblio-
thek, HB.X.28: 84n, 92n

Trier, Stadtbibliothek, 535: 16n

Valencia, Biblioteca universitaria, 1764: 52n

Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana,
Pal. lat. 725: 205n; Pal. lat. 1030: 84n,
92n; Vat. lat. 811: 52–53; Vat. lat. 832:
84n

Vendôme, Bibliothèque municipale, 148:
12n, 14n

Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat.
VI.94 (2492): 84n, 92n; lat. VI.156
(2672): 245n

Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek,
1589: 16–17nn

INDEX OF NAMES AND ANONYMOUS WORKS

This index does not cover the footnotes and the tables on pp. 160–76

- Adam: 60
 Adrian V: 132
 Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (Pius II): 7, 260, 263, 268–75, 277–79
 Aesopus: 230
 Afonso IV of Portugal: 113, 119
 Alan of Lille: 13, 15–16, 19
 Albert of Bavaria-Munich: 262
 Albert the Great: 5, 16, 19–20, 31, 77, 86–90, 92–93
 Alexander the Great: 62–63, 144, 146, 150, 257
 Alexander of Hales (Pseudo-): 25
 Alfonso I of Aragón: 38
 Alfonso II of Asturias: 35
 Alfonso VI of León-Castile: 33, 36–39
 Alfonso VII of León-Castile: 34, 39–40
 Alfonso VIII of León-Castile: 34, 43–46
 Alfonso IX of León-Castile: 42, 45
 Alfonso X of León-Castile: 34, 43, 47–50, 103, 106–07, 111–12, 116
 Alfonso XI of León-Castile: 112–16, 118–19
 Álvaro Fáñez: 40
 Álvaro Pelayo: 5, 103, 112–20
 Andronicus of Rhodes (Pseudo-): 27, 254
 Anonymous of Milan (commentator of Aristotle's *Politics*): 5, 80, 87, 89–90, 96
 Antilogus: 145
 Antonio da Conti: 264
 Arispus: 145
 Aristotle: 3–6, 9–10, 18–19, 24, 26–28, 30–32, 56, 70, 74–98, 124–25, 127–29, 133, 135, 137–38, 177, 192, 194, 202, 206, 208, 211, 216, 228–30, 232, 234–35, 240, 243–44, 251, 255, 257, 261, 274–76
 Arnaldo of Astorga: 39
 Augustine: 10, 15–16, 22, 56, 67, 102, 153, 157, 179, 199, 209
 Augustus (Octavian): 58, 149
 Bachus: 279
 Bartl, Annemarie: 262
 Basil of Caesarea: 269, 271
Bayerische Fürstenspiegelkompilation: 262, 267–68, 274

- Baxter, Kenneth: 43
 Bejczy, István P.: 4, 7
 Benedict XII: 119
 Berenguele of León-Castile: 42
 Berges, Wilhelm: 100, 102–03
 Bernard of Clairvaux: 56–57, 67
 Bernard of Sédillac: 36
Bocadas de oro: 100
 Boethius: 50
 Bonaventure: 29–30, 207, 216
 Borso of Este: 239–41, 243–49, 253–54, 256–58
 Brinkhus, Gerd: 262
 Brunetto Latini: 198
Buch von den vier Angeltugenden: 262, 273–74, 276–77

 Carneades: 150
 Cassiodorus: 113
Castigos: 120
 Cato: 230
 Catullus: 271
 Charlemagne: 39–40
 Charles VI of France: 219, 224, 227, 233
 Charles VII of France: 219
 Charles the Bold: 264
 Christine de Pizan: 183, 198
Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris: 39–40
Chronica Naierensis: 41
 Cicero: 56, 142, 208–09, 212, 215, 227, 254, 269, 271
 Cid, the (Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar): 37–38
 Cloto: 278
 Codrus: 154–56
 Constantine the Great: 269–70
Crónica general de España: 48
 Cyprian: 67

 Damocles: 150
 Dante Alighieri: 5, 123–38, 180
 David: 277, 279
 Davis, Charles T.: 125
 De Castro, Manuel: 103
De strenuitate regis: 104
 Dicineus (Gothic king): 44
 Diego Gelmírez: 38
 Dietrich Gresemund: 264
 Diogenes: 56
 Diomedes: 144, 158
 Dion Chrysostomus: 261
 Domenico de Domenichi: 264, 269, 271, 278–79
 Dondaine, Antoine: 52, 56

 Edward II of England: 191
 Edward III of England: 184, 187–88, 190, 192
 Eliodorus: 66
 Engelbert of Admont: 20–21, 27–28, 57
 Enrique de Tastámara: 119
 d'Entrevés, Alessandro P.: 126
 Ercole of Este: 248
L'estat et le gouvernement comme les princes et seigneurs se doivent gouverner: 6, 182, 191–98
 Eve: 60

 Falque, Emma: 42
 Ferdinand I of León-Castile: 36, 109, 111
 Ferdinand III of León-Castile: 41–44, 46, 48
 Fernando de la Cerda: 103, 107
 Ferrante, Joan M.: 126
 Ferster, Judith: 100–02, 112, 120
 Francesco Todeschini-Piccolomini: 260
 Frederic I, Count Palatinate: 264
 Frederic II of Germany: 41, 47, 49, 146

Frederic III of Germany: 239, 263, 269, 278, 280
 Frontinus: 104
Fuero juzgo: 34
Fürstenregel: 262, 273, 275, 277

 Galen: 116
General estoria: 48
 Gian Mario Filelfo: 263
 Gilbert of Tournai: 55, 102, 215
 Gilbert, Allen H.: 126–27
 Giles of Paris: 57
 Giles of Rome: 3, 6–7, 21–23, 27–28, 30–31, 57, 85, 100, 135, 181–82, 192, 208, 211, 215–16, 229–30, 240–41, 243–45, 247, 249–56, 258
 Gilson, Etienne: 125
 Ginzburg, Carlo: 97
 Giovanni Balbi: 17, 23
 Godfrey of Fontaines: 18
 González–Casanovas, Roberto: 49
 Graßnick, Ulrike: 203
 Gregory I the Great: 56, 67
 Gregory VII: 102
 Gregory IX: 41
 Guenée, Bernard: 3, 100

 Hamm, Berndt: 265
 Hedegård, Gösta: 143
 Henry II of Germany: 270
 Henry III of England: 189
 Henry of Ghent: 16, 23–24
 Henry of Langenstein: 268
 Henry of Rimini: 27–28, 57
 Herrmann, Erwin: 202, 205
 Hippocrates: 116
Historia augusta: 10
Historia compostellana: 37–38

Historia Roderici: 37
Historia silense: 36
 Hogg, James L.: 202
 Hohlstein, Michael: 6
 Holofernes: 276
 Homer: 244
 Horace: 56
 Hostiensis: 234
 Hubertus: 14
 Hugh of Saint-Cher: 16
 Hugh of Saint Victor: 213

 Innocent III: 12
 Isidore of Seville: 42–44, 214

 Jacobus de Cessolis: 6, 139–76
 Jakob Wimpfeling: 264, 270–71, 273, 278–80
 James (apostle): 38
 James of Viterbo: 113
 Jean d'Arsonval: 219
 Jean Cadart: 219
 Jean Gerson: 7, 219–36, 265
 Jerome: 56, 271
 Jerome of Périgord: 37
 Jezebel: 38
 Job: 62
 Johannes Hinderbach: 260
 Johannes Rothuet: 262, 265–67, 274
 Johannes Versor: 87, 91
 John XXII: 112–13, 119
 John Ball: 181
 John of Cleves: 264, 272
 John Fortescue: 198
 John of Salisbury: 23, 50, 102, 140, 180, 214, 249
 John of Wales: 6, 21, 56–57, 104, 113, 141–76

Juan of Soria: 41, 46–47
 Juan Gil de Zamora: 5, 102–12, 114, 119–21
 Juan Manuel of León-Castile: 118–19
 Julius Caesar: 245
 Justinian: 12
 Juvenal: 270

Kaeppli, Thomas: 52
 Kalning, Pamela: 6
 Kantorowicz, Ernst H.: 125–26
 Krynen, Jacques: 102–03

Lachesis: 278
 Ladislaus of Hungary: 262–63, 279
 Lambertini, Roberto: 249
 Laurent (author of *Somme le roi*): 229
 Leonardo Bruni: 269
 Leonello of Este: 240, 245–46, 248, 254
 Leonor de Guzmán: 118
Libro de las cruces: 48
 Linehan, Peter: 34, 36, 42–43
 Livy: 272
 Louis V, Count Palatinate: 264
 Louis IX of France: 55, 215
 Louis of Bavaria: 112–13
 Louis of Bavaria-Landshut: 262, 267
 Louis of France: 219, 222–25, 230
 Lucas of Tuy: 41–46, 50, 104–05
 Lucretia: 152–53, 155
 Lycurgus: 149

Machiavelli, Niccolò: 2, 42, 97, 194–95
 MacIntyre, Alasdair: 2
 Macrobius: 9–13, 21, 26, 28–32, 142, 152, 207–09, 254
 Manegold of Lautenbach: 11
 Maria of Portugal: 119
 Marsilius of Padua: 100, 113, 198

Martin of Braga: 56, 206, 229
 Martin Gosia: 12
 Martin of Troppau: 104
 Martin, Georges: 43
 Maximilian I of Germany: 260–61, 264, 278, 280
 Mazour-Matusevich, Yelena: 7
 McGinn, Bernard: 221
 Mehl, Jean-Michel: 140, 146
 Michael of Prague: 6, 202–17
 Michel Beheim: 262, 273
 Miro (Suebian king): 206, 229
Moralium dogma philosophorum: 55
 Munio Alfonso: 38, 40

Nederman, Cary J.: 6, 68, 100–02, 203
 Nicholas of Lyra: 229
 Nicholas of Waudemont: 91
 Niccolò of Este: 248
 Niccolò III of Este: 240, 248, 256
 Oliver (Charlemagne's peer): 40
 Origen: 29, 56

Paul (apostle): 55, 236, 271
 Pelayo of Oviedo: 36
 Pedro of León-Castile: 118–19
 Perillus: 144
 Peter Abelard: 12
 Peter of Auvergne: 5, 77–82, 87–89, 93–98
 Peter the Chanter: 12
 Peter Comestor: 66, 113
 Peter Lombard: 15, 55
 Petrus Antonius de Clapis: 263, 268–72, 277, 279
 Philip II of France: 229
 Philip IV of France: 229
 Philip the Chancellor: 23–24, 55

- Philosenus of Erixius: 276
 Picascia, Maria Luisa: 225
 Pisistratus: 144
 Pizzani, Ubaldo: 273
 Plato: 9, 31, 46, 50, 76, 157, 206, 236, 245–46, 253, 271, 274
 Plotinus: 9
 Pompey: 66
 Poncio de Cabrera: 40
 Propertius: 271
 Ptolemy of Lucca: 113
 Pyrrhus: 145, 152
- Quintilian: 10
- Raimund Lull: 16
 Recaredo (Visigothic king): 34
 Richard of Mediavilla: 27
 Roboam: 197
 Robert Grosseteste: 27
 Robert Kilwardby: 22–23, 30
 Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar: see Cid, the
 Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada: 41, 43–45, 47–48, 50, 104, 109
 Rodríguez de la Peña, Alejandro M.: 4
 Roger Bacon: 22
 Roland (Charlemagne's peer): 40
 Roland of Cremona: 22–23, 29
 Rueger, Zofia: 234
 Rupert II, Count Palatinate: 205–06, 208, 217
 Rupert III, Count Palatinate, King of Germany: 205–06, 208, 217
- Sallust: 272
 Salomon: 29, 46, 48, 222–23, 236, 277, 279
 Sampiro of Astorga: 36
 Samson: 277, 279
- Sancho II of León–Castile: 109, 111
 Sancho IV of León–Castile: 103–08, 110–12, 120
 Savonarola, Girolamo: 7, 237
 Savonarola, Michele: 7, 237–58
 Scipio: 144–45
 Scott, John A.: 124
Secretum secretorum: 194, 238, 261–62, 274–76
 Sedulius Scottus: 10
 Seneca: 56, 206, 208, 213, 215, 223, 227, 229–30
 Senellart, Michel: 97
 Servas Sanctus of Faenza: 16
Siete partidas: 48–49, 120
 Sigismondo of Este: 248
 Sigmund of Tyrol: 263
 Simon of Tournai: 14
 Singer, Bruno: 260–61, 263–64
 Skinner, Quentin: 100–02
 Socrates: 269
 Stark, Rodney: 198
 Stephen of Bourbon: 16
 Storey, William G.: 202, 204
 Strack, Georg A.: 7
 Suero of Zamora: 110
 Sullivan, Mary E.: 5
- Tang, Frank: 4–5
 Tello Téllez: 45
 Theodosius I: 269–70, 274
 Thomas Aquinas: 3, 5, 23, 25–28, 30, 52–53, 77, 81, 85–86, 90–91, 93, 95–98, 100, 113, 125, 127, 202, 208–12, 215–16, 228, 240, 244, 249–52, 254, 275–76
 Thomas of Ireland: 213, 216
 Tiberius: 145
 Took, John: 127

Toste, Marco: 5

Trajan: 134

Tugendregel: 262, 266, 275

Ullmann, Walter: 124, 137, 177

Urraca of León-Castile: 38–39, 109

Valerius Maximus: 140–41, 143, 151, 153

Vegetius: 104

Venus: 279

Verweij, Michiel: 4–5

Vetter, Ferdinand: 140

Vincent of Beauvais: 68, 140, 229, 249

Vincent of Beauvais (Pseudo-): 27

Vincentius Hispanus: 41

Virgil: 131, 244, 271

Wamba (Visigothic king): 34

Wie man sein Königreich bewahren soll: 263

William of Austria: 262

William of Auvergne: 25, 28

William of Auxerre: 15–16, 23–25, 55

William of Conches: 11

William Durand: 16

William of Moerbeke: 5, 93

William Ockham: 113

William of Pagula: 6, 182–92

William Peraldus: 5, 16, 28, 51–71, 114,
214–17, 229, 249

Williams, Steven J.: 3

Wilks, Michael J.: 115

Xerxes: 157–58

Zalmoxis (Gothic king): 44

Zeno: 128

Zeutas (Gothic king): 44

Zuccolin, Gabriella: 7

CONTRIBUTORS

István P. Bejczy was, until 2007, a senior researcher in the Department of History, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands, where he directed the research project *A Genealogy of Morals: The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages*. His books include *Erasmus and the Middle Ages: The Historical Consciousness of a Christian Humanist* (Leiden: Brill, 2001) and *La lettre du Prêtre Jean: Une utopie médiévale* (Paris: Imago, 2001). Together with Richard G. Newhauser, he edited *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

Michael Hohlstein was, until 2007, a postdoctoral fellow of the research project *A Genealogy of Morals: The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages* in the Department of History, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands. He is currently preparing a study on the cardinal virtues in fifteenth-century moral literature.

Pamela Kalning is a research fellow in the Department of German at the Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Germany, where she is working on the edition of the *Ritterspiegel* of Johannes Rothe. She is author of *Kriegslehren in deutschsprachigen Texten um 1400: Seffner, Rothe, Wittenwiler* (Münster: Waxmann, 2006).

Yelena Mazour-Matusevich is associate professor of French at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, United States. She is the author of *Le siècle d'or de la mystique française: Un autre regard; Etude de la littérature spirituelle de Jean Gerson (1363–1429) à Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (1450?–1537)* (Milan: Archè, 2004).

Cary J. Nederman is Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. He is the author/editor of fifteen books and a frequent contributor to journals in political science, history, and medieval studies. His most recent publications

include *John of Salisbury* (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2005) and *Talking Democracy: Historical Perspectives on Rhetoric and Democracy* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2005).

Manuel Alejandro Rodríguez de la Peña is assistant lecturer of medieval history at the Universidad San Pablo-CEU, Madrid, Spain. He is the author of *Los reyes sabios: Cultura y poder en la Antigüedad Tardía y la Alta Edad Media* (Madrid: Editorial Actas, 2007).

Georg A. Strack is a recipient of the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes scholarship and is preparing a doctoral thesis on Thomas Pirckheimer at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany.

Mary Elizabeth Sullivan holds a bachelor's degree in history and government from Georgetown University and is presently a doctoral student in political science at Texas A&M University. She is the author of several forthcoming articles on medieval political thought.

Frank Tang teaches history at a secondary school in Leiden, Netherlands. His specialization is medieval political thought and Spanish history. He is the author of *King, Sword and Morals: Kingship in the Mirrors of Princes from Castile-León, c. 1230–1350* (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, forthcoming).

Marco Toste is a Ph.D. student at the Université de Fribourg, Switzerland. For his dissertation, he is preparing a critical edition and an interpretative study of the *Quaestiones super libros Politicorum* of Peter of Auvergne.

Michiel Verweij is a keeper of manuscripts at the Koninklijke Bibliotheek/Bibliothèque Royale Albert I, Brussels, Belgium. He has written many books and articles on Renaissance humanism in the Low Countries. As a postdoctoral fellow of the the research project *A Genealogy of Morals: The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages* in the Department of History, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands, he investigated the manuscript tradition of William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus*.

Gabriella Zuccolin is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Università di Pavia, Italy. She wrote a doctoral thesis on Michele Savonarola and currently studies the spread of philosophical and scientific knowledge at North Italian courts in the fourteenth century.

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